ML032160596
| ML032160596 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/2003 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML032160596 (57) | |
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2 PUBLIC MEETING 3 Between U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 0350 Panel and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 4
5 Meeting held on Wednesday, July 9, 2003, at 6 7:00 p.m. at Oak Harbor High School, Oak Harbor, Ohio, taken by me, Marlene S. Lewis, Stenotype 7 Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.
8 9
10 PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT:
11 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 12 John (Jack Grobe), Chairman for 0350 Panel Davis-Besse facility 13 Christine Lipa, Branch Chief, NRC 14 William Ruland, Vice Chairman, MC 0350 Panel 15 Scott Thomas, Senior Resident Inspector 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
2 1 MS. LIPA: Were just about ready 2 to get started. Okay, great! Well go ahead and 3 get started then.
4 Id like to welcome everybody to this meeting 5 and welcome the members of the public for coming to 6 this meeting.
7 Im Christine Lipa, and Im the Branch Chief 8 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Im 9 responsible for the inspection program at 10 Davis-Besse, and we had a business meeting during the 11 day. It started at two, and the purpose of tonights 12 meeting is to inform those of you that werent at 13 that meeting of what we discussed during that 14 meeting, and then also give folks an opportunity to 15 ask questions or make comments to the NRC.
16 Before we get started, I wanted to mention 17 that there are copies of the July edition of our 18 monthly newsletter. Its called the Davis-Besse NRC 19 Update, and that has a lot of good information in it.
20 It also has on Page 4 and 5 the Restart Checklist, 21 and we went over that document in detail during 22 todays meeting.
23 Also there are copies of the slides from the 24 NRC presentation today and copies of the slide from 25 the FirstEnergy presentation today.
MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
3 1 We also have a public meeting feedback form 2 that you can use to provide comments to us, and were 3 interested in your perspectives on how this facility 4 works out, how well you can hear and participate 5 compared to Camp Perry. Both of the facilities have 6 been working out well for us, but were interested in 7 your feedback.
8 Were having this meeting transcribed today 9 by Marlene to maintain a record of the meeting, and 10 then we post those transcripts to our web page about 11 three to four weeks after the public meetings, and 12 the public meeting transcripts from June are already 13 posted.
14 What Id like to do then is start off with 15 some introduction for some of the NRC folks that are 16 here. We have Jon Hopkins, whos the NRR Project 17 Manager for Davis-Besse.
18 MR. HOPKINS: (Indicating).
19 MS. LIPA: Hes located in our 20 headquarters office in Rockville, Maryland.
21 We have Bill Ruland.
22 MR. RULAND: (Indicating).
23 MS. LIPA: And Bill is the Senior 24 Manager in NRR and also is the Vice Chairman of the 25 Oversight Panel, and Bills position is the Director MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
4 1 for Project Director III in the Division of Licensing 2 Project Management.
3 We have Jack Grobe.
4 MR. GROBE: (Indicating).
5 MS. LIPA: And Jack is the Senior 6 Manager in the Region III office, and hes also the 7 Chairman of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel.
8 We have Jack Rutkowski.
9 MR. RUTKOWSKI: (Indicating).
10 MS. LIPA: And Jack is the 11 Resident Inspector at the Davis-Besse plant.
12 And Scott Thomas is the Senior Resident 13 Inspector at the Davis-Besse plant.
14 MR. THOMAS: (Indicating).
15 MS. LIPA: In the foyer was Nancy 16 Keller, and shes our office assistant at the 17 Davis-Besse office, too, and then we also have 18 Viktoria Mitlyng.
19 MS. MITLYNG: (Indicating).
20 MS. LIPA: And shes our Public 21 Affairs person, and thats it for NRC folks, so what 22 Id like to do next is turn it over to Scott. Hell 23 prevent a summary of what we discussed during this 24 afternoons meeting, and then well go ahead and turn 25 it over for public comments and questions.
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5 1 MR. THOMAS: The licensee discussed 2 their progress in completing major projects within 3 the containment building, the installation of 4 equipment hatch, and the turnover of containment 5 control to the Ops Department.
6 They discussed their desired outcomes for the 7 upcoming normal operating pressure tests. These 8 outcomes included to assess performance and attitude 9 of the personnel, assess plant performance, assess 10 their various processes, such as emergent work 11 control, online work management, and online risk 12 assessment.
13 They discussed progress of testing to support 14 their proposed modification to the high pressure 15 injection pumps. They have come across some 16 unexpected results during their modification 17 validation testing, but they believe that the high 18 pressure injection pump modification is their best 19 success path and continue testing to support that 20 modification.
21 The licensee discussed performance in the 22 areas of operation, engineering and maintenance.
23 The performance indicators -- there were performance 24 indicators for each areas -- each of these areas, and 25 they included -- these performance indicators assess MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
6 1 attributes in the areas of safety, personnel, 2 reliability and cost.
3 They discussed what they termed as "safety 4 margin improvements." These improvements focused on 5 people, plant and design improvements. Some of these 6 improvements included in the area of people, continue 7 to communicate and seek alignment, implement an Ops 8 leadership plan and strengthen individual ownership 9 and commitment across the board. In the area of the 10 plant, focused on several substantial equipment 11 upgrades and improvements, and in the area of design 12 improvements discussed several in-depth design 13 reviews that have been completed and the 14 implementation and/or strengthening of several key 15 design programs, and they reviewed their progress 16 toward the completion of restart milestones and 17 actions, so briefly thats what the earlier meeting 18 discussed.
19 MS. LIPA: Okay, thanks, Scott. One 20 of the things that I discussed at the beginning of 21 the meeting today was the Restart Checklist which is 22 on Page 4 and 5 in the monthly update, and we went 23 through the items that we closed and where those are 24 documented and we went through the status of the 25 items that are open, so if you look at this document, MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
7 1 on Page 4 youll see the ones that have check marks, 2 those are the ones that are closed. Weve closed 13 3 of the 31 items so far, and then we have plans for 4 reviewing the rest of the items, so, other than that, 5 that was -- those are the highlights of what we 6 discussed this afternoon, so lets go ahead and if 7 anybody has any questions or comments wed like to 8 start with local members of the public first and --
9 come up to the podium and sign in and state your name 10 for the transcriber, and go ahead and provide us your 11 question or comment.
12 MR. WHITCOMB: Good evening. My 13 name is Howard Whitcomb. First of all, Id like to 14 commend you for the NRC update. Its grown over the 15 months, its gotten bigger, thicker, but also its 16 got a lot of good information in it, and I think if 17 you do put the bullets as far as what inspection 18 reports cover each of the enclosed items it would be 19 helpful to go in and look for the members of the 20 audience.
21 I have a prepared statement I would like to 22 read.
23 It has been nearly 17 months since the public 24 first received reports of a large hole in the 25 Davis-Besse reactor vessel head. Initially, the NRC MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
8 1 stressed to the public the importance of and its 2 commitment towards an understanding of the root cause 3 as to why the degraded reactor vessel head had 4 occurred. During the first several months, the NRC 5 conducted an investigation and reported that the root 6 cause of the degraded reactor vessel head included an 7 apparent lack of appropriate safety consciousness 8 regarding the safe operation of the Davis-Besse 9 facility. It was evident to the inspectors that 10 there existed a "production over public safety" 11 philosophy as directed by the highest levels of 12 management within FirstEnergy. Additionally, the 13 NRC performed a limited review of its own programs in 14 mid-2002 and identified a purported number of 15 programmatic weaknesses within its inspection 16 processes. Further, the findings of the Lessons 17 Learned Task Force failed to identity and report the 18 lack of appropriate safety culture within the ranks 19 of the NRC in any of its 51 recommendations to the 20 NRC commissioners.
