Text

Part 2 of 2 - Request for Amendment to Technical Specifications 3.2.4, 3.3.1, & 3.3.3
	ML023190040
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/07/2002
From:	Mauldin D; Arizona Public Service Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	102-04864-CDM/TNW/DWG
	Download: ML023190040 (90)
	v • d • e

Attachment 2 Proposed Technical Specification Pages (retyped)

DNBR (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.2.4 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.4 Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)

LCO 3.2.4 APPLICABILITY:

The DNBR shall be maintained by one of the following methods:

a.

Maintaining Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service, and either one or both Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs) are OPERABLE):

b.

Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by the allowance specified in the COLR (when COLSS is in service and neither CEAC is OPERABLE);

c.

Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the COLR using any OPERABLE Core Protection Calculator (CPC) channel (when COLSS is out of service and either one or both CEACs are OPERABLE): or

d.

Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the COLR using any OPERABLE CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is OPERABLE).

MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 20% RTP.

(Before CPC Upgrade)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

COLSS calculated core A.1 Restore the DNBR to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Sower not within within limit.

imit.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 I

I AMENDMENT NO. 4-3.2.4-1

DNBR (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.2.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

DNBR outside the B.1 Determine trend in DNBR.

Once per region of acceptable AND 15 minutes operation when COLSS is out of service.

B.2.1 With an adverse trend, restore DNBR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to within limit.

OR B.2.2 With no adverse 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months trend, restore DNBR to within limit.

C.

Required Action and C.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion to

20% RTP.

Time not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.4.1 NOTE--------------

1.

Only applicable when COLSS is out of service.

With COLSS in service, this parameter is continuously monitored.

2.

Not required to be performed until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 20% RTP.

Verify DNBR, as indicated on any OPERABLE 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months DNBR channels, is within the limit of the COLR, as applicable.

SR 3.2.4.2 Verify COLSS margin alarm actuates at a 31 days THERMAL POWER level equal to or less than the core power operating limit based on DNBR.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 I

3.2.4-2 AMENDMENT NO.

4-1-DNBR (After CPC Upgrade) 3.2.4 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.4 Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)

LCO 3.2.4 The DNBR shall be maintained by one of the following methods:

a.

Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS)

In Service:

1. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR when at least one Control Element Assembly Calculator (CEAC) is OPERABLE in each OPERABLE Core Protection Calculator (CPC) channel; or

2. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by the allowance specified in the COLR when the CEAC requirements of LCO 3.2.4.a.1 are not met.

b.

COLSS Out of Service:

1. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the COLR using any OPERABLE Core Protection Calculator (CPC) channel when at least one Control Element Assembly Calculator (CEAC) is OPERABLE in each OPERABLE CPC channel: or

2. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the COLR using any OPERABLE CPC channel (with both CEACs inoperable) when the CEAC requirements of LCO 3.2.4.b.1 are not met.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 20% RTP.

(After CPC Upgrade)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

COLSS calculated core A.1 Restore the DNBR to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ower not within within limit.

imit.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.2.4-3 AMENDMENT NO.

DNBR (After CPC Upgrade) 3.2.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

DNBR outside the B.1 Determine trend in DNBR.

Once per region of acceptable AND 15 minutes operation when COLSS is out of service.

B.2.1 With an adverse trend, restore DNBR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to within limit.

OR B.2.2 With no adverse 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months trend, restore DNBR to within limit.

C.

Required Action and C.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion to

20% RTP.

Time not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.4.1

NOTE--------------

1.

Only applicable when COLSS is out of service.

With COLSS in service, this parameter is continuously monitored.

2.

Not required to be performed until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 20% RTP.

Verify DNBR, as indicated on any OPERABLE 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months DNBR channels, is within the limit of the COLR, as applicable.

SR 3.2.4.2 Verify COLSS margin alarm actuates at a 31 days THERMAL POWER level equal to or less than the core power operating limit based on DNBR.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 3.2.4-4 AMENDMENT NO.

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Protective System (RPS)

Instrumentation - Operating LCO

3.3.1 APPLICABILITY

Four RPS trip and bypass removal channels for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

According to Table 3.3.1-1. (Before CPC Upgrade)

ACTIONS

-NOTE OTE--------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each RPS Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one automatic RPS bypass or trip.

trip channel inoperable.

AND A.2 Restore channel to Prior to OPERABLE status.

entering MODE 2 fol 1 owing next MODE 5 entry B. One or more Functions B.1

NOTE-----

with two automatic RPS LCO 3.0.4 is not trip channels applicable.

inoperable.

Place one channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months bypass and the other in trip.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 I

I AMENDMENT NO.

17 3.3.1-1

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One or more Functions C.1 Disable bypass 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one automatic channel.

bypass removal channel inoperable.

OR C.2.1 Place affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months automatic trip channel in bypass or trip.

AND C.2.2 Restore bypass Prior to removal channel and entering MODE 2 associated automatic following next trip channel to MODE 5 entry OPERABLE status.

D.

One or more Functions ----------- NOTE--------

with two automatic LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

bypass removal channels inoperable.

D.1 Disable bypass 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channels.

OR D.2 Place one affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months automatic trip channel in bypass and place the other in trip.

E.

One or more core E.1 Perform CHANNEL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months protection calculator FUNCTIONAL TEST on (CPC) channels with a affected CPC.

cabinet high temperature alarm.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 I

3.3:1-2 AMENDMENT NO.

4'

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One or more CPC F.1 Perform CHANNEL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months channels with three or FUNCTIONAL TEST on more autorestarts affected CPC.

during a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period.

G. Required Action and G.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE -

Refer to Table 3.3.1-1 to determine which SR shall be performed for each RPS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of each RPS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months instrument channel.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 I

3.3.1-3 AMENDMENT NO.

47

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2

NOTE-------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER Ž 70% RTP.

Verify total Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the RCS total flow rate.

If necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the RCS flow rate.

SR 3.3.1.3 Check the CPC autorestart count.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 I

3.3.1-4 AMENDMENT NO.

1-1 RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.4 NOTES--

1. Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER

Ž 20% RTP.

2.

The daily calibration may be suspended during PHYSICS TESTS, provided the calibration is performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.

Perform calibration (heat balance only) and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months adjust the linear power level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to make the CPC AT power and CPC nuclear power calculations agree with the calorimetric, if the absolute difference is Ž 2% when THERMAL POWER is - 80% RTP.

Between 20%

and 80% RTP the maximum difference is -0.5%

to 10%.

SR 3.3.1.5 NOTE--------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER Ž 70% RTP.

Verify total RCS flow rate indicated by 31 days each CPC is less than or equal to the RCS flow determined either using the reactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentation and the ultrasonic flow meter adjusted pump curves or by calorimetric calculations.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 I

3.3.1-5 AMENDMENT NO.

47

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.6

NOTE-------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER Ž 15% RTP.

Verify linear power subchannel gains of the 31 days excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape annealing matrix elements in the CPCs.

SR 3.3.1.7 NOTES-------------

1.

The CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.

2.

Not required to be performed for logarithmic power level channels until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after reducing logarithmic power below 1E-4% NRTP.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days channel.

SR 3.3.1.8

NOTE--------------

Neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the power 92 days range neutron flux channels.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 I

3.3.1-6 AMENDMENT NO. 4

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.9

NOTE-------------

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each 18 months channel, including bypass removal functions.

SR 3.3.1.10 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 18 months CPC channel.

SR 3.3.1.11 Using the incore detectors, verify the Once after each shape annealing matrix elements to be used refueling prior by the CPCs.

to exceeding 70% RTP SR 3.3.1.12 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within automatic bypass removal function.

92 days prior to each reactor startup SR 3.3.1.13 ----------------- NOTE-------------

Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits.

18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 I

3.3.1-7 AMENDMENT NO.447

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

1.

Variable Over Power

2.

Logarithmic Power Level - High(a)

3.

Pressurizer Pressure - High

4.

Pressurizer Pressure -

Low

5.

Containment Pressure - High

6.

Steam Generator #1 Pressure - Low

7.

Steam Generator #2 Pressure - Low 1.2 2

1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3 1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 SR SR SR SR 3.3.1.1 3 3.1.7 3 3.1.9 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1 12 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3 3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 Ceiling : 111.0% RTP Band : 9.9% RTP Incr. Rate

11.0%/mn RTP Decr. Rate > 5%/sec RTP S0.011% NRTP

2388 psia 2 1821 psia

3.2 psig

890 psia 2 890 psia (continued)

(a)

Trip may be bypassed when logarithmic power is > 1E-4Z when logarithmic power is : 1E-4% NRTP.

NRTP.

Bypass shall be automatically removed PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 I

3.3.1-8 AMENDMENT NO. 1-

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

8.

Steam Generator #1 Level - Low 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

43.7%

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3 3 1.13

9.

Steam Generator #2 Level - Low 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

43.7%

SR 3.3 1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3 1.13

10. Steam Generator #1 Level - High 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

91.5%

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1 13

11. Steam Generator #2 Level - High 1,2 SR 3.3.1.1

91.5%

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13

12. Reactor Coolant Flow. Steam 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1 Ramp:

0.115 psid/sec.

Generator #1-Low SR 3.3.1.7 Floor: 2 12.49 psid SR 3.3.1.9 Step:

5 17.2 psid SR 3.3.1.13

13. Reactor Coolant Flow. Steam 1.2 SR 3 3.1.1 Ramp:

S 0 115 psid/sec.

Generator #2-Low SR 3 3.1.7 Floor: Ž 12.49 psid SR 3.3.1.9 Step:

5 17.2 psid SR 3.3.1.13 (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 I

3.3.1-9 AMENDMENT NO. 2-6

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 3)

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

14.

Local Power Density - High(b) 1.2 SR 3 3 1.1

21.0 kW/ft SR 3.3 1.2 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3 1.5 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13

15. Departure From Nuc)pte Boiling 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

1.3 (through Ratio (DNBR) -

Low SR 3.3.1.2 operating cycle 10)

SR 3 3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.5 2 1.34 (operating cycle SR 3.3.1.7 11 and later)

SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3 1.13 (b)

Trip may be bypassed when logarithmic power is < 1E-4% NRTP.

when logarithmic power is Ž 1E-4% NRTP.

Bypass shall be automatically removed PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 I

3.3.1-10 AMENDMENT NO. 43

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Protective System (RPS)

Instrumentation - Operating LCO 3.3.1 APPLICABILITY:

Four RPS trip and bypass removal channels for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

According to Table 3.3.1-1. (After CPC Upgrade)

-NOTE NOTE ------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each RPS Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one automatic RPS bypass or trip.

trip channel inoperable.

AND A.2 Restore channel to Prior to OPERABLE status.

entering MODE 2 fol l owing next MODE 5 entry B. One or more Functions B.1 NOTE with two automatic RPS LCO 3.0.4 is not trip channels applicable.

inoperable.

Place one channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months bypass and the other in trip.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 ACTIONS AMENDMENT NO.

3.3.1-11

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One or more Functions C.1 Disable bypass 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one automatic channel.

bypass removal channel inoperable.

OR C.2.1 Place affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months automatic trip channel in bypass or trip.

AND C.2.2 Restore bypass Prior to removal channel and entering MODE 2 associated automatic following next trip channel to MODE 5 entry OPERABLE status.

D.

One or more Functions ----------- NOTE--------

with two automatic LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

bypass removal channels inoperable.

D.1 Disable bypass 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channels.

OR D.2 Place one affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months automatic trip channel in bypass and place the other in trip.

E.

Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.3.1-12 AMENDMENT NO.

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

-NOTE-NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.1-1 to determine which SR shall be performed for each RPS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of each RPS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months instrument channel.

SR 3.3.1.2

NOTE-------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER Ž 70% RTP.

Verify total Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the RCS total flow rate.

If necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the RCS flow rate.

SR 3.3.1.3 Check the CPC System Event Log.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 AMENDMENT NO.

3.3.1-13

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.4

NOTES------------

1.

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER

Ž 20% RTP.

2.

The daily calibration may be suspended during PHYSICS TESTS, provided the calibration is performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.

Perform calibration (heat balance only) and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months adjust the linear power level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to make the CPC AT power and CPC nuclear power calculations agree with the calorimetric, if the absolute difference is Ž 2% when THERMAL POWER is Ž 80% RTP.

Between 20%

and 80% RTP the maximum difference is -0.5%

to 10%.

SR 3.3.1.5

NOTE Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER Ž 70% RTP.

Verify total RCS flow rate indicated by 31 days each CPC is less than or equal to the RCS flow determined either using the reactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentation and the ultrasonic flow meter adjusted pump curves or by calorimetric calculations.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.3.1-14 AMENDMENT NO.

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.6

NOTE-------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER - 15% RTP.

Verify linear power subchannel gains of the 31 days excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape annealing matrix elements in the CPCs.

SR 3.3.1.7

NOTES-------------

1.

The CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.

2.

Not required to be performed for logarithmic power level channels until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after reducing logarithmic power below 1E-4% NRTP.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days channel.

SR 3.3.1.8

NOTE--------------

Neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the power 92 days range neutron flux channels.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 3.3.1-15 AMENDMENT NO.

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.9 NOTE-------------

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each 18 months channel, including bypass removal functions.

SR 3.3.1.10 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 18 months CPC channel.

SR 3.3.1.11 Using the incore detectors, verify the Once after each shape annealing matrix elements to be used refueling prior by the CPCs.

to exceeding 70% RTP SR 3.3.1.12 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within automatic bypass removal function.

92 days prior to each reactor startup SR 3.3.1.13 -----------------

NOTE-------------

Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits.

18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.3.1-16 AMENDMENT NO.

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

1.

Variable Over Power

2.

Logarithmic Power Level - High(a)

3.

Pressurizer Pressure - High

4.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low

5.

Containment Pressure - High

6.

Steam Generator #1 Pressure - Low

7.

Steam Generator #2 Pressure - Low 1.2 2

1,2 1.2 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3 1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1 1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3 3.1.9 SR 3 3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3 1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 SR SR SR SR 1.2 1.2 3 3.1.1 3.3.1.7 3.3.1.9 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13 Ceiling : 111.0% RTP Band

9.9% RTP Incr. Rate

11.0%/min RTP Decr. Rate > 5%/sec RTP

0.011% NRTP 5 2388 psia 2 1821 psia

3.2 psig 2 890 psia Z 890 psia (continued)

(a)

Trip may be bypassed when logarithmic power is > IE-4% NRTP.

Bypass shall when logarithmic power is : 1E-4% NRTP.

be automatically removed PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 3.3.1-17 AMENDMENT NO.

RPS Instrumentation - Operating (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

8.

Steam Generator #1 Level - Low 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

Ž 43.7%

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13

9.

Steam Generator #2 Level - Low 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

Ž 43.7%

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3 3.1.13

10. Steam Generator #1 Level - High 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

< 91.5%

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3 1.9 SR 3.3 1.13

11. Steam Generator #2 Level - High 1.2 SR 3.3 1.1

< 91.5%

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.13

12. Reactor Coolant Flow. Steam 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1 Ramp:

0.115 psid/sec.

Generator #1-Low SR 3.3.1.7 Floor:

12.49 psid SR 3.3.1.9 Step:

17.2 psid SR 3.3.1.13

13. Reactor Coolant Flow. Steam 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1 Ramp:

< 0.115 psid/sec.

Generator #2-Low SR 3.3.1.7 Floor: Ž 12.49 psid SR 3.3.1.9 Step:

! 17.2 psid SR 3.3.1.13 (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 3.3.1-18 AMENDMENT NO.

