ML031830347
| ML031830347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/2003 |
| From: | Roy D Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 50-443/03-301 50-443/03-301 | |
| Download: ML031830347 (40) | |
Text
ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Seabrook Station Scenario No.:
1 Op-Test No.:
1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
75% Dower Turnover:
reduce Dower to 50% in an exDeditious manner.
The reactor is at 75%. The diwatcher has requested that Seabrook Station Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 8
(N)ormi
~~
Malf. No. 1 Event I Twe" Event Description R(USIRO)
N(BoP)
OS1 000.06, "Power Decrease".
Crew continues downpower in accordance with ptFWPT505
'(ALL)
PT-505 fails low; control rods automatically insert.
LTRCLT459 W
)
Controlling PZR level channel, LT-459, fails low.
Charging increases and letdown isolates.
I N(RO) I Restore letdown to service.
1 1
Main generator breaker trips open (faulty 86 relay)
I M(ALL) I causing a loss of load turbine trip/reactor trip.
MFED037
~
MFRPSO19 C(USIBOP)
MSlVs are failed open and will not close automatically.
MFRPSOPO I
I I
I (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor c
SCENARIO 1 OVERVIEW The crew will take the shift at 75% with instructions from the SM to reduce power to 50%
in an expeditious manner as requested by the dispatcher.
After the crew has the shift, PT-505 fails low. The crew responds in accordance with OS1 235.05, "Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 or PT-506 Instrument Failure". The failure of this instrument will result in inward rod movement if rod control is in AUTO.
The RO should place rod control in manual to halt rod insertion. The crew will BYPASS PT-505 and continue with the startup with SM permission.
The crew continues with the power reduction. After the crew reduces power by 3-4%,
the controlling PZR level channel, LT-459, fails low. Charging flow will increase and letdown will isolate. The RO is expected to take manual control of the PZR level controller and restore PZR level. The RO will also restore letdown to service.
After PZR level is stabilized and letdown is restored, the main generator breaker trips open causing a loss of load and reactor trip. The crew is expected to enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection".
RCS and S/G pressures should rise due to trip. One PZR PORV and two S/G safety valves on S/G 'A open and fail open during the transient. If pressure does not get high enough to lift them, the simulator instructor will fail them open and stick them open.
It is expected that the crew will identify the stuck open PZR PORV early in E-0 and shut the associated block valve, mitigating the vapor space LOCA. If they do not, they will be directed to E-I, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" where they will be directed to shut the affected block valve.
The stuck open S/G safeties should cause transition from E-0 to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator".
All 4 MSlVs are faulted at the beginning of the scenario such that they do not close automatically. Operator action will be required to shut the MSIVs, which will compound difficulties during the S/G depressurization due to the stuck open safeties.
Crew should remain in E-I until S/G 'A' blows down completely after which the crew will be directed to ES-I.I, "SI Termination". The scenario can be terminated when the crew transitions to ES-1.I or when the lead examiner is satisfied.
Part C - Operating Exam - Scenario 1 Event PT-505 TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER Descri Time tion:
Position FAILS LOW Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
NOTE I Shaded items are (CRITICAL TASKS.
CREW NOTE CUE Continue power decrease in accordance with OS1 000.06, "Power Decrease".
The first event will take place shortly after the crew assumes the watch and prior to any actions to reduce power so that the first event takes place while control rods are in AUTO.
After the crew has the watch and on the lead examiner's cue, PT-505 transmitter fails. This generates a B7457 ROD MOTION DETECTED and a D4421 TAVE-TREF DEVIATION alarm on the RO VAS. The sound of rods stepping in should be noted by the crew.
RO may take manual control of rods as a skill of the operator. He is USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 BOP us RO BOP BOP us NOTE Page I of 8 expected to check that the rod motion is not warranted by high Tave or turbine load reduction first.
Checks W-PI-505 and determines it has failed low and informs US.
Enters OS1 235.05, "Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 Or PT-506 Instrument Failure" Places rod control in MANUAL. Manually controls rods to restore Tavg to program level.
Place steam dump controller to PRESSURE mode and adjust steam dump pressure setpoint to 1092 psig.
Verifies other plant status items (AMSAC, P-13)
Verify TS compliance TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item 18.f. Rx Trip System Instrumentation. Action 8: determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator windows that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. Contacts maintenance/l&C about channel failure. Directs I&C to place AMSAC channel in BYPASS.
I&C will be called to troubleshoot the failed instrument. The instrument will be put in BYPASS which will remove input to any controVprotection systems. The I&C personnel will also conduct any tripping of bistables called for by Technical Specification Action Statements.
The crew continues with the power reduction. After the crew reduces power by 3-4%,
and when directed by the lead examiner, the controlling PZR level channel, LT-459, fails low. Charging flow will increase and letdown will isolate. The RO is expected to take manual control of the PZR level controller and restore PZR level. The RO will also restore letdown to service.
FAILURE OF CONTROLLING PZR LEVEL INSTRUMENT Applicants Actions or Behavior After crew completes OS 1235.05, SM directs them to continue shutdown. Allow candidates to demonstrate reactivity control by reducing power by 34% (lead examiners discretion).
During power reduction, RO must maintain AFD within administrative limits.
If US directs, place heater level controls in Local (Level) Control Mode.
DETERMINE the quantity of boric acid required to make the desired reactivity change from RSI 735,Reactivity Calculations SET CS-FK-1 I O, RCS boric acid makeup flow controller, to the desired flow rate SET the boric acid supply counter to the desired acid quantity TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to BORATE.
Operators are required to remain at the makeup controls during the boration/dilution and makeup evolution. This will ensure proper system response is verified as well as the desired amount.
TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to START When the boric acid supply counter has added its preset quantity, VERIFY the boration stops. TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP.
PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to OFF.
As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic blended makeup.
As directed by US, if RCS boron concentration is being changed by greater than 50 ppm, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.
RO will manually insertlwithdraw rods to maintain axial flux difference in band.
Use the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to the desired load but not less than 45%.
If reducing load with the load selector. FOLLOW the load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.
