ML021090419
| ML021090419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/2002 |
| From: | Merschoff E NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Anderson C Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358, IR-01-006 | |
| Download: ML021090419 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000313/2001006
Text
April 15, 2002
Craig G. Anderson, Vice President
Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO BACKFIT CLAIM REGARDING NRC INSPECTION
REPORT 50-313/01-06; 50-368/01-06
Dear Mr. Anderson:
As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313;-368/01-06, dated August 20, 2001, the NRC
identified an unresolved item in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator corridor and the Unit 1
north electrical switchgear room concerning use of manual actions in lieu of providing protection
for cables associated with equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown as
specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. This issue was considered
unresolved pending further NRC review and the determination of its risk. Subsequently, in an
exit meeting held on August 30, 2001, the NRC informed Entergy Operations, Inc., that the
existing configurations did not conform to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2. However, the issue remained unresolved pending the completion of the NRCs
risk determination.
Your letter of September 28, 2001, claimed that our position that manual actions cannot be
used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, was a backfit. At issue is
your use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions in the event
of a fire in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator corridor (Fire Zone 98J) and north switchgear
room (Fire Zone 99M). In this letter, you asserted that the NRC has accepted such manual
actions in the past, and stated that our position with respect to disallowing the use of manual
actions for complying with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R should be considered a backfit that is
generic to all plants.
On October 26, 2001, and again on January 17, 2002, we convened a backfit panel in
accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Management of Plant-
Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," to review your backfit claim as stated in your
letter of September 28, 2001. After careful consideration of your appeal, we have determined
that (1) the NRC did not impose a regulatory staff position that is new or different from a
previously applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north
electrical switchgear room in lieu of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2.a, III.G.2.b, or III.G.2.c; and (3) your methodology for using manual actions (in
the event of a fire in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north switchgear room), in lieu of
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-2-
ensuring that one train of redundant cables and equipment of systems needed for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage, does not comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Your claim that our position (that
manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2) is
a generic backfit will be addressed by the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in their
response to a letter from the Nuclear Energy Institute dated January 11, 2002. Accordingly,
Unresolved Item 50-313;368/0106-02 has been reclassified as an Apparent Violation pending
NRCs assessment of the risk significance associated with this finding. When completed, the
results of the risk determination will be forwarded to you by separate correspondence. The
basis for our conclusion regarding your backfit claim is enclosed.
If you disagree with this evaluation of your backfit claim, you may submit a written appeal to the
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in accordance with NRC Management
Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Management of Plant-Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power
Plants." A copy of the applicable portion of this management directive is enclosed for your
convenience.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator
Enclosures: As stated
Dockets: 50-313; 50-368
cc: w/Enclosure
Executive Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-3-
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russellville, Arkansas 72801
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
David D. Snellings, Jr., Director
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867
Mike Schoppman
Framatome ANP, Inc.
Suite 705
1911 North Fort Myer Drive
Rosslyn, Virginia 22209
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-4-
Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:
W. F. Kane, DEDO
S. J. Collins, D:NRR
Regional Administrator (EWM)
Deputy Regional Administrator (TPG)
DRS Director (ATH)
DRP Director (KEB)
DNMS, Director (DDC)
K. D. Smith, RC (KDS1)
G. F. Sanborn, D:ACES (GFS)
ACES, Enforcement Staff (GFS)
Branch Chief, DRS/EMB (CSM)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (LJS)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (JAC)
Senior Resident Inspector (RLB3)
Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
G. M. Holahan, NRR
S. C. Black, NRR
L. W. Barnett, NRR
R. J. Barrett, NRR
J. N. Hannon, NRR
M. R. Johnson, NRR
R. A. Gramm, NRR
W.D. Alexion, NRR
OGC (GSM)
S. A. Morris, OEDO
J. L. Dixon-Herrity, OE
OEMAIL
DOCUMENT: R:\\_ano\\2001\\an0106backfit-rln.wpd
RIV:DRS/PSB
C:EMB
D:DRS
C:DRP/D
D:DRP
D:DNMS
RLNease/lmb
CSMarschall
ATHowell lll
LJSmith
KEBrockman
DDChamberlain
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
2/1/2002
2/11/2002
2/27/2002
3/12/2002
3/12/2002
3/15/2002
RC
D:ACES
NRR/DLPM
KDSmith
GFSanborn
GSMizuno
SARichards
TPGwynn
EWMerschoff
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
3/5/2002
3/12/2002
3/20/2002
4/11/2002
4/15/2002
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
1 Entergys claim that this position is a backfit generic to all plants will be addressed by
the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in their response to a letter from the Nuclear
Energy Institute dated January 11, 2002.
2 In response to a question regarding whether NRC Inspection Manual guidance is
considered an approved position, Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," states,
"No, inspection procedures are not approved staff positions, which is the reason they are not
reviewed by CRGR." NUREG 1409 further states, "Licensees cannot be required to implement
positions discussed in an inspection procedure or manual unless the same positions exist in the
ENCLOSURE
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), claimed that
Region IVs position that manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R,Section III.G.2. was a backfit, generic to all plants1. Backfitting is defined in
10 CFR 50.109 as the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or
design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility; any of which may
result from a new or amended provision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a
regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from a
previously applicable staff position . . .
On October 26, 2001, the NRC convened a backfit panel to review Entergy's backfit claim as
presented in their letter of September 28, 2001, and accompanying attachments. As a result of
that meeting, the panel requested an evaluation of the following four key points presented in
Entergy's backfit claim.
I.
NRCs Past and Present Positions Regarding the Use of Manual Actions for
Meeting the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G
In their letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the NRC had accepted on
many occasions, including at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), the use of manual actions
for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Entergy stated that
NRC generic Appendix R guidance documents, the NRC's Triennial Fire Protection
Inspection Procedure 71111.05, and recent NRC fire protection reports all supported
this position.
Entergy claimed that certain statements in NRC fire protection inspection reports and
inspection procedures provide an NRC position that permits the use of manual actions
for achieving post-fire safe shutdown. With respect to NRC inspection reports, the
statements quoted by Entergy were taken from the description of the scope of the
inspection, not from the inspection findings section of the reports. The triennial fire
protection inspection scope consists of a review of the licensee's methodology for
reaching safe shutdown, including any manual actions that are credited in that
methodology. These scope statements are not an endorsement for the use of manual
actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, rather they are statements describing
what the inspectors reviewed. As described in NUREG 1409, NRC inspection
procedures are not approved NRC positions2.
form of an approved regulatory staff position. Examples of approved staff positions are
described in Manual Chapter 0514 and include the SRP [Standard Review Plan], branch
technical positions, regulatory guides, generic letters, and bulletins."
-2-
In 1981, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire protection," and Appendix R to
10 CFR Part 50, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to
January 1, 1979." ANO, Unit 1 was licensed in 1974, and Unit 2 was licensed in 1978;
therefore, for both units, the licensee was required to meet the provisions of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown
Capability," provides the requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment
needed for safe shutdown is free of fire damage. As discussed in the Statements of
Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, it is not possible to
predict the conditions under which fires may occur and propagate; therefore, the
Commission established three specific methods for protecting safe shutdown equipment
so that at least one train remains free of fire damage. These three methods are
specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. The first method is separation of redundant
safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by 3-hour fire rated barriers. The second
method is a combination of separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and
associated circuits by 20 feet or more of space with no intervening combustibles or fire
hazards, plus area-wide automatic fire suppression and detection. The third method is a
combination of separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by
a 1-hour fire-rated barrier plus automatic fire suppression and detection capability. If
these conditions cannot be met, an exemption from Section III.G.2, or an alternative or
dedicated safe shutdown capability specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.3, is required. Specific requirements for alternative or dedicated shutdown
are provided in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.
The requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment needed for safe
shutdown is free of fire damage is described and discussed in numerous generic NRC
documents such as:
Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R
Generic Letter 81-12, "Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980)"
Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12
Information Notice 84-09, "Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire
Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)"
NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, "Fire Protection Program"
In addition, in ANO-specific licensing basis documents, such as safety evaluation
reports and exemptions, the NRC staff described the same specific requirements for
ensuring one train of safe shutdown equipment is free of fire damage. In these
documents, the NRC restated the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
-3-
Section III.G, and discussed the three methods for ensuring that one train of equipment
and cables for systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions was free of fire damage, as required by Section III.G.2. The NRC further
explained that if these methods could not be met, then an alternative fire protection
configuration must be provided in accordance with Section III.G.3 (alternative or
dedicated shutdown), of Appendix R. Specific requirements for meeting Section III.G.3
(alternative or dedicated shutdown) are provided in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.L.
Conclusion: The regulations, statements of consideration, and generic correspondence,
as well as ANO-specific documentation, are in agreement concerning the use of manual
actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions as required in
Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. As these documents show, the NRC
has not in the past and does not currently consider manual actions to be acceptable for
complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, unless specifically
reviewed and approved. The panel concludes that the position to disallow the use of
manual actions for meeting 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is not an
imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either
new or different from a previously applicable staff position. Therefore, this position is
not a backfit specific to ANO. Entergys claim that NRC inspection report statements
constitute a basis for their backfit claim is addressed in Section IV of this enclosure.
II.
ANOs Position Regarding 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy summarized their positions concerning
the use of manual actions as:
"1.
The use of manual actions to operate necessary components . . . outside the
identified fire areas is permitted by 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.1 and
does not violate 10 CFR 50, Section III.G.2;
"2.
Compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2 does not require
protective features on circuits that are not required to function and, therefore, are
not necessary systems required to achieve safe shutdown conditions and,
regardless of fire damage cannot prevent the ability to achieve safe shutdown
conditions."
Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides the overall fire protection
objective to protect equipment so that in the event of a fire in any fire area, (a) one train
of systems necessary for reaching hot shutdown conditions (from either the control
room or emergency control stations) is free of fire damage; and (b) systems necessary
for reaching cold shutdown conditions (from either the control room or emergency
control stations) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Section III.G.1.a. can be met by
ensuring one train of safe shutdown systems is free from fire damage as specified in
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, or by using an alternative safe shutdown capability
specified in Section III.G.3. While Section III.G.1.a. contemplates the use of manual
actions, these are provided in the context of alternative or dedicated shutdown under
Section III.G.3.
-4-
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides three acceptable methods for
ensuring cables and equipment associated with one train of systems necessary for
achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. None of the
three methods in Section III.G.2 describes the use of manual actions to mitigate the
effects of a fire on safe shutdown equipment and cables. Rather, these methods have
the objective of preventing fire damage through the use of specific protection features.
Section III.G.2 also requires these same fire protection features for circuits whose
damage (by fire) could adversely affect the accomplishment of safe shutdown functions.
Contrary to Entergys position (2) above, cables associated with systems necessary for
safe shutdown are required to be free of fire damage, whether the cables themselves
are considered "necessary" or not. In addition, certain circuits which may not be
required to function, but whose maloperation could adversely affect safe shutdown,
must also be free of fire damage.
If a licensee cannot meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2 for certain fire areas, then an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability
is required as outlined in Section III.G.3. Under Section III.G.3, manual actions may be
taken. The goals and requirements associated with alternative and dedicated shutdown
capability under Section III.G.3 are specified in Section III.L of Appendix R, and include
a requirement that alternative shutdown capability be implemented by procedures.
Another option would be to request an exemption from those portions of Section III.G.2
that cannot be met.