RPS Instrumentation - Operating Table 3 3.1-1 (page 3 of 3)

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.1 APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

14.

Local Power Density - High(b) 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

21.0 kW/ft SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3 3.1.4 SR 3.3 1.5 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13

15.

Departure From Nucjg@te Boiling 1.2 SR 3.3.1.1

Ž 1.3 (through Ratio (DNBR)

- Low£D)

SR 3.3.1.2 operating cycle 10)

SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3 1.5 t 1.34 (operating cycle SR 3.3.1.7 11 and later)

SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3 1.10 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 (C)

Trip may be bypassed when logarithmic power is < 1E-4% NRTP.

when logarithmic power is : 1E-4% NRTP.

Bypass shall be automatically removed PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 3.3.1-19 AMENDMENT NO.

CEACs (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3 Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs)

LCO 3.3.3 APPLICABILITY:

Two CEACs shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1 and 2. (Before CPC Upgrade)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CEAC inoperable.

A.1 Perform SR 3.1.5.1.

Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND A.2 Restore CEAC to 7 days OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Verify the departure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion from nucleate boiling Time of Condition A ratio requirement of not met.

LCO 3.2.4. "Departure from Nucleate Boiling OR Ratio (DNBR),"

is met.

Both CEACs inoperable.

AND (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 I

3.3.3-1 AMENDMENT NO. 4

CEACs (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 CONDITION R

REQUIRED ACTION I

COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.2 Verify all full length and part length control element assembly (CEA) groups are fully withdrawn and maintained fully withdrawn, except during Surveillance testing pursuant to SR 3.1.5.3 or for control, when CEA group #5 may be inserted to a maximum of 127.5 inches withdrawn.

Verify the "RSPT/CEAC Inoperable" addressable constant in each core protection calculator (CPC) is set to indicate that both CEACs are inoperable.

Verify the Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System is placed in "STANDBY MODE" and maintained in "STANDBY MODE."

except during CEA motion permitted by Required Action B.2.

Perform SR 3.1.5.1.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 4 hours 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 ACTIONS AND B.3 AND B.4 AND B.5 AND 1.

I 3.3.3-2 AMENDMENT NO.

17

CEACs (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.6 Disable the Reactor 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Power Cutback System (RPCS)

C.

Receipt of a CPC C.1 Perform CHANNEL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channel B or C cabinet FUNCTIONAL TEST on high temperature affected CEAC(s).

alarm.

D.

One or two CEACs with D.1 Perform CHANNEL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months three or more auto FUNCTIONAL TEST on restarts during a affected CEAC.

12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period.

E.

Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.3.2 Check the CEAC auto restart count.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.3.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 I

3.3.3-3 AMENDMENT NO.

4

CEACs (Before CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.4 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

18 months SR 3.3.3.5 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months SR 3.3.3.6 Verify the isolation characteristics of 18 months each CEAC isolation amplifier.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 I

3.3.3-4 AMENDMENT NO.

47

CEACs (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3 Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs)

LCO 3.3.3 APPLICABILITY:

Two CEACs shall be OPERABLE in each CPC channel MODES 1 and 2. (After CPC Upgrade)

ACTIONS

-N O

T E

NOTE.............-.

Separate condition entry is allowed for each CPC channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CEAC inoperable in A.1 Declare the affected Immediately one or more CPC CPC channel(s) channels.

inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Perform SR 3.1.5.1 Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND A.2.2 Restore CEAC to 7 days OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Declare the affected Immediately associated Completion CPC channel(s)

Time of Condition A inoperable.

not met.

OR OR Both CEACs inoperable in one or more CPC (continued) channels.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 AMENDMENT NO.

3.3.3-5

CEACs (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION jREQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.2.1 Verify the departure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from nucleate boiling ratio requirement of LCO 3.2.4, "Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR),"

is met.

AND B.2.2 Verify all full length and part length control element assembly (CEA) groups are fully withdrawn and maintained fully withdrawn, except during Surveillance testing pursuant to SR 3.1.5.3 or for control, when CEA group #5 may be inserted to a maximum of 127.5 inches withdrawn.

AND B.2.3 Verify the "RSPT/CEAC 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Inoperable" addressable constant in each affected core protection calculator (CPC) is set to indicate that both CEACs are inoperable.

AND (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 AMENDMENT NO.

3.3.3-6

CEACs (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.2.4 Verify the Control 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Element Drive Mechanism Control System is placed in "STANDBY MODE" and maintained in "STANDBY MODE,"

except during CEA motion permitted by Required Action B.2.2.

AND B.2.5 Perform SR 3.1.5.1.

Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND B.2.6 Disable the Reactor 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Power Cutback System (RPCS)

C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition B not met.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.3.3-7 AMENDMENT NO.

CEACs (After CPC Upgrade) 3.3.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.3.2 Deleted SR 3.3.3.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.3.4 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

18 months SR 3.3.3.5 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 AMENDMENT NO.

3.3.3-8 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identified those actions committed to by APS in this document.

Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Thomas N. Weber at (623) 393-5764.

REGULATORY COMMITMENT DUE DATE

1. APS will ensure that all plant specific action items Prior to implementation of described in Section 6.0 of NRC Safety Evaluation (SE), the Common Q CPCS at Acceptance for Referencing of Topical Report CENPD-PVNGS.

396-P, Rev. 01, "Common Qualified Platform" and Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4, Rev. 01 (TAC No. MA1677),

dated August 11, 2000, are completed.

4 4

4 Changes to Technical Specification Bases (Information Only)

DNBR DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES APPLICABLE

b.

During a loss of flow accident, there must be at least SAFETY ANALYSES 95% probability at the 95% confidence level (the (continued) 95/95 DNB criterion) that the hot fuel rod in the core does not experience a DNB condition (Ref. 4,);

c.

During an ejected CEA accident, the fission energy input to the fuel must not exceed 280 cal/gm (Ref. 6):

and

d.

The control rods (excluding part length rods) must be capable of shutting down the reactor with a minimum required SDM with the highest worth control rod stuck fully withdrawn (Ref. 7).

The power density at any point in the core must be limited to maintain the fuel design criteria (Ref. 4).

This is accomplished by maintaining the power distribution and reactor coolant conditions so that the peak LHR and DNB parameters are within operating limits supported by the accident analyses (Ref. 1) with due regard for the correlations between measured quantities, the power distribution, and uncertainties in the determination of power distribution.

Fuel cladding failure during a LOCA is limited by restricting the maximum Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) so that the peak cladding temperature does not exceed 2200°F (Ref. 4).

Peak cladding temperatures exceeding 22007F may cause severe cladding failure by oxidation due to a Zircaloy water reaction.

The LCOs governing LHR, ASI, CEAs, and RCS ensure that these criteria are met as long as the core is operated within the ASI and F, limits specified in the COLR, and within the Tq limits.

]he latter are process variables that characterize the three dimensional power distribution of the reactor core.

Operation within the limits for these variables ensures that their actual values are within the range used in the accident analyses (Ref. 1)

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION

B 3.2.4-4

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCO rBif-&eC1i7CPC

ý51pgo -

)

Fuel cladding damage does not occur from conditions outside the limits of these LCOs during normal operation.

However, fuel cladding damage could result if an accident occurs from initial conditions outside the limits of these LCOs.

This potential for fuel cladding damage exists because changes in the power distribution can cause increased power peaking and correspondingly increased local LHRs.

DNBR satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

The power distribution LCO limits are based on correlations between power peaking and certain measured variables used as inputs to the LHR and DNBR operating limits.

The power distribution LCO limits are provided in the COLR.

With the COLSS in service and one or both of the Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs)

OPERABLE, the DNBR will be maintained by ensuring that the core power calculated by the COLSS is equal to or less than the permissible core power operating limit based on DNBR calculated by the COLSS.

In the'event that the COLSS is in service but neither of the two CEACs is OPERABLE, the DNBR is maintained by ensuring that the core power calculated by the COLSS is equal to or less than a reduced value of the permissible core power operating limit calculated by the COLSS.

In this condition, the calculated operating limit must be reduced by the allowance specified in the COLR.

In instances for which the COLSS is out of service and either one or both of the CEACs are OPERABLE, the DNBR is maintained by operating within the acceptable region specified in the COLR and using any OPERABLE CPC channel.

Alternatively, when the COLSS is out of service and neither of the two CEACs is OPERABLE, the DNBR is maintained by operating within the acceptable region specified in the COLR for this condition and using any OPERABLE CPC channel.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION B 3.2.4-5

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES LCO Jeioree, Cl cnpgrnde) kcontinued)

LCO F(Afifrc pC With the COLSS out of service, the limitation on DNBR as a function of the ASI represents a conservative envelope of operating conditions consistent with the analysis assumptions that have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR for all AOOs.

Operation of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit ensures that an acceptable minimum DNBR is maintained in the event of the most limiting AOO (i.e.. loss of flow transient, CEA misoperation events, or asymmetric SG transient).

'ThTeipo i'd]siri1Utit"'i on -CO imi m!

bslare, aat ons l et uweet power.C pekin.rg and certaie n me'a'sured

,vari I a bles u*se6d finputs~tothe'LHR and DNBR operating limits.~ "The,poweri

ýdAisrbution LCO~limits-,areprov,oyded,.ne,,the OLR.

Wi*nTthsaCOLeSS Ti* rVi '664 c

"aeifOeaSS ones o-fs e'tfe7 C6ilnt at

'Element Ass Iembl y.h Cal cul ators, (CEACs) 'OPERAkLE*'inheach p0erable CPC Channel,-, theDNBR: will be mRa ntai nedaby ensuring that:~the co Ire I p6oir calculated by the COLSS79Tý e q Iual ~to or. less than the permissible 'core Ipower op~eratiý'ii f1im-it based 'onDNBR calculated by theCOLSS:. ~In th~e ýevent that-the COLSSgis in iserviCe but the above conditionus s ano met,.the DNBR ie s maiantaibned ýby 'ensuri ng that the -DNore,power.

.alcblated by the ICOLSS~is equal~to on'less than'a reduced ae'6f:i n

ethe permiss'ibl cr ptower operating limit ca l ated by. the COLSS.R I*

n th] s -conditi6on.

the calus-la-y obprti ng~ jimit must,tbe :reduc~d., by, the ýal. ownce, specified Kthe-ICOL"R.1 g-nJ-hsta-hcf ef6--Ffhi Ehthe-COLS S-7'h f-off t~T Vi 7ah j

~

leastBone'Cof thea'CEACsare OPERABLE 'in each o hannel, the DNBR ~is maintained by 6perating,(withi nth d

)

ccpble eio,;seifie' the COLR and usin any O

PERABLE'-CPC channel.' Alternatively,~: when'the'COLSS.' ý'iRt.

0f, 'ser"vicea'ard' the above coilditio'n is no ft metthe DNBR is m ai ntdine~d by,'operati ng.wi thi n' the acceptable6,region

§pecifiedi in the COLR for, this conditioni and -usi~ng,,Ayy PeRBECR hnnl,'_iith~tWo,in ierable'CEACs;`

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 REVISION 4 B 3.2.4-6

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES ACO

,(Aft ie P PeC Upgrade Ccontinued)

APPLICABILITY Vfuncti o'n-of:thie ASI represents a conserWat-iye envel oiie of peatjng conii

ý ditions consistent with the. analysis assmpion tat'have been',-analytically demonstrat6-d ladequate to maintain an ~acceptable& mini mum DNBR :'or-l1T Mo~s..'jOperation of thbtoc6r i.,With' aDNBR at or ~above thiýý j1 mi t ensures that an acce~pta6ble mi ninmum DNBR i s rnaintainri-d

,inthe-:event~bf the most l imitinhg AOO (i.e., loss of fl-o'w" ftranibnt)

E

, 0 10 Power distribution is a concern any time the reactor is critical.

The power distribution LCOs, however, are only applicable in MODE 1 above 20% RTP.

The reasons these LCOs are not applicable below 20% RTP are:

a.

The incore neutron detectors that provide input to the COLSS, which then calculates the operating limits, are inaccurate due to the poor signal to noise ratio that they experience at relatively low core power levels.

b.

As a result of this inaccuracy, the CPCs assume a minimum core power of 20% RTP when generating the Local Power Density (LPD) and DNBR trip signals.

When the core power is below this level, the core is operating well below the thermal limits and the resultant CPC calculated LPD and DNBR trips are highly conservative.

,ygrqd CPC sys-tem ciioistof eiCEiotVal ECs7 isnstle*

a-d Tf the twO founid in thei.CPC S estim priorl* to upgrade..Tofacilitate the dfifferencýe in ý'h-itte uber o6f C-EACs 'a-",w'e'll"asý to_ suppor thie

~nhincd eatresfond n te pgraded CP systema id32 echnicfia e

catnhas,been developed.* The determiation i

on wvhich -Specqifcaton,,apphes Ts based on whether or not theunit hds received the upgraded iCPCs..

Each unt shall ionly use the eifiation that reflectsfhstatus d y(cotie

~(ie.beo r oraftertcC pgae.1 (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 REVISION B 3.2.4-6a

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND occurrence.

Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an (continued) accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.

The RPS is segmented into four interconnected modules.

These modules are:

"* Measurement channels;

"* Bistable trip units; RPS Logic; and

"* Reactor trip circuit breakers (RTCBs).

This LCO addresses measurement channels and bistable trip units.

It also addresses the automatic bypass removal feature for those trips with operating bypasses.

The RPS Logic and RTCBs are addressed in LCO 3.3.4. "Reactor Protective System (RPS) Logic and Trip Initiation."

The CEACs are addressed in LCO 3.3.3, "Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs)."

Measurement Channel s J('B~f7CjCP-jfjTjr?7id)

Measurement channels, consisting of field transmitters or process sensors and associated instrumentation, provide a measurable electronic signal based upon the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured.

The excore nuclear instrumentation, the core protection calculators (CPCs),

and the CEACs, though complex, are considered components in the measurement channels of the Variable Over Power - High. Logarithmic Power Level - High, DNBR - Low, and Local Power Density (LPD) - High trips.

Four identical measurement channels, designated channels A through D. with electrical and physical separation, are provided for each parameter used in the generation of trip signals, with the exception of the control element assembly (CEA) position indication used in the CPCs.

Each measurement channel provides input to one or more RPS bistables within the same RPS channel.

In addition, some measurement channels may also be used as inputs to Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION B 3.3.1-2

RPS Instrumentation -

Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Measurement Channels

ýr7hC

)(conti nued) bistables, and most provide indication in the control room.

Measurement channels used as an input to the RPS are not used for control functions.

When a channel monitoring a parameter exceeds a Sredetermined setpoint, indicating an unsafe condition, the istable monitoring the parameter in that channel will trip. Tripping bistables monitoring the same parameter in two or more channels will de-energize Matrix Logic, which in turn de-energizes the Initiation Logic.

This causes all four RTCBs to open, interrupting power to the CEAs, allowing them to fall into the core.

Three of the four measurement and bistable channels are necessary to meet the redundancy and testability of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 21 (Ref. 1).

The fourth channel E rovides additional flexibility by allowing one channel to e removed from service (trip channel bypass) for maintenance or testing while still maintaining a minimum two-out-of-three logic.

Thus, even with a channel inoperable, no single additional failure in the RPS can either cause an inadvertent trip or prevent a required trip from occurring.

Adequate channel to channel independence includes physical and electrical independence of each channel from the others.

This allows operation in two-out-of-three logic with one channel removed from service until following the next MODE 5 entry.

