ML021220362
| ML021220362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/2002 |
| From: | William Jones NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E |
| To: | Venable J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| Download: ML021220362 (44) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 61`1 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-3084 MAY - 1 2002 Joseph E. Venable Vice President Operations Waterford 3 Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, Louisiana 70066-0751 LEVEL MEETING
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
FOR THE APRIL 24, 2002, WORKING TO REVIEW WATERFORD 3 REFUEL 11
Dear Mr. Venable:
office on April 24, 2002. The This refers to the open public meeting conducted in the Region IV including an event that meeting was conducted to review the Waterford 3 Refuel 11 outage, shutdown cooling for about occurred on March 23, 2002, involving the inability to initiate declared an ALERT, and 11/2 hours (reference PNO-IV-02-016). During the event, operators conditions until shutdown Region IV activated its incident response center to monitor plant cooling was established.
the anti-rotation device on Other topics discussed during the meeting included the failure of suction piping, results of the reactor Reactor Coolant Pump 2B, voiding in the shutdown cooling outage. A copy of the vessel head inspection, and overall plant performance during the any commitments to the NRC attendance list and the handouts are attached. You did not make during the meeting.
2, Title 10, Code of In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part in the NRC's Public Document Room.
Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed pleased to discuss them with Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be you.
Sincerely, William B. Jones, ief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-382 License: NPF-38
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Enclosures:
- 1. Attendance List
- 2. Licensee Presentation cc w/enclosures:
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 General Manager, Plant Operations Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, Louisiana 70066-0751 Manager - Licensing Manager Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, Louisiana 70066-0751 Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission P.O. Box 91154 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-9154 Director, Nuclear Safety &
Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, Louisiana 70066-0751
Entergy Operations, Inc. -3 Michael E. Henry, Administrator and State Liaison Officer Department of Environmental Quality P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 Parish President St. Charles Parish P.O. Box 302 Hahnville, Louisiana 70057 Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502
LICENSEE/FACILITY Entergy Operations, Inc. Waterford 3 DATE/TIME April 24, 2002, 1 p.m.
CONFERENCE LOCATION Training Conference Center, Region IVOffices
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Waterford 3 SES Review of Refuel 11 April 24, 2002 Arlington, Texas 1 Entergy
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Introduction/Overview Joe Venable 2
-Entergy
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Agenda
"* Refuel 11 Events
- Shutdown Sequence Douet 2 min Thayer 5 min
- Event Summary / Review Teams min
- RCP Anti-Rotation Device Lambert 10 Lambert 15 min
- Voiding of SDC Suction Piping 15 min Lambert
- SI-405 A & B Failure to Open Douet 5 min
"* Operations Douet 5 min
"* Emergency Plan Performance Venable 5 min
"* Reactor Vessel Head Inspection Venable 5 min
"* Outage Overview Venable 5 min
- Closing Remarks 3 -Entergy
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Shutdown Sequence Randy Douet 4!Entergy
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Shutdown Sequence 3/22 2300 Opened breakers - outage start 3/23 0135 Vented SI-405 B piping (7 minutes) 0403 Vented SI-405 A piping (11 minutes) 0508 Secured RCP 1B 0509 Secured RCP 2B 0550 Control Room contacted - RCP2B rotating @ 630 RPM 0645 Secured RCP 1A & 2A, transfer to natural circulation 0651 RCP 2B indicates zero speed 0847 Enter Mode 4 1005 Attempted to open SI-405 A 1008 Attempted to open SI-405 B 1020 E-plan "ALERT" declared 1137 Opened SI-405 A 1143 Opened SI-405 B 1150 Exited E-Plan 1242 Placed Shutdown Cooling Train A in service
-- Entergy
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Refuel 11 Events Summary Jay Thayer 6 M%
Entergy
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Shutdown Issues Review Team
- Executive lead put in charge from EN-S headquarters
- 3 separate Root Cause Teams formed to address each event:
- RCP 2B Anti Reverse Rotation Device Failure (Natural Circulation Cooldown)
- SI-405 A & B Failure to Open
- Voiding of Shutdown Cooling Suction Piping
- 1/2 of team members non-Waterford personnel 0 Team included external industry expertise
- All RCA reports reviewed by EN-S Vice Presidents
- All RCA reports completed and approved by April 4, 2002 0 Each team addressed
- Root cause and contributing cause(s)
- Safety significance
- Corrective actions (short and long term)
- Generic Implications --- te
==--Entergy
RCP 2B Anti Reverse Rotation Device Failure Event Description On March 23, 2002, during shutdown for RF1 1, Reactor Coolant Pump 2B rotated in reverse direction when secured. The Control Room crew entered the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction procedure and secured all Reactor Coolant Pumps. This stopped Reactor Coolant Pump 2B's reverse rotation. RCP 2B rotated in the reverse direction for approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 35 minutes.
Root Cause
- The most likely cause associated with this failure is sludge accumulation in the ARRD assembly.
8 ne
~Entergy
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Voiding of Shutdown Cooling Suction Piping Event Description On March 23, 2002, during shutdown for RF1 1, a portion of both trains of Shutdown Cooling (SDC) suction piping (between the inboard and outboard containment isolation valves SI-405A(B) &
SI-407A(B)) was determined to be empty by performance of ultrasonic examinations. Immediate corrective actions involved the fill and vent of the SDC suction piping.