21 It was not until December of 2002 when the 22 Inspector General issued its independent assessment 23 that the public first became aware that an alarming 24 percentage of the NRCs own employees had reported a 25 reluctance to raise safety concerns within their own MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
9 1 management. The NRC has attempted to verbalize an 2 understanding of concepts such as root cause, safety 3 culture and safety conscious work environment. The 4 NRCs actions of late indicate otherwise.
5 Over the last several months, FirstEnergy has 6 reported that they have uncovered operability issues 7 involving several safety related systems including 8 the Emergency Diesel Generators and the High Pressure 9 Coolant Injection System. Additionally, concerns 10 about the condition of the reactor coolant pump 11 shafts and ETAP raise new questions regarding the 12 overall system health and material condition of the 13 plant. Based upon the sampling of the systems 14 reviewed and the resultant findings, it remains 15 unclear whether additional system reviews should be 16 required. It is equally disturbing to note that no 17 one has ever reported a root cause as to why the 18 previous safety analysis supporting HPCI and 19 Emergency Diesel Generators operability were 20 inadequate since the beginning of commercial 21 operations of the Davis-Besse facility. Without 22 such a root cause determination, it is unclear as to 23 what appropriate corrective actions are necessary to 24 prevent further calculational errors or whether there 25 are additional systems that require an operability MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
10 1 review based on similarly unsupported analysis.
2 The NRCs failure to require a root cause 3 determination of these safety system issues and make 4 it a part of the Restart Checklist is very troubling.
5 Additionally, the recently reported promotions of Mr.
6 Sam Collins and Mr. James Dyer challenge the NRCs 7 previously stated commitments regarding the 8 improvement of its own safety culture. These moves 9 do not invoke or instill increased public confidence 10 in the NRC. Quite the opposite is true. These 11 moves create additional suspicion regarding the NRCs 12 credibility and create further doubt whether the NRC 13 even cares what the public thinks. It is further 14 apparent from these recent management changes that 15 the NRC believes itself to be blameless regarding the 16 events involving its failure to identify the 17 inadequate boric acid inspection program at 18 Davis-Besse or for the inappropriate decision made by 19 Mr. Collins to allow the continued operation of the 20 Davis-Besse facility in November 2001. These moves 21 re-emphasize the need for massive reform and 22 re-organization within the NRC.
23 These changes come about despite the fact 24 that the public in Northwest Ohio has been told that 25 the NRC is providing aggressive oversight at the MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
11 1 Davis-Besse facility. During the last 17 months, 2 both FirstEnergy and the NRC have offered several 3 "progress reports" relative to committed changes in 4 the safety environment. The deception of the public 5 continues. The reported action of FirstEnergy and 6 the NRC over the last 17 months amounts to little 7 more than a charade. FirstEnergy continues to place 8 a higher priority upon the restart schedule than it 9 does on its efforts to establish an appropriate 10 safety culture at the Davis-Besse facility.
11 What the public does know is this:
12 1) A hole the size of a pineapple was found 13 in the reactor vessel head.
14 2) Less than one-quarter inch of stainless 15 steel maintained core pressure and inventory.
16 3) The safety analysis report did not 17 evaluate the consequences of an uncontrollable loss 18 of coolant from the top of the reactor vessel.
19 4) The ability of the High Pressure Coolant 20 Injection System to perform its intended function was 21 in question as was the size of the available 22 containment sump. And, finally, collectively, these 23 conditions place the health, welfare and safety of 24 the public at substantial risk.
25 It is apparent to this citizen that the MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
12 1 unknown material condition of the Davis-Besse 2 facility coupled with the obvious lack of a 3 meaningful commitment towards safety culture issues 4 by both FirstEnergy and the NRC remains a dangerous 5 combination. Thank you.
6 MS. LIPA: Thank you for your 7 comments, Howard. Id like to offer a few thoughts.
8 First of all, I can assure you that the 9 panel -- as a panel member, we have been working very 10 hard, so I dont agree with your opinion, but its 11 your opinion about the charade. In any case, let me 12 just say a couple things.
13 We did add a new item to the Restart 14 Checklist item to the checklist that we talked about 15 today, which was the High Pressure Injection Pumps, 16 and in accordance with our 0350 procedure, theres a 17 criteria for adding new items to the Restart 18 Checklist, and that did meet our criteria, so we did 19 add it. We also did that months back with the 20 containment sump, so we do add items to the checklist 21 as warranted.
22 A couple other things we did, when we first 23 started out we had a checklist on system readiness 24 for restart or something about the system health, and 25 we did an inspection last fall. Its called an SSDI, MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
13 1 Safety System Design Inspection, and a system health 2 inspection. Those inspections had quite a few 3 findings, and that combined with the licensees own 4 latent issue reviews, they decided to expand the work 5 that they were doing, and they started doing these 6 safety function validation reviews, so we have been 7 talking about those at all of our meetings so the 8 scope has expanded based on what was found, and I 9 think that's important to point out for you. And 10 then one of the other things that you talked about 11 was requiring a root cause, and actually 10 CFR 50 12 Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires for significant 13 conditions adverse to quality that they be corrected 14 and to prevent recurrence, and so the way that's 15 implemented is through a corrective action program 16 that the utility has so for the conditions that they 17 find that are considered significant conditions 18 adverse to quality, that really does trigger a root 19 cause, and I know the licensee is doing numerous root 20 causes. I can't tell you they're doing one for 21 every item you mentioned, but based on our sampling, 22 we believe that they're doing root causes where they 23 are necessary. That's about all that I got from 24 some of the things that I wanted to comment on, but 25 let me move it over here.
MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
14 1 MR. GROBE: Thanks, Christine. A 2 couple other comments, Howard. Hardly would the NRC 3 say they were blameless in the situation. The 4 Lessons Learned Task Force performed a very thorough 5 evaluation of the NRCs programs, both our inspection 6 as well as our other regulatory programs, including 7 our ability to gain and utilize international 8 operating experience as well as national operating 9 experience, our inspection programs, and our 10 licensing programs, and as you correctly stated made 11 51 recommendations to the commission and those 12 recommendations, the majority of those, I believe, 13 two of the recommendations were not accepted by the 14 senior management team that reviewed the Lessons 15 Learned Task Force report, but the other 49 have 16 action plans, and those are being implemented, so the 17 NRC has clearly self-assessed and acknowledged areas 18 where improvement is necessary to ensure that a 19 situation like the situation that occurred here at 20 Davis-Besse does not recur.
21 You commented regarding the IG report, and 22 the chairman has clearly responded to the Inspector 23 Generals findings, and I dont think I have anything 24 more to add to what the chairman stated, and his 25 response is posted on our public website. Im MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
15 1 trying to think of the other points you made, if we 2 missed any of them -- I think that pretty much 3 captures -- oh, one other thing I wanted to mention, 4 you commented about root cause and Christine 5 correctly indicated that our requirements in Appendix 6 B of 10 CFR 50 of our required cause analyses and 7 corrective actions, in addition for those issues that 8 you identified those significance assessments and 9 cause analyses and corrective actions are required to 10 be included in the licensee event reports and those 11 are publicly available. Some of the cause analyses, 12 for example, the high pressure injection pump is not 13 yet completed, but as soon as its completed it will 14 be included in an update to the licensee. Thank you 15 very much.