Since no single failure will either cause or prevent a protective system actuation, and no protective channel feeds a control *Ti*-i6

, this arrangement meets the Pi7V--jji-abVe ýrequireens The CPCs perform the calculations required to derive the DNBR and LPD parameters and their associated RPS trips.

Four separate CPCs perform the calculations independently, one for each of the four RPS channels.

The CPCs provide outputs to drive display indications (DNBR margin, LPD margin, and calibrated neutron flux power levels) and provide DNBR - Low and LPD - High pretrip and trip signals.

The CPC channel outputs for the DNBR - Low and LPD - High trips operate contacts in the Matrix Logic in a manner identical to the other RPS trips.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 REVISION4 B 3.3.1-3

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Measurement Channels j(Bfo* P*F-UpCjij

) (continued)

Each CPC receives the following inputs:

"° Hot leg and cold leg temperatures:

Pressurizer pressure:

Reactor coolant pump speed; Excore neutron flux levels:

Target CEA positions: and

° CEAC penalty factors.

Each CPC is programmed with "addressable constants."

These are various alignment values, correction factors. etc., that are required for the CPC computations.

They can be accessed for display or for the purpose of changing them as necessary.

The CPCs use this constant and variable information to perform a number of calculations.

These include the calculation of CEA group and subgroup deviations (and the assignment of conservative penalty factors), correction and calculation of average axial power distribution (APD)

(based on excore flux levels and CEA positions), calculation of coolant flow (based on pump speed), and calculation of calibrated average power level (based on excore flux levels and AT power).

The DNBR calculation considers primary pressure, inlet temperature, coolant flow, average power, APD, radial peaking factors, and CEA deviation penalty factors from the CEACs to calculate the state of the limiting (hot) coolant channel in the core.

A DNBR -

Low trip occurs when the calculated value reaches the minimum DNBR trip setpoint.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION B 3.3.1-4

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Measurement Channels

,Bff jC%/RiFd-)

(continued)

The LPD calculation considers APD, average power, radial peaking factors (based upon target CEA position), and CEAC penalty factors to calculate the current value of compensated peak power density.

An LPD - High trip occurs when the calculated value reaches the trip setpoint.

The four CPC channels provide input to the four DNBR - Low and four LPD - High RPS trip channels.

They effectively act as the sensor (using many inputs) for these trips.

The CEACs perform the calculations required to determine the position of CEAs within their subgroups for the CPCs.

Two independent CEACs compare the position of each CEA to its subgroup position.

If a deviation is detected by either CEAC, an annunciator sounds and appropriate "penalty factors" are transmitted to all CPCs.

These penalty factors conservatively adjust the effective operating margins to the DNBR - Low and LPD - High trips.

Each CEAC also drives a single cathode ray tube (CRT),

which is switchable between CEACs.

The CRT displays individual CEA positions from the selected CEAC.

Each CEA has two separate reed switch assemblies mounted outside the RCPB.

Each of the two CEACs receives CEA position input from one of the two reed switch position transmitters on each CEA, so that the position of all CEAs is independently monitored by both CEACs.

CEACs are addressed in LCO 3.3.3.

MFTurd6-nfhCi~rfie1§ T(ffCPIg~ia-di)

M laossuie'-m'nan" l s,"c-o-n-s-i s~tii nýT5f fhlatrns-o-tf h

e rasm-i tetrs '-on-6

)rocesst*sensorsiand assocl ated: instr6umentat on, provi'de-a neasbur,,ble ',electroiiic signial based idpo'n9,th~e~phy Icl

ý,-ar'acterj st! cs ofj.the__,parameter. bei ng Fnqas(ýpe Fihe

-exco ea nst ru ta t 4% t Fe uor e

Fn calcul ators', (CPCs),

and,the CEACs. though comiplex*,'are bonsjdeed components in the me'asu'rement cifannels of t46~

V ari-able6 Oven.Power.,-

High, Logarithmic Power Level -iRj1-Jt

~NBR

_ -Low, and_.Local_ýower DensiJ ty,(LPD).

Hgh(tri nue.

(continued)

REVISION4 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.1-5

RPS Instrumentation -

Operating B 3.3.1 BAS ES BACKGROUND ffF -uF ffe-tf'C Fh-h&Ifl s

ýCP U d6T

'TiIit"h1 Th

-eheit 6h-an-nef7, dTd6 n-ate-d--ich--an--el ý2

ýýthrough D,- With elect'r'ica', and ýphysical separation, 'ar'd provide'd for each. par'ameiter. used 'inth'e gen~er'aion of t'tiý,

tsignals.['with the' e)ceptic1ri of the control ~ele~ment-.assernbjS

~(EA) p,,obs'i~tioh Inhdicat-ion used 'in the ICPCs. -Each (deas~u'rembet channel.:prbvides' input to.one or more -RPS istblewithin th'e same ~RPS 'dhannel-

~In ~addition,:,some neasremnt hanelsmay~also~be used as~ inputs- -,to Engineered Safety ~Features,A'ctuation System,:(ESFASY bistabl' es, and most provi dei ndi cati on i n !theýcion'tr'61~~i' M1easur'ement channels.'used'as-an.,input tojthe RPS' are 'not--'

b.se-d for, control functions.

jredeter' i ned -setpoint;i, nrdkicaing an unsafe con-difti-o-hi-t-h bi stabl 6 monitoring :the p'a'rameter in that channel will 'trip'.'

Sr.ippi,ng ýbistables monitoriing the same 'parameter'in two or or-e channels, willhde-ener~gizeMatrixLog'ic,, which in turn

,e-energizes the In'it'iation Logic:This 11ssl fou RTCBs ~to open,.' inerpinpwrt teEs-alwn necessary to meet the'redundancy a~nd' testability of, R O CFR 5O;ý Appendix A-. GDC 21 (Ref., 1'.,'. Thie~four'th'Tfiianiell hovides'~additiona'l flexibility by allowifiig,one channel to Obe removed ~fromi ~srvi Ice (trip channel~ bypass),for mainten I nce or testi'ng ~while~sti'll maintaining a mini-mum two-%out-of-ithree: logic.ý Thus, '

evien with a ~channel niioperable.,"no single,,additional faillure: in the RPST-E6 itercause:,an j nadvert-enTtI3.ptr nvaeýtequi redltp qqqqm~ccuri Dg.'l

ýThis allows~operation 'in 'tWO-out-of~-.three logic with-one channel xernoved from~ser'vice until -f6llowing the next MODE-5 entry.~ 'Sincem.o,,single failure will :either ~cause~ or preven Sprotecti ye 'system actuation.,,an'd n',roi~jrtective channel,-"

reeds,,,a&,contr~ol,fnnciti6ni, this' arrangement nmeets: the aýpplicable,.,requi r'emenits,of'standards referenced n'the., USARI MhaptejE1tnrg129'91

'42 (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3B3..-aRVSO B 3.3.1-5a REVISION

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND M 6 -as W -em On t, 17C h n -nb 1 -

-(Xft i F,-1CP -VfikF

ýc

, q! Q -( 7qýp-t Fe---CPCrp-(Frf6r-m7,'t-ff-e:,ýc-alc-ulEfl76-ný" I 'r-e-gy-j-r-eFd'.-.t-67d6r-lve-","tffe 1 1--

"Výl ps.

MR 'and, LPD.','p"a.ýr"-aý"'m-'eýteý"rs and --,'the-l r,'associ atýdi,'[RSl--ý,

ýour separate CPCs per "ým'ýth6".ý'ýalcul'ý"t'i'oHý'.ýind-eDen entlT-.,

one TOreach of the'fo6rRPS'ýC`hannels The-'CPCt`.,pýbVi de butputs to drive dis layý,indi6aitib`ns (DNBR-,ým6--r-g'ln, LP'D'-"

ý

ý.,

margin,.and-calibrated neutro6'fluxpower.16'vý'bls).add

ýr6yide DNBR--"-' Low.and LPD - High pretrip'and'tri i n a IP'll jTh-6-'CPC-'cha-nfie-l outputs for the DNBR - Low and LPD - H*"h-'-*

trips operate,; contacts i n theg Matr-i Logjc in,,a.manner!

h-0enticali-It 'lthý,,other :R S` rzjpsj,,

L 5--J P-re,-ss-u-riz-e--,

_r-_ý eqsýQre tpE

-3ý

'T'-----sDeed7 jýc-jfbr;,:,ýý6ýolWn ppmp,lspee,.,,.

Cl EAC rs,","

'pý-r-a-M6EIJ -ýj`f

-yd

'1'

"'a I

a riýss5b b're various' alignment val ue's', ý clorreftýi on, factors,, etcý-th6f

ý--r-e'required:for.ýtheCPC computations.' Theyýcan belýaccesý6.d

,_e_

ppse._

.,gin them as

ý6r di0lay.or-for th -pur of,,chan ' 9 pecessalry,-,

66-ltiii's' d-ofi-stRt"Whd výýýJaM'E-VKMTUW dh-t.6 perforwa number 'of dakulations. eThese irtlu'de the

ýk fl6iion ofCEA group and.subgroupdeviations (and' '

'tKe cy -......

.assignment of conservative penalty factors'),, cbrrection,6-nd E616ulbtion of. aver, age I a xial istributioh-,(APD) -(bdsýEid bq ý:'excore f I ux, I evel s arfd, CEA ý obtl ti bns) ; 6al 661 ati on of olahtlifflow (based'on pum"'

"d and ýalcblatldh of r vspee ali.br"Add aver'ajq powe- -1 eyel (bdsed on.eýc6re:flux 166-1-s' nd',,AT.,.66Wer) J (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B 3.3.1-5b REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND han~

f

-CCý VhTffDNBRT~l1-ul-ario--c----ii-r-s- ---

p~_1m~r-lt, tempratue: coolanit f~bw average ýpower; APD;, radial peaking fa~tors,', and CEA'deviation' penalty'factors :froiith'e CEACs-to calculate.the state of the limiting:(hot) tcoolanjf Ehanne'l in the core.,A

ADNBR - L'ow~trip~occurs~when. the "bd1cu'l ated val ue reaches ~the mini rfum LDNBIR Kr~i pjsetpoint7T Ilhe 'LPD-51ncRidhtion c6 1Z1ýý.APD^, -vrag j*"*-'-e'T",-adia1 eaki ng factoisKjbased 'upon ~tar-get CEA ~positi on), :_and_,ýCEAC en yfactor's to calculate th~ecir~r~ent value of compensated -peak. power density...iAn LPD,- High' trip oc~curs' w~hen the' calculated ~value 'reaches..the trip setpoint.-,;The^

ýour CPC channels provide inputitto thexfour DNBR'- Low 'and_

Irour LPD -,Hi'h RPS~trip 'channels.K They~effectively~act,,a§ the sens or~ and,bistablejiipjinits,(s igjany upts~Lo We7C Cs__p e'

-m7tfF ý6TUl`5`ti 6ns, -requii'Fed t'f 6J6t-em1-nt~T

'i fT or sit.i on I of I'CEAs within theiirýsiibgroups, for the' CPCs:. jWo idependent CEACs :uiithtin 4e~hiPC,'channel, compare the pOsition~of~each ~CEA to its I s ubgrbuOp'position.

If a~

de-v-1atidn' is

~detected by either-1CEAC, ~an 'annunciatorsou-66nds

~nd ~app'ropri ate "'penalty ~factors"- are rnmted~o&4 gpgI& th'e CPC in the affected channel.' These ~penalty 'fctors' "bdnser vati vely adju~tj' he effective -oper'ati ng :margins ~toý-t~i tpansmi ttronechEA zoht hep iin ofi a ll ý IEunaWrz, (RCB) deigatd RSPT 1 oif andRST.qnE psn itio frim the 'RSPTs is procesisedby-1 7two CEA'Positlionl'roc~e-s'so6r-s (CPWs lcatedineacfrC7P3Z C.hadnnel.i (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3B3.1-cRVSOB 3.3.1-5c REVISION

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.

3.1 BACKGROUND

Md5u-me-t Ch-a-nFels§ 1

,ý,C-PPi-fiW~smfCEAý:i5si-t'i'on;'-IF i

thWWrpatEC II~s fouirCPCch'ahnnels ove-roptically islated datalinks,, such.that EAC fini all c~hanels eceives tWhe posititon of all,CEAs based

-uonRSPTI ianddCEAiC 2 f"e~c~eiv~esth'e position oif atll CE&sbag~d pon* RSPT2. *This the* positibnof all cEas ar epende"t1tly

!nonitoed bybt CE-nec Pcha nne'l

arate ingleI CEA'Positin Flat Panel Display. Each CPC

ýSOlatd data lin'k.' The operato6r may select the chatnnelfo lisplay. Selectingchannel A

orB wrill disl cEA Y

p-osition'bhsed 4upon -RSPI1 on each.CFA, w~hereas selecting canne C 11wl

'lsl!CE poiinbae pn -RSPT2 on~eachCEA.'

Bistable Trip Units r(3F Bistable trip units, mounted in the Plant Protection System (PPS) cabinet, receive an analog input from the measurement channels.

They compare the analog input to trip setpoints and provide contact output to the Matrix Logic.

They also provide local trip indication and remote annunciation.

There are four channels of bistables, designated A. B, C, and D, for each RPS parameter, one for each measurement channel.

Bistables de-energize when a trip occurs, in turn de-energizing bistable relays mounted in the PPS relay card racks.

The contacts from these bistable relays are arranged into six coincidence matrices, comprising the Matrix Logic.

If bistables monitoring the same parameter in at least two channels trip, the Matrix Logic will generate a reactor trip (two-out-of-four logic).

(continued)

REVISION PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B 3.3.1-5d

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Bistable Trip Units

'WpY0 (continued)

Some measurement channels provide contact outputs to the PPS.

In these cases, there is no bistable card, and opening the contact input directly de-energizes the associated bistable relays.

These include the CPC generated DNBR -

Low and LPD - High trips.

The trip setpoints used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits derived from the accident analysis (Ref. 5).

The selection of these trip setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account.

To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties.

instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RPS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref.

6). Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1, in the accompanying LCO, are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits.

A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the trip setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in "Plant Protection System Selection of Trip Setpoint Values" (Ref. 7).

The nominal trip setpoint entered into the bistable is normally still more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the interval between surveillances.

A channel is inoperable if its actual setpoint is not within its Allowable Value.

To maintain the margins of safety assumed in the safety analyses, the calculations of the trip variables for the DNBR - Low and Local Power Density - High trips include the measurement, calculational, and processor uncertainties and dynamic allowances as defined in the latest applicable revision of CEN-305-P, "Functional Design Requirements for a Core Protection Calculation" (Ref. 10) and CEN-304-P," Functional Design Requirements for a Control Element Assembly Calculator," (Ref. 11).

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.1-5e REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Bistable Trip Units J(13pfj i) (continued)

Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value'will ensure that SLs of Chapter 2.0. "SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)," are not violated during AOOs. and the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the plant is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the AOO or DBA and the equipment functions as designed.

Note that in LCO 3.3.1, the Allowable Values of Table 3.3.1-1 are the LSSS.

Functional testing of the entire RPS, from bistable input through the opening of individual RTCBs, can be performed either at power or shutdown and is normally performed on a quarterly basis.

Nuclear instrumentation, the CPCs. and the CEACs can be similarly tested.

UFSAR, Section 7.2 (Ref. 8).

provides more detail on RPS testing.

Processing transmitter calibration is normally performed on a refueling basis.

