ML021120136
| ML021120136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/2002 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Tabatabai O, NRR/DRIP/RLEP, 415-3738 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML021120136 (15) | |
Text
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Application for Renewed Operating License Technical and Administrative Information 2.3 Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems 2.3.1 Engineered Safety Features Systems The following systems are addressed in this section:
"* Safety Injection System (Section 2.3.1.1)
"* Containment Spray System (Section 2.3.1.2)
- Residual Heat Removal System (Section 2.3.1.3)
- Containment Hydrogen Detectors and Recombiners System (Section 2.3.1.4)
Containment Isolation Components (Section 2.3.1.5) 2.3.1.1 Safety Injection (SI)
System Description
The Safety Injection System supports RCS inventory and reactivity control during accident and post-accident circumstances by automatically delivering borated water to the reactor vessel for cooling under high and low reactor coolant pressure conditions. Additionally, the system serves to insert negative reactivity into the Reactor core in the form of borated water during an uncontrolled plant cooldown following a steam line break or an inadvertent valve operation. The Safety Injection System is also credited for use in safe shutdown following some fires and contains components that are part of the Environmental Qualification Program.
Adequate core cooling following a loss-of-coolant accident is provided by the Safety Injection System (SI), which operates as follows:
- 1. Injection of borated water by the passive accumulators.
- 2. Injection by the high-pressure safety injection pumps drawing borated water from the RWST.
- 3. Provide capability for injection by the residual heat removal pumps also drawing borated water from the RWST.
- 4. Recirculation of reactor coolant and injection water from the containment sump to the reactor coolant system by the residual heat removal pumps and the SI pumps,if needed (piggy-back operation).
The principal components of the SI system are two passive accumulators (one for each loop), high-head safety injection pumps, interface with low-head safety injection (Residual Heat Removal pumps), and the essential piping and valves.
The accumulators are passive devices that discharge into the cold leg of each loop. During MODES 1 and 2 the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is.
Page 2-34
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Application for Renewed Operating License Technical and Administrative Information aligned to the suction of the high-head safety injection pumps and residual heat removal pumps. The Containment Spray System shares the RWST liquid capacity with the SI system. After the injection phase, coolant spilled from the break and water injected by the safety injection system and the containment spray is cooled and recirculated from the sump to the reactor coolant system by the low-pressure safety injection system or, if needed, by the high-pressure safety injection system.
The following fluid systems interface with the Safety Injection System:
Reactor Coolant Waste Disposal Residual Heat Removal Plant Air Containment Spray Spent Fuel Cooling Chemical and Volume Control Component Cooling Water Service Water In addition to the System Functions described above, the Safety Injection System also contains components which support additional functions (associated system design functions) that may or may not be License Renewal Intended Functions. A comprehensive list of system functions is provided below:
Cril Cri2 Cri3 FP EQ PTS AT SB B
INTRODUCE EMERGENCY NEGATIVE REACTIVITY TO X
MAKE THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this primary design system function.
The Safety Injection system increases the boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant system during the injection phase of Safety Injection to ensure adequate reactor shutdown margin in the event of a secondary pipe break. The Safety Injection system provides sufficient boron to maintain an adequate post-LOCA sump boron concentration to ensure shutdown of the core.
The Safety Injection system delivers borated water to the Reactor Coolant system, as necessary, to compensate for Xenon decay to maintain hot shutdown margin.
Cril Cri2 Cri3 FP EQ PTS AT SB G
PROVIDE EMERGENCY CORE COOLANT WHERE THE ECCS X
PROVIDES COOLANT DIRECTLY TO THE CORE Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this primary design system function.
The Safety Injection system delivers borated cooling water to the Reactor Coolant system during the injection phase to support core cooling.
Cri I Cri 2 Cri 3 FP EQ PTS AT SB J
PROVIDE HEAT REMOVAL FROM SAFETY RELATED HEAT X
EXCHANGERS Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this associated design system function (e.g. seal water heat exchangers and/or heat exchanger interfaces with other fluid systems).