Root Cause
- The root cause of this event is original design inadequate.
i -Entergy
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B Failure to Open SI-405 A &
Event Description
- On March 23, 2002, during shutdown for RF1 1, SI-405A(B) did not open when attempting to put the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) relief valves in service delaying the initiation of shutdown cooling. The Plant declared an ALERT due to this event.
Root Cause
- The root cause of this event was determined to be thermal binding.
10 ~Entergy(
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Root Cause Analyses Craig Lambert 11
-t-- Entergy
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RCP 2B ARRD Failure ATTEMPTED REVERSE MOTION 0
9P 0CL) CAMS WEDGE STATIONARY 0
BETWEEN CIRCULAR FACE RACES Sprags are lined with FORWARD MOTION babbit.
STATIONARY Centrifugal force keeps FACE sprags clear of stationary face when pump is rotating in Entefgy
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RCP 2B ARRD Failure Root Cause Analysis
- The most likely cause associated with this failure is sludge accumulation.
- Induces erratic sprag operation
- Springs are not able to overcome additional frictional forces to properly position the sprags Main Contributing Cause o No vendor recommendations exist for preventative maintenance.
13
---Entergy
RCP 2B ARRD Failure Short-term Corrective Actions
"° Guidance for monitoring secured RCP's during the shutdown and startup sequences issued
"*Operations training on the indications of ARRD failure and entry requirements for RCP malfunction completed
"*Replaced 2B ARRD and replaced all RCP 2B motor bearings
"*Drained, cleaned reservoir, changed oil on all RCPs
"*Backlash checked on all 4 RCPs
"*RCP 2B pump and motor vibration monitored during startup
- Analyzed sludge found in RCP 2B ARRD
- ARRDs monitored during pump bumps 14
~Entergy
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RCP 2B ARRD Failure Long-term Corrective Actions
"* Develop and implement a preventive maintenance program.
"*Complete metallurgical evaluation of broken sprags and springs.
"*Issue Operating Experience.
"*Enhance indications available to operator.
15- bEntergy
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RCP 2B ARRD Failure Safety Significance ARRD failure mechanism has no impact on Reactor Coolant System integrity or any system or component needed for accident mitigation.
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-- Entergy
Voiding of Shutdown Cooling Suction Piping Root Cause Analysis
- Determined root cause of this event to be OriginalDesign Inadequate.
- SDC suction piping routed above hot leg and normal RWSP level Main Contributing Cause
- Causes of a Previous Event or Known Problem were not Determined
- The causes of a previous event were not adequately determined
- The SDC suction piping voiding mechanism was not broadly understood
- Significance of this configuration was not adequately determined 17 Is Entergy
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Shutdown Cooling Suction Piping (Approx) EL 25"10" SI-4051B SI-405B SI-401B CL Elev +23"0" Min Flow Recirc Penetration#40 (41)
Elev +1L'-O" CL Elev +15"0" Disch to Cont.
(90%indicated level)
CL Elev 9' CL Elev- 26' CL Elev-33"7" CL LPSI PUMP B 18
-*-Entergy
Voiding of Shutdown Cooling Suction Piping Short-term Corrective Actions
" Confirmed that air intrusion will not prevent SDC or LPSI systems from performing their safety function
"*Confirmed no other safety system is inoperable due to air intrusion
"*Confirmed that a water seal is present at other penetrations at the start of and 30 days post accident
"° Confirmed that containment integrity is maintained
"*Confirmed continued compliance with Technical Specifications 19 Entergy
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Voiding of Shutdown Cooling Suction Piping Long-term Corrective Actions
"* Define options for resolving the air intrusion conditions
"* Identify training needs related to containment design and testing and technical issue resolution
"* Complete an organizational effectiveness assessment
"* Perform periodic UT examinations to determine static leak rates 20 OEntergy
Voiding of Shutdown Cooling Suction Piping Safety Significance
- Very low safety significance
° Containment Integrity is maintained Air pocket growth during LOCA will not affect LPSI injection
- LPSI secured at Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)
- Time to RAS < time to impact injection
- Air pocket too small to gas bind pump
- Size limited to containment SI sump elevation
- Air pocket compressed by RCS pressure
° Plant experience shows air pocket is swept through pump 21 go
=7--Entergy
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SI-405 A & B Failure to Open
"*14-inch flex wedge gate
- interlocks prevent opening while > 386 psia
"*hydraulic-pneumaticactuator
- second valve off of the RCS to
"*hydraulic pump opens the valve align SDC (SI-401 is first) 22 ° stored nitrogen closes the valve
- Entergy
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SI-405 A & B Failure to Open Root Cause Analysis
- The Root Cause of the event is determined to be thermal binding of SI-405 A & B e Actuator set-up had little margin Main Contributing Causes
"*Vendor manual contained incorrect chart for charging nitrogen system
"* GL 95-07 analysis did not consider event conditions 23 Ak
~Entergy
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SI-405 A & B Short-term Corrective Actions
"*All circuits and instrument setpoints checked with no problems found
"*Performed analysis to verify S1-405 A(B) susceptibility to thermal binding
" Evaluated data from normal hydraulic actuator PMs to validate there were no actuator problems