9TtBl

-i651 f*rf0p7ffn*

f, mo ns ed"A' -Ti ff6 ldn-e.iP]at iP--tpectl*;

-"6 n 7-Sys!t*7

ý(PPS) ý aabi net recei ve 'an anal og ihnput 'f rom.the measu d reme nt c6hanels'.', Th'ey compa're'the analog input to~trip's"'etpbi"1n't"s

nid Tprdvide contact output to the Matrix-Logic

, aThe lals*

41'~de' 13ocal cjr~i j ndi cation.and remote annunci at-ion.

andeD."'for each RPST*rnameser Done fore46ach mea'urem ine't

~h'6nn

-Bistables de'-'enie~rigize when,'a p" o (ccurs'. inuteid)i

.d6 -` e"g

-m~g Isab jea rouhted 1jh thePPSyrel~agar~d ix coincidence matrices, compri'singth Matiogcf b

ist'a~bles 'monitoring ~the same parameter ~in at~ieast tw'o t wo7 -ot -ofJ'our-l3o'gic )j j -,gj (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION B 3.3.1-5f

RPS Instrumentation Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND fli. t-a5l ejThi ~Unif Xft7A "CP 7d)d6itiF PPS.' :In~ hes6' a'ses,- there is 'no bista~ble card. and' I6mnin the cont'act in'put directly ~de-:energ Iizes~the., a ssoci 'ated istable 'relays. 'Thesebj nclubde' ite,.CPC, gnrte-d DNBR"T-b,

.nd. LPD+i-High triP54 1The'& tri-p s' tpoiit i hts- -9ea d i TF thbiF: st-bl E'_J~- -

d t~a'§'6 the

.;nalyt~ica] 'limits derived'from the aýci dent, analysis~

C'Ref:'5).: The'sele'ction lo'fthese trip setrpoints is' iiU1i tha't'adequate~protection is I provided when ~all senso'r~'and processing time delays ~are taken'into account. ý'To allowjf6j ta] 1bration' tolerances. i nstrumentati on uncertainties,,

iinstrument drift, and severe'er'v'ironment 'errors for th-6-s 4PS channels-~that must function~i~n' harsh envi ronme'nts'as

'dfndb 1'F'04 (Ref., 6).'IAllowable Values-,speciffi~d

ýin Table 3.3.1-1, in'the'accompanying LCO, are conservatively ~adjusted with-:respe'ct to-'th'e anafl~tT1'6l im~its': A' detailed description' of" the methodology~'used~it' 1calcul ate the trip Isetpoints. :including itheir ~explicit bbn'e-rtai nti es, J'sprovi ded i n'ý"PI ant. Protecti on System'i

~election ~of Trip Setpoint Values"'ý(Ref.' 7).. The. n6mti'Tl

ýtri plsetpoi nt entered into' 'the ~bistabl e is 'normally ~sti 11 more cbnservativ'e~than.that-sjieci fied, bythe 'All1ow'able:alud'6 to account 'for changes' in, random meas§urementlerro,r s

NJtectable by a,CHANNEL'FUNCTIONAL TEST.' One~~examplehUf tu'ch,a'change',in-rneasurement~error is drift during theO iint&rVal betw.,een'surveillances. ' A channel is ~inope'rabl,7 ff pts'atua ~setpo-int is,,Aot'Within, i'ts~,All oabe)aje_,.'6 bnaly~s6s,,thei'cal cUla'tions,'of 'the,tri p varia-bles for.th@

.N.BIR -':'Low'and Local Power'Deiisity -' High~'trips include'thid peasurement. ;c'lcul ati dna].: and processor uncertalhti ds',,6d dynami6`ic' allowAnce~s' 'as' defined ~in the ~latestý applicable te'evJisiof of CEN-305-'P, ~"Fiiuzcti onalI DesiýgnR Jeqi1i".i..-tsf6Ti.

'CordýPro'tection" Calculationt '(Re f.'1O) an'd

~CEN-304-P, " Functtionl Dtin eLremýsfFkrf7TFC0ii6ia ble-ment Assemnbly ýC-al culator- !ý(Re.1)

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3B331-gRVSO B 3.3.1-5g REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND 81 slaDbl e Ir,57Un-lS p ed) qtha rt e f

C h s

apt 0r.

Nu!,

2.0 1

"SAFETYt LIMITS otSLs)," arer not i P atedL dun ngi, Adrss, and Cthe c

onsequencestof DBAs wi 1 Tboth acceprtableacproviding the p1 nt is operated fri'on withieth fou Osatnelssen the a

o pDBArand'dheequip.

Tnt Bis,,table rea on' act'o utptse. frmtefu hnelar 6conf

§ ias designed.:o chbe3ks3for ace the, tLSeSSp.r tw throughathe openingeofhndividual RTCBsi.can be performed bither atpower or shutdowgcatd is norma))y~performed onal enarterly basis.

Nucleay instrumentatiofi d

the CPCis d

andct, cEAns can oe asimi p

any tested.

CPCFandCEAC'functionat w

testing is performed quarterly and during refueling., UFSARa Sbcti oii;7.2. (Ref.' 8),. provides moedetail on RPS tefstj~g*4" Processi~ng transmitteri calibnat-i.6his-ornd aijy_: p~erfjprmedq

'6:reueing'basis.

RPS Logic The RPS Logic, addressed in LCO 3.3.4, consists of both Matrix and Initiation Logic andzemoys a scheme that provides a reactor trip when bistabl(es in any two of the four channels sense the same input parameter trip. This is called a two-out-of-four trip logic.

Bistable relay contact outputs from the four channels are configured into six logic matrices. Each logic matrix checks for a coincident trip in the same parameter in two bistable channels. The matrices are designated the AB, AC, AD, BC, BD. and CD matrices to reflect the bistable channels being monitored.

Each logic matrix contains four normally energized matrix relays. When a coincidence is detected.

consisting of a trip in the same Function in the two channels being monitored by the logic matrix, all four matrix relays de-energize.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.1l-5h REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO

14.

Local Power Density - High Bf cPCU~g e

(continued)

This LCO requires four channels of LPD - High to be OPERABLE.

The LCO on the CPCs ensures that the SLs are maintained during all AOOs and the consequences of accidents are acceptable.

A CPC is not considered inoperable if CEAC inputs to the CPC are inoperable.

The Required Actions required in the event of CEAC channel failures ensure the CPCs are capable of performing their safety Function.

The CPC channels may be manually bypassed below 1E-4% NRTP, as sensed by the logarithmic nuclear instrumentation.

This bypass is enabled manually in all four CPC channels when plant conditions do not warrant the trip protection.

The by pass effectively removes the DNBR - Low and LPD - High trips from the RPS Logic circuitry.

The operating bypass is automatically removed when enabling bypass conditions are no longer satisfied.

The automatic bypass removal channel is INOPERABLE when the associated Log power channel has failed.

The bypass function is manually controlled via station operating procedures and the bypass removal circuitry itself is fully capable of responding to a change in the associated input bistable.

Footnotes (a) and (b) in Table 3.3.1-1 and (d) in Table 3.3.2-1 clearly require an "automatic" removal of trip bypasses.

A failed Log channel may prevent, depending on the failure mode, the associated input bistable from changing state as power transitions through the automatic bypass removal setpoint.

Specifically, when the indicated Log power channel is failed high (above 1E-4%). the automatic Hi-Log power trip bypass removal feature in that channel cannot function.

Similarly, when the indicated Log power channel is failed low (below 1E-4%), the automatic DNBR-LPD trip bypass removal feature in that channel cannot function.

Although one bypass removal feature is applicable above 1E-4% NRTP and the other is applicable below 1E-4% NRTP, both are affected by a failed Log pbwer channel and should therefore be considered INOPERABLE.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 REVISION B 3.3.1-23

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO

14.

Local Power Density - High Me (continued)

When a Log channel is INOPERABLE, both the Hi-Log power and DNBR/LPD automatic trip bypass removal features in that channel are also INOPERABLE, requiring entry into LCO 3.3.1 Condition C or LCO 3.3.2 Condition C depending on plant operating MODE.

Required Action C.1 for both LCOs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 require the bypass channel to be disabled.

Compliance with C.1 is met by placing the CR switches in "off" and "normal" for the Hi-Log power and DNBR/LPD bypasses respectively.

No further action (key removal, periodic verification, etc.) is required.

These CR switches are administratively controlled via station procedure therefore, the requirements of C.1 are continuously met.

This operating bypass is required to perform a plant startup, since both CPC generated trips will be in effect whenever shutdown CEAs are inserted.

It also allows system tests at low power with Pressurizer Pressure - Low or RCPs off.

a41 ~d~1~PU~~Y~

&Th~ t7-Hi-~

lh

LCO7 Heiu Ke -th'os:toe IThý[eC-0-EGO

-tiFh eCPRC

en-ur-es h-t-fiaEhFS I,77a mai ntai ned, duri ng,,all --.AOOs, and~ the',.onseqe~6

~cci dents fr cetbe ihe 1-CPO are ib noperabl e The Requiired Actilons required in~the evient of CEAC channel failures ensure'.the'(CPCs Fe caable of,-

erforin ~th'eir sa'fetyFunct-ion.1 '-

Rimproe chainnel reliabiliti. Aihminimum ns-u bset f fieatisresý mnust'1be11`nctional in ordrfr h P to becapable of iefrmin~gits s afety'related trip fucion~i~i. Therefore; t`1ke chaninelMayremain "OPERABLE in the'presenc,of "a' iu-bset 6,f chantnel-failuires, 7ihiletinittitainin~t -t aiiy'tpovd i#hekLPD--High, t-fction (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 REVISION I-&

B 3.3.1-24

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO R7471 L6_CaTP6W6_r7D6-h§jjfy_

c _jtj!jqed.),_

DiNiiii"M 7 iWýnnjj Tdtagiio's 7tics I iii-dk-ridiin-dd.nýR, Yý4`Mres to maintdin'th4nnel opera hility 46-the extent

""hirm and annutic'id possiok--on4yr x-ii'de-oh",

fdiliiiiif Those,', itiFfaWIF CPC aiannilvilures ries=ulting7ifi7 protective and c-hannel inoperability'vill risiiltina C PC Ftiil indica tion and ass o ciated L0-'w'w01V'BR,4 nidt ig channel trips. Inputfiailures reýu'ltin'g'in'_,a sensorP07-ot range, ectinkone or niore'CPC process inputs Will'r*esy n

41'CPt Sensor Failure indication'. In addition, since th iý

.;-, -_ ý.

e I CPC s4ftware litnits the sensor value to thi'l6wer 0'ý',,uýijppe...

lim"ifbalue, a CPC channel trip Wouldti_e generated in,'mQs t 6"'1, diiý- to these extreme Values. Detect bk`f t

6" re

'I,,

resulfinti:`channel "Iiethi6i4he Q -a entýz Ist.

P Fd Wn-d iRo`nstrqfý7 lows.

Eh'thý:C-PC-thanneirediittdatity,:jý,ro,ýýssqý"iin, ogprocess and nuclear instrumentatio-n inputs. On-ly-no-neof t e, 0

redii

'ant analo'g'-prý'Qcessitigm6,4ýieýý,;sLteýquire bý maint ikopejýqbi post on'ISre un an y proc

ýCEA' "fi

-C-EA each -CPi2*ch"a'ý'n"-nýý'e'lýý,"a' 6nsmiftidid1h

'aivroigriare,,CEACý'iii"ml-,"t6iiiCPC h -a"n ný e I s"o' v ir'o n-'e':',`w-ay', fi b ýir`, 4 o"P-

"t i I 1.#!ý I s ý I a 6 d 'd a"'t d" lmks.'ý OMy one source ofCEAposýjfj6.n, isre. -uired 6aintain:channel-bilifký E a- _c I i -C P r ý h -a n-n e 11 i as"f Wo-r e d i Fn-d a n i ý -6p-jitýiýc`e p a i i e I s, ý a m a i n i a I h cieli e"s',if, p a n e 1, (A TFP),-ii i "t h e C o r e I-C W"i" ',Smsteni fC-PCS)_'ýab`inet,' and Protection., dlcu a 0'r Perator,'g'AI6ýdiilýý"(OM)'in'the c6fitrolro In NMheris requiredfibithe CPCf6-0eiPnn it§!sý4fgt e

Pinction.: How'ever,, 'one 'Miiust be funiii 6na"l to ass`lFt personnel in perf6rmingxerta s rveilldiiees. qPon f4ilure of the OM;.,;

tPe

&finhelwill rMainjopeiaYli" Ed&ý',CP-CS-cWatrnil'ýFon-tdinýsVFpr-07ce-gý 097ýMilfiWW "d

df Mlow"S'i (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 1 B 3.3.1-24a REVISION

RPS Instrumentation -

Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO

~4

~'6

~

TTT

[(pppont in ued),

thatinelin operability, ~as~addressegb bythis',.LC0(Y' kresult ina CPC channel inoperabiliilstn sincethisjnoil Ie,4die

n ot P erfo ring#ny~sftyltdintos

,MC 31,3.3.

E-4%NRTP,

~

ýf as se1e r-- seaoartiii ncle

~nstrumentation.~ This by'pass iJs -enabled ma~nuA'll'y__hý lIl four CPC channels whern p1ant.?zonditi ons do not

_~arat the trip. protecti b n. -The 'bypass' effective~ly

,'emioves:ýthe DNBR -16w 2and LPD Hightrips ~6KpheRP Logic,,circuitry. The operating-bypass is 3utonfatically remnovedwe nbin yas_

ýrj& b6 longer, satisfied :11

~hentheassoci ated log' power ~channel 'has failed. 2h bypass ifunctiohn i s",mariua] 1y.controll1ed via,,stati on prtin p'rdcedu 'es ' "d the" -bypass-remnov'al,'ci'r'c'uly

~~

caal o.rpoding ýtoa' change iri

hýassoci ated'-i nput, bi'sta'ble.~.

Foo~tnotes, (a),. andlb JinThble 3.1.~1 'Ia'nd<(d)' iný:able -3'.3.,2z"leaný6ry Veciui'rban ~"automnatiC:'re'm'oval,"of triD bvi'as-ses-.ý ;A (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2;3 B3312bRVSO B 3.3.1-24b REVISION -

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO a"4-1 Iýoh l - P R Mle ns DTTtWHi h(~CCU~~

(b6l*w*1E-4%):-.the*,ia*utomatic DNBR-LPD strip'bypass removal feature in :that channl cannot function.*

Asthough -onew o'pass ofem.val "feature is appl iabl

~bove HE-4% NRTP. and~the6 other s ap'p i cabl e be]6oaI1Ej S

NRTP. both are affmctedBlbyna failed Log power, This elO aendshouldthes rfore be onsi dered INOwERABtoe hn TiEALNOPERAB[E T'tt6WH" iC[g"Vow-er TheDBRDoautomatihc trip byhasts removaV featuresir mhat channed daren 'all so NOPERABLEnt requiring entry into LCOi3sn3.1 ConditiodeC oirLCOp3.3b2 Condition Cidepeudis tn plan rinoperatingaMODE.

Required Action s

C.1forebothe nCOs t3.-3.1 "andt3.3:2 requA rhethe bypassi ehannel 'toh b

Jlisabled.: <ýCompli'ance withýCA' is met 'b.y';placing the CR aritehes a

npb "off" andpr

'normaig for sthetyHi g power, and D NBR/LPD ~byp'asses: respecti vely,', No, fiifthe'r actjon_,,XkeM

_'Iemoval', ý'perlb'dic& ve'i f i cation -,'tc. ) is r'equ'ired.

Tfhese,CRP swatches marye ~adminiutratielyb controloled station procedure bheref orethe lo equithmenus of' C:leaare ortjnuousjotnmet.ed startup, sihc'c~both -CPC gdenerated 'trips 'will 'b in'

'effect whenever, sh~tdoWin:CEAs 'are Jnse'tedV:t' a6 Pressure - Low or RCP~s o-ff.