16 MR. RULAND: One other thing I 17 would like to address, Howard, if I could. You 18 talked about the priority of the restart schedule 19 over safety, I think was one of your questions or one 20 of your points, theres always a dichotomy between 21 operating these complex machines relative to, you 22 know, schedule versus safety, and I guess I dont 23 accept that dichotomy. The best performing 24 licensees have shown, based on capacity factors, that 25 when weighing production and safety, in fact, it MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
16 1 was -- there are -- the licensees that have good 2 production capability, high capacity factors, by and 3 large also have good safety performance. Now, 4 theres not a clear link, but the skills it requires 5 to manage and make sure your plant is producing can 6 be translated, given the right management, into good 7 safety performance, so I dont accept that production 8 over safety. I think its a difficult challenge 9 that licensees face, and its something that they 10 have to weigh. Personally, I think from this 0350 11 panel, if you take the HPI pump issue, were 12 frankly -- the NRC is not particularly focused on 13 schedule. The only reason we are focused on 14 schedule is to make sure we know what to do as far as 15 inspection, and at least for this panel member and 16 for the others, theres nothing, I think, that the 17 licensee is going to do in that -- for that 18 particular example to put schedule over safety.
19 Theyre going to have to resolve that issue, and the 20 NRC is going to have to make sure that they, in fact, 21 resolve it and the safety issues are resolved, so 22 I -- while I respect your opinion, I humbly disagree.
23 MR. GROBE: Thanks, Bill. Jon?
24 MR. HOPKINS: Yeah, I just wanted to 25 say one thing for the record. I believe the MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
17 1 commenter was referring to the IG survey on safety 2 culture within the NRC, and there were several 3 positive things in that survey, but the NRC is 4 reviewing the results to try and see more what they 5 mean, so I just wanted to say that.
6 MR. GROBE: Thanks, Jon. One 7 final comment that you made that I thought warranted 8 comment is you commented that the NRC doesnt care 9 about public input, public opinion. I think I have 10 been out here now for over 12 months every month 11 conducting public meetings with anywhere from as few 12 as maybe 75 to 100 people and upwards to 500 people 13 at each of these meetings and have spent countless 14 hours listening carefully to public comments and 15 questions and responding to them, and we had the 16 opportunity today from Ohio Citizens Action to 17 receive 400 or so letters, which we will all read and 18 carefully consider and respond to. I think weve 19 clearly demonstrated that we care about public input 20 and public opinion, and we will continue to be out 21 here listening and responding. Thank you.
22 MS. LIPA: Okay. Is there 23 anybody else from the local area that has a comment 24 or question for us?
25 MR. DUSSEL: Tim Dussel, just a MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
18 1 citizen. I read an article here a while back where 2 the head of the NRC made the statement that Ohio 3 citizens was never put in danger over this whole 4 situation, and you read the facts and all the things 5 that went on, and the head of the NRC feels that the 6 public was not put in danger scares me very much.
7 These kind of actions, the same with I have not seen 8 were any of the FirstEnergy or anyone has been held 9 accountable for any of these, NRC or FirstEnergy.
10 This has been going on for a year and a half, and 11 theres been one person supposedly that was fired who 12 was an engineer and they wanted to put most of the 13 blame on him, but I believe theres a whole lot of 14 people here thats made a whole lot of mistakes that 15 should be held accountable, and if you want the 16 public to trust you, until thats done, no one is 17 going to trust anyone. No one has had to pay for any 18 of this. It does not make sense to me. If I was 19 caught going down the road drunk driving, I would be 20 in jail. What did you people do? Thank you.
21 MR. GROBE: Thank you very much 22 for your comment. I think there were two things 23 there that I want to respond to. The first one has 24 to do with the chairmans comments, and I believe 25 those were made at the regulatory information MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
19 1 conference in his opening statements. In fact, 2 those comments were correct, that there was not an 3 imminent danger, and there was not an event at 4 Davis-Besse. I dont want to underplay the 5 significance of what happened. All of the design 6 margin for the reactor coolant system was eliminated, 7 and that occurred as a result of poor management and 8 poor safety culture at the facility, and thats not 9 acceptable, and we categorized the significance of 10 that at the highest level that we categorize 11 inspection findings. It was categorized as a red 12 finding and -- but a red finding is not necessarily 13 dangerous. It just means that the risk was increased 14 from what the normal operating plan would be, and 15 thats an unacceptable increase in risk at the red 16 level.
17 The second comment you made had to do with 18 personal accountability, and FirstEnergy has taken 19 fairly extensive actions with respect to the 20 accountability of the individuals that caused the 21 situation to occur. I believe that there were -- I 22 might not have this number exactly correct, but I 23 believe there were 19 personal actions that were 24 taken including terminations and other types of 25 personal actions. Theres a whole new management MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
20 1 team at the Davis-Besse facility, so I think the 2 information that you may have read in the newspaper 3 regarding one engineer was an incorrect 4 characterization of what has happened at Davis-Besse.
5 MR. DUSSEL: Thats the only 6 information I have, sir. Its what I read in the 7 paper, I think FirstEnergy if they done these things 8 should put it out to the public so the public 9 understands that.
10 MR. GROBE: I believe thats been 11 discussed on a number of occasions at our public 12 meetings. Other comments?
13 MS. LUEKE: Hi. Donna Lueke, 14 local resident. Shorter than everybody else.
15 (Laughter).
16 The comments that I had were echoing similar 17 to whats been said already, and I think the way I 18 would state it is that we dont feel at this point 19 that theres -- or we do feel that theres one item 20 that needs to be added to that checklist and that is 21 of was there an intentional concealment of 22 information, and, as far as I know, that hasnt been 23 resolved yet, and, in my opinion, that should be 24 resolved before restart. I know there is an ongoing 25 investigation; am I correct in that?
MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
21 1 MS. LIPA: Thats correct.
2 MS. LUEKE: Okay. It seems to me 3 unless thats resolved before restart, thats a big 4 missing link about the safety culture, and it just 5 seems unlikely that five serious -- from what we know 6 and just from an amateur standpoint, the hole in the 7 reactor head, the undersize sump, the problems with 8 the high pressure injection pumps, the flawed safety 9 culture, if these all existed and they all existed at 10 the time the shutdown occurred, then why wasnt it 11 caught, and if it wasnt caught, if nobody knew about 12 that -- and I know Lessons Learned has addressed some 13 of those things, but I dont think that anybody has 14 addressed the idea or the assumption that maybe some 15 people did know about this and that that hasnt been 16 addressed yet.
17 MR. GROBE: Donna, thank you very 18 much for your question. I wouldnt consider you an 19 amateur, you have studied everything that has gone on 20 very carefully, and your comments are always 21 insightful.
22 I had intended to mention in response to the 23 previous gentlemans question, the issue of 24 accountability from the perspective of the NRC.