Maintain generator VARs consistent with load per The Turbine Generator Capabilitv Curve and load dimatchefs instructions.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 2 of 8
BOP BOP t
I I Recognizes controlling channel (Ll-459) has failed low. Recognizes I I
I RO Maintain the manual voltage regulator nulled.
Maintain speed deviations for both main feed pumps nulled.
us letdown has isolated. Informs US.
Enters and directs action IAW OS1 202.07, "PZR Level Instrument RO Failure".
Takes manual control of PZR level controller RC-LK-459 or controls RO level with letdown and charging flow.
Selects an alternate level channel for CONTROL/BACKUP as I
I I Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Verifies redundant channel I
RO RO necessary. Selects an alternate RECORDER channel.
Determines that letdown can be restored and restores letdown IAW OS1201.07.
Establish normal letdown: OPEN CC-V341, place CS-TK-130 in AUTO, RC-LCV-460, OPEN CS-V145, establish letdown flow using letdown flow CLOSE CS-HCV-189, CLOSE CS-HCV-190, OPEN RC-LCV-459, OPEN RO USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 control valves.
Returns PZR level controller to AUTO after new controlling channel Page 3 of 8 us selected.
Verifies TS compliance 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item I I and TS 3.3.3.6 NOTE bistables NOT tripped and inform I&C of controller failure.
Table 3-3.1 item 1 I:
inoperable channel LT-459 tripped within 6 NOTE hours.
TS 3.3.3.6 requires that LT-459 be returned to operable status within 7 days.
When directed by the lead examiner, the main turbine generator output breaker will trip open due to a faulty 86 relay. This will cause a reactor trip. Immediately after the reactor trip, PZR PORV 456A is failed open and 2 safety valves on S/G A are failed open. The MSlVs are failed open such that they will close only with manual operation.
The A S/G will depressurize fairly rapidly. The crew should enter E-0 then transition to E-2 then ES 1.1 where the scenario can be terminated. A brief transition to E-I may be made if the crew does not shut the PZR PORV early in the event.
I Event MAIN GENERATOR BREAKER TRIP I REACTOR TRIP Applicants Actions or Behavior After the US discusses TS requirements for the failure of controlling PZR level instrument, and at the discretion of the lead examiner, the main turbine generator output breaker will open on fault resulting in a loss of load/reactor trip. The first-out alarm will be TURBINE TRIP in addition to several trip related alarms.
PZR PORV 456A fails OPEN. The operators have the red valve open indicator lamp as indication that the valve is OPEN. Two SG safeties fail open on SG A. It is expected that the PZR PORV will be detected early. The SG safeties may not be noticed until appropriate diagnosis step in E-0. SG A ERN OPEN indicators on UL-2 and UL-4 indicate that SG A is at low pressure and EFW has been automatically secured to it on high EFW flow.
Enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection The RO may ask permission from the US to take manual control of PORV 456A and shut it (skill of the trade). The valve will fail to close. The RO will be directed to close the associated block valve.
Reactor trip immediate actions: verify reactor trip, turbine trip, power to AC buses, and SI actuated.
Performs ESF Actuation Verification per Attachment A of E-0 (SI will actuate approximately 1 minute after the reactor trip due to low RCS pressure).
Check main steam line isolation required. Crew may not meet criteria in this step to shut MSlVs yet. MSlVs will NOT automatically isolate (they are faulted OPEN). BOP will have to manually shut MSlVs if required here.
Verify Total EFW Flow -Greater than 500 GPM. BOP may recognize at this point that EFW is isolated to A S/G on high flow (if S/G pressure is low enough).
Stabilize S/G water levels - maintain S/G water levels 25-50%
narrow range by opening EFW pump mini-flow valves and throttling EFW flow. (operator action summary page)
Monitor RCS temperature - Stable At or Trending to 557F. RCS will be cooling down due to PZR PORV open and steam demand from stuck open S/G safeties. Stop dumping steam to condenser and atmosphere. OPEN EFW min-flow valves AND throttle total feed flow to maintain greater than 500 gpm. If cooldown continues, close MSlVs and MSIV bypasses.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 4 of 8
us have been earlier).
CLOSE MS-V393 (steam supply to EFW pump). CLOSE MSD-V44 (main steam drain to S/G 'A'). CLOSE SB-V9 (blowdown isolation valve to S/G 'A). The isolation of the 'A' S/G mitigates radioactive release to the public and is a critical task per NUREG 1021 App D.
If S/G boils dry, the BOP may adjust ASDV setpoints to stabilize RCS temperature as directed by Operator Action Summary page of Check if ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced. Crew is directed to ES-1.I, "SI Termination".
Lead examiner may terminate scenario at any point in ES-I.I BOP NOTE E-2.
RO/US CUE decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or may be completely depressurized.
Directs transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator" based on S/G
'A' demessurization.
NOTE USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Ensure the MSlVs are closed before an ORANGE path condition on the pressurized thermal shock CSF tree. Ensure that the PORV was closed prior to an ORANGE condition on core cooling CSF tree.
Page 5 of 8
Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario I MFRPSO1 9 MFRPS020 RESET simulator to IC 101, 75% power.
INSERT INSERT Please track the following parameters in addition to the standard set (if any):
ptFWPT505 SR, IR, and PR power level Loop 2 Tave Loop2 Tc Thermocouples (2 channels)
RCS pressure PZR level RVLIS (all level channels)
CCP, RHR, SI flow rates into the RCS S/G A water level (NR and WR)
S/G A pressure All MSlV position indication.
FailLow INSERT Perform immediately after simulator is in RUN:
Shortly after the crew assumes the watch and only after lead examiners cue:
The crew will contact I&C to respond to PT-505. Simulator operator will play role of I&C. When directed by crew, bypass PT-505. If the crew does not make a decision on bypasdtrip status, call in as SM and direct BYPASS of PT-505.
To select operator bypass for PT-505:
PANEL OVERVIEW I AMSAC CP-519 Select SWITCH SW12 to TBIMP(P505)
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 6 of 8
Crew continues power reduction.