Cri 1 Cri 2 Cri 3 FP EQ PTS AT SB Page 2-35
Table 2.1-1 System Function Codes System Function Description ANSI 51.1 Notes Function Discussion Code Paragraph A
MAINTAIN REACTOR CORE ASSEMBLY 4.1.1, 4.4.1 GEOMETRY B
INTRODUCE EMERGENCY NEGATIVE 4.2.1,4.8.1 Functions include limiting the introduction of REACTIVITY TO MAKE THE REACTOR positive reactivity.
SUBCRITICAL C
INTRODUCE NEGATIVE REACTIVITY TO 4.2.1 ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN SUBCRITICAL REACTOR CONDITION D
SENSE OR PROVIDE PROCESS CONDITIONS 4.3.1 AND GENERATE SIGNALS FOR REACTOR TRIP AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION E
PROVIDE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE 4.4.1 BOUNDARY F
REMOVE RESIDUAL HEAT FROM THE RCS 4.5.1 Residual heat removal by direct recirculation of reactor coolant. This system function does not address emergency core cooling via Engineered Safety Features Actuation.
Page 2-24 Application for Renewed Operating License
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Application for Renewed Operating License Technical and Administrative Information K
PROVIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY X
Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this associated design system function. A portion of the Safety Injection system is a Closed Loop Outside Containment (CLOC) pressure boundary.
Cri l Cri 2 Cri 3 FP EQ PTS AT SB L
PROVIDE EMERGENCY HEAT REMOVAL FROM PRIMARY X
CONTAINMENT AND PROVIDE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this primary design system function.
The Safety Injection system provides the liquid capacity of the Refueling Water Storage Tank for the Containment Spray system to provide emergency heat removal from primary containment and provide containment pressure control.
Cri I Cri 2 Cri 3 FP EQ PTS AT SB S
SPECIAL CAPABILITY CLASS FUNCTIONS Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this associated design system function (augmented quality). For the purposes of License Renewal, components within the Safety Injection system that perform special capability class functions are tracked under the Criterion 3 codes (ZI through Z5). The Safety Injection systems Refueling Water Storage Tank provides a source of borated water during refueling shutdown to flood the refueling cavity.
Additionally, the Safety Injection system provides a backup source of water during normal plant operations for the Chemical and Volume Control system charging pumps in the event the normal source (VCT) is lost. The Refueling Water Storage Tank also provides one of two required boric acid sources sufficient to provide the required shutdown margin at cold shutdown, xenon-free conditions from any expected operating condition.
Cril Cri2 Cri3 FP EQ PTS AT SB T
NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY CLASS FUNCTIONS Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this associated design system function. The Safety Injection system contains non-nuclear safety class components such as normally isolated sample points and test connections.
Cri I Cri 2 Cri 3 FP EQ PTS AT SB Y
LICENSE RENEWAL CRITERION 2 - CONTAINS NON X
SAFETY RELATED SSC'S WHOSE FAILURE COULD PREVENT SATISFACTORY ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this associated design system function. The Safety Injection system contains non-safety piping segments and components whose failure could impact a safety related function.
Cri 1 Cri2 Cri3 FP EQ PTS AT SB ZI LICENSE RENEWAL CRITERION 3 - CONTAINS SSC'S X
RELIED UPON IN SAFETY ANALYSES OR PLANT EVALUATIONS TO PERFORM A FUNCTION THAT DEMONSTRATES COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS FOR FIRE PROTECTION (10 CFR 50.48)
Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system perform this associated design system function. The safety injection system is capable of isolating RCS boundaries, preventing loss of inventory of the RWST and supplying RWST inventory to the charging system to support reactor coolant make-up capability and reactivity control. Additionally, a Safety Injection pump may be used following some fire events to provide inventory and reactivity control for safe shutdown.
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SYSTEM SCOPING EXCEPTIONS
- 1.
THE ONLY IN-SCOPE PORTION OF THE SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF COMPONENTS THAT WILL RECEIVE A COMMODITY GROUP EVALUATION (e.g., FIRE BARRIERS, EQUIPMENT SUPPORTS)
- 2.