25 Youre correct there is an ongoing investigation. It MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
22 1 has been ongoing for quite a while now. The 2 Oversight Panel has been staying abreast of the 3 results of that investigation as they have evolved, 4 the evidence thats collected, the assessment of the 5 evidence by the investigators, and I can assure you 6 that any necessary immediate actions relative to 7 Davis-Besse will be taken prior to restart.
8 There -- the NRC has whats referred to as civil 9 enforcement authority, and what that means is we can 10 issue orders, and we can issue civil fines, monetary 11 fines. A deliberate violation of NRC requirements 12 also carries criminal sanctions -- jail time, those 13 sorts of things. The NRC does not have the 14 authority to pursue those sorts of actions. We have 15 a close relationship with the Department of Justice 16 if we find ourselves in a situation where there may 17 have been deliberate violations, so the Department of 18 Justice may want to evaluate the results of the 19 investigation. If those activities are ongoing, the 20 results will not be disclosed publicly for reasons 21 Im sure you can appreciate, but I can assure you 22 that any actions that are necessary coming from the 23 results of those investigative activities will be 24 taken before restart.
25 MS. LUEKE: Before restart?
MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
23 1 MR. GROBE: Right.
2 MS. LUEKE: So youre assuring us 3 at this point that that will be done?
4 MR. GROBE: Thats right.
5 MS. LUEKE: Okay. Thank you.
6 MS. LIPA: Okay, do we have 7 anybody else who has comments or questions for us?
8 (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE).
9 MR. GROBE: While people are 10 pondering their intestinal fortitude of nerve to come 11 up to the panel -- to the microphone, Ill provide a 12 little bit more context to my statements in response 13 to Donnas question.
14 The concept of the need for immediate action 15 has two characteristics to it, and theyre described 16 in our enforcement manual. If the Agency believes 17 that an individual -- there is sufficient evidence, 18 preponderance of the evidence, that an individual 19 willfully violated our requirements and that that 20 individual is in a position of responsibility in any 21 activity regulated by the NRC and that the NRC does 22 not have reasonable assurance that future actions of 23 that individual will ensure the safety of the public, 24 meaning the NRC loses confidence in that individual 25 in fulfilling those responsibilities if theyre in a MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
24 1 position of authority, then we would consider 2 immediate action, so theres a number of things that 3 we look at, so theres not necessarily immediate 4 action for all investigative findings. Normally what 5 occurs is that the -- if there are considerations by 6 the Department of Justice, those will occur 7 concurrent with any ongoing activities that the NRC 8 will not take immediate action, but if the NRC loses 9 confidence in an individual who is in a position with 10 responsibility, then immediate action will be taken.
11 Who else would like to come forward?
12 MR. LOCHBAUM: Anybody?
13 MR. THOMAS: Sure.
14 MS. LIPA: Yeah, come on up.
15 MR. GROBE: Thank you for being 16 patient, Dave.
17 MR. LOCHBAUM: Dave Lochbaum with the 18 Union of Concerned Scientists. I apologize, I just 19 got here, so I dont know if you may have covered 20 this this afternoon, I dont want to repeat it, but I 21 noticed on the latest update that the NRC puts out, 22 the ongoing safety culture inspection is ongoing and 23 theres a couple public meetings planned to discuss 24 what those findings are.
25 Ive also seen some recent results from MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
25 1 culture surveys showing that 50% of the workers were 2 reluctant to raise safety issues and 30 percent of 3 the workers who had raised safety issues felt that 4 they were retaliated or discriminated against for 5 having done so. I know that may not be applicable 6 to Davis-Besse because those numbers are the NRCs 7 internal surveys of its own culture, so I guess the 8 question would be given the attention on 9 Davis-Besses safety culture, whats the NRC doing to 10 fix its own safety culture?
11 MR. GROBE: Thats a good 12 question. Thanks, David. Ive seen recently a 13 draft of an action plan in response to the Inspector 14 Generals findings in that area, and Mr. Whitcomb 15 mentioned it earlier, Im not sure we responded to it 16 completely. The Agency has taken several actions, 17 and what was particularly interesting about the 18 safety culture assessment that the IG did was the 19 variability office to office, work group to work 20 group of those specific cultural attributes. What 21 was satisfying is the people at the regional office 22 by far had the strongest safety culture. Those are 23 the folks that day in and day out are in contact with 24 the facilities performing inspections. The office 25 with the weakest safety culture was the office of the MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
26 1 chief information office. Those are the guys that 2 provide the --
4 MR. GROBE: ADAMS, thats right.
5 MR. LOCHBAUM: I understand.
6 MR. GROBE: Those of you have had 7 the opportunity to interface with ADAMS, but, also, 8 you know, all of the internal computer systems for 9 managing resources and data and information, so 10 its -- there was quite a variability office to 11 office. Each office individually is preparing its 12 response as we did following the 1998 survey which 13 was the last time that was done. Theres been 14 significant improvements. Region III, for example, I 15 have a lot of familiarity with the actions that we 16 took after 1998. Double digits improvements in every 17 category. Were an organization as we expect our 18 licensees to be a continuously learning organization 19 and a continuously improving organization, were the 20 same type of organization, and we will continue to 21 take corrective actions and continue to monitor their 22 effectiveness.
23 MR. LOCHBAUM: Unrelated follow-up 24 question. I know the 0350 panel and all of the team 25 that supported it, spent a lot of time over the last MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
27 1 year doing inspections and evaluations.
2 Do you have an estimate, ballpark estimate, 3 how many inspection hours that was over the past year 4 or so?
5 MR. GROBE: I do not have a -- I 6 cant quote you a number off the top of my head.
7 The last time I answered this question was early this 8 year, I believe the data was through January, and I 9 have it in dollars, not hours, and there were several 10 million dollars worth of efforts spent regarding 11 Davis-Besse at that time, but I dont have an updated 12 number. Obviously it would be significantly more.
13 MR. RULAND: We can get you that.
14 MR. GROBE: Yeah, we can put that 15 together for you. Well get back to you on that.
16 MR. LOCHBAUM: As I understand it, 17 that level of effort which is fairly intensive and 18 invasive and covers a lot of ground, is going to form 19 the basis for your decision on whether the plant is 20 restored to the acceptable levels of safety and ready 21 for operation, not predicating that will be the 22 answer, but that information supplemented by this 23 remaining work will get you that decision one way or 24 the other.
25 Once you return to the normal levels of MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
28 1 oversight that preceded March of 2002 and didnt find 2 the problem with the sump and didnt find the problem 3 with the head and didnt find the problem with the 4 safety culture, what assurance is there that that 5 lower level of oversight will be adequate?
6 MR. GROBE: Well, let me -- youre 7 an excellent straight man, these are very good 8 questions and give me an excellent opportunity to 9 talk about really important topics.
10 One of the things we have done specifically 11 with respect to Davis-Besse is Davis-Besse is the 12 only plant in the United States that is going to have 13 only single units safe -- its going to have three 14 resident inspectors. We just selected a third 15 Resident Inspector. Jack Rutkowski joined us a month 16 or so ago as the second Resident. Seems about like a 17 year, right, Jack, but its only been a month or so, 18 and a young lady by the name of Monica 19 Salter-Williams, whos an experienced engineer, has 20 had utility experience and also NRC experience will 21 be joining us in September.