LTRCLT459 When directed by lead examiner:
Fail Controlling PZR Level Transmitter.
Fai I Low INSERT I Comeonent Malfunction - Reactor Coolant I
MS-V6 MS-V7 FailOpen INSERT FailOpen INSERT When I&C is directed to bypass LT-459:
To select operator bypass for LT-459:
PANEL OVERVIEW CP-1 DOOR OPEN SWITCH to OPEN I CPI - BTI BYPASS ENABLE SWITCH to ENABLE Select LB-459A BYPASS When directed by lead examiner:
Main Generator Breaker Trip:
I MFED037 - Main Generator Breaker Trip I INSERT Insert following 2 malfunctions immediately after Main Generator Breaker Trip:
PZR PORV 456A Fails OPEN I ComDonent Malfunction Reactor Coolant I
VpRCPCV456A I FailOpen I INSERT I
SIG A Safeties Fail OPEN Briefing Sheet for Scenario 1 The dispatcher has requested that Seabrook Station reduce power to 50% in an expeditious manner.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 7 of 8
No equipment is out of service.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 8 of 8
Amendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I Facility:
Seabrook Station Scenario No.:
2 Op-Test No.:
1 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Reactor is at I O
- amm. CCP B is taqued out for maintenance.
Turnover:
power increase to raise reactor Dower to minimum loadinu.
Power increase is in proat-ess. Current Dower level is I O4 amw. Continue Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event DescriDtion I
Normal power increase to minimum loading in accordance with OS1000.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load and OS1000.07, Approach to Criticality.
S/G C level transmitter, LT-539, fails high. C S/G FRV bypass valve closes.
30 GPD primary to secondary tube leak on S/G A.
S/G A ASDV fails OPEN.
LTFWLT539 I(US,BOP) 2 3
MFSGOOZ C(US,BOP) 4 ptMSPK3001 C(US,BOP) 5 ptRCPT455 I(US,RO)
PZR pressure instrument, PT-455 fails high. PZR spray initiates.
S/G A 500 gpm tube rupture.
Control rods fail to insert automatically and manually (ATWS).
6 M(ALL)
MFSGOOZ 7
C(ALL)
MFCPOO5 AUTORODS MANUALRODS FRPSOOI FRPSOOZ bkCPRTA bkCPRTB override Rx Trip SW MFCCO16 8
C(US,RO)
CCP A trips. Crew must start positive displacement pump to complete emergency boration.
(N)orm (R)eactivii (1)nstt-u lent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SCENARIO 2 OVERVIEW The crew will take the watch at CCP B is tagged out for maintenance. The crew is instructed to continue a power increase in accordance with OS1 000.07, Approach to Criticality and OS1000.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load.
amps on the intermediate range channels.
NOTE: The control rods are faulted such that they will not insert from the beginning of the scenario.
After the crew assumes the watch, they will continue power ascension in accordance with OS1 000.07, Approach to Criticality. Once the lead examiner is satisfied with the reactivity addition, the C S/G level transmitter, LT-539, fails HIGH. The high input to the feed control system will cause C S/G feed regulating bypass valves to modulate closed, securing feed to C SIG. The is no redundant channel for this level transmitter thus the BOP operator must maintain manual control of S/G C feed regulating bypass valve for the remainder of the startup.
Once level control is regained in the S/Gs (proper level not necessary), a 30 gpd tube leak develops on S/G A. The crew should respond to the leak in accordance with OS1227.02, Steam Generator Tube Leak. This procedure has the crew verify lineups and notify Chemistry of the tube leak. The crew will begin calculating leak rate. While making the proper notifications, S/G A ASDV will fail OPEN. The BOP will takemanual control of the valve and close it. The US will verify TS compliance.
After the ASDV is closed, the controlling PZR pressure instrument fails high.
PZR spray initiates. RCS pressure will decrease rapidly. It is expected that the RO will verify RCS pressure is normal and manually secure PZR spray flow. If the crew is too slow, the plant may trip on low pressure. A plant trip will not negatively affect the scenario at this point because the control rods are faulted. If the crew trips the plant, the S/G tube rupture will be inserted immediately (500gpm) on S/G A.
When PZR sprays are secured and RCS pressure is steady or rising, a 500 gpm tube rupture will start on S/G A. PZR level will decrease as the leak rate is greater than the capacity of the charging system. When the crew manually initiates SI, the A CCP trips. The US will order a manual safety injection at this point if the plant did not trip automatically. Control rods will not insert in response to any action by the crew.
Crew combats ATWS in accordance with FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS. CCP A tripped, thus the normal emergency boration flow path is not available. The RO will line up and start the positive displacement pump to complete the emergency boration.
The crew will address the tube rupture in accordance with E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture".
The scenario is complete when the crew completes a cooldown to the target value in E-3.
Part C - Operating Exam - Scenario 2 The purpose of scenario two is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures as well as actions for a S/G tube rupture and ATWS event.
The crew takes the watch with instructions to continue a power increase from IO* amps to minimum loading on the main turbine. CCP 'B' is danger tagged for maintenance.
The S/G 'Cy level transmitter, LT-539, fails high resulting in S/G 'C' feed regulating bypass valves modulating closed, securing feed to S/G IC'.
Time Position NOTE CREW NOTE NOTE RO RO CUE BOP us BOP BOP BOP us SIG 'C' LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH Applicant's Actions or Behavior Crew assumes the watch and continues with power ascension on step 4.7 of OS1200.07, "Approach to Criticality" then starts OS1200.02, "Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Loading".
Expect a reactivity brief.
Step 4.7.1 of OS1200.07: The reactor is critical and power is being maintained at approximately 10' amps in the intermediate range. To continue plant startup to minimum load, refer to OS1000.02.
Caution: Do not exceed the capacity of the startup feed pump (1 91 amps or 3% RTP). Do NOT exceed a STABLE start up rate of 1 DPM.
Increase reactor power to between 1% and 3% by soluble boron control or control rod motion, and maintain TAVG greater than or equal to TREF and within the limits of Figure 2, TAVG Program.