THE ONLY IN-SCOPE PORTION OF THE SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF COMPONENTS THAT ACT AS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BOUNDARIES
- 3.
THE ONLY IN-SCOPE PORTION OF THE SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF COMPONENTS WHOSE FAILURE COULD AFFECT AN INTENDED FUNCTION FOR OTHER EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THE AREA.
CRITERION 2 SCOPING METHODOLOGY 10CFR54.4(a)(2)
- 1.
GINNA Q-LIST "SAFETY SIGNIFICANT" CLASSIFICATION INTERNAL FLOODING PROTECTION EXTERNAL FLOODING PROTECTION TORNADO PROTECTION LOAD HANDLING EQUIPMENT CREDITED FOR NUREG-0612
- 2.
SR/NSR PIPING INTERFACE
- 3.
SEISMIC II/I SUPPORTS ALL SUPPORTS IN AREAS CONTAINING SR EQUIPMENT IS SCOPE AS A COMMODITY GROUP
- 4.
NON-SAFETY EQUIPMENT WHOSE CREDIBLE POSTULATED FAILURE COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT AN INTENDED FUNCTION NOTE: MAJOR EXCEPTION TO 4 WHERE ALTERNATE MITIGATION STRATEGY IS EMPLOYED
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Application for Renewed Operating License Technical and Administrative Information Cri I Cri 2 Cri 3 FP EQ PTS AT SB Z2 LICENSE RENEWAL CRITERION 3 - CONTAINS SSC-S X
RELIED UPON IN SAFETY ANALYSES OR PLANT EVALUATIONS TO PERFORM A FUNCTION THAT DEMONSTRATES COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION (10 CFR 50.49)
Comment:
Components within the Safety Injection system are designated as Environmentally Qualified.
UFSAR Reference Additional Safety Injection System details are provided in Section 6.3 and Table 6.2-15 of the UFSAR.
Boundary Drawings The license renewal drawings for the Safety Injection System are listed below:
33013-1246,2 33013-1250,1 33013-1261 33013-1262,1 33013-1262,2 Components Subject to an AMR The component groups for this system that require aging management review are indicated in Table 2.3.1-1 along with each Component Group's passive function and reference(s) to the corresponding AMR Table(s) in Section 3.
Table 2.3.1-1 Safety Injection (SI)
Component Group Passive Function(s)
Aging Management Reference ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE BOUNDARY Table 3.2-1 Line Number (9)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (1)
CS COMPONENTS PRESSURE BOUNDARY Table 3.2-1 Line Number (10)
FASTENERS JOINT INTEGRITY Table 3.2-1 Line Number (10)
(BOLTING)
J TTable 3.2-2 Line Number (9)
Table 3.2-1 Line Number (9)
FLOW ELEMENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY Table 3.2-2 Line Number (16)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (17)
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Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Application for Renewed Operating License Technical and Administrative Information Table 2.3.1-1 Safety Injection (SI)
Component Group Passive Function(s) 1 Aging Management Reference Table 3.2-2 Line Number (24)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (25)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (26)
! Table 3.2-2 Line Number (27)
- Table 3.2-1 Line Number (8)
PRESSURE BOUND i Table 3.2-2 Line Number (21)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (22)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (23)
I Table 3.2-2 Line Number (28)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (29) i Table 3.2-1 Line Number (9)
INDICATOR PRESSURE BOUNDARY iTable 3.2-2 Line Number (31)
Table 3.2-1 Line Number (9) This PRESSURE BOUNDARY I
ORIFICE applies to both passive functions.