22 MS. LIPA: Yeah.
23 MR. GROBE: She was selected a 24 month or two ago, and shes in the process of 25 wrapping up her personal business with her current MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
29 1 location and moving out here, so Davis-Besse will 2 have for at least the next two years three Resident 3 Inspectors.
4 In addition to that, the Oversight Panel 5 doesnt go away at restart. The panel will stay in 6 existence until such time that it is convinced that 7 the routine oversight program would be appropriate 8 for this facility. While all of these activities 9 have been going on, the Lessons Learned Task Force 10 recommendations are being acted upon and improving 11 that routine program.
12 Concurrent with that, theres a lot of work 13 going on in the assessment of safety culture. I 14 dont believe I saw you at the meeting of the 15 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards a couple 16 weeks ago, but the Advisory Committee is a group of 17 very senior individuals from universities across the 18 country, the premier research institutions as well as 19 experienced former executives from the industry that 20 provide advice to the commission on important topics 21 and they have taken this topic on -- and the 22 commission has expressed its view, but its not ready 23 to publish a regulation on safety culture, but it 24 views it very important that we continue to monitor 25 the evolution of safety culture assessment and task MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
30 1 the Advisory Committee to give them advice. Thats 2 what they do. The Advisory Committee conducted a --
3 it was a very long day. It was about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 4 meeting, invited participants from all aspects of the 5 country. Howard Whitcomb was one of the presenters 6 that was invited to present at that meeting, along 7 with myself, Lew Myers, other industry executives 8 from Fermi and Millstone, other International experts 9 from the NEA and other locations, so they collected a 10 very broad set of views and opinions on safety 11 culture, and they will be providing their advice to 12 the commission and what direction we should go in 13 that regard. The Institute of Nuclear Power 14 Operations, which is a utility formed independent 15 oversight, indicated that it was interested in adding 16 safety culture attributes to its assessment process.
17 The institute does two very important activities; one 18 is to provide inspection and assessment of licensee 19 performance not to regulatory standards, but to 20 industry best practice standards, which in many 21 regards are far beyond the minimum regulations that 22 we have, and they provide advice to -- to the 23 individual utilities on how they assess their 24 performance.
25 In addition to that, what they do is they MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
31 1 provide what we call the training academy, and thats 2 an independent assessment for the NRC, and we inspect 3 INPO, and they accredit the training programs for 4 nuclear plant workers in all regards, maintenance 5 workers, health physician physics workers, chemistry workers, 6 and those accreditation standards are very high, and 7 a senior NRC executive was at each accreditation 8 board meeting making sure that those accreditations 9 were proper. The institute indicated that it was 10 willing to enter into a relationship with the NRC to 11 similarly assess safety culture, and I use the word 12 similarly very broadly. Its not clear at all what 13 structure that would take, but that was one of the 14 presentations from George Felgate, who is the Vice 15 President of INPO, so it was a very interesting and 16 meaningful meeting of the Advisory Committee on 17 Reactor Safeguards, and the committee will be 18 considering all of the input they got and advise, and 19 the commission will go in what direction it thinks 20 the commission should go.
21 MR. LOCHBAUM: Last question, you 22 mentioned that the Lessons Learned Task Force for 23 Davis-Besse -- and I know one of the areas that the 24 Lessons Learned Task Force looked at was the 0350 25 process and made a number of recommendations. One MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
32 1 of the recommendations that they didnt make -- or, 2 not to my knowledge, was on just the team, the 3 staffing of the 0350 panel. I know Mr. Ruland is 4 new to the panel due to Mr. Deans change, but you 5 and Ms. Lipa have been on it for the whole year 6 plus -- well, you know better than I do.
7 MS. LIPA: And Scott.
8 MR. LOCHBAUM: And others, and I was 9 just wondering have you looked at whether thats a 10 burden or could you roll people on and off to minimum 11 the burden on you people, but also get more Agency 12 people involved in the process, if it ever is invoked 13 anywhere else broadening the experience?
14 MR. GROBE: Its an interesting 15 question. As youre well aware, Ive had this 16 opportunity in the past.
17 MR. LOCHBAUM: Youre way ahead of 18 anybody else, I understand.
19 MR. GROBE: Weve worked together 20 on other plants. The process that were 21 implementing today is new. It was restructured 22 after the institution of the revised Reactor 23 Oversight Program, which happened in 2000, April of 24 2000, and this is the first time the process has been 25 exercised, and weve identified a number of MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
33 1 opportunities to improve the process and we have been 2 providing that feedback to the Division of Inspection 3 and Program Management, which writes the procedures.
4 I have been provided very strong assurance 5 that I wont have the opportunity to get rotated off 6 of this assignment until its over, so there will be 7 at least one or two people who are consistent to the 8 end. The moving people on and off the panel is just 9 a fact of life in any kind of operating organization, 10 and Bill and I worked very closely. It was a fairly 11 daunting list, at least thats the impression I got 12 from Bill when he got assigned to the panel, and I 13 put together an E-mail of the things that he and I 14 needed to spend time talking through the historical 15 aspects of the panel -- where weve been, where we 16 are today, and we spent many hours doing that after 17 his assignment here, so there is some start-up costs 18 associated with that, but its been effective in 19 managing the transitions.
20 The panel itself is comprised of about nine 21 or ten people. Many of them we dont see here on a 22 monthly basis. Theres two other managers in the 23 regional office as well as a couple senior staff in 24 the regional office that are members of the panel, 25 but that is not the extent of the Agency commitment.
MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
34 1 There has been literally dozens and dozens of people 2 who have been involved in the assessment of whats 3 going on from every corner of the Agency, from all of 4 the regions, from headquarters, from a variety of 5 offices at headquarters that have augmented the 6 panel, and in its assessment of whats going on, so 7 its a fairly -- I think the size of the panel is 8 appropriate. The access to resources that are 9 provided is extensive, and essentially we can tap 10 anybody that we need from the Agency, and weve done 11 that.
12 MR. LOCHBAUM: I guess I intended the 13 question more towards -- it is a big commitment, I 14 dont even like doing things I enjoy for a year and a 15 half, let alone things that arent all that much fun, 16 so I just -- would it be -- have you looked at the 17 value of continuity versus burn-out on staffing the 18 0350 panel and whether maybe some adjustments need to 19 be made for that?
20 MR. GROBE: Its an interesting 21 question. The -- theres a tremendous, I mean, this 22 is kind of getting off the beaten path here, but 23 theres a tremendous amount of job satisfaction in 24 this kind of job assignment. We have the 25 opportunity to truly make a substantive change, and MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
35 1 if everything is successful to return a nuclear plant 2 which can return a tremendous amount of electricity 3 to the United States back into service if it can be 4 done safely, so theres a lot of benefit and 5 satisfaction, personal benefit and satisfaction, that 6 comes along with an assignment like this.
7 Its also an interesting opportunity in many 8 regards, so I dont believe -- Im confident that if 9 my boss thought I was getting burned out or if I 10 thought Christine was getting burned out that actions 11 would be taken to make sure that was remedied.
12 MR. LOCHBAUM: I didnt mean to 13 suggest there was, but --
14 MR. GROBE: This is getting a lot 15 of attention, you know, people are paying close 16 attention to the process and its working 17 effectively.