RO will have manual control of control rods and withdraw rods at a rate determined by US, probably 2-step incremenk Once the reactivity manipulation is completed satisfactorily, the lead examiner will direct the failure of the 'C' S/G level transmitter, LT-539, to it's HIGH value. The high S/G level will cause 'C' S/Gs feed regulating bypass valve to modulate closed and 'C' S/G water level to decrease. No immediate alarm is received. If crew does not notice failure, the SG C LEVEL HI/LO annunciator will come in.
Informs US of lowering S/G water levels in 'C' S/G. The BOP will verify level deviation on controlling level channel, MI-LI-539 OR RN-Ll-553. The BOP will take manual control of S/G 'C' feed regulating bypass valve and restore S/G 'Cy water levels to the program level.
The US will enter and direct action from OS1235.03, "S/G Level Instrument Failure".
Place 'Cy steam generator bypass feed control valve in MANUAL.
Control S/G water level manually between 50-70% on the narrow ranae level detectors.
~
BOP may select different channel for feed regulating valve control in anticipation of future use during startup.
Verif; redundant bistables NOT tripped. Verify Technical Specification Compliance, TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item 13 Reactor Trip USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 1 of 11
System Instrumentation, TS 3.3.2 table 3.3-3, items 5.b, 6.a, 7.c, and 1O.c Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instruments, TS 3.3.3.6 table 3.3-10, item 7 Accident Monitoring Instruments.
TS Actions required:
For 3.3.1 and 3.3.2:
startup and/or power operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement is met. The channel may be bypassed up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance of other channels.
For 3.3.3.6: requires LT-539 to be returned to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Notifies I&C of level channel failure and directs them to come to the control room.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 2 of 11
A 30 gpd tube leak develops on S/G A.
This leak is not large enough to be noticeable on level instruments but will be detected on radiation monitors. While the crew is making the proper notifications for the tube leak, the A S/G ASDV will fail open.
Event Descril lime tion:
Position CUE us BOP/RO BOP/RO CUE BOP BOP us NOTE us 30 GPD PRIMARY TO SECONDARY TUBE LEAK ON S/G A Applicants Actions or Behavior At lead examiners cue, a 30 gpd leak develops on S/G A. RDMS alarms alert the crew to the leak. The first indication of the leak is S/G blowdown lines in an ALERT status on RDMS. Expected VAS alarms are B8442, PRI to SEC Leak Rate of Change HI and B8443 PRI to SEC Leak Rate of Change HI HI. Note: 30gpd tube leak will not be noticeable in any plant parameters except radiation monitors.
Enters and directs action of OSI227.02, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
Identify affected steam generators. Check RDMS for increasing radiation levels: main steam line monitors and S/G blowdown sample monitors.
Notify Chemistry to implement CS0905.08, Response to a Primary to Secondary Leak. Chemistry may recommend RDMS setpoint changes and report results of grab samples. Notifications to HP, plant management, and waste services will be made to facilitate station response to the leak.
While the crew is implementing 081227.02 (during notifications), a S/G A ASDV will begin to fail open. The failure is ramped over 30 seconds. The ATMOS STM DUMP VALVE OPEN annunciator will come in as well as the VAS alarm D5214 ASDV A NOT FULL CLOSED.
Place controller for ASDV to manual - MINIMUM Verifies Technical Specifications are met. T.S. 3.7.1.6 Atmospheric Release Valve and T.S. 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves.
TS 3.7.1.6 and 3.6.3 are not applicable due to ASDV being manually operable.
Refer to FR-H.4, Response To Loss Of Normal Steam Dump Capabilities USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 3 of 11
After the crew shuts the 'A' S/G ASDV manually, the controlling PZR pressure channel fails high. This results in a rapid pressure decrease in the RCS. The crew will have to take action to manually shut the PZR spray valves or take manual control of the master pressure controller to mitigate the pressure decrease.
RO Event I FAILURE OF CONTROLLING PZR PRESSURE CHANNEL PT-455 flow to return RCS pressure to program band.
Select an alternate pressure channel for CONTROUBACKUP.
Descril Time us ion:
Position breaches and will verify pressure setpoints on the master controller.
Verify Redundant Channel Bistables NOT TRIPPED and Verify Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the 'A ASDV is closed and the US has addressed any TS issues, the controlling PZR pressure instrument, PT-455, fails high.
PZR spray initiates. RCS pressure decreases quickly. The crew will receive VAS alarm F7860 PZR PRESS HI CHANNEL TRIP and the NOTE I PRESSURIZER PB-455A PRESS HI annunciator will come in.
I Uses VAS alarm procedure or skill of the operator to identify failed RO Technical Specification Compliance: TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1, items 7'9, and I O Reactor Trip System Instrumentation. TS 3.3.2 table 3.3-3 items 1.d and 1O.a ESFAS Instrumentation. TS 3.2.5 DNB Parameters (if RCS pressure drops below 2185 psig). Ensures I&C is informed and directs all appropriate bistables in attachment A are tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
TS Actions:
I PT-455 instrument. The RO may take manual control of the master us NOTE RO pressure controller or spray valves to control RCS pressure.
Enters and directs actions in OSI201.06, "PZR Pressure Instrument PT-455/458 Failure".
If pressure decrease is not stopped quickly, the reactor will trip on low pressure. This should not affect the course of the scenario because the control rods are already faulted. The simulator instructor will insert the tube rupture immediately if the plant trips on low pressure.
Realign Pressure Instruments. If not done so already, the RO will either take manual control of the master pressure controller or spray RO I The RO will verify that there are no other pressure boundary USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 4 of 1 i
After the crew stabilizes RCS pressure and restores RCS pressure control to automatic, the tube leak in S/G 'A develops into a 500 gpm tube rupture. The crew will manually SI because PZR level cannot be maintained with normal charging. Control rods will fail to insert on the SI. The crew will take action for an ATWS when they realize that control rods will not insert. CCP 'A' trips on overcurrent when the SI is manually initiated, preventing the crew from performing a normal emergency boration. Emergency boration will be lined up in an alternate lineup using the positive displacement pump (PDP).