- Validated design parameters in the field for actuator capability and perform testing using AOV/MOV test equipment
- Increased the SI-405 A(B) open stroke actuator thrust
- Re-evaluated response to GL 95-07 24-Entergy
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SI-405 A & B Failure to Open Long-term Corrective Actions
"* Evaluate modification/replacement of SI-405 A(B) with respect to thermal binding design
"* Evaluate implementing EPRI study recommendations for coping with thermal binding 25 a Entergy
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SI-405 A & B Safety Significance
"* Very low safety significance
"* Delayed SDC initiation
"* Required additional SG steam release / feedwater inventory
- Accident conditions bounded by FSAR for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> delay
- Small (< 1 Rem) increase in offsite dose assuming actual SG leakrate
- Feedwater inventory available Risk Impact
- Instantaneous ACDF = 5.4 x 10-8
- ACDP 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> - 8 X 10-11 26_
Entergy
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Operations Views Randy Douet 27
-- Entergy
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Operations Views Plant Performance
"* Equipment problems led to unnecessary burden on control room operators
- Charging pump tripped
- Pressurizer level control malfunction
- RCP reverse rotation
- SI-405 A & B delayed opening
"* Plant and procedures responded well to natural circulation cooldown 28
~Entcrgy
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Operations Views Operations Performance
"° Weak diagnosis of RCP 2B reverse rotation
"* Missed opportunity on LPSI SDC line voiding impact on containment penetration
"* Prompt conservative E-Plan entry amidst heavy activity load
"* RF1 1 Operations human performance excellent
- Human error rate for RF 0 = 1.43
- Human error rate for RFR1 = 0.00 29 ist_
-Entergy
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Emergency Plan Performance Randy Douet 30
-Entergy
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Emergency Plan Performance
"* Emergency Action Level - Inability to Achieve or Maintain Cold Shutdown
"* Declared 15 minutes after valves declared Inoperable and Technical Specification entry Performance Indicators Met - 2 of 2
"* Shift Manager promptly relieved of Emergency Plan duties - 17 Minutes
"* Timely Emergency Facility Activation
- EOF ready for activation in 52 minutes
° Offsite notifications timely and accurate
- State and Locals -6 Minutes; NRC - 18 Minutes 31 Entfrgy
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Emergency Plan Performance Lessons Learned
"* Event termination
- Checklist to be revised by May 15, 2002
"* ENS commitments/site boundary surveys
- Communicated to emergency organization decision makers (action complete)
- Status boards to be provided by May 15, 2002
"* Emergency News Center staffing
- Communicated to Emergency News Center Directors (action complete) 32
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Reactor Vessel Head Inspection Joe Venable 33 0- Entergy
Reactor Vessel Head Inspection
- Effective visual examination completed on 4/1/02 0 No evidence of boric acid deposits
- 3600 of all nozzles were inspected
- - 20% of the original reflective insulation was not removed due to the risk of damage to the CEDM's and vent line
- This section was raised to permit a borescope inspection of the bare metal
- A robotic crawler used to inspect the balance of the head
° NRC Sr. Resident and Regional Inspector were present during portions of insulation removal and inspection evolutions.
- Blanket insulation was installed in place of the removed reflective insulation
- Dose received on this activity which included headstand spacer and shielding modification, inspection and re-insulation was 8.5R 34
~Entergy
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Waterford 3 Reactor Head Inspection Photos Waterford 3 Reactor Head (stored on the refueling stand)
Old Insulation and "Donuts" Head with Insulation Removed New blanket Insulation E r 35
ýEntfrgy
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Outage High Level Overview Joe Venable 36 A Entergy
Outage High Level Overview RF11 Safety Performance
- 0 critical safety function challenges 0 0 lost-time accidents
- 0 OSHA recordables (7 during RF10)
- 15 first aid cases (34 during RF10)
- Outage total dose = 102.5* Rem
- no over-exposures
- personnel contaminations down 35% from RF10 RF11 Duration
- 25 days, 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />, 15 minutes
- to be updated 37 - n
~Entffgy
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Outage High Level Overview RF1 1 Major Activities/Results
"* No RCS nozzle leakage identified during inspection
"* No boric acid deposits / reactor head degradation identified
- No fuel reconstitution required
"* Steam generator inspection - plugged a total of 36 tubes
"* Major activities
- Reactor head modification / permanent seal plate
- Part Length CEA / 4-finger CEA elimination
- Appendix K power uprate
- Resolved remaining GL 96-06 penetrations
- MS 401 A & B valve replacements
- Replace Main Transformer A
- Replace S1-142 A 38
~Entergy
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Closing Remarks Joe Venable 39 -Entergy
Entergy Operations, Inc. MAY - 1 LuU2 Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (EWM)
DRP Director (KEB)
DRS Director (ATH)
Senior Resident Inspector (TRF)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (WBJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (GAP)
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
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_ _ __/2002 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax