ML033010575
| ML033010575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/2003 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB |
| To: | Scarola J Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-02-008 | |
| Download: ML033010575 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000400/2002008
Text
iR
EC4
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
0 {
o
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-31
Carolina Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. James Scarola
Vice President - Harris Plant
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. 0. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
lk4
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC SUPPLEMENTAL
INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/02-08
J
.
>I
Dear Mr. Scarola:
9
a9
This supplemental inspection was an examination of your proble h identification, root cause
evaluation, extent of condition determination, and corrective actions associated with a White
finding identified in the mitigating systems cornerstone. The White finding involved a violation
of your fire protection program resulting from a Thermo-Lag fire barrier assembly (wall) which
had an indeterminate fire resistance rating.
I
_'4"'ased on the results of the
ee-s_-L-r
For administrative purposes, a Severity Level IlIl violation associated with the Thermo-Lag fire
barrier assembly between the B train switchgear room/auxiliary control panel room and the A
train cable spreading room which was previously dispositioned in NRC's letter dated April 16,
2002, is identified in the enclosed report.
I
No findings of significance were identified during the inspection.
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.aov/readina-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
Charles R. Ogle, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No.: 50-400
License No.: NPF-63
Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/02-08
w/Attachment
cc w/encl:
Terry C.'Morton, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs
CPB 9
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Robert J. Duncan II
Director of Site Operations
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Benjamin C. Waldrep
Plant General Manager-Harris Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
James W. Holt, Manager
Support Services
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
(cc w/encl cont'd - See page 3)
3
(cc w/encl cont'd)
John R. Caves, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
William D. Johnson
Vice President & Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128
Beverly Hall, Acting Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environmental
Commerce & Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
Peggy Force
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Electronic Mail Distribution
.
.1
.. .
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. 0. Box 11 649
Columbia, SC 29211
Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
P. 0. Box 29510
Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
4326 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-4326
(cc w/encl cont'd - See page 4)
4
(cc w/encl cont'd)
Linda Coleman, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Wake County
P. O. Box 550
Raleigh, NC 27602
Gary Phillips, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Chatham County
Electronic Mail Distribution
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I I
O,
t
.
Docket No:
License No:
Report No:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-400
_
50-400/2002-08
Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562
V"-
nnng
-
_
c
CAL 4I.
A
R?02-
'
J. Lenahan, Senior Reactor Inspector
Charles R. Ogle, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000400-02-08; Carolina Power and Light Company; on65e21~2; Shearon Harris
Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Supplemental inspection of Thermo-Lag fire barrier with indeterminate
fire resistance rating.
This inspection was conducted by regional inspectors. A White finding, which was previously
dispositioned in an NRC letter dated April 16, 2002, is identified in this report for administrative
purposes. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,
Red) using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP
does not apply are indicated by "Green" or be assigned a severity level after management
review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power
reactors is described in NUREG-1 649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated Julyt
2000.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
( 0 A,77
The
uclear Requ
NRC3_performed t
supplemental inspection to
assess the licensee's
assoc ate with the Therm
Lag fire barrier s8parating Train-A
and Train B safoty related eables in the Auxiliary Control P
Inel
(ACP) room. The Thermo-Lag
barrier provided a fire resistance o n h
a
1 m
,
e
1
t
the minimum three-
hour fire resistance rating required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix
- This performance
issue was previously documented in NRC Inspection Report
5000/99-13 and later
tt J,
characterized as having low to moderate risk significance
ite) in an NRC letter dated
r' ,/vJ
April 16, 2002.
(3'
During this supplemental inspection, performed in accorda e with Inspection Procedure
(
95001, the inspectors determined that the licensee's pro em identification, root cause and
extent of condition evaluation were adequate. The lice see's corrective actions to resolve the
issues were ongoingtdapoarod to be adeguato.
owever, the inspectors identified that the
licensee intended to use local manual operator actions
lieu of protect ig Train A a,1J T.v11 B
cablcs in the new AGP room fire
eoa
as roquired Ly 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.The licensee
entered this issue into its corrective action program and resolution is pending.
As a result of this z
Tncem,
the white pen4Fnce issue associated with the Thermo-Lag fire
barrier willnot be closed at this time. The issue will remain open pending further NRC review of
the licensee's corrective actions associated with the use of loal ma operator actions in the
Ponnrt Dntgair
01
INSPECTION SCOPE
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C
mrnic2
ormed this supplemental inspection
to assess the licensee's evaluation assoc
d with
Thermo-Lag fire barriers
n
Train A ad Train Bafetv R
elatd
cables in the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP) room. The
JheroLgbrirddl
resistance -of ne hur an ;~1mjLS*,
rather 0-
.0 it;-
mminimum three-hour fire resistance rating required
50,Appendix R regaut22.