15.

Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) -

Low WJfoWCPC!ZjF;4 This LCO requires four channels of DNBR -

Low to be OPERABLE.

The LCO on the CPCs ensures that the SLs are maintained during all AO0s and the consequences of accidents are acceptable.

A CPC is not considered inoperable if CEAC inputs to the CPC are inoperable. The Required Actions required in the event of CEAC channel failures ensure the CPCs are capable of performing their safety Function.

The CPC channels may be manually bypassed below 1E-4% NRTP. as sensed by the logarithmic nuclear (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.1-24c REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO

15.

Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)

Low JB*f6irFCP7Cjj'd) (continued) instrumentation.

This bypass is enabled manually in all four CPC channels when plant conditions do not warrant the trip protection.

The bypass effectively removes the DNBR - Low and LPD - High trips from the RPS logic circuitry.

The operating bypass is automatically removed when enabling bypass conditions are no longer satisfied.

The automatic bypass removal channel is INOPERABLE when the associated Log power channel has failed.

The bypass function is manually controlled via station operating procedures and the bypass removal circuitry itself is fully capable of responding to a change in the associated input bistable.

Footnotes (a) and (b) in Table 3.3.1-1 and (d) in Table 3.3.2-1 clearly require an "automatic" removal of trip bypasses.

A failed Log channel may prevent, depending on the failure mode, the associated input bistable from changing state as power transitions through the automatic bypass removal setpoint.

Specifically, when the indicated Log power channel is failed high (above 1E-4%). the automatic Hi-Log power trip bypass removal feature in that channel cannot function.

Similarly, when the indicated Log power channel is failed low (below 1E-4%), the automatic DNBR-LPD trip bypass removal feature in that channel cannot function.

Although one bypass removal feature is applicable above 1E-4% NRTP and the other is applicable below 1E-4% NRTP, both are affected by a failed Log power channel and should therefore be considered INOPERABLE.

When a Log channel is INOPERABLE, both the Hi-Log power and DNBR/LPD automatic trip bypass removal features in that channel are also INOPERABLE, requiring entry into LCO 3.3.1 Condition C or LCO 3.3.2 Condition C depending on plant operating MODE.

Required Action C. 1 for both LCOs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 require the bypass channel to be disabled.

Compliance with C.1 is met by placing the CR switches in "off" and "normal" for the Hi-Log power and DNBR/LPD bypasses respectively.

No further action (key removal periodic verification, etc.) is required.

These CR switches are administratively controlled via (continued)

PALO VERDE)UNITS 1.2,3 B 3.3.1-24d 7REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO

15.

Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)

Low f6CP[lUisj! -P U

dg ) (continued) station procedure therefore, the requirements of C.1 are continuously met.

This operating bypass is required to perform a plant startup, since both CPC generated trips will be in effect whenever shutdown CEAs are inserted.

It also allows system tests at low power with Pressurizer Pressure -

Low or RCPs off 11".... "...

Boi l ii

R~tT'(*

DNBRf...

6*

a-_.

eDpaSrtu-r-e-4' o-m NUC r ase:&I o- -1 Fq~f- -MB)" L: 0-w (After CPC tUpgrade) 6-T -

5DNBR-- I 'L--

16-6ILW e

FIPERABLE J1 n t he'oevent eof,

gEAchannel tfalures'ensure the CPCs m

capabne eotperfgp e naflor*ming !t~heis s afdetyheunct-on.:

! mrove channel reliab'ility. A !minim~um subset of features

~,eronni it sa ety elThedri funcion Thred

'fionsre, thýe

,hanel *m*aCremin OPER ABEain the presce of a*

eu,

f chaennel failiures,Tihilemaintaining the *ab ility toprvide the DNBR-owe trp fucin Oný,~ line CP ct ch nnel

diagnOstic make use o'f rediudant feature tod mainta3n oanel opahnerabielityto h xet possi'"'ble;ndprvdealr rand annuncaton of detctbl f iur aneMi 10EALi th lrsnc oss of~

6iroetv functio an hinlioeabilityl w

Pi esut m Ml"DT-6 CPC Falidcto n ascae o

Raind Hig LPD channel trips

. input failurs reslting in seno it oangpepretin

'o'.s.eW efl-CPC SnoFalrindiain' -In addirestioin, ailcsh~ CP (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.1-24e REVISION

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO qqnt-inue

-pa'lu'0TCPC Wdnnýl triý,w'6iildbi eraM Jn m I ostcases due to thesý 4

ý kýý iz " - d - "

1 1 evalueýs-.'Dife'ctaW fdiliiý-eýý","ý'.X-ph'e'th'eý'r'they re's-ulfin a Wanniljnoperabilitý,,or not, -a"'r e'jog' d'n ysýietn,

"'-` kliifi.

edii-ndancy is-diW6n"s&qWd-'

ows:

5.'-"EiFcliýC,-P-CTWan-nii4idiRdiFn-tI ocessfsq-i'n-qloý and iiuciýart*ný'stiiiý fýtio'ni'nputs.

the'

'rediindant anallo, "Odto M.4'fiitain operokiktý.',

un ypr VýA

-',%!1'FCEA'Positi6n is Wand a

ocesse y.twbi

'!Pb"-S"ItioiiPi6cessorý",ý(C-PPýi,,Itnle'd&ýC,-PC'ch'aý"'ýný'ný"'e--I,'ý"'a'n6'd iýansmitie-d t6the approp fiq'M.,.CEkCs in dliffidiii:CPC

'chainn'elg ov""ý'r',bnezi;ay;fib'- " "' "

lily iýoMtid diiia""'Wiks-.1

ýe--

post ioi;js,,re ;'f-ir'e'd tq",m-ain'idin Rh so q

P. i ýrýqbil 40 i -C P-,C 7 ý hidn -ne 1:'Wd q- -'-d i Fn-d dhi Vo v

-er a t 6 F-i fe 1-9 W -c ne19"",qmointenance teýst'

&ffP)jWfhi'Cbre

SiiSiiein"'(CPCS)'i7q"'-b-d'

'0 1",

- -e "

perato -s Mýdtilý1(00 fti,ý'thie co"n't6d"I room. Niiihe-i`is reqWredfi ý:thirpij-f iW its:saptjvýýdated funýtiA2 6,?Výpg c

On]fitii iire ain [survii1lances. Up

-I, "of thý"'QAI ahn'e'l, will -r6ha"i blil' Vdih-icpts "ifi-aTtW-1 --cF66RCa iWq-'7s--'X'-Pý-r--"'" esi Mesemodu`lesiare"fý tid,"",follows."

r

-CpýC; eý 0

are ts th'a rgssid bjithi 'L'CO p

bilii asadd S:

JCPC' ioFF9§6r.Mo ule f4ili th i Tfidi Ifire -d 5FiW&

bilit " ýsiniiýfhi

'resitiltin'a CpCihilnnel inopqa y

smo uli'd6-es not s'hft relaM&funca6nýj yjfV W ",.1-............

'CEAJCTPA'biý OFf, hir-FT19jý-f I i FFe-7 i -ad d i Fi i W!; -ei I i n CEACYF'r:b-aýss

ýNIMr-e-7-tWiD Wr-e-is-q--ddFe-ssR1-(continued)

REVISION PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3

,B 3.3.1-24f

RPS Instrumentation -

Operating B 3.3.1 BASES 00

,114ou e)PC (coantnued),

we~ln odtos oo rPut2iriati call emssoveU6d -Iwheni ena ng~bii sjcoi~ir-1jt1'&

fhT'_fftoat-mynuas y bypassed A[

hNRthe

'a~s~

ciated Logth,1' p6riweYc'annel asrale.

bypass foun'ctionisan uals~hnly, contoldviaiost'tiorVno wperanti ng ti proeu es an.d

~The b'pass removal 6i ruty, thovs&

asoithe-dNR-,o iptbsandLe? Higotnrtes'a ando

(

RPIn Tage3:.-c i andty' v~e(d) atn inas Tal:~.21 iserI reur a

'utom~aticall removadlwhn ofna tri p

,ýbypas5 esýcqfffA6 bfilre mod-6ier, sath'E4ascae. ip.'ital

rr cqhaengthe ing statei as poer t 6 '-pwrancsitionse thog~h asfMed

)ptomatih' rceus'n-h bypass' removal sepit pcificallT7w itshe indicate caLobg power

'channelis ~tfai chiaghi h`]aboe 3:.1E'4)

he auomti Hin Talog,3 power a~rl~hy~

q ujemoan eaturinthatic channel cannot functson.

Ste"indii-arl5",

Loen' thwe'indcaed Lb

~channel~i N16]d 1ow (below 1E-4%),. the,:automatic.DNBR-LPbDfijiji pas s removal ~feature in~~that channel cannot frfi~on. Although one bypass rem'oval 'featuri's

?pPlicabl e above 1E-4% NRTP~ and ~the -othe'r!"ýis applicable below 1E-4% NRTP, both airafe'67f6c-te-bdj

~fai 1ed Log :power channell and ~Shouldj therefore~ be

~onsi'dered ~INOPERABLE.,

WKTL6-hane 7T-i`~ NOPERABCE.b"5tFhfThHe-fFL[b-j power and ~DNBR/LPDauitomati'i Gt'rip 'bypass ~removal jeatures in that channel are'also MIOPERABLErILo hequi ring entry' into ýLCO,3.3: A Condition ~C o'ofC

&ponqWti n, C,depeid, ng',jon,,,pl ant operatingMODE.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,33..-4gRVSO B 3.3.1-24g REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES LCO I51 Dfep-arnt-unie ifromilNu-cl ea*-t-eBo-i'i ing-*=RRa-t'i o '*'*(

DNB R **'*%Eow ft-e--

Acdi e on 'c :l onti ed3, a

re6quiiýe'the bypass 'channel.to be -disabled.- Co6plTi anc With iv.

s met by.,pl acing the :CR switches in "off" bnd "normal`" for 'the, Hi -Log -power anrd!,DNBR/LPD byýpasses respectively..,'No~further action (key Iremoval 'perifodi c verni fi cation, etc. ) s.i'Sequi ied Vhee CRswitches areoadminisstratively controlled stt o'procedure the r~efor6ýe,,~he;,reqij rbemerts:,,oC.1" Th e LO continuousbypmet pi "i'

requirestthd atoomipeorfrobremoval fpaphtu RP rtup c

sincenbthoano CPC generated trips t

will besin i ftfects whenvLffhutdown CEAs are ionserted.

It f

as biowa s sycshtem tests at low pPEeL t

hePretssurizero P~sur

-,,Low orRCIs,off.

Interlocks/Bypasses The LCO on operating bypass permissive removal channels requires that the automatic operating bypass removal feature of all four operating bypass channels be OPERABLE for each RPS Function with an operating bypass in the MODES addressed in the specific [CO for each Function. All four bypass removal channels must be OPERABLE to ensure that none of the four RPS channels are inadvertently bypassed.

Refer also to B 3.3.5 for ESFAS operating bypasses.

This LCO applies to the operating bypass removal feature only. If the bypass enable Function is failed so as to prevent entering a bypass condition, operation may continue.

In the case of the Logarithmic Power Level -

High trip (Function 2). the absence of a bypass will limit maximum power to below the trip setpoint.

The interlock function Allowable Values are based upon analysis of functional requirements for the bypassed Functions. These are discussed above as part of the LCO discussion for the affected Functions.

APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable to the RPS Instrumentation in MODES 1 and 2. LCO 3.3.2 is applicable to the RPS Instrumentation in (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.1-24h REVISION"*

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABILITY 0 The Logarithmic Power Level - High trip, RPS Logic (continued)

RTCBs, and Manual Trip are required in MODES 3, 4.

and 5, with the RTCBs closed, to provide protection for boron dilution and CEA withdrawal events.

9 Steam Generator Pressure-Low trip, is required in MODE 3. with the RTCBs closed to provide protection for steam line break-events in MODE 3.

The Logarithmic Power Level - High trip, and the Steam Generator Pressure-Low trip in these lower MODES are addressed in LCO 3.3.2.

The Logarithmic Power Level - High trip is bypassed prior to MODE 1 entry and is not required in MODE 1.

_,pgraae,*sse mconsýsrs olit e otnl;C-A 7., nsr

r n

-irAd~d CPC obiit f ei The mtwos oundin the CPC h ate prior to upgrade.o farcilitutrihi failueree o rif the u

betCEACs as well as to supportethe sfenthanced featuresfoind inthe tlpgraded C bC s'te

pantec, s3p Technical s

Spcficati onay hai s by detveloped. The teonbinsalioand o un which' cation appliesois ther iiithan wh no the unitchs risvedthen ispgrded cPCs. Ea d

usmnit tosha bnlygusei te wpet cation.Ith trefleeiths"estatur softhetinitis ACTIONS The most common causes of channel inoperability are outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance a mowed by the plant specific setpoint analysis.

Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when the process instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it to within specification. If the trip setpoint is less conservative than the Allowable Value in Table 3.3.1-1, the channel is declared inoperable immediately, and the appropriateCondition(s) must be entered immediately.

In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value. or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics.

or RPS bistable trip unit is found inoperable, then all affected functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable, and the unit must enter the Condition for the particular protection Function affected.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 REVIS11ON B 3.3.1-27

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)

The restoration of one affected bypassed automatic trip channel must be completed prior to the next CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, or the plant must shut down per LCO 3.0.3 as explained in Condition B.

The Required Action is modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

The Note was added to allow the changing of MODES even though two channels are inoperable, with one channel bypassed and one tripped.

In this configuration, the protection system is in a one-out-of-two logic, which is adequate to ensure that no random failure will prevent protection system operation.

Condition E applies if any CPC cabinet receives a high temperature alarm.

There are redundant temperature sensors in each of the four CPC bays.

Since CPC bays B and C also house CEAC calculators 1 and 2. respectively, a high temperature in either of these bays requires entry into LCO 3.3.3, Condition C.

If a CPC cabinet high temperature alarm is received, it is possible for an OPERABLE CPC to be affected and not be completely reliable.

Therefore, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on OPERABLE, CPCs within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is adequate considering the low probability of undetected failure, the consequences of a single channel failure, and the time required to perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Eo~

ffditT6n;G"7E-`1 s -ýe-n-ered -'wffien""-tfieF, Re-qq~l re-d -'A7Cfl on -an ssociated -CompjhEti n -i me.-oflýConditrio,6,A B, ýC, D7,I I

a'ej not 'met.:

IT f teReq u

'c6ni--

s6iatd with these Conditions c-annot',be' compl4-etedwithin the'requ4ired Cbmpletion `ýTim6'e7Tffe

'eacftOr must be br ught xtb

)

to a MODE wýhere the Requi rectýi.c hs'

'oo not apply..The allowed-Compl'etion'Time of,

'6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sis,reasonable, based on I operating expel ne7Tior ireachingthe required MODE from *full power conditi6nsjn _a n oriderly man ne'r and wi th`6ot, ch'1I engi ngl pl*a.nt1 ystems *1 (continued)

,REVISION PALOVERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.1-31

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS F. 1.(1erf3io*

C iUpg e)

Condition F applies if an OPERABLE CPC has three or more autorestarts in a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period.

CPCs and CEACs will attempt to autorestart if they detect a fault condition, such as a calculator malfunction or loss of power.

A successful autorestart restores the calculator to operation: however, excessive autorestarts might be indicative of a calculator problem.

