ML032680930
| ML032680930 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/2003 |
| From: | Nease R Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Anderson C Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0277, IR-01-006 EA-03-016 | |
| Download: ML032680930 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000313/2001006
Text
September 19, 2003
Craig G. Anderson, Vice President,
Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
CONCERNING A FIRE PROTECTION FINDING AT THE ARKANSAS
NUCLEAR ONE FACILITY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-313/01-06;
50-368/01/06)
Dear Mr. Anderson
On July 10, 2003, a regulatory conference between Arkansas Nuclear One management and
staff and NRC representatives was conducted in the NRCs Region IV office. This conference
was held to discuss a finding, which was preliminarily determined by the NRC to have a risk
significance of greater than green (greater than very low safety significance). The summary of
the regulatory conference was provided to you in a letter dated July 17, 2003. In Enclosure 5 of
that letter, we requested additional information necessary for our understanding of your risk
assessment. You provided your response to our request in a letter to us dated
August 11, 2003. We have reviewed your response and determined that we need further
clarification. Our request for clarification of the additional information you provided in your
August 11, 2003, letter is in Enclosure 1. For reference, in Enclosure 2, I have provided our
July 17, 2003, request for additional information.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Rebecca Nease, Team Leader
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Dockets: 50-313; 50-368
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-2-
Enclosures:
1. Request for Clarification of Additional Information
2. Request for Additional Information (July 17, 2003)
cc w/enclosures:
Senior Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russellville, Arkansas 72801
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
Bernard Bevill
Radiation Control Team Leader
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867
Mike Schoppman
Framatome ANP, Inc.
Suite 705
1911 North Fort Myer Drive
Rosslyn, Virginia 22209
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-3-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Acting Regional Administrator (TPG)
Acting Deputy Regional Administrator (DDC)
DRP Director (ATH)
Acting DRS Director (GMG)
Deputy Director, DRP (MAS)
Senior Resident Inspector (RWD)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (LJS)
Branch Chief, DRS/EMB (CSM)
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
K. Smith, Region IV (KDS1)
G. Sanborn, D:ACES, Region IV (GFS)
M. Vasquez, ACES, Region IV (GMV)
W. Maier, Region IV (WAM)
J. Clark (JAC), OEDO RIV Coordinator
J. Hannon, NRR (JNH)
T. Alexion, NRR (TWA)
S. Weerakkody, NRR (SDW1)
M. Reinhart, NRR (FMR)
S. Wong, NRR (SMW1)
M. Salley, NRR (MXS3)
P. Qualls, NRR (PMQ)
N. Iqbal, NRR (NXI)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OE (JLD)
OEMAIL
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ADAMS: X Yes
No Initials: ______
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available
Sensitive
Non-Sensitive
RIV:TL:DRS/EMB
RIV:C:DRP/D
RIV:C:DRS/EMB
RIV:DD:DRS
RLNease;lmb
LJSmith
CSMarschall
GMGood
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
09/18/03
09/18/03
09/18/03
09/19/03
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE 1
Request for Clarification of Additional Information
Clarification - Request for Additional Information (RAI) Question 1:
a.
Did you limit your search to only safe shutdown cables? If so, please provide a
list of all cables (including non-safe shutdown and associated circuits) containing
thermoplastic materials.
b.
The cable and raceway numbers you provided do not give us the information
necessary for evaluating the effects of having thermoplastic cables versus
thermoset cables. Please provide a list of the equipment that is associated with
the thermoplastic cables, and whether that equipment is necessary for achieving
and maintaining safe shutdown conditions. You should specify whether the
cables are power or control cables, if the power cables are ac or dc, and the
voltage of the power cables.
c.
The fire scenarios described in your response of August 11, 2003, did not
specify which cables and/or equipment are likely to suffer fire damage and did
not provide us with the effects of fire damage on equipment. Please provide us
with a list of equipment and cables that could suffer fire damage. In addition,
evaluate the effects that fire damage would have on the equipment that is
associated with cables likely to sustain damage.
Clarification - RAI Question 2:
.
a.
In order for us to review the basis for your timing estimates, please provide
a copy of Reference 23, "Entergy Nuclear Engineering Analysis
Calculation EAD-NS-92/015.R0," Revision 0.
b.
On page 8 of your response to RAI Question 2, you stated that the timing for the
simulator operator actions were on pages 98-99 of your July 3, 2003, submittal
(0CAN070302). With respect to Table 32, "Summary of Selected Actions for
Maintaining Core Cooling During Simulated Fire," on page 99, and the
discussion on pages97-100, it is difficult to discern which conditions, or
indications in the control room are prompting the operators to perform the
manual actions (in the control room and locally) to maintain core cooling during a
fire. Please provide the time line or chronological sequence of each of the
simulated operator recovery action from the time of cue, in a graphical line
format.
Clarification - RAI Question 5
a
Please provide all CFAST input files for all fire simulations.
ENCLOSURE 2
Request for Additional Information (July 17, 2003)
1.
List the cables in Unit 2 that are thermoplastic, in what fire zones they appear, and the
effect that having thermoplastic versus thermoset cables would have on your ability to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in these fire zones.
2.
Provide the thermal/hydraulic time line that defines when critical safety functions must
be established for all operator recovery actions for Fire Zone 99M. In addition, please
provide data sheets from your simulated operator actions, including the times recorded.
3.
Provide cable construction information (i.e., insulation and jacket material, such as
XLPE/PVC) for all cables installed in cable trays or exposed (such as air drops) in Fire
Zone 99M, including vendor and/or manufacturer.
4.
Provide the extent to which cables and cable trays in Fire zone 99M are coated with
Flamemastic 71A. Include a list of which cables are coated, the Flamemastic installed,
the date of installation, ignition temperature, and heat release rate of Flamemastic 71A.
5.
Please provide the CFAST model results in Fire Zone 99M, assuming forced ventilation
is not secured and continues to supply air to the fire throughout the duration. In
addition, please provide the input files you used in the CFAST fire simulation for all fire
scenarios for Fire Zone 99M.