ML032200274

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Safe Shutdown Validation Fire Protection Project Plan
ML032200274
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/2003
From:
Progress Energy Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0277
Download: ML032200274 (24)


Text

Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Validation Fire Protection Project Plan Nuclear Geiieratioii Group Progress Energy L O Enclosure 2

Attendees I Abdy Khanpour - Manager, Engineering John Caves - Supervisor, Licensing Tony Maness - Supervisor, Fire Protection qProgress Energy

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Agenda I Overview Of Fire Protection Inspection Findings, Root Causes, Corrective Actions SSA Validation Project D Organization D Goals D Tasks D Milestones Latest Discoveries 6- eProgress b , Energy 3

Focus Team 10 Team Members B Supervisor B FP Program Manager B SSA Program Manager B Operations - STA B FP Staff Augmentation Engineer B Staff Augmentat ion Configuration Management B Matrix additional staff as needed B Progress Energy Fleet Steering Committee 61- Progress Energy 4

Overview of Inspection Findings 0 Failure To Protect Cables Potentially Affected By Fires Inconsistency Between Safe Shutdown Analysis And Implementing Procedure Some Non-feasible Manual Actions Technical Compliance D 8 Hr Battery Backed Emergency Lighting D Manual Actions Not Approved a Progress Energy 5

Summary of Root Causes I o Post-Fire Circuit Analysis D Errors In Analysis B Procedures Allowed Use Of Manual Action In Lieu Of Circuit Protection For 3.G.2 Fire Areas From Initial Plant Licensing Efforts In Remote Shutdown D HNP Understanding Of Standards For Acceptability Of Manual Actions Changed In August 2002 based on industry OE (AN0 and NRC/NEI meetings)

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Summary of Root Causes 10 Operational Implementation D AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Validation D Lack Of Specific Criteria For Manual Action FeasibiIity Assessments Focused On Conventional Fire Protection - Barriers, Detection, Suppression, Equipment Impairments

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Fire Protection Corrective Actions I Immediate Actions Completed B Established Fire Watch Coverage For ldentified Issues B Revised Safe Shutdown Operating Procedures Assi ned 1 Additional Auxiliary Operator B

7l To S ift Staffing B

6 De-Energized MOV MCC-1E l 2) To Eliminate Hot Short otential B Plexiglas Cover Removed For TDAFW Fuse p progress Energy

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Project Plan Goals 10 Validate SSA Design B Reduce Reliance On Manual Actions B Correct Identified Deficiencies B Ensure SSA Is Properly Reflected In Operating and Maintenance Procedures B Configuration Controls Protects The Design Basis 0 Improve Reliability Of Fire Protection Equipment 6

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Project Plan Goals (cont)

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Position HNP For Potential Future Development Of A Fire PRA 0 Ensure SSA Is Consistent With Fleet Circuit Analysis On Multiple Circuit Failures 6-b: Progress Energy 10

Project Plan Tasks

=Sixteen Plan Tasks

1. Project Initiation
2. Modifications

+ Proposed Modifications v Cable Protection v Circuits In MCCs v 8 Hour Battery Backed Lighting a Progress Energy 11

Project Plan Tasks (cont)

2. Modifications (cont)

+ Modifications in Progress v ACP Room Cable Protection I Remove Thermo-Lag Enclosure I Add Fire Wrap to Cable Tray v VCT Outlet Valve Cable Protection I Armored Cable I Reroute tb*r,: progress Energy 12

Project Plan Tasks (cont)

3. Oversight/Gap Analysis 4 NGG Fleet FP Strategic Plan
4. SSA Validation 4 Developed Project Scoping Document 4 N E Selection 4 Kick Off Of Validation 4 Major Milestones 4 Additional Discoveries V Document in Corrective Action Program 6 Progress Energy w,.

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Project Plan Tasks (cont)

5. Thermo-Lag Configurations

+ ACPRoom V Current Modification

+ Cable Spread Room V Modification Completed 6- Progress Energy ukl 14

Project Plan Tasks (cont)

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I 6. HemydMT Fire Barrier Wrap

+ SSA Validation V Identify functions where protection is needed and Hemyc wrap is credited V Monitoring Industry and NRC testing

7. Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA)/SSA Integration

+ Resolve Identified Deficiencies

8. NFPA Code Compliance

+ Resolve Identified Deficiencies

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Project Plan Tasks (cont)

Fire Protection QA Inspection Hold Point

+ Identify Inspection Attributes V Update Implementing Procedures IO. Enhance Transient Combustible/Fixed Combustible Loading Controls

+ SSA Integration

+ Revise Combustible Control Program 64-"

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Project Plan Tasks (cont)

I I I . Penetration Seals

+ Improve program I Adopt Wisconsin Electric Internal Conduit Seal Testing I Enhanced Pen Seal Report Generation Tool I Drawing 6- 2Progress

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Project Plan Tasks (cont) rp-+

I 2. Surveillance Optimization Evaluation And Improve

+ Performance Based Assessment

13. Miscellaneous FP Program Deficiencies

+ Manage and Prioritize FP Backlog

14. Fire Response/Operational Implementation

+ Improve Operations Response To Fires ui8 6 .Progress Energy 18

Project Plan Tasks (cont)

I I 15. Effectiveness Review

+ Self-Assessment

16. Allocation Of Funds

+ Administrative 6h

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Design Validation Validation of SSA D Develop Safe Shutdown Equipment List D Perform Circuit Analysis D Load SSD Program Manager Database D Perform Compliance Fault Tree Analysis D Manual Action Feasibility D Revise Safe Shutdown Procedure D Revise Admin Control Procedures 6-&s Progress Energy 20

SSNFire Protection Major Milestones Best Estimate B SSA Project Kick-Off Mtg 5/20/03 5/20/03 B Discovery Phase 6/9/03 1/5/04 B Manual Action Identification/Feasibility Analysis 10/17/03 3/9/04 I B EC Approval -- I 6/9/04 I B EC Turnover - Implementation Of New SSA 6/10/04 I 9/30/04 I B Self-Assessment Of New SSA FCable Protection Mods I I B ACP Room 5/2 1/03 12/15/03 B Charging System 7/7/03 12/3 1/03 Progress Energy L.

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Latest Discoveries Current State:

HNP SSD Analysis does not include components as part of the analysis.

B ICT-102 - Cnmt Sump To Cnmt Spray Pump 16-SB lsol Vlv CIV B ICT-105 - Cnmt Sump To Cnmt Spray Pump 1A-SA lsol Vlv CIV

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Latest Discoveries I Real or Potential Consequences:

0 Valves are required to remain shut to prevent transfer of water from the RWST to the containment recirculation sump.

Spurious opening could result in inadvertent Iy t ransferring water from the RWST to the sump.

Water used for charging would not be available from its alternate suction source (i.e., the RWST) credited by the SSA.

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SUMMARY

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L H N P is committed to resolving Fire Protection Program and Safe Shut Down Program concerns

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