The autorestart periodic test restart (Code 30). and normal system load (Code 33) are not included in the total.

If a nonbypassed CPC has three or more autorestarts, it may not be completely reliable.

Therefore, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on the CPC to ensure it is functioning properly.

Based on plant operating experience, the Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is adequate and reasonable to perform the test while still keeping the risk of operating in this condition at an acceptable level, since overt channel failure will most likely be indicated and annunciated in the control room by CPC online diagnostics.

G.1 f

Cre U

3pr)

Condition G is entered when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A. B, C, D, E, or F are not met.

If the Required Actions associated with these Conditions cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the reactor must be brought to a MODE where the Required Actions do not apply.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE The SRs for any particular RPS Function are found in the SR REQUIREMENTS column of Table 3.3.1-1 for that Function.

Most Functions are subject to CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and response time testing.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.1-31a REVISION

RPS Instrumentation Operating RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The flow measurement uncertainty may be included in the BERRK term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%.

SR 3.3.1.3 B4Wf~---CPC;U~g-rde)

The CPC autorestart count is checked every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to monitor the CPC and CEAC for normal operation.

If three or more autorestarts of a nonbypassed CPC occur within a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period, the CPC may not be completely reliable.

Therefore, the Required Action of Condition F must be performed.

The auto restart periodic tests restart (Code 30) and normal system load (Code 33) are not included in this total.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of more than one channel failing within the same 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval.

,ebureorl the,CpC n E

foj its operlaton ti

,ti6*

ý2, hour-period, 'the CPC ma ntbccmpldtcly1 relIbh Vet oe. '*CPG~the Reqie e d

i tionof o*ntt mu ber

-A perfor-mcd. 'The 'auto resti'art

-pedriodictests restrtt a-C96d- - J

30) 4nd norria! '

pstnioa (Cd 1

3) ar'9'nt;;~T~

etuenytota hours e'

isevaoer on eat ingo e

sthe"ClPCchannel perfotIrmance, nclu edingredunodaint features n6t

oWsir-def thie CPC to pber*frilts safetyieiated trip*fhancti6ne The sistem event logtprovilde a historical recordf thelast(thii ned Wletected:CPCchA~nnel erro~r ~conditio'ns. 'A' detected error, condition Way not rendera channeljnoperab~ie,ynless, it is accompvanied,byji surveilla 40ncei in etctng many n'on-critical error condiftijitd k~osierstht dtetabe ailre reulingina channel

-nprb*iliyvlreutna CPC-Fail condiion.

(continued)

REVISION 9 "B13.3.1-34 PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.13 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Response time may be verified by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, such that the response time is verified.

Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from the records of test results, vendor test data. or vendor engineering specifications.

Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements."

(Ref. 12) provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the Topical Report.

Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test.

The allocation of sensor response times must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and reverified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time.

A Note is added to indicate that the neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because they are passive devices with minimal drift and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Slow changes in detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the daily calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.4)

REFERENCES

1.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 21

2.

10 CFR 100.

3.

NRC Safety Evaluation Report, July 15, 1994.

5.

UFSAR, Chapters 6 and 15.

6.

10 CFR 50.49.

7.

"Calculation of Trip Setpoint Values. Plant Protection System".

CEN-286(v), or Calculation 13-JC-SG-203 for the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip function.

8.

UFSAR. Section 7.2.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 REVISION B 3.3.1-42

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

9.

CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March3, 1989, and Calculation 13-JC-SB-200.

,40c4-305npCFiinctonat -es!gnRe

12.

CEOG Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements."

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.1-42a REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.3 Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs)

BASES BACKGROUND The Reactor Protective System (RPS) initiates a reactor trip J.BTf6WCPC*

to protect against violating the core Specified Acceptable Jp de'),

Fuel Design Limits (SAFDLs) and breaching the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) during Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs).

By tripping the reactor, the RPS also assists the Engineered Safety Features Systems in mitigating accidents.

The protection and monitoring systems have been designed to ensure safe operation of the reactor.

This is achieved by specifying Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RPS, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.

The LSSS (defined in this Specification as the Allowable Value), in conjunction with the LCOs, establish the thresholds for protective system action to prevent exceeding acceptable limits during Design Basis Accidents.

During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more times during the plant life, the acceptable limits are:

"* The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling:

"* Fuel centerline melting shall not occur; and The Reactor Coolant System pressure SL of 2750 psia shall not be exceeded.

Maintaining the parameters within the above values ensures that the offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 1) and 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 2) criteria during AOOs.

Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the plant life.

The acceptable limit during accidents is that the offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 2) limits.

Different accident categories allow a (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.3-1 REVISION 4

CEACs CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES BACKGROUND different fraction of these limits based on probability of

(Beif6iCPC*

occurrence.

Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an

,JPgrade) accident category is considered having acceptable (continued) consequences for that event.

The RPS is segmented into four interconnected modules.

These modules are:

"* Measurement channels;

"* Bistable trip units:

RPS Logic: and

"* Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers (RTCBs).

This LCO addresses the CEACs.

LCO 3.3.1. "Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation - Operating,"

provides a description of this equipment in the RPS.

The excore nuclear instrumentation, the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), and the CEACs are considered components in the measurement channels of the Variable Over Power-High, Logarithmic Power Level - High, DNBR - Low, and Local Power Density (LPD) - High trips.

The CEACs are addressed by this Specification.

All four CPCs receive Control Element Assembly (CEA) deviation penalty factors from each CEAC and use the larger of the penalty factors from the two CEACs in the calculation of DNBR and LPD.

CPCs are further described in the Background section of LCO 3.3.1.

The CEACs perform the calculations required to determine the position of CEAs within their subgroups for the CPCs.

Two independent CEACs compare the position of each CEA to its subgroup position.

If a deviation is detected by either CEAC. an annunciator sounds and appropriate "penalty factors" are transmitted to all CPCs.

These penalty factors conservatively adjust the effective operating margins to the DNBR - Low and LPD - High trips.

Each CEAC also drives a single!Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), which is switchable between CEACs.

The CRT displays individual CEA positions from the selected CEAC.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 REVISION B 3.3.3-2

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

BACKGROUND MAfter CPC 7 Wj~grAm_-

Each CEA has two separate reed switch assemblies mounted outside the RCPB.

Each of the two CEACs receives CEA position input from one of the two reed switch position transmitters on each CEA, so that the position of all CEAs is independently monitored by both CEACs.

Functional testing of the entire RPS, from bistable input through the opening of individual sets of RTCBs, can be performed either at power or shutdown and is normally performed on a quarterly basis.

Nuclear instrumentation.

the CPCs, and the CEACs can be similarly tested.

UFSAR, Section 7.2 (Ref. 3). provides more detail on RPS testing.

Process transmitter calibration is normally performed on a refueling basis.

L6 rotect oagai not vi oe'ting.t**m cor--

R s

pen i fi e& Acc t ablei F ue IDe~ign'Limnits :(SAFDLs)ý and breachi

.1 he'Ractor.

c6oi ant -Pressure. Boundary l(RCPB) during Anti cipaited..

Operational -Occufrrenc'es- (AOOs).

By. tripping the ý'rekto~,I,2

,theRPS 41lso assists; thEgntrb ytfs hnr*i ijtingt

'a ccidents.

enstire~afe operation of-th~e rea'ctor.' This is achievedjb jedi fyi ng iiitii 5fig Safety System Setti rigss :(LSSS) 1n'! terms parametr esdirectl y !mon!t o r~edbythe RPS. asýsLwejs LCOs en o

r.thear6 meatt*ystemn paraniet eSand:equi pment S..alue)

tbonjunction yith the LCOs. ~establish the Lthr~eshblds for pro6tect i ye 'sy'stem~ action to,,prevent. '&Cdein PLccept~able Yimits~during,Design Basis Accidents.i pilfi6sg eAOs" ei~

c` th&

1/2'en~ts

ýp

[nore tirme ~diri ng the,ýp]401ýlife, th aepable, 1imits ;ar~e;.

TH

-e "D*epa rtubr~e*f rom *Nu'cl -eate.-Bo-f -ng

R-atl o *(DNBR)*,,sh5`l1

&e~mai ntained above the Sa fety 'Linmit t(SL)'value to uefrmIn eate'boi~ig:

haln(not.iube dexceeded)

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 REVISION4, B 3.3.3-3

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES BACKGROUND MFi'ýt7aiiTin-g"-t'h--e'*:--p'a'r-am-'e!t-E-rs-9f'tfýifi7ý'HF,ý,,-atT6v6 -V-aluýs 6ffS'4re§

!(Aft&'_,CPC ih-dt.the'Ffffsýite'd&ýd Will be withib-Ithb,._10 CFRýý50_(R p

0 6d: 10 CFR 100,Mef. 2) criteri a 'du Osý,

tcontinued) event's thýt`67F6-6in'aIyzýeRd

'are ug t ey,:

lo ',expected'to occur during the'plant Iffe. Theadtept6bld

]Wt during accidents.is that: the ýoffsite'idose shall,ý,ýbd-___'

ithin an acceptable fracý`

10ion, 1100 Ref. 2ý 1i'mits., Different ' accident categories a-116w-'ý,a Jifferent fractfon of 'the's e, li 6fts ý,.-,boseo oh,,pr6bability c

I cur ; re I nce. Meeting.the.aýc6'ot'ýblb--doseýlimii,ýfor - 66 cons i'der., ýcý,,, h4ý `

t'-'bl e' s f6r:that e""Ht,

_g, pj a

__.psppqnce ye ljý Th ýqq ilPhosemoldu'-]'e--,s-,,'a-re':',

-B-i-ft7a 51 7Eý'-_ý r,

W RPS:A.Tg "-Rd Kq77rs 77 LTC, T ffl2 LCO'-a-ci'dres-seý",-thF,,,,C-EkCg.

[C0-3_..'3 1'-, R 6afff -6 F Pýoteftive Sys't'em'-,(RPS)1-Instrumentation -,Operating, r oyj d 6 s a d e t c"r". i pt-i c n' p f thi in the,ý;,RPS,.4, Men1F, rý--fF--C6F6--Pý&F_

fFe7'e-iE6F(Y nuc ear ins afi'C e

eCfi n

'dlcU'_1ators-(CPCs),

,C er6dý 6ý0666n-g and'tW EACsare consid i"t!J6,ýeasurement channel""' f-the Variable-O' "P6werý.`Hi 6hý,N Low-ahdI6661, P6ý hmit Power Lev'bl,ý.--Hig'h DNBR e h De

ý(LPD)ý- Hi ' h P5." The CEACs dd 6d by th' af q -.- 9_00 S _S-

.8 P cati.on.

E a c h -C P C -F,_

-'r-e c e-i-'v--e -s -G 6-firr 61 E I -em-e-n t-A s

-sernibl' C EAY Ueviaion pen,al ty., f actors f roý 4a-e4' botli CEACil4ii thi7t lch-n6ilel and, useý -the ýl arger ý of the 'penal ty f actors f rom tFe IM"CEACs, in the calc6lation of DNBR and LPD.-. CPCs'are

'described in,,'thb.,ýBackqrpqiqýL,ýbction of LCU, orm.tKýe--7c-a-l-c-ulaTf5rfs,,,,teqUiýred to, e ermin

EACs'---Derf-d6týR-61-b aE-H-e Pos, i on' of, cEAs.'withfn41W r' sbbjýp6ps for the CPICý. ý Two pnd bbh`d6htý CEACsin eýýajýfi'C-Pt',chidiiyiel c6mpare'the -pos'iti6h bfrekh11CEA,1to: its subgrb6ppbsition -If a'deviatimls J4 dtýdby eittidr,,.

an ahbbh6iý'tor.sou'nds",6nd-"--"ý-

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.3-3a REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES BACKGROUND ptp.aoprr lae atro:-ans-m'c:e-d

fdo41

'hAftereCPC ehCPC',Processorin that channel.", These penalty factors

ý,Ip-16edo-'onsdrvatiwvelys adjustethe effective wratingmnarginsstt h

(continued)

NBR' "Low andmLPD mo ihtripse heactr C

oolnt Pressr a

BEAuc.'dmc CRTPB,'ei zJqy.indivSEi:dua CEApo~i2.iildna!ftim ii bro~tfidc the RCPB.li jiacsh bof

'tcEAw CEA6riti civePz*s (CEA s oantmittcrz Aon achanei. 'oTha tpon of tlonCto iEzj!*s n

hdcc de tly, monitocd fby. bo:th'!CEA~gi iP linSP) assemblies mounite'doutsid*el*'theR'eatriitiCoolant Pse 116oundar", (RCPB), designta ted RSPT 1 an"d iRSPT2. ýCEA position f ro the-RaSPTs iseprocessed bo CEA` Position Processoas e(CPPs)u located in' eachaCl tchannel. The acCPPs.trasitdCEA positeionj Sh'TY AappropriateSCdEACeinllo foum'CePC channels over: ptically is~ola'ted d-atalinks;suchthat CEAC n all hanne'ls recivs(thnted Position of all CEAS "ba"'!ed pon'RASP 71, and CEAC--2 receiv;eýs ýýthe position of all C-EAs ba'Sed upon'RSP-T2. "Thus, the posi.. tio-n ofall CEAs is minde"'"'4fenly~mpy tit~rd~byiboth.CEACs in eaich`ýgC C r

_icPCWdispA'P ph~~iii of ac~ n separatesinl CAPsitionT Fat Panel Display" Eac~h`CPC

ýhan~iwlis coninecýted to the displayi by m eans of an optically

~islaed daa lnk Th

'oertor',miayp select th~ec'ha~lnnel for,i,;4iluij FST

-- Et'on" each t-EAn whrassletn'cane o

jthrough'~he opening o6f individual"'sets of RTCBs. can be per~formed either at pjower or "shutdown and is normally,~

pe~rformed o'n'a,quarterly basis. ':Nucl ear jnstrumentatTion.

Ifhe -.

1 mlr07.

,CPCs, and the'-CEACs 'can be smlry tested.' C-PC. and ECfiunc tional testing is performned on a Refulnitealbs.

UJFSAR;- Section,7.2 '(Ref~.:3),: provides more detail onIPS testfig2. -Pro'cess transmitter, cali brationis]norma~lyl p~e~rlrmed on a reuli"'ij~

APPLICABLE Each of the analyzed transients and accidents can be SAFETY ANALYSES detected by one or more RPS Functions.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.3-3b REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The effect of any misoperated CEA within a subgroup on the core power distribution is assessed by the CEACs, and an appropiately augmented power distribution penalty factor wi be supplied as input to the CPCs.

As the reactor core responds to the reactivity changes caused by the misoperated CEA and the ensuing reactor coolant and doppler feedback effects, the CPCs will initiate a DNBR - Low or LPD - High trip signal if SAFDLs are approached.

Each CPC also directly monitors one "target CEA" from each subgroup and uses this information to account for excessive radial peaking factors for events involving CEA groups out of sequence and subgroup deviations within a group, without the need for CEACs.

Therefore, although the CEACs do not provide a direct reactor trip Function, their input to the CPCs is taken credit for in the CEA misoperation analysis.

The CEACs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO f(Bi-fcie"C1P

Jpgrade).

LCO

,(AfteiRCPlc This LCO on the CEACs ensures that the CPCs are either informed of individual CEA position within each subgroup, using one or both CEACs, or that appropriate conservatism is included in the CPC calculations to account for anticipated CEA deviations.

Each CEAC provides an identical input into all four CPC channels.

Each CPC uses the higher of the two CEAC transmitted CEA deviation penalty factors.

Thus, only one OPERABLE CEAC is required to provide CEA deviation protection.