This performance issue was previously documented in NRC Inspection Report number
50-400/99-13 and later characterized as having low to moderate risk significance (White)
in an NRC letter dated April 16, 2002.
The inspectors assessed problem identification, the licensee's root cause and extent of
condition evaluation, and the licensee's corrective actions to solve the White finding in
their fire protection program. The inspectors reviewed desinge documents,
including design inputs, assumptions, and design evaluati
nsee self assessmer)
and changes to operating procedures, fire protection proceswes, and the safe shutd;Rn-
analysis. The inspector also examined in process plant modifications being performed on
02
EVALUATION OF INSPECTION REQUIREME
02.01 Problem Identification
a.
Determination of who identified the issue and un er what conditins-
During he 4
ire
protection inspectio ,
/
ucted fro
ember
1 -5, 1999, and documented in NRC Inspe
onport No. 0-400/99-13,
unresolved
items (URls) were identified by NRC inspe ors. One of th URls concerned the
adequacy of a Thermo-Lag wall whi
designated as
three-hour fire barrier
between the Train B switchgear ro m
d rain A safety elated cables routed in the
Auxiliary Control Pane
ron. Te
otential problm of using Thermo-Lag as a fire
barrier material was
entified to indu
y the NRC in 992 in Generic Letter (GL) 92-08
and NRC Bulletin 9201D Inr s s oNRC Bulletin 9 -01 and GL 92-08, the licensee
conducted testing o a mo k-up of
Thermo-Lag wa . This testing showed the barrier
failed fire endurance le-acceptance criteria at 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 8 minutes. The licensee then
performed an engineering evaluation which concluded the as-constructed Thermo-Lag
wa
_izci1M94retrelBFbrif
The licensee\\
initiated Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 99-006863 to document and disposition the
URI identified'/
b. Determination o h
n
the issue existed, and prior opportunities for identification
Hog
The degraded fires
installe during original plant construction. Prior2-08k
Y'
,
\\
opprtuntiesfar dentficaion
erersponse to NRC Bulletin 92-01 and GL 92-081t
t{
\\
gcensee actions to addres
esulted in the acceptance of an inadequate
Thermo-Lag fire barrier in 1997 (ESR 95-00620, Thermo-lag Fire Protection Issues
Resolution," Revision 1). There v
vcre b
Itl uppui luatics to find this prb~obe.The final
\\
ptv
fi<
r;ea
S
Cut
S
go
>Agokwiz
noie mddiat;E~.t998 triennial fire
otection Nuclear Assessment Section audit
iaspacte"
Sa O
f Ther-ghr
and included thereurdiepnrl
er}"'
performee y
s of the fire protection program
after 1 997, also head Ihu ieuppurtuliyt}fn the poeblem.
v
Determination of the plant-specific risk consequences (as applicable) and compliance
concerns associated with the issue
The degraded fire barrier was evaluated for a postulated fire in the B switchgear room than
_! -1Mki:Cagxfid
eaM*Q-d
cause the Thermo-Lag fire barrier wall in the ACP area of the
B switchgear room fire area to fail. Failure of this wall exposed Train A..cables, located
within the enclosed barrier area, to the postulatesfre. The Train A cables behind the
Thermo-Lag wall affected the Train
eayl
Gdwater function and the A steam
generator pressure operated relief vWe funcioPs. The NRC assessment concluded that
this event was in the increased regulatory response (White) band. The results of the
NRC's final significance determination for the degraded fire barrier were documented in
an NRC letter to CP&L dated April 16, 2002, Subject: Final Significance Determination For
a White Finding and Notice of Violation (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - NRC
Inspection Report 50-400/00-09).
02.02 Root Cause and Extent of Condition Evaluation
a.
Evaluation of methods used to identify root causes and contributing causes.
The licensee initiated a Significant Adverse Condition Report, Action Request number
53063, to evaluate and correct the problem associated with the Thermo-Lag wall. The
evaluation was performed using the systematic methods specified in the licensee's
corrective action program specified in CP&L procedure CAP-NGGC-0200. The licensee
concluded that the root cause of the White finding was. *
-inannrmwriate
'use of an
analysis to accept changes to the NRC approved fire
causes were inadequate testing of installed fire barriers..
evaluations, and failure to address design requirement:
b.
