ML032200274
| ML032200274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/2003 |
| From: | Progress Energy Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0277 | |
| Download: ML032200274 (24) | |
Text
Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Validation Fire Protection Project Plan Nuclear Geiieratioii Group Progress Energy L O
Attendees I Abdy Khanpour - Manager, Engineering John Caves - Supervisor, Licensing Tony Maness - Supervisor, Fire Protection QJ
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Agenda I Overview Of Fire Protection Inspection SSA Validation Project Findings, Root Causes, Corrective Actions D Organization D Goals D Tasks D Milestones Latest Discoveries be, 6-Progress Energy 3
Focus Team 10 Team Members B
B B
B B
B B
B Supervisor FP Program Manager SSA Program Manager Operations - STA FP Staff Augmentation Engineer Staff Au g men tat ion Configuration Management Matrix additional staff as needed Progress Energy Fleet Steering Committee
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Overview of Inspection Findings 0 Failure To Protect Cables Potentially Affected By Fires Inconsistency Between Safe Shutdown Analysis And Implementing Procedure Some Non-feasible Manual Actions Technical Compliance D 8 Hr Battery Backed Emergency Lighting D Manual Actions Not Approved a
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Summary of Root Causes Io Post-Fire Circuit Analysis D Errors In Analysis B Procedures Allowed Use Of Manual Action In Lieu Of Circuit Protection For 3.G.2 Fire Areas From Initial Plant Licensing Efforts In Remote Shutdown D HNP Understanding Of Standards For Acceptability Of Manual Actions Changed In August 2002 based on industry OE (AN0 and NRC/NEI meetings)
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Summary of Root Causes 10 Operational Implementation D AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Validation D Lack Of Specific Criteria For Manual Action Feasi bi I ity Assessments Focused On Conventional Fire Protection - Barriers, Detection, Suppression, Equipment Impairments
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Fire Protection Corrective Actions I Immediate Actions Completed B
B B
B B
Established Fire Watch Coverage For ldentif ied Issues Revised Safe Shutdown Operating Procedures Assi ned 1 Additional Auxiliary Operator De-Energized MOV MCC-1 E l 2) To Plexiglas Cover Removed For TDAFW Fuse To S 7l ift Staffing Eliminate Hot Short 6 otential p p Q
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Project Plan Goals 10 Validate SSA Design B Reduce Reliance On Manual Actions B Correct Identified Deficiencies B Ensure SSA Is Properly Reflected In B Configuration Controls Protects The 0 Improve Reliability Of Fire Protection Operating and Maintenance Procedures Design Basis Equipment k
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Project Plan Goals (cont)
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- 1.
Position HNP For Potential Future Development Of A Fire PRA 0 Ensure SSA Is Consistent With Fleet Circuit Analysis On Multiple Circuit Failures b: 6-Progress Energy 10
Project Plan Tasks
=Sixteen Plan Tasks
- 1. Project Initiation
- 2. Modifications
+ Proposed Modifications v Cable Protection v Circuits In MCCs v 8 Hour Battery Backed Lighting a
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Project Plan Tasks (cont)
- 2. Modifications (cont)
+ Modifications in Progress v ACP Room Cable Protection I Remove Thermo-Lag Enclosure I Add Fire Wrap to Cable Tray v VCT Outlet Valve Cable Protection I Armored Cable I
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Project Plan Tasks (cont)
- 3. Oversight/Gap Analysis 4 NGG Fleet FP Strategic Plan
- 4. SSA Validation 4 Developed Project Scoping Document 4 N E Selection 4 Kick Off Of Validation 4 Major Milestones 4 Additional Discoveries V Document in Corrective Action Program w,.
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Project Plan Tasks (cont)
- 5. Thermo-Lag Configurations V Current Modification
+ ACPRoom
+ Cable Spread Room V Modification Completed ukl 6-Progress Energy 14
Project Plan Tasks (cont)
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- 6. HemydMT Fire Barrier Wrap
+ SSA Validation V Identify functions where protection is needed and Hemyc wrap is credited V Monitoring Industry and NRC testing
- 7. Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA)/SSA Integration
+ Resolve Identified Deficiencies
- 8. NFPA Code Compliance
+ Resolve Identified Deficiencies
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Project Plan Tasks (cont)
Fire Protection QA Inspection Hold Point
+ Identify Inspection Attributes V Update Implementing Procedures IO. Enhance Transient Combustible/Fixed Combustible Loading Controls
+ SSA Integration
+ Revise Combustible Control Program 6
"-4 Progress Energy Q-16
Project Plan Tasks (cont)
I I I. Penetration Seals
+ Improve program
'I Adopt Wisconsin Electric Internal Conduit Seal Testing
'I Enhanced Pen Seal Report Generation Tool
'I Drawing
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Project Plan Tasks (cont) rp-I 2. Surveillance Optimization
+ Evaluation And Improve
+ Performance Based Assessment
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Miscellaneous FP Program Deficiencies
+ Manage and Prioritize FP Backlog
- 14. Fire Response/Operational Implementation
+ Improve Operations Response To Fires ui8 6.
Progress Energy 18
Project Plan Tasks (cont)
I I
- 15. Effectiveness Review
+ Self-Assessment
- 16. Allocation Of Funds
+ Administrative 6
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Design Validation Validation of SSA D Develop Safe Shutdown Equipment List D Perform Circuit Analysis D Load SSD Program Manager Database D Perform Compliance Fault Tree Analysis D Manual Action Feasibility D Revise Safe Shutdown Procedure D Revise Admin Control Procedures 6- &
s Progress Energy 20
SSNFire Protection Major Milestones B SSA Project Kick-Off Mtg 5/20/03 5/20/03 B Discovery Phase 6/9/03 1 /5/04 B Manual Action Identification/Feasibility Analysis 10/17/03 3/9/04 Best Estimate B ACP Room B Charging System 5/2 1 /03 1 2/15/03 7/7/03 1 2/3 1 /03 I
B EC Approval I 6/9/04 I B EC Turnover - Implementation Of New SSA B Self-Assessment Of New SSA 6/10/04 I 9/30/04 I FCable Protection Mods I
I Progress Energy 21 L.
Latest Discoveries Current State:
HNP SSD Analysis does not include components as part of the analysis.
B ICT-102 - Cnmt Sump To Cnmt Spray B ICT-105 - Cnmt Sump To Cnmt Spray Pump 16-SB lsol Vlv CIV Pump 1A-SA lsol Vlv CIV b~
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Latest Discoveries I Real or Potential Consequences:
0 Valves are required to remain shut to prevent transfer of water from the RWST to the containment recirculation sump.
Spurious opening could result in i nadve rte n t I y t ransf e rri n g water from the RWST to the sump.
Water used for charging would not be available from its alternate suction source (i.e., the RWST) credited by the SSA.
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SUMMARY
L H N P is committed to resolving Fire
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Protection Program and Safe Shut Down Program concerns bb+
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