This LCO requires both CEACs to be OPERABLE so that no single CEAC failure can prevent a required reactor trip from occurring.

ST iFLCO7m5hhf; iidCEACi §dTua 1

aCEts t

6i'n P*whn h br u,,

uinformed-of i ndiVi dual, CEA position :withi n eac -'subgru.oi~

Usi ng:I one o6rI both CEACs 'in each chaninel,' or. that 1ppropri ate conservati sm is i n'cl uded -i n the,CPCT`ca1&jjR0h'tjns to,account 1Afor 'anticipatedtEA deviations.. EaaehGAG Eac CP

-es the'hgcro the 449oCE~~razite E

~icviat~n pena tyfcos.ý Thu.' only onc OPERALEC C7

~~equircd A

to p 4o'i'e EA', dc'.'ati"n prteti en

~Th1 UC reure'ot"E

~

o b PEPLEo ttnoigl 7CEAC

~~ai~ucc~a n,~ p rc rcqu' irdl:cot

ý-onJ curn (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B 3.3.3-3c f

REVISION

C)

CL)

VA)

CA)

Z-1 CIE Q 'I "A."

C)t 0(Di 00 U,)

C. C-)

VA)U

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable to the CEACs in MODES 1 and 2.

The RPS Instrumentation in MODES 1 and 2 is addressed in LCO 3.3.1. The RPS Instrumentation in MODES 3, 4, and 5 with any RTCB closed and any CEA capable of withdrawal is addressed in LCO 3.3.2. The RPS Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, RTCB, and Manual Trips in Modes 1. 2, 3, 4. and 5 are addressed in LCO 3.3.4.

Most RPS trips are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 because the reactor is critical in these MODES.

The trips are designed to take the reactor subcritical, which maintains the SLs during AOOs and assists the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System in providing acceptable consequences during accidents.

Most trips are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4. and 5.

In MODES 3. 4. and 5, the emphasis is placed on return to power events.

The reactor is protected in these MODES by ensuring adequate SDM.

Because CEACs provide the inputs to LPD - High trips, they are required and 2 for the same reasons.

the DNBR - Low and to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 en PgadeatCC, ýtisyRemco~nsii's s o6-f*,Ft o -a-lCE7C.7is-sfe-aado the*two *6pfond inithieCPC Syýst portO uprade. To facilitate thý Wdfference in "the "nýumiber oft-EA6s as well'as t~upr h

enhanced features found i theupgraded CPC system,' a:sec613.3.3 Fechnica'l *spe tificati6nhasb'e*en d l

d. The detrination'on whiich Specification appflies is basged* on iiwheth6' r nt ithe unt ha 6-eiv th pae

.Each ýUnitf shall o nly(use ont i

ýSpecif.ation ýthat reiflect s thie staitus 6f jhei unt's7cPC~si~

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 REVISION B 3.3.3-4

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTI ONS 712pc

'( pT.giq~

A.1 and A.2 Condition A applies to the failure of a single CEAC channel.

There are only two CEACs, each providing CEA deviation input into all four CPC channels.

The CEACs include complex diagnostic software, making it unlikely that a CEAC will fail without informing the CPCs of its failed status.

With one failed CEAC, the CPC will receive CEA deviation penalty factors from the remaining OPERABLE CEAC.

If the second CEAC should fail (Condition B), the CPC will use large preassigned penalty factors.

The specific Required Actions allowed are as follows:

With one CEAC inoperable, the second CEAC still provides a comprehensive set of comparison checks on individual CEAs within subgroups, as well as outputs to all CPCs, CEA deviation alarms, and position indication for display.

Verification every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months that each CEA is within 6.6 inches of the other CEAs in its group provides a check on the position of all CEAs and provides verification of the proper operation of the remaining CEAC.

An OPERABLE CEAC will not generate penalty factors until deviations of

> 9.0 inches within a subgroup are encountered.

The Completion Time of once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is adequate based on operating experience, considering the low probability of an undetected CEA deviation coincident with an undetected failure in the remaining CEAC within this limited time frame.

As long as Required Action A.1 is accomplished as specified, the inoperable CEAC can be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

The Completion Time of 7 days is adequate for most repairs, while minimizing risk, considering that dropped CEAs are detectable by the redundant CEAC, and other LCOs specify Required Actions necessary to maintain DNBR and LPD margin.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 I

REVISION B 3.3.3-5

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (contue)CPC

!pgrqgfe~

(continued)

B.1, B.2, B.3. B.4A B.5 and B.6 Condition B applies if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Required Action A are not met, or if both CEACs are inoperable.

Actions associated with this Condition involve disabling the Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS),

while providing increased assurance that CEA deviations are not occurring and informing all OPERABLE CPC channels, via a software flag, that both CEACs are failed.

This will ensure that the large penalty factor associated with two CEAC failures will be applied to CPC calculations.

The penalty factor for two failed CEACs is sufficiently large that power must be maintained significantly < 100% RTP if CPC generated reactor trips are to be avoided.

The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is adequate to accomplish these actions while minimizing risks.

The Required Actions are as follows:

B.1 Meeting the DNBR margin requirements of LCO 3.2.4. "DNBR" ensures that power level is within a conservative region of operation based on actual core conditions.

B.2 This Action requires that the CEAs are maintained fully withdrawn (Ž 144.75"), except as required for specified testing or flux control via group #5.

This verification ensures that undesired perturbations in local fuel burnup are prevented. The Upper Electrical Limit (UEL)

CEA reed switches provide an acceptable indication of CEA position.

B.3 The "RSPT/CEAC Inoperable" addressable constant in each of the OPERABLE CPCs is set to indicate that both CEACs are inoperable.

This provides a conservative penalty factor to ensure that a conservative effective margin is maintained by the CPCs in the computation of DNBR and LPD trips.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 REVISION 4 B 3.3.3-6

CEACs CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS B.4

ýUp-d')

The CEDMCS is placed and maintained in "STANDBY MODE."

(continued) except during CEA motion permitted by Required Action B.2, to prevent inadvertent motion and possible misalignment of the CEAs.

B.5 A comprehensive set of comparison checks on individual CEAs within groups must be made within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Verification that each CEA is within 6.6 inches of other CEAs in its group provides a check that no CEA has deviated from its proper position within the group.

B.6 The Reactor Power Cutback (RPCB) System must be disabled.

This ensures that CEA position will not be affected by RPCB operation.

C.1 Condition C applies if the CPC channel B or C cabinet receives a high temperature alarm.

There are redundant temperature sensors in each of the four CPC bays.

A high temperature alarm in any CPC cabinet requires entry into LCO 3.3.1. Condition E. Since CPC bays B and C also house CEAC calculators 1 and 2, respectively, a high temperature in either of these bays may also indicate a problem with the associated CEAC.

If a CPC channel B or C cabinet high temperature alarm is received, it is possible for an OPERABLE CEAC to be affected and not be completely reliable.

Therefore, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on OPERABLE CEACs within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is adequate.

considering the low probability of undetected failure, the consequences of failure, and the time required to perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION fr B 3.3.3-7

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1

,(Befo7r-eCPC Condition D applies if an OPERABLE CEAC has three or more (continued) auto restarts in a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period.

CPCs and CEACs will attempt to auto restart if they detect a fault condition such as a calculator malfunction or loss of power.

A successful auto restart restores the calculator to operation; however, excessive auto restarts might be indicative of a calculator problem.

The auto restart periodic test restart (Code 30), and normal system load (Code 33) are not included in the total.

If an operable CEAC has three or more auto restarts, it may not be completely reliable.

Therefore, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on the CEAC to ensure it is functioning properly.

Based on plant operating experience, the Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is adequate and reasonable to perform the test while still keeping the risk of operating in this condition at an acceptable level, since overt channel failure will most likely be indicated and annunciated by CPC online diagnostics.

E.1 Condition E is entered when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B. C, or D are not met.

If the Required Actions associated with these Conditions cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the reactor must be brought to a MODE where the Required Actions do not apply.

The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION B 3.3.3-8

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS

'On-e-'N5t--elFq-sYe-eJi-qdde-d f-o"ih'e-AC,77ONS'-Vj-te-17h-a-'s-be-en

,(Afi&'iCpi7-'

did t6""I 4jiýliciifi6n of the C I

omp 6fidnZime iwe-s-.- Twe"c6nlifi6ns-oft E "d hisýSPecification may be ifit&Fd le M-7

ý'--A 7ý AT-r p

ýAr G4 p-m 3 g,

e,

-of its Alro t

-, - -UG GpG will r-p CAr CAAdi tj

ýG&84.

if the GeGbýd I.- I -

AA Ve

_Wýý4 6lGe jaý4 A P P 1 A,,E)WS.

W. -17 A 2.-l -dn-d A.-2-.2 r-67ndifiso--AA77aýRj

ý6'ne.CEAC,,;'jn'on-- r-ýinoreQt es, o e ai

eoi,

ýhdh' ils. ý A" "iý-ýffeýtiitkýals'tngle."chaii"n"ý'e'lýeditldi6ult

)ir6mlfidilure',ýw'itfiin 'dCl;'AC,, bcýssorý n' od Aýrv"

-1ý Jý. ltýý,-,

_Tv.erýqq aCEAC It""'le c anne cou tp'

./ý'. " -ý IdAý 'a"M-by'fi illi-re"otiediinddfif CPPS'7Wth4n al-OZI*Wi4ýWliý,-tjgk4k lities.

A-21 equiied Action A.1,provi esi PH

'm'-"m*-edia-týi-deýcia-r-atii5Wý'-of irffiike-a tCPC'ch'tinnellnoperabilitýy, and entr--

ýR 4iiiiM Actio-n's

16ýoýC-liiw ýw-iih LCQ-3.ý'll for theDNBR4rmý"'nd 1PD-Hi "W"

).ýncti6ný- ý ThisRequiiid-Action fi&tts'ýin liýýCEAIC'fWluiirieisllnion, e rdr'-jn6re-',ehah] ýihamanherý;conýW twitli,ýý'oth'e"'r'!Zpsfdiiiii;ii'iji

,p 6ne'-o-r-i"Iýihiiineels, and

'h 'he h pre err dýac 'on ' 'nýy'o`

r r

mor 'c s a'

'4ge fa

-a ec an

'Is a OC i4C

"'n Sý,

I A-2 2, ul b

?rable r6h e

, ne ed A h q d e

ciý I Mt urý ff if 0 (continued)

B 3.3.3-8a PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES

ýCTIONS W-2.31 Wi R W 122

,(AW-C-P-C (cont,

inued)

Xc-tio-n-sX.'T.ýlYddX.ý2.-!YcFo-iiýý6-ddfFa-,16-§ýF07f CEA bi it.yiby.9ne 00i, cpc,ýý,

fouicpc,,Ch"ýa"'n""n""e'I,-,,Th6i`aii;tivoZFACs each PrOVjdq'1'g_'C-FAWgpiq!!on, * ---- " " -h-

.1 inpu-fto'"t eýassociatM& n _,jCpCý.i,7Vj' "I. fti -ý111j.

I ý ne Post On 111PU CEACsand'CPP

't t `ý1hi`C-FACi-__

ýt fi-c I u d e" ti-b m'"

r q arema h"ata t

p ex., tagnos ic so

.CEACiýillýfti'iliiýitho'iitinfoiiýi"'",th'e"' Cotits"t4ilids4d ith`,6ni,'jýiWJCEA'c1i '."'o*n"e'ý"o'rmor'e"'ý'ýhýýýa'ý'n'n'elýs',,theýC --C 4#iýW chainnels-w"'illie"c"ietvi CPAýd iation penahy)ýaoýis frOM Me'rema, iningOPERABLEthýa'nýýn"elýCEAC. Iftheseiond,".'CEAC Is'h oy' I d fia-i I '('C-o't i i d i

ýbie:'CPICIIWý'-ill tise larýe preassigned eqiiife'd Actions Thýý

"j, -I ----- 1-

'#_ e-as P11ows' W ft h ý- 6 i ý e " C E A C 7 i no p -er a-'b 1 -e i n-o-nie 'o irmo-t r-e-cl i -an n-el sý,` t h e --_sb -c'o-nFd PEAC still provides a I c'ompr',eh'ensive-'set',ofýcomparison chedk-s on: i ndi vi dual, CEAs wi thi n,,s'ubg'r-p' -',, as wel I as, output"

ý4 the affected CPCs, CEA `devýi'ation alarms,-and position 11ndication for display.

' Vbrifibitibnevery-,4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months tha b'dch CEA isý:within,6.6 1inche'fs-,,ii6f the other CEAs in it's 'g-ýqpp, I,6rovi des -a check ',on the.,pbsA t'i on; of "al Y CEAs and provi des

.ý,erjfication ofýtheproper-,-,.op ration of the remai ni fib CEACT nOPERABLE,,CEACwill nbt"Onerate penalty fadt6rs'-bntil,_,___

.deviationsof > 9.0 i e 't: Wj utý are

!T h F C 6 ým-pj it fb fi T i m'e-'-'-o-f `46'fi be-6 -r 4 '1 rco"u" r' ýs-A a"d e-b

'operating experien ce,' cohside'ring ýthe low pý6bab`il`jtyof-,,ah 6tected CEA devi&-i&h`&6ihc'ident Withan ufiddt66ted lure inthe.ýeý6iiiim-ýJCEAC-: " ithin.th"s liýi't6&,t*e Ms long as RFqL-il'F(ý'd-7A-ct-i"6-6'4.4"'A.2.1 AT"abcomplis e

ýpecified. the ih6o6rdblý-CEAC canýbe rest6ý6d &'.'OPERABVE katbs.,within 7 days.,, The Completion Time of, 7 day.'K*Lý dequate.,-.'fdr'mbst repair's.' while minimizing risk,,

id&rl'fid that dropo6d-CEAs',are'detectable"by.t[Td nd6nt'ý',- CEAC,ý:: and-, other, LCOsý.,-.-sjoecijýtý.. Requi red ýAcVibns 55 1 sary..,.,

Mai h

BR _a",'L P-W 0M " Q0 J RQJOrýlp_,

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 B 3.3.3-8b REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES 7<

ACTIONS 13,.1,

=-4342ýiý 8::4_,BJ,27.1,,9.Y72,7

.0;779.-2.4; B.2.5,ý!and.,B.12.6 (conti nUed)

C 6ýd' i fIff'B " qffili W`i f 'rtW_, Re -gif ý6d rAEn &'Fi 'a-M- -a s-66 Abd I mp, etion.Time

'Condition A lare',nbt ff6f; br if b6th CEACs'are i-ný'o"'p'e'r"ýa'bl'ýeý'itio-ne-'orinoreCPCcitaiiiiels, I

Actibns"'a-s"'s'o"c"1"ated',"w'ith tffis`.,_C0'n-dit`jon involve'two'ehoic'e4ii

_n he,"Ren'Wirýea Actions fqu;rt!tg ertry.44-0-P-A s ociated with',,`W 0 3.13.1.1

-Acti67n-B_2_ h e

n ro Elbý6'fifVivie' ec an1§M`.,,`Cdhtrbl8,SySt CEDMCS).

Whi'T6 pidy-iding increased: asý`uranc'e that, CEA,.devia'tions 'are ýH, 66+/-6,rringand:infoýming ý11,OPERABLE CPCýchannels'., via a-

, that both CEACs dre'failed, Thiswill

ýbftwareflag

ýhýu're thatý,&:,large.penalty fa'ctorýassociated'with fWo tEAC failures'will be applied to',tlieý'CPCýcaltu"lý'ti'o"ns'.-'-^'

jThe-penalty1actorJor'.two failedCEACs-is-sdfficiently, U

16 ýge thatpower must be maintainedsignificantly < 10,09 P',if CPC generated -reactor'.t'rips are tolbel,.a.voidedl;'i_

TjheýCompletion Time of-4 hours:isladequate.,t I p,

I accompifýh`

ýhese'llactio.n.slwh.i,.l"e"m.inimizing..rjl8kt"..",.