Level of detail of the root cause evaluation
The inspectors determined that the root cause evaluat
support the identified root and contributing causes. Ti
identify why the inadequate fire testing of the installed
or why there was too much reliance on GL 86-10 engi
cause), or why there was a failure to adequately addres
_..-:,..
(contributing cause). How
r
-
i
r"'it
.__t
... pg.
_
addiio' ln:t
"
"
- -
...
Ind
I-
A_,
,_v.^t
,,
q o o ,- J .___ _
AA4a"A%4*.
3
c.
Consideration of prior occurrences of the problem and knowledge of prior operating
experience
The licensee's investigation identified 218 matches from the INPO database including
GLs, NRC Bulletins and Information Notices, and LERs related to similar Thermo-Lag
issues at various nuclear power plants. The root cause evaluation found that the method
of resolution at HNP was unique from the others identified.
d.
Consideration of potential common causes and extent of condition of the problem
In late 2000, the NRC identified additional Thermo-Lag fire barriers in the cable
spreading rooms which did not meet the requirements for three-hour fire barriers.
Because fire suppression systems (sprinklers) existed in most of these areas, the
licensee was able to downgrade the barriers to a'one-hour fire rating and comply with
i
10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements. However, soMe areas did not have sufficient
spatial coverage by these sprinklers. The licensee also did not have sufficient test
data/documentation to adequately demonstrate that some as-built Thermo-Lag barrier
configurations in the cable spreading room provided a one-hour barrier. As a result, the
licensee has initiated a program to evaluate existing sprinkler coverage, install new
sprinklers as required, and test the existing barrier configurations to show they will meet
the one-hour requirement. These corrective actions are scheduled to be completed by
December 2002. The licensee performed a detailed self-assessment to examine the
overall fire protection program and compare it to applicable regulatory requirements,
(Appendix R, UFSAR, SERs, etc.) 'The evaluation portion of the assessment has been
completed. Numerous findings were identified. Examples of findings include: illegible
UFSAR drawings, typographical errors in the UFSAR, unclear statements In the UFSAR
and SERs, factual errors in the UFSAR (e.g., location of hose stations), and lack of test
documentation to demonstrate the mullians door frames and transoms over fire doors
meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements. Ti
.4 indingsar being ro'iowod to
detrmi a-howt
ripo UaAugust, 2002.
02.03 Corrective Actions
a.
Appropriateness of corrective action
The inspector determined that
licensee's corrective actions were dequate to res
the issue. Corrective action included modifying the ACP fire are
-for the-Thormeag-barior._
Th
_
_wouldb
d 1
by upgradin
n existing concrete wall
toa-free-hour fire barrier. Jign procedures were revis
to emphasize the
requirement
a dequate q lification testing be perfor ed prior to changing the
approved fire protection program. However, the insp
ors identified that the licensee
intended to use local manual operator actions'ie of protecting Train A and Train B
cables in the new ACP room fire area
licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as NCR 20020823, Fire
Protection Manual Action Discrepancies."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
5war <7=
11~~~~~~~~~~#?
4
As a resulef ie eeRewe, the White pe4oranoe issue associated with the Thermo-Lag
fire barrier will not be closed at this time. The issue will remain open pending further
NRC review of the licensee's corrective actions asoeiated wth II ie us of local mai Iuat
oporator Oatien9 in the netw A
rom fire area t aehove safe shutdown in-
the
ovilf x
b.
Pq`AtftW'o =etive actions °-
The inspector concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were properly prioritized to
address the risk. The changes to the ACP fire area were being worked concurrent with
completion of the engineering change. The inspectors revi we
emr
Change
(EC) 48802 to upgrade an existing concrete wall betweenW
g
m B and the
ACP room to a three-hour rated fire barrier. This work inc uded sealing the existing
penetrations in the wall. The above actionsZ sforted the ACP room into a new fire
area. The licensee has revised its fire
f?136, Safe Shutdown Following a Fire)
to address the newly created area
cludes the use of local manual operator
actions to achieve safe shutdown
ire scenarios in the new ACP room fire area.
As
dic..so abd "'xH
c.
Establishment of schedule for implementing and completing the corrective actions
The inspector verified that the Iiensee's corrective action program identified assigned
individuals, completion dates,
d reference numbers to the licensee's corrective action
tracking program to ensure t t corrective actions would be completed in accordance
with:their priority. Procedur changes to ensure that review criteria exist to ensure that
fire barrier modifications daSnot invalidate test results in the future was complete.