Event I
500 GPM TUBE RUPTURE I ATWS Descril Time ion:
I Position CUE Applicant's Actions or Behavior After the US determines TS compliance for PT-455, the 500 gpm tube rupture will be inserted on S/G 'A. The 500 gpm leak is beyond the capability of both centrifugal charging pumps. The crew should receive VAS alarms PZR Pressure Lo & B/U Heaters On and PZR LEVEL DEVIATION annunciators and RDMS alarm "MAIN STEAM LINE LOOP 1 - HIHI'.
us Will determine that PZR level CANNOT be maintained with leak this RO us RO us RO large. Per OS1227.02 caution statement before step 1, SI is to be initiated if PZR level cannot be maintained greater than 5% with normal charging lineup. CCP 'A' fails when SI is initiated.
Manuallv initiates SI. Control rods do not insert. Informs US of ATWS iondition. Isolates letdown based on decreasing PZR level.
Enters and directs actions of E-0. Acknowledges ATWS condition.
Verify Reactor Tripped. RO determines that the reactor is NOT tripped and reports this to US.
Transition to FR-S.I. "ResDonse to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS". 'Dire& NSO to locally trip reactor.
Verify reactor tripped: reactor is NOT tripped.
RO Initiate Emergency Boration of the RCS. The RO should note that there are NO CCPs runnina.
2D and -1 12E. Isolate VCT by closing CS-LCV-I 128 NSO will oDen USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 5 of 11
I us I Returns to E-0 (procedure in effect) after FR-S.l is completed.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 6 of 1 I
The crew will address the 500 gpm tube rupture in accordance with E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture", after FR-S.l is exited. The scenario is complete once the crew isolates S/G 'A. The US will be expected to make an EAL evaluation for the end state of the scenario and complete section A.4 of the Administrative JPM Examination.
Event
==
Description:==
Time I Position I CUE 500 GPM TUBE RUPTURE ON SIG 'A' Applicant's Actions or Behavior When crew reaches step 13 of E-O they will be directed to E-3, RO/BOP "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" Identify ruptured steam generator using S/G narrow range level USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material - Scenario 2 BOP Page 7 of 11 (increasing uncontrollably) or radiationmonitors.
Adjust ruptured S/Gs ASDV controller setpoint to 1125psig.
Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 2 MFRPSOOl AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE TRA RESET simulator to IC 194, I O 4 amps & critical.
INSERT Initial Setup:
Conditions to make control rods untrippable from control room:
1 PANEL PDF12B Override Rx Trip Switches to RELEASE INSERT INSERT OVERRIDE I INSERT REACTOR TRIP FAILURE COMPONENT MALFUNCTIONS ROD CONTROL bkCPRTA I FAILCLOSED I
bkCPRTB I FAILCLOSED Place Train A Control Room Ventilation in Filter Recirc Mode Conditions for having charging pump B tagged out:
I RACKOUT CS-P-2B I
Override CS-VI 97 CLOSED Place CS-P-2B in PTL COMPONENT REMOTE FUNCTIONS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL BKCSIP2B 52 RF: RACKOUT I
ECCS TRAIN B B~PASSANOP cvcs TRB PUSHBUTTON 1
PANEL PDF1 1A INSERT OVERRIDE CS-VI 97 CLOSE SELECT CLOSE CS-VI 97 REDLIGHTOFF SELECT OFF INSEK I INSERT OVERRIDE CS-VI97 GREENLIGHTOFF SELECT OFF USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 8 of 11
S/G LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE After crew achieves their reactivity addition and on the lead examiners cue, fail the S/G C level transmitter.
PTMSPK3001 FAIL TO SPECIFIED VALUE COMPONENT MALFUNCTIONS FEEDWATER (Perform actions for BTI for failed channel if lead examiner requests.)
I LTFWLT539 I FAILHIGH I INSERT 1500 To trip bistables:
PANEL OVERVIEW DOOR OPEN SELECT OPEN TRIP CP-1 Place following switches to TESTlTRlP (or BYPASS):
LB 539A LB 5398 S/G A TUBE LEAK Once level is restored in Cy S/G, insert tube leak in S/G A MALFUNCTIONS STEAM GENERATOR I MFSG002 I SG A TUBE RUPTURE I I FINAL VALUE 0.021 GPM I INSERT S/G A ASDV FAILURE When the crew is making notifications for the tube leak, the lead examiner will cue the ASDV failure.
I I
I I RAMP 30 SECS I INSERT PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH After the crew gets the S/G A ASDV shut and on the lead examiners cue fail PT-455 high.
COMPONENT MALFUNCTION REACTOR COOLANT I PTRCPT455 I FAILHIGH I INSERT If the reactor trips due to low pressure, IMMEDIATELY insert the rod control and 500gpm tube rupture below.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 9 of 11
Otherwise, once RCS pressure is stable, and on the lead examiners cue, insert the rod control failure and 500 gpm tube rupture on S/G A.
ROD CONTROL FAILURE MALFUNCTION ROD CONTROL IMF MFCPOOS AUTO/MANUAL ROD MOTION FAILURE INSERT
~~
I 500 GPM TUBE RUPTURE ON S/G A MODIFY MFSG002 TO 500 GPM SET FINAL VALUE TO 500 I
INSERT I
I FAILURE OF CCP A When the crew manually initiates SI, fail the remaining CCP.
MALFUNCTIONS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL I MFCCO16
[ CS-P-2A OC TRIP I INSERT TRIP REACTOR After the crew establishes emergency boration with the PDP, manually open the reactor trip breakers.
DELETE MALFUNCTIONS MFRPSOOI AND MFRPSOOZ (and/or breaker MALFUNCTIONS) TO TRIP REACTOR.
Report to the control room that trip breakers have been opened locally.
Scenario 2 ends when target temperature is reached during E-3 cooldown.