WoRt es ofinime tdfe-7d

.CPC'channJel ifiooeraUilit d`-

6' A"'fib q, an entry-into! equire ý c ns associate'd 'with 1CO 13.3.1,ftii:,,'th'ý"DNBR-'ýL6ibý,ýiid-ýýLýPD-ýHiýli7 yyn, ýoný.. This Required Acfi6n1iidtif4i1u'ri,6f both CEACs in bne or more cliannels in amanner.-consistent w, itk'other RPS i1iiies 4it oneor inore on týis'ýgequired AM nne inoperability;a Wl" penrits ipi?ýTdiate d "'laiatibii-cha' H '

n entry in:thý'ReqiiiredActi6niý"6ýfLCO.'3*

'3ýl-ifýthiRýiiýiiidAýtion'sdiid 4ýs-'s"o'e'i'a-'t'edCo--i6ioliii6ýi 'Times of iCo'n'ditibnA are not4net. RequiiFýd

_1.1 I ý,__ -h.1 'ijkeyrifoyed ajMbný`ifofily.one CPC channel is' onoXinik t b'

-tio sB.

'I "thr6ii-li'

!ýqgirq Ac n

2.

B.2.6466iild&

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.3-8c REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES

ý(A-ff -

PC MdWifiý tfiCDNBR 'iiSr-g--ýý--ýe-q6i-Fe-me-nt'ý---

0-- - -.-4, DNBR d) ensu

that.poWer'levelJs within aýconservatiVe-regibn-oYf ation based wactualcorecon tinued) b Pýpr d"I d i t i o'hs'

ý.Y-2 requires -th-6t.-tKe-CEA-ý*"ýýiY,-ý6-i6tdi-rTd-d7,,f6l,)y i

r-6k- (>,144.75"), exc6ýt aýs-required for spý66ifibd

, e, s -i ng I -or'f,]Ux'. control vi I a group'#5.,, This": verifi6dt'16n nsures that'undesiredp6r.turbationsin lo'calfuel burnup repre vented.,.The Upperý,,',Ele-c'tr-ý'ical, Limi I t MEL) I CEA;reed

ýi

'vid'

`06 indljotjo-, f ositioF"

._j#hes.`prpyj ean aCCeDta

ý:.QEA, pý__

TjF6-'-RSPT7ýCE4C7, I j To-p

-er a b-1 ?'- 7ad d'FTs-§a-bil -F 5 -ns frn t -j 7 T Ya -c F -b f 01 e

"both are the OPERABLE CPCs is sett-Jhdic'dt" that'

-C EAts ý ' '

-This p IrDYlildes -:aconserva'tive`'ý66alty factor:16

,bns &,,e that a cons6rvat-ive-effebtive.marýih"-iý'maintained bq t_i ej Jh the.

f' BR

-ion, q 'DN P§ý 9474':"B.72:4 r'M Tffe-CEDMCS'is ýpj'aced`-Nncl ýmaijfifaffjn-e--d i'E"'STANDBY' ODEý-"

ekept' duri ng CEA.ýoti on -p'bihmii tte'd; by Requi'ý6&1--Actibn :B-2, 1ý0,, a 11ý--.-ý,. ý nm6nt of ib"brevent)-inadVertent fo 6dlDossible,,glýý1,1g.

Vcdd-mpr e4e-h-si-ve' s et.o f ýom 0ýafl ýýdh ý:'ý hRd ks "on i -nd f Vfd 5-517 C EAs

ýilthi n -gribu'p's must' be m'ade wi thi n-4 hours. ý Veri f-i 6ati bin-

,th6t'e'achCEA,1s within,:6.6 inches'of other'CEAsin its'

.group provides acheck that noýCEA-has deviated fromitg 94 B.?2-.6 ys em tTh's-',6h§drbs t

ý,wi, 1.ý,,.:ndt. 1*jffh J*. 2M (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.3-8d REVISION

S3SV9 (p@nULqUOD) t L

0;04-1; L-ý 'I' L ',t' L L L

E)E)U E 5

'A I q p I LAP E)l p, jjýjjA q,,w 1 11

-A-W-ML4,41 Pgi A

89 L

t p %Pzý 44o PnAq),

ftet-EHa*-"-

kuc,

%sat ýa#!#Zfaq aqt ffi&f, qzie4sazi e am au zie, Q:41

+

4t-ttýtý5VJt tit I ffi-Lj fifib:F-9:31 N, WMJi 4

98t6PH19 J:,E)

ý44 Ee 91 aim in' I In t #,ýj Z)-I-L IVIVU A.-a aq tau LVt q.ý Eq bVj t 3 1 M L:l tie iv ljý,

S ACI=l Aq i p;4 -Yquj V.JJ,-

JUJ 11" V

11"'l Jdj, ýilqet, e4+!-+w 4-ýý pe-H19pazi aziH4eziaekbal WGR CA A I ;z 5

NOISIA36',

C'ý'l SIINni,,3Od3A OlVd (p@nU Ljý_90)

SNb.IIOV, C*C*C a SDV33

CEACs B 3.3.3 BAS ES ACTIONS (cAft&tinCP SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

(Bq~f6i PC Upgrade) ^-

1associ-ated-C6mJ~etion Timne 6f-Condition B,,4.r D ac?

hotmt.f tý9ý7_4I

~onditi`:anot6b completecbwi~thin the required

~ompl e ti'on Timb'ýthe,re~actor :mus§t be 'br~ought to'a ~MODE~w'_Wi~r the ReurdAtons dono appl 1y.,The Compl et ion ý ime of 6ý

~ours is reas6hible., bas'e'don operating experience, for

,N'achi~ng the required planbt~condiltions from full power bonditions in

ýan 'orderly manner 6ancwithout ~chall nin

~~ an t

7ssemns:

SR 3.3.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on another channel.

It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious.

CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability.

If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside!its limits.

The Frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of channel failure.

Since the probability of two random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period is extremely low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due to failure of redundant channels.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.3-8f REVISION

CEACs CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

Bf6WCPC The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more

1pgrade) frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.

SR 3.3.3.2 The CEAC auto restart count is checked every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to monitor the CPC and CEAC for normal operation.

If three or more auto restarts of a nonbypassed CPC occur within a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period, the CPC may not be completely reliable.

The autorestart periodic test restart (code 30) and normal system load (code 33) are not included in the total.

Therefore, the Required Action of Condition D must be performed.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of more than one channel failing within the same 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval.

SR 3.3.3.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each CEAC channel is performed every 92 days to ensure the entire channel will perform its intended function when needed.

The quarterly CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed using test software.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis presented in topical report CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 5).

SR 3.3.3.4 SR 3.3.3.4 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the sensor.

The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive surveillance.

CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B 3.3.3-9 REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS (B~foFeCPC The as found and as left values must also be recorded and Upgra) reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the surveillance interval extension analysis.

The requirements for this review are outlined in Reference 5.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and includes operating experience and consistency with the typical 18 month fuel cycle.

SR 3.3.3.5 Every 18 months, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the CEACs.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of a signal as close to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY, including alarm and trip Functions.

The basis for the 18 month Frequency is that the CEACs perform a continuous self monitoring function that eliminates the need for frequent CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.

This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST essentially validates the self monitoring function and checks for a small set of failure modes that are undetectable by the self monitoring function.

Operating experience has shown that undetected CPC or CEAC failures do not occur in any given 18 month interval.

SR 3.3.3.6 The isolation characteristics of each CEAC CEA position isolation amplifier are verified once per refueling to ensure that a fault in a CEAC or a CPC channel will not render another CEAC or CPC channel inoperable.

The CEAC CEA position isolation amplifiers, mounted in CPC cabinets A and D. prevent a CEAC fault from propagating back to CPC A or D.

(continued)

B 3.3.3-9a REVISION PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILTANCE REQUIREMENTS 16IAfter-C-P SR 3.3:3.6 (continued)

The CEA position Isolation amplifier isolation characteristics test shall include the following; 1) with 120 VAC (60 HZ) applied for at least 30 seconds across the output, the reading on the input does not change by more than 0.015 VDC, with an applied input voltage of 5-10 VDC, and 2) with 120 VAC (60 HZ) applied for at least 30 seconds across the input, the reading on the output does not exceed 15 VDC.

The Frequency is based on plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY, which demonstrates the failure of a channel in any 18 month interval is rare.

-SR ' 3ýr'3r3 Verfdni~~th~fANNE[TC oneCKeb-hLT V2-esLh Lh at gross,failuree of instrumentation has not-,occurred. -A 1

HANNEL CHECK is:normally o

'ecompari*sone-wof ths e p,arameteri i ftdithted on' 'one channel, to sa

~sd'e

- es ir oa rameter -on-' ah6therC Nanhnel.' It i s based on the assumititionfe that J nstrumeinti

ýfi~hn'l onitori nýg,the2 same -paý'ameter shou 1 d -r ead pxpemjene

ft hate(demsase val ueau

~ ~t e~t7Zariri4IILL C.oul d be Kan~ indcation~l to excessive srmn

'r ti n

of the channels n

'ofsýo6mar*2o p

g 'evenemoreylseriousw CHANNEC HECK wil]dete'ct gossannOrb ;tus,(it is uey

)

,ý'eri fyi ng that. t-he,"ins'trýumýent'ati*o-n"*c-o-n-tinues _to_opperate prop~erly~,-etWee CHjIANNEL CALIBRATION.

~n a 60om b n ati o'n 'of te chali6-nne I -i ns trum6e nt 'u nce rtaintie Is,.

~ncluding indication and readab~ility: At Ialchannel is Soutside'the criteria, it maY be'an'Indicationlthat~the"

.ýeMro,orthe si gnal-pcpcessi rig,.eqiii pmetjhsrjfe 00ts de~its I imits.,

experience that de-monstrbates the'~ra'rity of channel ~failure.'

Sinc6ýthb Probability of two random~failu-re in' redundant, bfha'nn'ls in any:42 hour 'period is extremely low.' th'e, CHANNEL PHECK :mi nimizes ~the chance of.1oss ofpbeqie

'g LL tp falue

-f,.rbdundant'chanJs.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 REVISION B 3.3.3-9b

C EACs B 3.3.3 BASES

-SURVEILLANCE

-SR7 3.3:3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTSh~NNECEK s~~hhihsI s76~i~.bfi5

,(After JCP~C' PT

_PNE7 frequent,. chec`ks o f :channe'l 'OPERABILITY ~duri ng 'norm~l

~Ipyjtde.

pertional use ofthe disp sascated iM1the CO fe.qui red ch'annels:.

~~hei~t dco t~ac he rait of1 m'ctan6b'hn

-3 1-psa-p.iti h ae i--i- ---

rx~

(eede

~

33) r Fo 724d~

h HCAN NE LF 0N CT1 0 NA[-T E ST, 7ii' ch CEAC7ýh~and -i-9

'perf6iiiim7d

~vr~92. days to: 6nsure ~the":enit'i re ch~n1wl performrn,'Jts p ntended functi on when nee ed.',T rh 6qarelyACHANNEC1 FUNCT-IONAL 'TES~i s peniformed,usi ng,test s'oftware~. Thd 06quncy of 92 day's is ba'sed,'on~ the. rliabi'ity'analys'i-s presente in' topical 'rep6r~tCEN-3 27-,',,R.P,5!EFASý Extended

ýTst-_'Ihterval Evaluationt'_*(Ref_5.,

Sýý44=

5R7`1'3:3:3 SR'

~4~3333 T ~&'i

~

'~ CHANN EL tALIj BRATjION-everyJ18.month~s,ýQ HIANNELý_CALI BRTO'

-_a"`mlb_

bhannel Jinc]Uding'the sensor. '.The Surv..eill1ahce veri1fies' thtthe channel responds't memasiedp ter ýwithi'n-'thf

~ics~r #ne ida~~~yq~CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1 aves__

1the channel 'adjusted to accou'n't.for~inst~rument ~drift betwdeen

.ýuccessive calibrations to 'ensure that the,channel remains bpr'ioa bt.e ucce Is Xs 4ive urveil11ance.,' "CHANNEL__

CALIBRATIONS miust be~perforrned~bon~istetwt~h, l

_specqi fc,se~tDOifit,analysis%.'_

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.3-9c REVISION

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES URVEILGANCE

ýSP'2_2ý_ý2_4 ýMTý--.3-1378 (continued)

RQUIREMENTS F, a ft&rpa

-ues--_m0u-st_-fl_-s-o-b-'e'r-ecoMed rfd Nviewed for cons i'ýtenty with theýassurýptionsý,bf"-fý6------

Výveillanceý,interval extension analysis.-The rq

ý6yr this review areoutlined inReference 5.

quý Me- "Fr-ý"eý'q"-u"'e-'-n'-c'ý-'y"-",i ý'ba§6d a's s umpti b'*n_','6f -aK-18 'hWK Ulibýatibninterval.Jn the determinati&fý,ff the magnitddd of, equipment drift in

.the setpoint andlysisland includes-pperat'jng 'experience "and, co'nsi stengy,,Vj ILh ýý_ýký_typj

'fuel cyclb"ý

Ever, moTn-ths,_'_a-CRANNEF-TUNCTIONA ---TEST7-1T-ý-e-rf6`rmRd on he CEACs. -'The-,,CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:shall jnclude',06 I s:close',to the sensorsas.practi a6l niectionof'asigna a c

e 0

OPE'RABILIITY-,,,includinqýal"arm and tripFýunctions.:_

E

-tha ACs qqency is, t

performa-continuou -self:,m6nitoý.ing'functibriý-,th bliminates' the need for freqbehV'-CHANNEL, FUNCTIONAL"JEST57, ent-ia 11 y d6b CHANNEL41UNGTIONAL TEST 6§ý vdli 6' th mTnýitori ng-,f unct-16...

h".1'and checks foý.a smal I -set of failure m6d6sth'at are lbn`d6feftable by the self monitoringýfuncti6h.

bbd6ting ex'pe'rib6ce has shbwnthatýundet'bctedACPC or CEAC "c'u.r. J11,4

'ýýiv,

ký j iý ape

ý-ns 1-t a ýaul t i R a ýCEA a 9P9 GhanRel il (continued)

B 3.3.3-9d REVISION PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

CEACs B 3.3.3 BAS ES 5SURVEIEUANCE REQUIREMENTS I,(A#e'CPC

~rg33~

~jfj4 00hAraceitc (tedt U7)'l in;d4 h~llw~YV

~2O.'A +t6,HZ Appie 4-k-tTat 3oqconnlaroz outut Ztcjedn nth nu obit hneb mr

'thAw01 C :tan plIe inputvlaco 0C Bd24 :t 2 lG(0H)aplc~o tlat3 6od

~cro~ te~n tTcradný hc-4p4~dcp ece REFERENCES

1.

10,CFR 50.

2.

10 CFR 100.

3.

UFSAR, Section 7.2.

4.

NRC Safety Evaluation Report, July 15, 1994

5.

CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1.

March 3, 1989, and Calculation 13-JC-SB-200.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 B 3.3.3-9e REVISION

ML023190040

Text

3.3.1 APPLICABILITY

3.1 BACKGROUND

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