Although the EC for the
CP room had not been issued, the field work had been
-
perfoormed at risk and w s essentially completed prior to completion of the.EC Revews
of other fire barri
in progress, and initial walk dowrs were complete. Resolution
oter fire protection is
s
k*dtsce
ing prioritized based on risk.
b W
d.
Establishment of quantitative or qualitative measures of success for determining the
effectiveness of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence
The effectiveness of these measures will be determined through direct observation of the
completed modifications and changes to the fire protection program. The licensee has
scheduled an effectiveness review for July 2003.
The inspectors performed plant walk downs and conducted document reviews in
determining that the extent of condition for the Thermo-Lag wall issue included all
Thermo-Lag usage in the plant. Thermo-Lag usage in the plant included various
transoms and mullions on the 216', 236', 261', and 305' elevations of the reactor auxiliary
building and control building; and Thermo-Lag wall and tunnel assemblies in the A and B
cable spreading rooms, the B switchgear room and the ACP area. The problem with the
Thermo-Lag issue was related to the use of engineering evaluations for determining the
applicability of fire test results to qualify plant features as rated fire barriers. In the case
of the Thermo-Lag, a failed three-hour qualification fire test was used to accept Thermo-
Lag features by engineering evaluation as adequate for the hazard. The use of failed
tests for fire rating determination appears specific to the resolution of this Thermo-Lag
5
issue. In other cases, hardware modifications were made to reconcile the configurations
to the test configurations that passed rating tests. Upgrading the concrete wall between
the B switchgear room and the ACP room to a three-hour barrier decreases the risk of
damaging the A train cables in the ACP room as a result of a fire in the B switchgear
room.
03
OTHER ACTIVITIES
03.01 Other
(Closed) AV 50-400/00-09-01: ailure to Maintain the Fire Area Separation Barrier
Between The B Train Switchgear Room/Auxiliary Control Panel Room and the A Train
Cable Spreading Room as a 3-hour Rated Barrier
This apparent violation was identified to the licensee in a letter dated December 18,
2001, Subject: NRC Inspection Report 50-400/00-09; Preliminary White Finding. The Scl"
apparent violation concerned the Thermo-Lag fire barrier assembly whiclFeB train
switchgear room and the A train cable spreading room. The results of testing performed
by the licensee in 1994 and 1995 showed that the fire barrier did not have the required
three-hour fire resistance rating. After reviewing the test results, the licensee changed
the fire protection program by revising the rating of the fire barrier from three hours to
.
that suitable for the hazard. This issue had been initially identified by NRC as unresolved
item 50-400/99-13-01. In a letter dated April 16, 2002, Subject: Final Significance
Determination For a White Finding and Notice of Violation (Shearon Harris Nuclear
Power Plant - NRC Inspection Report 50-400/00-09), the licensee was informed that
NRC had determined that this issue was a violation of License Condition 2F of the Harris
Operating License. A Notice of Violation, Severity Level IlIl, was included as an
Enclosure to the April 16, 2002 letter. For tracking purposes, this Severity Level ill
violation is identified as Violation (VIO) 50-400/02-08-01: Failure to Implement and
Maintain NRC Approved Fire Protection Program Safe Shutdown System Separation
Requirements. Apparent Violation 50-400/00-09-01 is closed.
'
(Closed) AV 50-40000-09-026Falure to Obtain NRC Approval Prior to Implementing a
Change to the Approved Fire Protection Program
This apparent violation was also identified to the licensee in a letter dated December 18,
2001, Subject: NRC Inspection Report 50-400/00-09; Preliminary White Finding. This
apparent violation concerned the fact that the licensee made changes to the approved
fire protection program by accepting the degraded fire barrier, through an engineering
evaluation, without prior Commission approval. This issue had been initially identified by
NRC as unresolved item 50-400/99-13-02. In a letter dated April 16,2002, Subject: Final
Significance Determination For a White Finding and Notice of Violation (Shearon Harris
Nuclear Power Plant - NRC Inspection Report 50-400/00-09), the licensee was informed
that NRC had determined that it was appropriate to cite this issue as part of Violation
(VIO) 50-400/02-08-01: Failure to Implement and Maintain NRC Approved Fire Protection
Program Safe Shutdown System Separation Requirements. Apparent Violation
50-400/00-09-02 is closed.
0z
6
MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented interim results of the inspection to Mr. J. Scarola and other
members of his staff at the conclusion of the inspection on May 31, 2002.
exit 4l
,
-metig was held
ee
with Mr.
es on September 6, 2002, to I
44
present the final results of the inspection. The license acknowledged the findings
presented. Proprietary information is not included in tije nspection report.