USNRC Examination - Seabmk Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Pageloof11
Scenario 2 Briefing Sheet The reactor is at IO' amps. Step 4.6 of OS1000.07, "Approach to Criticality" is complete. The crew will continue a power increase in accordance with OS1200.02, "Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Loading".
The "B" CCP is tagged out for maintenance.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 11 of I 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I I1 Event Twe*
Facility:
Seabrook Station Scenario No.:
3 Op-Test No.:
1 ll Event Description Examiners:
Operators:
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
11 Initial Conditions:
Reactor is at 75%
I ttRClT411 ctRNFK509A MFRCOOG MFRC024 MFRHOOS MFRHOOG MF RPSOI 3 MF RPS014 MFRHOO3 CCBSVl4 I 11 I(USIBOP)
C(USIRO)
WALL)
Turnover:
SGFP from service. SW PumD 41C is taqaed out for maintenance.
Reactor Dower is at 75%. Crew must continue Dower decrease to remove A SGFP master speed controller fails (pumps slow down).
PCCW leak to supply of C RCP oil cooler. US will direct reactor trip on high RCP vibrations.
Large Break LOCA.
N(US,RO)
R(B0P)
Normal power reduction in accordance with OS1 000.06, Power Decrease I(US,RO)
Loop I Tc fails high resulting in high Tave for loopl; rods insert automatically.
C(US,BOP)
C(US,RO)
Both RHR and SI pumps fail to start automatically; manual start is required.
Containment isolation phase-B failed to auto initiate, manual action is required.
Loss of ECCS Recirculation
~
f, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SCENARIO 3 OVERVIEW The crew takes the watch with reactor power at 75%. The crew is instructed to continue with a power reduction to remove steam generator feed pump A from service for corrective maintenance.
When the crew assumes the watch they will continue with a downpower maneuver IAW OS1000.06, Power Decrease. After the crew takes the watch but before they commence the power reduction, Loop I Tc fails high resulting in Tave for loop 1 failing high. This results in an automatic rod insertion. The RO should take manual control of control rods and stop uncontrolled insertion. The crew will respond to the broken Tc instrument IAW OS1201.08, TAVG-Delta T Instrument Failure. The crew should defeat affected loop delta-T and Tavg inputs.
Once all bistables are tripped, channels defeated for the loop 1 Tavg instrument, the crew will continue with the power decrease. After a sufficient reactivity change is observed by the examining team, the lead examiner will cue the next event. The SGFP master speed controller setpoint is failed to zero, resulting in SGFPs slowing down. The RO will take manual control of each SGFP and restore proper feed flow.
Once feed flow is stabilized and plant condition is assessed by the US, a leak develops in the PCCW system to the supply of RCP cooling. The leak is 90gpm on the Cy RCP oil cooler. The leak is great enough to cause RCP shaft and frame vibrations above the ALERT limit. The US should direct a reactor trip based on RCP frame vibration greater than 5 mils.
When the crew completes immediate actions of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, a large break LOCA develops. The crew is expected to enter E-I,
Reactor Coolant or Secondary Coolant Leak to combat the LOCA.
Both RHR pumps and both SI pumps will fail to start automatically requiring manual action by the RO to restore injection to the RCS.
Containment isolation phase B fails to auto-initiate. Manual action is required to complete containment isolation.
The crew will have to transition to a coldleg recirculation scheme or a cooldown/depressurize scheme based on RCS pressure. It is expected that RCS pressure will be less than 260 psig at this point which results in transition to ES-I.3, Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation.
After the crew aligns the ECCS for recirculation, the A RHR pump and a valve in the B RHR train will fail resulting in a loss of recirculation cooling. The crew will transition to ECA-1.I to supply makeup water to the RWST.
The scenario is complete when makeup water is being supplied to the RWST.
Part C - Operating Exam - Scenario 3 The purpose of scenario three is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures as well as actions for a large break LOCA with complications.
The crew takes the watch with instructions to continue a power decrease from 75% to 50% to remove A SGFP from service. SW C is danger tagged for maintenance.
Loop 1 Tc instrument will fail high resulting in a high Tavg for loop I.
Auctioneered high Tavg will fail high resulting in inward rod motion.
Event
==
Description:==
Time I Position RO RO us RO RO RO RO RO us LOOP1 TC INSTRUMENT FAILS HIGH Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew assumes the watch and continues downpower from 75% to 50%.
Shortly after assuming the watch, upon lead examiners cue, a loop 1 Tc fails high resulting in high Tave for loop 1. The following VAS alarms will come in due to the failure: B7457 ROD MOTION DETECTED, D4422 AUCTIONEERED TAVG HIGH, and D4421 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION. The sound of rods driving inward will also cue the operators. Operators will have visual indication on loop 1 Tavg and delta-T instrumentation of which instrument has failed.
RO should identify which channel is faulted by using Tavg and Delta-T instruments.
Verify rod motion unnecessary and place rod control in MANUAL to stop insertion. The RO may do this very quickly prior to referencing any procedure as a skill of the trade.
Enters and directs action of OS1201.08, TAVG-Delta T Instrument Failure Determine loop I TAVG channel failed HIGH.
Place rod control in MANUAL (required by procedure at this point).
Depress loop 1 delta-T defeat pushbutton.
Depress loop I Tavg defeat pushbutton.
Restore Tavg within 1 F of Tref by manually controlling rod motion.
The operators may choose to reduce turbine load instead because they are performing a power decrease procedure-this is acceptable.
Place rod control in AUTO.
Verify redundant channel bistables NOT tripped and verify technical specification compliance. TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 items 7 & 8.
Coordinate with I&C for bypass operation or bistable tripping within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
TS Actions required:
For 3.3.1 ITEMS 7 & 8: startup and/or power operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the minimum channels OPERABLE reauirement USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 1 of 13
is met. The channel may be bypassed up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance of other channels.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 2 of 13
I Event FAILURE OF SGFP MASTER CONTROLLER
==
Description:==
Time Position CUE NOTE Applicants Actions or Behavior After the US determines TS compliance, crew will continue with power reduction.
During power reduction, RO must maintain AFD within administrative limits.