18 MR. LOCHBAUM: Thank you.
19 MR. GROBE: Thanks, Dave.
20 MS. LIPA: Any other questions?
21 MR. MUGGE: Hi, Bill Mugge, 22 manager of security at Davis-Besse, and our usual 23 presentations include conditions in containment and 24 sumps, pumps, regaining and restoring what we need to 25 do to bring our unit back safely. Id like to take MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
36 1 this opportunity to remind the public that the 2 security is a focus at Davis-Besse also.
3 We have, obviously with the events of 4 September 11th, homeland threat moving from yellow to 5 orange, world events of terrorism, the Davis-Besse 6 organization does respond to each of those, and even 7 in the smaller sense, the day-to-day activities, 8 security is integral with the site activities. In 9 fact, at the morning meeting we have a standard place 10 on the agenda where we can bring our issues forward.
11 Id also like to take this opportunity to 12 acknowledge and thank Chief Deputy Bratton, Sheriff 13 Emahiser and Detective Steve Lavorchick. When I get 14 together with my peers, the working relationship we 15 have with our local law enforcement is an envy for 16 them. That working relationship, the connection, 17 sharing of information and resources is essential to 18 the success of our security team. Thank you.
19 THEREUPON, the audience applauded.
20 MS. LIPA: Thank you, Bill.
21 MR. GROBE: Bill, I appreciate 22 your comments. Its a topic we dont focus on very 23 often. As youre well aware, but maybe others are 24 not, the NRC just issued several orders to all 25 nuclear power plants in the United States. Shortly MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
37 1 after the September 11th debacle, the NRC issued what 2 we referred to as interim compensatory measures, 3 ICMs, for each utility to take action and then 4 initiated a rather extensive review of how we are 5 assuring appropriate safeguards of nuclear power 6 plants. The details of the specific requirements 7 and protective strategies for plants are not public 8 knowledge for obvious reasons. If somebody wanted 9 to do ill -- who had ill will towards a nuclear power 10 plant and was able to access all the protective 11 strategies that would benefit them in accomplishing 12 their goal, so the details of that is not public 13 information, but rest assured that the commission has 14 put a tremendous amount of effort, including the 15 commissioners, I refer to them as the five great 16 Americans, has put a tremendous amount of effort into 17 re-evaluating closely, coordinating with the 18 Department of Homeland Security, aligning our 19 security, organization and regulations with the 20 expectations of the Department of Homeland Security.
21 Weve been a leader in the Government in that regard.
22 Homeland Security has a very broad umbrella and --
23 not only in nuclear power force, but in Border 24 patrol, imports and exports, coordination of local 25 law enforcement. Its just -- their task is MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
38 1 daunting, but its important that each of the 2 Government agencies get aligned with homeland 3 security expectations and the NRC has been a leader 4 in that regard, so weve continued to take aggressive 5 steps to refine and expand the security strategies, 6 protective strategies, for nuclear power plants.
7 Our inspection program, youll see a very 8 general paragraph in front of each inspection report 9 that assures the public that these security 10 inspections are ongoing. Again, the details are not 11 provided for the same reasons that I discussed 12 earlier, and we continue to have inspections at 13 Davis-Besse to make sure that security strategies are 14 appropriate and Davis-Besse is taking actions 15 consistent with our expectations. Its a good 16 subject. Thank you.
17 MS. LIPA: Okay. Anybody else?
18 MS. EBERT: My name is Christina 19 Ebert. My concern is in regards to the evacuation 20 plan. Its my understanding that it only covers a 21 10 to 15 mile radius and volunteer bus drivers would 22 have to come in and take the people to Sandusky High 23 School or gymnasium. How is that effective -- first 24 question, and then second question, what about the 25 residents who live on the Islands in Lake Erie?
MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
39 1 MR. GROBE: I dont know the 2 specific answer about Middle Bass and -- I cant 3 remember the names.
4 MS. EBERT: Kelleys Island, 5 Put-in-Bay, Middle Bass, Mouse Island.
6 MR. GROBE: There you go. The 7 NRC emergency planning regulations are predicated on 8 whats referred to as an Emergency Planning Zone and 9 that zone is roughly a 10 mile radius throughout the 10 plant. The selection of the Emergency Planning Zone, 11 the minimum size which is a 10 mile radius, is based 12 on projected worse case post accident radiation 13 effects. The -- oftentimes the Emergency Planning 14 Zone is not a circle because it needs to follow local 15 boundaries, you know, townships or counties or things 16 like that, so oftentimes its very oddly shaped, but 17 its roughly a 10 mile radius around the plant.
18 The emergency planning -- the off site 19 emergency planning is not actually regulated by the 20 NRC, its required to be effective by the NRC, but 21 its not regulated by the NRC. Its regulated by the 22 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. Its 23 implemented through the State and the local 24 officials, so the -- for example, Ottawa County is 25 very active in the emergency planning at the MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
40 1 Davis-Besse station as well as the State of Ohio.
2 On site emergency planning is our responsibility.
3 Every two years a comprehensive drill is conducted 4 involving all of the elements of the emergency 5 procedures, and it just so happens that that drill 6 occurred June 10th, and the drill was very 7 successful. An inspection report on that will be 8 out shortly, I would expect in about 10 or 15 days, 9 so you can read about it there. Not only did the 10 NRC have an assessment but the Federal Emergency 11 Management Agency had an assessment of the on site 12 effectiveness, so its a combination of the planning 13 is extensive. The numbers of organizations involved 14 in the planning is very extensive, and it does 15 include things like utilizing school busses and 16 things to move people that cant be moved otherwise.
17 Its a very detailed plan. I would suggest if you 18 need more information that Jere Witt, W-I-T-T, who is 19 the Ottawa County Administrator, would be an 20 excellent source of information on off site emergency 21 planning. Not only is it required for the operation 22 of a nuclear power plant, but its also a tremendous 23 benefit, and Mr. Witt has made comment on a number of 24 times the response to the tornado that was less than 25 a year ago, I believe, in Ottawa County was MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
41 1 significantly enhanced because of the emergency 2 planning for Davis-Besse. All of that 3 infrastructure was in place for communications and 4 coordination of the response, so it benefits the 5 County in a lot of regards. Thank you for your 6 question.
7 MS. EBERT: Thank you.
8 MS. LIPA: Anymore questions?
9 MS. STEWART: Hi. My name is 10 Vanessa Stewart. Theres a lot of evidence that has 11 come out about the corrosion in the past year and a 12 half, and two of those pieces of evidence I thought 13 were interesting. There were air filters clogged 14 with rust color particles and boric acid. They had 15 to change those every other day since 1999, and then 16 there was also the red photo which The Plain Dealer 17 published that showed rust corrosion and boric acid 18 on the reactor. Obviously, FirstEnergy knew that 19 there were problems since at least 2000 or 99 with 20 the reactor. Their job is to keep the plant safe, 21 the facility clean, the reactor clean. The NRC had 22 two Resident Inspectors at the site full-time also 23 doing that job.
24 Why didnt anyone notice or care about this 25 corrosion and attempt to shut it down, and why did MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
42 1 the NRC allow them to extend the shutdown from 2 November until about February?
3 MS. LIPA: Well, Ill tell you what I 4 know about that because these questions have come up 5 before. During the AIT, which was the first 6 inspection we did after the corrosion was found last 7 March. We did an Augmented Inspection Team in April, 8 and they looked through a lot of documents and they 9 found these, what we call missed opportunities, which 10 were the air filters that were clogged, thats when 11 they found the red photo, and they started piecing 12 together what information should have been available 13 if Davis-Besse staff had been putting it altogether 14 to figure out that there was corrosion going on.