7
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
D. Alexander, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Section
J. Caves, Supervisor, Licensing
M. Fletcher, Fire Protection System Engineer
C. Georgeson, Electrical Engineer
J. Holt, Site Support Services Manager
A. Khanpour, Superintendent of Design, Harris Engineering Support Services (HESS)
D. McAfee, Fire Protection Program Manager
E. McCartney, Superintendent Of Technical Services, HESS
J. Scarola, Harris Plant Vice President
M. Wallace, Senior Analyst, Licensing
NRC
J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-400/02-08-01
Vlo
Failure to Implement and Maintain NRC
Approved Fire Protection Program Safe
Shutdown System Separation Requirements
(Section 03.01)
Closed
50-400/00-09-01
Failure to Maintain the Fire Area Separation
Barrier Between The B Train Switchgear
Room/Auxiliary Control Panel Room and the
A Train Cable Spreading Room as a 3-hour
Rated Barrier (Section 03.01)
Failure to Obtain NRC Approval Prior to
Implementing a Change to the Approved
Fire Protection Program(Section 03.01)
50-400/00-09-02
LIST OF BASELINE INSPECTIONS PERFORMED
The following procedure was used to perform the inspection during the report period.
Documented findings are contained in the body of the report.
Supplemental Inspection For One Or Two White inputs In A Strategic
Performance Area.
ATTACHMENT
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
CP&L Procedure CAP-NGGC-200, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 4
Engineering Service Request 99-0180, Evaluation of Low Density Silicone Elastomer (LDSE)
Seals, Rev. 0, 6/16/99
Engineering Change 48802, Make ACP Room Separate Fire Area, Revision 0, 7/17/02
Design Basis Document
Calculation E-5525, Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire, Rev. 5, 517/02, and pending
changes resulting from EC 48802
Calculation E-5524, Safe Shutdown Analysis Changes to the Cable Function Report and
Essential Cable Analysis, Rev. 5, 6/2/02
Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Following A Fire, Rev. 19, and
pending revisions resulting from EC 48802
Drawing Numbers SK-48802-C-1 000, ACP Door Transom Detail, Sheets 1 and 2
Drawing Number SK-48802-C-1 000, ACP Wall Penetrations, Sheet 1
Work Orders 233062 01 and 233062 02, Make ACP Room Separate Fire Area
ATTACHMENT
Carolina Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. James Scarola
Vice President - Harris Plant
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. 0. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC SUPPLEMENTAL
INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/02-08
Dear Mr. Scarola:
On May 31, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a supplemental
inspection at your Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the
inspection findings which were discussed on May 31, 2002, with you and other members of
your staff.
This supplemental inspection was an examination of your problem identification, root.cause
evaluation, extent of condition determination, and corrective actions associated with a White
finding identified in the mitigating systems cornerstone. The White finding irvolved a violation
of your fire protection program resulting from a Thermo-Lag fire barrier assembly (wall) which
had an indeterminate fire resistance rating.
Based on the results of the inspection, the NRC determined that your corrective actions (both
planned and already completed) are appropriate to resolve the deficiency in your fire protection
program concerning the Thermo-Lag fire barriers which did not comply with 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R requirements. However, the White finding will remain open pending further NRC
review of your corrective actions associated with the use of local manual operator actions in the
new ACP room fire area to achieve safe-shutdown in the event of a fire.
For administrative purposes, a Severity Level IlIl violation associated with the Thermo-Lag fire
barrier assembly between the B train switchgear room/auxiliary control panel room and the A
train cable spreading room which was previously dispositioned in NRC's letter dated April 16,
2002, is identified in the enclosed report.
No findings of significance were identified during the inspection.
2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,' a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at httP://www.nrc.aov/readinp-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
Charles R. Ogle, Chief
..Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No.: 50-400
License No.: NPF-63
Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/02-08
w/Attachment
cc w/encl:
Terry C. Morton, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs
CPB 9
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Robert J. Duncan II
Director of Site Operations
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Benjamin C. Waldrep
Plant General Manager--Harris Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
James W. Holt, Manager
Support Services
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
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John R. Caves, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
William D. Johnson
Vice President & Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128
Beverly Hall, Acting Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environmental
Commerce & Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
Peggy Force
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Electronic Mail Distribution
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. 0. Box 11649
Columbia, SC 29211
Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
P. O. Box 29510
Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
4326 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-4326
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