BOP RO If US directs, place heater level controls in Local (Level) Control Mode.
Calculates and aligns boration in accordance with OS1008.01, Chemical and Volume Control System Makeup Operations. See RO reference.
DETERMINE the quantity of boric acid required to make the desired RO RO reactivity change from RS1735,Reactivity Calculations SET CS-FK-I 10, RCS boric acid makeup flow controller, to the desired flow rate SET the boric acid supply counter to the desired acid quantity USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 RO RO NOTE RO RO Page 3 of 13 TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to BORATE.
Operators are required to remain at the makeup controls during the boration/dilution and makeup evolution. This will ensure proper system response is verified as well as the desired amount.
TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to START When the boric acid supply counter has added its preset quantity, VERIFY the boration stops. TURN the BLENDER MODE START RO SWITCH to STOP.
PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to RO RO RO OFF.
As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic blended makeup.
As directed by US, if RCS boron concentration is being changed by greater than 50 ppm, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.
RO will manually inserVwithdraw rods to maintain axial flux BOP difference in band.
Use the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD BOP BOP LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to-the desired load but not less than 45%.
If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.
Maintain generator VARs consistent with load per The Turbine Generator Capability Curve and load dispatchers instructions.
BOP BOP CUE BOP BOP Maintain the manual voltage regulator nulled.
Maintain speed deviations for both main feed pumps nulled.
Once crew has demonstrated a satisfactory reactivity addition, the SGFP master controller fails such that the SGFPs slow down. The following annunciators should illuminate: S/G A LEVEL HI/LO, S/G B LEVEL HVLO, S/G C LEVEL HVLO, S/G D LEVEL HVLO. VAS alarms D4770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION, D4770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION, D4770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION, and D4770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION will come in.
The RO should notice that the SGFP controller is malfunctioning and report condition to US (the RO will notice that the setpoint indicates 0).
Takes manual control of SGFP master controller and controls speed NOTE USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 manually to restore proper S/G water levels.
The BOP should reference the Secondary Technical Data Book to Page 4 of 13 BOP NOTE determine the proper delta-P for flow desired.
Manually controls SGFPs to maintain proper differential pressure for feed flow.
No TS compliances issues with this failure.
A PCCW leak develops in the C RCP oil cooler. The lack of cooling causes pump vibration and low levels in the PCCW expansion tank. The US will direct a reactor trip due to high vibrations on RCP IC. A large break LOCA develops immediately after the reactor trip. Both RHR pumps and both SI pumps fail to inject automatically and phase B containment isolation will fail to automatically initiate. The crew will eventually transition to either ES-1.3, Transition To Cold Leg Recirculation (expected) or ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. The RH-P-8A pump will fail after the recirculation lineup is established followed by closure of CBS-VI4 (suction valve for pump RH-P8B) resulting in a loss of ECCS cooling. The crew will transition to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
RO Event result in a manual reactor trip and subsequent securing of RCP I C.
Manually TRIP the reactor. RCP C will be secured after immediate
==
Description:==
Time Position E BOP PCCW LEAK ON RCP C OIL COOLEWLARGE BREAK LOCA (phase B status panel)
Stop all RCPs. RCPs may have been tripped earlier because Applicants Actions or Behavior When manual control of the SGFP master controller is complete and S/G water levels are being restored, insert a PCCW leak on RCP C oil cooler. Many VAS alarms will come in, including D5781 RCP C MOTOR VIBRATION HIGH and D4313 RCP C UPPER OIL RESVR LEVEL HIGH. The RCP VIBRATION HI annunciator will come in.
Will use plant computer to investigate RCP C -will determine that frame and shaft vibrations are high.
Orders reactor tripped because frame vibrations are greater than 5 mils. The ALARM level is 5 mils for RCP frame vibrations and will RO subcooling is below 40F. -
The RO Derforms attachment A of E-0 (SI alignment verification).
actions of E-0 are completed.
Enters and directs actions of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection I
I I CUE I After immediate actions of E-0 are taken, a large break LOCA BOP BOP BOP develops in the RCS.
Stabilize S/G water levels - maintain S/G water levels 25-50%
narrow range by opening EFW pump mini-flow valves and throttling EFW flow. (Operator Action Summary page)
At step 7 of E if containment pressure has risen above 18 psig, containment isolation must be verified. Actual containment pressure reaches approximately 30 psig. Operators should notice that phase Manually align valves and equipment necessary by status panel 1
levels: pressure and water levels will cause transition to E-I, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Will acknowledge RED path on P FR status tree. Enters FR-P.1. No operator action required.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 5 of 13
us Will acknowledge ORANGE path on Z FR status tree. Enters FR-2.1. No actions by applicants required. Staff will align hydrogen I
I I narrow range level between 5% and 50% (25% and 50% for adverse I BOP analyzers.
Open ERN pump mini-flow valves AND control feed flow to maintain i
Resets SI (step 10 of E-I).
NOTE Stops unloaded EDGs and resets them for auto-start. Press both emergency stop buttons. After the EDG has stopped, reset the EDG for auto-start. ISOLATE SW to the EDG.
At step 12, the US will determine to either transition to ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization or go to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation based on RCS pressure being less than or greater than 260 psig. It is expected that RCS pressure is less than 26Opsig and the crew will transition to ES-1.3.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 6 of 13
The crew transitions to ES-1.3, Cold Leg Recirculation. Once the crew completes the initial lineup, RHR pump RH-P-8A will trip on overcurrent and the suction valve for RH-P-86 will shut, isolating all RHR flow from the RCS. The crew must then transition to ECA
- 1. I to line up makeup water supply to the RWST.
Place RHR pump switches in the normal-after-start position.
NOTE us NOTE us USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 RHR pump P-8A trips on overcurrent Transitions back to E-I (end of ES-1.3).
Suction valve for RHR pump P-8B fails shut (Loss of ECCS Recirculation).
Transitions to ECA-1.I, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
Transition criteria are on the operator action summary page of E-I.