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (35)
RESTRICTS FLOW Table 3.2-2 Line Number (36)
Table 3.2-1 Line Number (9)
PIPE PRESSURE BOUNDARY iTable 3.2-2 Line Number (45)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (48)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (49)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (53)
PUMP CASING PRESSURE BOUNDARY Table 3.2-2 Line Number (54)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (55)
'Table 3.2-1 Line Number (3)
TANK PRESSURE BOUNDARY Table 3.2-1 Line Number (9)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (61)
Table 3.2-1 Line Number (9)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (71) able 3.2-2 Line Number (73)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (74)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (76)
VALVE BODY PRESSURE BOUNDARY Table 3.2-2 Line Number (77)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (78)
V Table 3.2-2 Line Number (79)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (88)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (90)
Table 3.2-2 Line Number (91)
Page 2-38
Engineered Safety Features Systems - Aging Management Programs Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that are Relied on for License Renewal Aging Further Aging Management Evaluation Component Effect/Mechanism Programs Recommended Discussion (1) Piping, fittings, and Cumulative fatigue TLAA, evaluated in Yes, TLAA Consistent with NUREG 1801. Cumulative Fatigue Damage is valves in emergency core damage accordance with 10 addressed as a TLAA in Section 4.3.
cooling system CFR 54.21(c)
(2) Components in Loss of material Plant specific t Yes, plant specific Consistent with NUREG 1801. The aging effect "loss of containment spray (PWR due to general material due to general corrosion" applies to external surfaces only), standby gas corrosion of carbon steel components exposed to ambient air. The treatment (BWR only),
plant-specific aging management program is the Systems containment isolation, and Monitoring Program.
emergency core cooling i
The combination of components, materials and environments identified in Items V.A.2-a and V.A.5-a are not applicable at systems Ginna Station. Components identified in Item V.C.1-a are included in the containment isolation valves and associated piping entry under line item 4 in this table..
(3) Components in Loss of material Plant specific Yes, plant specific Consistent with NUREG 1801 (containment isolation containment spray (PWR due to pitting and components and RWST bottom). The One-Time Inspection only), standby gas crevice corrosion Program manages these aging effects for RWST bottom. The treatment (BWR only),
Systems Monitoring Program is credited for managing all other containment isolation, and applicable aging effects.
emergency core cooling systems (4) Containment isolation Loss of material Plant specific
'Yes, plant specific Consistent with NUREG 1801 (containment isolation valves and associated due to components such as valves and pipe penetrations). The aging piping microbiologically i
effect "loss of material due to microbiologically influenced influenced corrosion (MIC)" is managed by the plant-specific Periodic corrosion Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance Program.
(5) High pressure safety Loss of material Plant specific Yes, plant specific The high pressure safety injection pumps are not used for injection (charging) pump due to erosion normal charging at Ginna Station. Loss of material due to miniflow orifice erosion of miniflow orifices is not applicable at Ginna Station.
Page 3-4 Application for Renewed Operating License Table 3.2-1
0 Table 3.2-2 Engineered Safety Features Systems - Component Types NUREG-1801 Subject to Aging Management not Evaluated in Component Type MaterialType EnvironmentType AERMs Program/Activity Discussion (1) ACCUMULATOR Carbon/Low Alloy Containment Loss of Material Systems Consistent with Item E.l-b of NUREG-1801.
Steel Monitoring Volume 1, Table 2 includes "External surface of Program carbon steel components" with a plant specific aging management program. This material and environment grouping is not included in NUREG-1800 Table 3.2-1. The Systems Monitoring Program is credited for managing this aging effect.
(2) BLOWER Carbon/Low Alloy Air and Gas Loss of Material Periodic Material and environment grouping are not CASING Steel (Wetted) < 140 Surveillance &
included in NUREG-1801. The aging Preventive Maint management program(s) referenced are Program appropriate for the aging effects identified and provides assurance that the aging effects are effectively managed through the period of extended operation.
(3)
Carbon/Low Alloy Containment Loss of Material Systems Consistent with Item E.l-b of NUREG-1801.
Steel Monitoring Volume 1, Table 2 includes "External surface of Program carbon steel components" with a plant specific aging management program. This material and environment grouping is not included in NUREG-1800 Table 3.2-1. The Systems Monitoring Program is credited for managing this aging effect.