15 There has been other things going on that may have 16 masked some of the signs, and they thought that it 17 was indicating something different when, in fact, it 18 was this corrosion, so thats kind of part of it, but 19 we have been talking for -- I mean, thats why we 20 have 0350 and thats why we have been looking into 21 all these areas, and the licensee did a root cause 22 because how were these things missed that were very 23 important to understand and learn from those going 24 forward.
25 Also, the NRC did a Lessons Learned Task MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
43 1 Force to understand what the inspectors do for 2 inspections, what the headquarters involvement was 3 with the bulletin and the request for extension on 4 Davis-Besses part, so based on the Lessons Learned 5 Task Force, we came out with a number of -- the NRC 6 Task Force came out with a number of actions, 7 recommended actions to be taken to improve our 8 processes, but theres no easy answer to tell you why 9 these were missed or why they werent put together 10 sooner, I dont really have one answer. I mean, we 11 have all been asking those questions for a long time.
12 MS. STEWART: I just dont 13 understand why anyone could consider restart when 14 this evidence was present and it was overlooked like 15 that.
16 MS. LIPA: Well, and thats what 17 we have been looking at with the root cause, you 18 know, how did this happen and how did the processes 19 that were in place at the plant allow it to happen 20 undetected, and so thats why the utility has been 21 doing a lot of program reviews and root cause reviews 22 and corrective actions to try to understand how to 23 prevent it from happening again. I mean, thats the 24 main focus of the root cause is to find out why did 25 it happen, what broke down and what needs to be MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
44 1 corrected, so I understand what youre saying, thats 2 why we have a Restart Checklist, and we wont 3 authorize restart until the panel is convinced that 4 the plant is ready to restart safely, and we have to 5 go through NRC management, so that will all be 6 reviewed.
7 MR. GROBE: You folks are asking 8 just outstanding questions tonight. Theres just a 9 plethora of investigations that are still ongoing.
10 Our Inspector General, its an organization that 11 reports to Congress but works at the NRC, they have 12 investigators and there are ongoing investigation of 13 NRC staff and involvement in what happened.
14 In addition to that, the General Accounting 15 Office, which is a separate Government entity also 16 reports to Congress has an ongoing investigation of 17 the NRC, much more broad based than the Inspector 18 Generals investigation.
19 In addition to that, we have an ongoing 20 investigation, our office of investigations of the 21 utility, and all of these activities are trying to 22 get at the exact question youre asking.
23 On a more organizational level, theres been 24 extensive assessment of the causes of what happened 25 at Davis-Besse, and those documents have been MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
45 1 submitted to us, and I believe were published on our 2 website and we found -- we categorize those, we call 3 them root cause assessments. We categorize them in 4 two areas in our checklist; one is the technical 5 aspects of how this corrosion occurred and how the 6 cracking occurred and why it occurred, and, like I 7 said, thats fairly highly technical. The utility 8 did an assessment of that. Unfortunately, in the 9 process of doing the activities very early in the 10 outage last year, much of the evidence was eliminated 11 which could have provided additional insight into --
12 this is prior to the discovery of the corrosion. At 13 the same time, they were doing repairs on the control 14 rod drive mechanisms that were cleaning the head, and 15 that head cleaning activity removed a lot of the 16 evidence that would have provided additional insight.
17 Notwithstanding that aspect of the technical root 18 cause, theres a number of organizations that are 19 working closely together to further understand 20 materials issues. Theres an organization called the 21 Electric Power Research Institute which has a 22 materials reliability project, and thats metal type 23 materials is what theyre focused on, and they have 24 research ongoing which is coordinated very closely 25 with the Nuclear Energy Institute and the Nuclear MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
46 1 Regulatory Commission Office of Research, so theres 2 what we evaluated and considered a reasonable and 3 plausible cause for the technical problem that 4 occurred at Davis-Besse, but theres additional 5 research going on to further understand materials 6 reliability in a broader context, because this issue 7 raised a whole lot of new questions that needed 8 studied.
9 On the more organizational side, there was a 10 rather extensive root cause. I think I saw Steve 11 Loehlein back there. Steve works for the utility.
12 He chaired the team that did the extensive root 13 cause assessment of the organizational performance 14 that was presented to us in a public meeting August 15 of last year, I believe it was, and thats available 16 on the public website, and that report is the one 17 that concluded that it was a combination of 18 management approaches and management attitudes toward 19 safety as well as incorrect priorities, which over a 20 period of years allowed the culture and expectations 21 of Davis-Besse to atrophy to the point where 22 information that was clearly indicating a problem is 23 happening was not properly responded to, and, as 24 Christine correctly pointed out, our Restart 25 Checklist captures all of the major aspects of the MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
47 1 root cause problems and assures that they are all 2 properly addressed before this plant is permitted to 3 operate again, so I believe both from an 4 organizational and a technical perspective the issues 5 are well understood what caused this, and the 6 licensee has created an assessment process and 7 improvement process. They call it their return to 8 service plan, and it has seven building blocks, and 9 that also is available on the website to address all 10 of these areas, and our checklist ensures that we 11 have correctly articulated to them and to the public 12 the issues that we feel are essential to be 13 adequately addressed before restart, and weve had 14 extensive inspection in each of those areas, so I 15 think the combination of the licensees assessments, 16 the NRCs oversight, their improvement efforts will 17 provide a sound basis for restart if the utility gets 18 to the point where theyve made sufficient 19 improvement that its appropriate.
20 MS. STEWART: And the two Resident 21 Inspectors that were at Davis-Besse late 2001 and 22 early 2002, are they still the current Resident 23 Inspectors, plus the third one that you just added?
24 MR. GROBE: Scott Thomas came in 25 January 2002, right?
MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
48 1 MR. THOMAS: 18 months ago, 2 whatever 18 months is.
3 MR. GROBE: About 18 months ago.
4 MS. STEWART: Is he the third?
5 MR. GROBE: No, Scott is the 6 Senior Resident. Hes actually the most senior of 7 the inspectors.
8 MS. STEWART: Okay.
9 MR. GROBE: The Resident Inspector 10 that was here during the time that the corrosion was 11 occurring is now at another facility. Jack Rutkowski 12 replaces him, and Monica is the third Resident thats 13 being added to the staff.
14 MS. STEWART: Thank you.
15 MR. GROBE: Thank you.
16 MS. LIPA: Does anybody else have 17 some questions or comments for us?
18 MS. RYDER: (Indicating).
19 MS. LIPA: Didnt have time to 20 get more letters?
21 MS. RYDER: Were knocking on 22 doors tonight. My name is Amy Ryder, Im with Ohio 23 Citizen Action. I just wanted to follow up on the 24 comment about the evacuation plan. I understand this 25 is not something thats under your jurisdiction, and MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
49 1 I understand what the FEMA regulations are, but I do 2 want to say that I have studied the Davis-Besse 3 emergency evacuation plan thoroughly. We have had it 4 reviewed by evacuation experts, and the evacuation 5 plan for Davis-Besse is not adequate. For example, 6 it is based on -- it is -- the plant is based on how 7 emergency experts or the people who wrote the plan, 8 how they would like people to behave in the event of 9 an accident and how people are likely to behave.