Page 7 of 13
RO RO RO us RO RO Check containment sump valve CBS-VI4 is OPEN-NO -if valve cannot be opened, then stop corresponding RHR and CBS pumps.
RO should stop RH-P-8B and CBS pump B.
Reset SI Reset automatic switchover S SIGNAL RESET FOR S/RWST LO-LC CBS-V8 or CBS-VI4 AUTO OPEN.
Locally OPEN makeup valves to RWST. Orders the following valves opened: CS-V446 and CS-V444.
Set BA flow counter for greater than 10,000.
Set total makeup flow counter for greater than 30,000.
RO Set total flow controller, CS-FK-111, for 120 gpm.
RO can be terminated by the lead examiner.
Set BA flow controller, CS-FK-I IO, for 40 gpm.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 RO Page 8 of 13 Place one RMW pump in AUTO. Place one BA pump in AUTO.
RO RO RO CUE Aligns the following valves: CS-FCV-I 1 OA AUTO, CS-FCV-1 I I A AUTO, CS-FCV-1 IOB CLOSED, and CS-FCV-I 1 1 B CLOSED.
Place the boric acid blender switch in MANUAL.
Place blender mode start switch to START.
Once BA flow and total makeup flow have been verified, the scenaric
The following script is provided in the case that the crew transitions to ES-I.2 instead of ES-1.3 following the LOCA. The scenario will be terminated when the crew establishes the maximum cooldown rate in step 8.
==
Description:==
Time Position RO I Event I ES-1.2. POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION I CONTINGENCY Applicants Actions or Behavior Reset SI.
RO RO us BOP RO NOTE BOP BOP BOP BOP CUE Reset Phase A and Phase B Containment Isolation Signals (T signal reset and P signal reset).
Place all PZR heater switches in OFF position.
Consult with TSC for a recommended minimum indicated PZR water level that will ensure heaters are covered.
OPEN EFW pump miniflow valves AND control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 5% and 50% (25% and 50% for adverse containment).
Monitors shutdown margin during cooldown.
Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs less than IOOF/HR.
Place the steam dump pressure controller in MANUAL and at minimum output.
Transfer steam dump control mode selector to steam pressure.
Bypass Low Low Tavg interlock as necessary to maintain steam dump operation during cooldown.
Slowly OPEN steam dumps to prevent a steamline isolation AND establish a cooldown rate less than IOOF/HR.
The lead examiner may terminate the scenario at this point after observina a Dortion of the cooldown.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 9 of I 3
Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 3 RESET simulator to IC101, 75% power.
PLEASE TRACK THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS IN ADDITION TO WHAT IS NORMALLY TRACKED:
Loop 2 Tave, Tc RCS pressure SR, IR, and PR power RHR flow rate into RCS PZR level RVLIS (some indication of water level in the reactor vessel)
Containment pressure Initial Setup:
SW Pump 41C tagged out for maintenance COMPONENT REMOTE FUNCTIONS SELECT CSW41 C BREAKER RACKED IN INSERT: RF: RACK-OUT SI Pumps fail to start on SI MALFUNCTIONS SAFETY INJECTION MFS1003 SI PUMP P-6A FAILS TO AUTO START I MFS1004 SI PUMP P-6B FAILS TO AUTO START RHR PumDs fail to start on SI MALFUNCTIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL MFRH005 RH-P-8A FAILS TO AUTO START MFRHOO6 RH-P-86 FAILS TO AUTO START Phase B Containment Isolation Fails MALFUNCTIONS REACTOR PROTECTION MFRPS013 I P SIGNAL FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE TRA I MFRPS014 I P SIGNAL FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE TRB Shortly after the crew assumes the watch, the lead examiner will cue event #I which is failure of Loop 1 Tc HIGH.
Failure of LOOD I Tc COMPONENT~\\~~ALFUNCTION REACTOR COOLANT ttRClT411 I FAILHIGH I INSERT USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 10 of 13
To trip bistables for loop I TdTavg:
I PANEL OVERVIEW I
MFRCOOG TRIP CP-I DOOR OPEN SELECT OPEN C RCP CC TO OIL COOLER LEAKAGE INSERT Place the following switches to TESTTTRIP:
TB-41 I G OP-delta T TB-411 C OT-delta T TB412G Low Tava for feedwater I TB412D Low Low-Tavg for PI2 To Bypass the Tc instrument:
I PANEL OVERVIEW I
DOOR OPEN SELECT OPEN SELECT ENABLE I
Place the following switches to BYPASS:
TB-411G OP-delta T TB-41 I C OT-delta T TB412G Low Tava for feedwater TB412D Low Low-Tavg for PI2 After TS evaluations are made for the Tc instrument, the reactor power decrease will continue. Once the lead examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change, he will cue the next event.
SGFP Master Controller Failure COMPONENT MALFUNCTION FEEDWATER CTFWFK509A FAILSETPOINT 0
INSERT I
-1 After the crew restores proper S/G water level and at the discretion of the lead examiner, insert the PCCW leak.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 11 of 13
The crew will trip the reactor and enter E-0. When the immediate actions of E-0 are complete and no later than 30 seconds after the trip, insert the LOCA.
MALFUNCTIONS REACTOR COOLANT MFRC024 RCS COLD LEG LOCA (DOUBLE ENDED SHEAR)
INSERT The crew will transition to ES-1.3, Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation. Once the crew aligns the ECCS system for recirculation, RH-P-8A fails.
Failure of RHR Pump 8A 1 MALFUNCTIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL I
I MFRH003 I RHR PUMP P-8A OC TRIP I INSERT The crew will transition back to E-I, when the crew reaches E-I, the RH-P-8B suction valve will fail shut.
Failure of CBS-VI4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING SPRAY cCBSV14 I GO TO POSITION 0 I INSERT On cue from the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 12 of 13
-n Scenario 3 Briefing Sheet The reactor is at 75%. Your crew is to continue a power decrease in accordance with OS1000.06, Power Decrease to 50% to facilitate taking SGFP A out of service for maintenance.
SW pump B is tagged out for maintenance.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 13 of 13