(4) CONTROLLER Stainless Steel Air and Gas No Aging Effects No Aging Material and environment grouping are not Management included in NUREG-1801.
Program Required (5)
Stainless Steel Containment No Aging Effects No Aging Material and environment grouping are not Management included in NUREG-1801.
Program Required (6)
Stainless Steel Indoor (No Air No Aging Effects No Aging Material and environment grouping are not Conditioning)
Management included in NUREG-1801.
Program Required Page 3-7 Application for Renewed Operating License 0
Component Type Review Tool Safety Injection ACCUMULATOR.
Carbon/Low Alloy Steel - Containment Equip ID Description TSI03B SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR B Reference 33013-1262,2 TSI03A SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR A 33013-1262,2 Stainless Steel - Treated Water Borated <140 Equip ID Description Reference TSI03A-CLAD Subcomponent - SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR A 33013-1262,2 TSI03B-CLAD Subcomponent - SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR B 33013-1262,2 CS.COMPONENTS
, K Carbon/Low Alloy Steel - Borated Water Leaks Equip ID Description Reference SI-CS-COMP THIS ASSET REPRESENTS THE EXTERNAL SURFACES OF CARBON NUREG-1801 STEEL/CAST IRON COMPONENTS IN THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM FASTENERS (BOLTING),,
t~
Carbon/Low Alloy Steel - Borated Water Leaks Equip ID Description Reference SI-BOLT-CS CARBON STEEL BOLTING IN THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM ME-318 Stainless Steel - Borated Water Leaks Equip ID Description Reference SI-BOLT-SS STAINLESS STEEL BOLTING IN THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM ME-318 FLOW ELEMENT Stainless Steel - Containment Equip ID Description Reference FE-925 SI LOOP "A" HOT LEG FLOW ELEMORIFICE 33013-1262,2 FE-924 SI LOOP "B" HOT LEG FLOW ELEMENT ORIFICE 33013-1262,2 Stainless Steel - Indoor (No Air Conditioning)
Equip ID Description Reference FE-916 FLOW ELEMENT BETWEEN 874H AND 874L 33013-1261 Stainless Steel - Treated Water Borated <140 Equip ID Description FE-924 SI LOOP "B" HOT LEG FLOW ELEMENT ORIFICE FE-925 SI LOOP "A" HOT LEG FLOW ELEMORIFICE FE-916 FLOW ELEMENT BETWEEN 874H AND 874L Reference 33013-1262,2 33013-1262,2 33013-1261 Page 1 of 23
Mechanical Systems Material V&V for PSSL: 05 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM (SIS) SR
.N dy/Bonnet or 11625 Description Bolting Material Reference Vendor Name Model No Rev Reference Title INSTR ISOL VLV TO LT-920 (RWST KEROTEST LVL)
MANUFACTURING 3/8 x 581 A182F304 R42X81N,1-2 11626 INSTR ISOL VLV TO LT-921 (RWST LVL)
A182F304 R42X81N,1-2 12402B INSTR EQUALIZATION VLV FOR FT 924 (SI PMP A DISCH FLOW)
D KEROTEST MANUFACTURIN D
KEROTEST MANUFACTURIN PACKLESS DIAPHRAGM VALVE 3/8 x 581 G
PACKLESS DIAPHRAGM VALVE 3/4X85M G
A182F304 9152N,1 F001 VALVE MANIFOLD VTD-K0085-4008 12402H INSTR HI SIDE ISOL VLV TO FT-924 KEROTEST 3/4X85M (SI PMP A DISCH FLOW)