10 There is no evacuation plan for the Lake Erie 11 Islands, and this time of year there are huge numbers 12 of people that go out to the Islands. In fact, I 13 actually called the director for the Emergency 14 Management Agency of Ottawa County, and he told me 15 that there was no need for an evacuation plan for the 16 Lake Erie Islands because those were the most 17 resilient people he knew, which didnt seem like a 18 real adequate answer, and, again, I understand this 19 is not under your jurisdiction, but it does not seem 20 reasonable to me that you could consider returning 21 this plant to service without there being an 22 evacuation plan that would guarantee peoples safety 23 in the event of an accident.
24 MS. LIPA: Well, and thats a 25 good point. Is there somebody we can refer her to MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
50 1 if she has concerns about the plan?
2 MR. GROBE: Well, the best 3 location is the County, and if you dont get 4 satisfaction there, which it sounds like you have 5 already pursued that option, would be the State of 6 Ohio, the Emergency Management Agency, but if there 7 is no evacuation plan for the Islands, my only 8 assumption is that theyre outside the Emergency 9 Planning Zone.
10 MS. RYDER: 15 miles.
11 MR. GROBE: 15 miles, so theyre 12 outside the Emergency Planning Zone. Those 13 people -- the Emergency Planning Zone is predicated 14 upon the assessment of off site doses where you would 15 need to take action immediately, and whats been 16 interesting in significant emergency situations where 17 evacuations are necessary -- and they happen fairly 18 regularly, most commonly with train accidents, 19 chemicals, train accidents -- involved in train 20 accidents -- is that the evacuations are actually 21 quite orderly and in times of crisis people pull 22 together and work closely together, and with the 23 planning that we provide through our Emergency 24 Planning Regulations and FEMAs involvement, there is 25 clearly effective plans in place to facilitate MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
51 1 orderly response to emergency.
2 The -- I know that youve written a letter to 3 the State of Ohio, Amy, regarding the James Witt 4 report, and I spoke with the Governors office as 5 well as the Emergency Management Agency at the State 6 of Ohio and I dont -- Im not aware that they 7 responded to you.
8 MS. RYDER: They have not.
9 MR. GROBE: I would pursue that 10 also. Im confident that the issues that Mr. Witt 11 raised at Indian Point, which is a plant in New York, 12 are not a concern here, and that the emergency plan 13 at Davis-Besse is in good shape. One of the 14 requirements of the panel is that we coordinate with 15 any Federal agencies, other Federal agencies and 16 State agencies as necessary to ensure appropriate 17 coordination and readiness for restart if, in fact, 18 that occurs. Several months before any expected 19 restart what the Agency does is sends a letter to the 20 Federal Emergency Management Agency asking for their 21 opinion on the situation, the state of emergency 22 planning at Davis-Besse in this case, and that letter 23 has been sent, and we received a response. What 24 FEMA does is contacts the State and the counties and 25 validates both that they have no concerns, FEMA MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
52 1 itself, as well as the State and local officials have 2 no concerns.
3 One thing that was of particular concern to 4 us was that there was a tornado within the Emergency 5 Planning Zone last year, and we wanted to make sure 6 there was no damage to the emergency infrastructure 7 and FEMA assured us that was not the case, so weve 8 accomplished that activity. FEMA has responded to us 9 and said that there are no outstanding emergency 10 planning issues that theyre aware of or that the 11 State or the County is aware of that would affect the 12 restart of Davis-Besse.
13 In addition to that, as I mentioned earlier, 14 we just had a biennial, once every two years, 15 emergency exercise at Davis-Besse, so we had that 16 additional opportunity to have assurance that things 17 were in good shape.
18 MS. RYDER: Thanks.
19 MR. GROBE: Thanks.
20 MS. LIPA: Does anybody else have 21 any questions for us?
22 MR. GRABNAR: Good evening. My name 23 is John Grabnar. Im the Manager of Design 24 Engineering at the Davis-Besse plant, and during the 25 discussion today, and I know weve talked about it MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
53 1 earlier regarding safety culture, I feel compelled to 2 share with you an experience I just had today that I 3 think will help illustrate the differences in the 4 plant from prior to the head event to where were at 5 today.
6 Today I had a discussion with my entire 7 section. Theres about 50 professional or degreed 8 engineers, all technical staff, responsible for 9 maintaining the design and licensing basis of the 10 facility. We talked about safety culture today.
11 We all got in a big conference room, separated into 12 about six groups and had some questions that I 13 provided focusing on where you think were really at 14 today, what does safety culture mean to you, whats 15 different today from what happened in the past, and 16 the comments I got back, one of them I thought was 17 significant was, you know, we used to spend a lot of 18 time justifying why things are okay. Today were 19 fixing items, just fixing the plant, making it safer.
20 Now, theres another item people brought up that, you 21 know, we used to, in terms of raising safety issues, 22 we used to think, boy, before I could really raise 23 this issue am I going to have a good solution for it 24 so I can hurry up and get it fixed, and now we 25 realize that the best way to get a problem fixed is MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
54 1 to raise the issues, get people involved the right 2 ones that can fix it best, and you get the best 3 solution and fastest that way.
4 We talked about being encouraged to raise 5 those issues, and one of the engineers jumped right 6 up and said, you know what, if Im encouraged thats 7 great, but I dont need to be encouraged to raise a 8 safety issue. Thats my job, thats my 9 responsibility to do that, so I was extremely 10 encouraged that from the rank and file engineers of 11 people there that work for me on the front lines now 12 doing design change work, making sure the plant is 13 safe, they understand the difference between 14 behaviors that we had in the past and behaviors we 15 have today and the need to make sure those continue 16 as we go ahead and fix the plant and get it ready to 17 safely restart. Thanks.
18 MS. LIPA: Thanks, John.
19 THEREUPON, the audience applauded.
20 MS. LIPA: Does anybody else have 21 any comments they would like to make or questions for 22 us?
23 (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE).
24 MS. LIPA: Next month our meeting 25 is on August 12th, and were planning to be here MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
55 1 again at the Oak Harbor High School, and the 2 transcripts from todays and tonights meeting will 3 be available on our web page in about three or four 4 weeks. Does anybody else have any comments or 5 questions?
6 (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE).
7 MS. LIPA: Well be available 8 afterwards if anybody wants to come up and ask us 9 some questions. Okay. Good night, thank you.
10 THEREUPON, the meeting was adjourned.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900
56 1 CERTIFICATE 2 STATE OF OHIO )
) ss.
3 COUNTY OF HURON )
4 I, Marlene S. Lewis, Stenotype Reporter and 5 Notary Public within and for the State aforesaid, duly commissioned and qualified, do hereby certify 6 that the foregoing, consisting of 55 pages, was taken by me in stenotype and was reduced to writing by me 7 by means of Computer-Aided Transcription; that the foregoing is a true and complete transcript of the 8 proceedings held in that room on the 9th day of July, 2003 before The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
9 I also further certify that I was present in the room during all of the proceedings.
10 11 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal of office at Wakeman, Ohio this day of 12 , 2003.
13 14 Marlene S. Lewis 15 Notary Public 3922 Court Road 16 Wakeman, OH 44889 17 My commission expires 4/29/04 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARLENE S. LEWIS & ASSOC. REPORTERS (419) 929-0505 (888) 799-3900