ML031350761

Tech Spec Change 01-09, Operations Involving Positive Reactivity Additions.

ML031350761
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/09/2003
From:	Salas P Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML031350761 (6)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 May 9, 2003 TVA-SQN-TS-01-09 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANTA(SQN) .UNITS 1,AND,2 -- TECHNICAL.

SPECIFICATION (TS)'^CHANGE NO.,01-09, "OPERATIONS,INVOLVING POSITIVE;REACTIVITY ADDITIONS"-ADDITIONAL.CHANGES-

Reference:

TVA letter to NRC dated July 10, 2002, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (S.QN) - Units 1 and 2 - Technical Specification (TS) Change No. 01-09, 'Operations

-Involving Positive.Reactivity-AdditiAons'"I This letter provi'des revised proposed TS changes (enclosed) for the subject change request. The NRC suggested this revision to the previously approved wording in TS Task Force 286, ReVxsion 1;-:the staff indicated-that-it would no longer be"found:acceptable,..-The revised language.-is editorial'.ih.n'ature. andAdoes not, change the- "No Significant Hazard Determination" contained in the referenced letter.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 9, 2003 This letter is being sent in accordance with NRC RIS 2001-05.

If you have any questions about this change, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J. D. Smith at (423) 843-6672.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the f regoing is true and correct. Executed on this 9 day of ly, L-Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Framatome ANP, Inc.

P. 0. Box 10935 Lynchburg, Virginia 24506-0935 ATTN: Mr. Frank Masseth Mr. Michael L. Marshall, Jr., Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-8G9A One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 Mr. Lawrence E. Nanney, Director Division of Radiological Health Third Floor L&C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, Tennessee 37243-1532

ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)

UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 327 AND 328 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NO. 01-09 REVISED MARKED-UP TS CHANGES El-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE# with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG

+/- 3%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5 ACTION:

MODE4 ADD--l -

With no pressurizer cod safety valve OPERABLE, immediately c Pnd peFafienn positive rcactivity changes an lace an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

MODE 5 o With no press er code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend operations that would cause introduction to the RCS, Goolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.2 and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within +/- 1%.

• The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve of nominal operating temperature and pressure.

1. A safety valve is not required OPERABLE provided at least one safety valve is removed from the pressurizer and the associated RCS breech is not covered by a pressure retaining membrane.

September 29, 1997 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 4-3 Amendment No. 104, 229 E1-2

f REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE# with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG +/- 3%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

MODE 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~sr With no pressurizer c de safety valve OPERABLE, immediately upend all operations involng positivc rcactivity changesd place an OPERABLE residual heat removal loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode./

MODE of coolant vVith no press er code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend operabons that would cause introductio to the RCS, eee4ant with boron concentrabon less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.2 and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operaion in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.2 No additonal Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specificabon 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within +/- 1%.

• The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

1. A safety valve is not required OPERABLE provided at least one safety valve is removed from the pressurizer and the associated RCS breech is not covered by a pressure retaining membrane.

September 29, 1997 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 4-6 Amendment No. 93, 220 E1-3

INSERT 1 suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, colant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.1 INSERT 2 no operations are permitted that would cause introduction nto the RCS 7 -

eeelant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.1, INSERT 3 suspend operations that would-cause introduction anto-the_RCS,z1nta

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with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.2 INSERT 4 no operations are permitted that would cause introduction nto the RCS,-

eeelant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.2, INSERT 5 and suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required shutdown margin or boron concentration.

INSERT 6 and suspend operations that would cause introduction nto the RCS 7 -

eeelant with boron concentration less than required to meet LCO 3.9.1.

INSERT 7 With the minimum required AC power sources not available, it is required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (Mode 5) or boron concentration (Mode 6). Suspending positive reactivity

~addit'it'hat coUld'fesult7i'd-failureto-meet mini'mum SDM or--boron -

concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation.

Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than or equal to that required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

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