MANUFACTURING A182F304 9152N,1 F001 VALVE MANIFOLD VTD-K0085-4008 12402L INSTR LO SIDE ISOL VLV TO FT-KEROTEST 3/4X85M 924 (SI PMP A DISCH FLOW)
MANUFACTURING A182F304 9152N,1 F001 VALVE MANIFOLD VTD-KO085-4008 403 INSTR HI SIDE FOR FT-925 w
FLOW)
A182F316 12404 A182F316 12405B E TEST CONN ISOL SI PMP B DISCH VTD-H0037-4005 INSTR LO SIDE TEST CONN ISOL FOR FT-925 (SI PMP B DISCH FLOW)
VTD-H0037-4005 IIi'TP FALIALIZATION VLV FOR FT-DRESSER IND VALVE &
8130S-1 INSTRUMENT DIV 0
HANCOCK VALVE MATERIALS AND VARIOUS DRAWINGS DRESSER IND VALVE &
8130S-1 INSTRUMENT DIV 0
HANCOCK VALVE TYPE NUMBERS GLOBE-813OS&W KEROTEST 3/8-X58M 925 (SI PMP B DISCH FLOW)
MANUFACTURING 9152N,1 INSTR DRAIN VLV FROM FT-925 (SI PMP B DISCH FLOW)
F001 VALVE MANIFOLD VTD-K0085-4008 KEROTEST 3/8-X58M MANUFACTURING 9152N,l INSTR HI SIDE ISOL VLV TO FT-925 (SI PMP B DISCH FLOW)
F001 VALVE MANIFOLD KEROTEST 3/8-X58M MANUFACTURING VTD-K0085-4008 9152N,1 INSTR LO SIDE ISOL VLV TO FT 925 (SI PMP B DISCH FLOW)
FOOl V
KEROTEST MANUFACTURING ALVE MANIFOLD 3/8-X58M VTD-K0085-4008
~82F304 DA-ME-2001-023 9152N,1 F001 VALVE MANIFOLD VTD-K0085-4008 Page 1 of 21 Rev 0
Remarks A182F304 12405D B-5-2485-N B-5-2485-N A182F304 12405H A182F304 12405L Casino Material DA Rfev
APPENDIX B PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM 10 ATTRIBUTES - USE GALL WORDS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
"* CONCLUSION SECTION CONSISTENT WITH GALL DIFFERENCES PROGRAM COMMITMENTS
"* INCORPORATED INTO PROGRAM BASIS DOCUMENTS
"* PROGRAM OWNER TRAINING (INC. SYSTEM ENGINEERS)
PROGRAM/PROCEDURE CHANGES COMMITMENT/ACTION TRACKING SYSTEM
FATIGUE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED FATIGUE - PRO AUTOMATIC CYCLE COUNTING 7 LOCATIONS FOR STRESS-BASED CYCLE COUNTING, BALANCE USE CYCLE-BASED COUNTING PROJECT CYCLES/EFFECTS TO 60 YEARS ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS DETERMINE CUF FOR NUREG/CR-6260 LOCATIONS REACTOR VESSEL m
USE FEN PER NUREG/CR-6583 SURGE LINE NOZZLE LIMITING COMPONENT FOR CUF OPTIONS TO MANAGE:
MORE REALISTIC CUF FROM SBF NRC APPROVED INSPECTION TECHNIQUE EXPLICIT FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION REPAIR/REPLACE B31.1 LOCATIONS NO DETAILED CUF CALCULATIONS SIMILARITY COMPARISON TO 6260 PLANT:
TRANSIENT TYPES, QUANTITIES, GEOMETRY AND MATERIALS USE MAX ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
TLAAs - 10CFR54.3 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL TLAAs PREVIOUS APPLICATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS GINNA CLB SEARCH BASED ON KEY WORDS SCREENING PER SIX 54.3 CRITERIA EVALUATION PER 10CFR54.21 (c)(1)(i),(ii), or (iii)
SPECIFIC RESULTS:
EQ CALCULATIONS REMAIN VALID OR BEING PROJECTED TO 60 YEARS (i) OR (ii) 0 60 YEARS PROJECTED CYCLES <40 YEAR DESIGN CYCLES PTS CALCULATED TO 60 YEARS P-T LIMITS CALCULATED TO 60 YEARS 0
RCS LBB CALCULATED TO 60 YEARS (INC. RCP)
EQUIVALENT MARGINS ANALYSIS - 60 YEARS 0
TENDON PRESTRESS LOSS -60 YEARS