Conclusion: For the ANO plant, Entergy must meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Section III.G.1. In addition, where a fire area contains redundant trains
of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, Entergy must
meet either Section III.G.2 or Section III.G.3 for the protection of cables and equipment
associated with systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions, or obtain an exemption. Section III.G.2 provides three specific methods for
preventing fire damage to equipment and cables associated with systems necessary for
achieving and maintaining hot shutdown, and to circuits whose maloperation could
adversely affect the licensees ability to achieve hot shutdown. Section III.G.3 provides
the option of using alternative or dedicated shutdown capability for those fire areas in
which the licensee cannot meet the requirements of Section III.G.2. Therefore, the use
of manual actions for meeting the requirements of Section III.G.2 is not permitted,
unless these actions were specifically reviewed and approved by the NRC and
documented in a safety evaluation report.
III.
NRC Review and Approval of Manual Actions for Meeting the Requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G in 14 Fire Zones at ANO
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the use of manual actions to
achieve safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire has been a standard practice at
ANO since the inception of Appendix R. In support of this position, Entergy cited an
August 31, 1982, meeting between NRC and Arkansas Power and Light (documented
by the NRC in a meeting summary dated September 3, 1982) and an Arkansas Power
and Light response to an NRC request for additional information (RAI), dated
October 5, 1982.
-5-
While we acknowledge that the NRC staff was aware that the ANO strategy for post-fire
safe shutdown included some manual actions, the docketed NRC correspondence on
the subject was written in the context of alternative shutdown, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
R,Section III.G.3. For example, the subject line of the September 3, 1982, meeting
summary reads, "Summary of Meeting with Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)
on August 31, 1982, Concerning the Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability in the Event of
a Fire at Arkansas Nuclear One Units Nos. 1 & 2 (ANO-1 & 2)." Clearly, this meeting
was held and manual actions discussed in the context of alternate shutdown, which is
governed by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 and Section III.L (specific
requirements for meeting Section III.G.3 shutdown are provided in Section III.L). The
RAI (to which the licensee responded via a letter dated October 5, 1982) was
transmitted to the licensee by letter dated September 3, 1982, which stated, "We have
reviewed your submittal dated July 1, 1982, with regard to your review of the alternate
shutdown capability for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units Nos. 1 and 2 and we discussed
our review with you at the meeting of August 31, 1982. As a result of that review and
the meeting of August 31, 1982, we have identified the additional information
(Enclosure 1) which we need to complete our review." In this letter, the NRC stated that
the RAI was in support of the staffs review of the licensees alternate shutdown
capability.
The NRC subsequently issued a safety evaluation report (SER) dated May 13, 1983,
which provided the staffs review of the licensees methodology for meeting
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L. The SER was entitled, "Safety
Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Arkansas Nuclear One -
Units 1 and 2, Dockets Nos. 50-313 and 50-368, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Items III.G.3
and III.L," and referenced the meeting of August 31, 1982, and the licensees response
of October 5, 1982. In this SER, the NRC reviewed manual actions credited in the
context of Sections III.G.3 and III.L, stating, "All other areas of the plant not required to
have alternate safe shutdown will comply with the requirements of Section III.G.2 of
Appendix R, unless an exemption request has been approved by the staff." The
licensee did not identify Fire Zones 98J and 99M as requiring manual action, and did not
request an exemption from Section III.G.2.
Upon review of these statements, we believe that they should be interpreted as
constituting NRCs review and approval of the use of manual actions for alternative
shutdown, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L.
Conclusion: The NRC requested additional information from the licensee in the context
of alternative shutdown (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3) for 14 fire zones
in which manual actions were credited. In their response to the request, the licensee did
not identify Fire Zones 98J and 99M as requiring manual action, and did not request an
exemption from Section III.G.2 for these two fire zones. As stated in a subsequent
safety evaluation report concerning alternative shutdown, for all other areas, the NRC
expected the licensee to either comply with Section III.G.2 or request an exemption.
Therefore, the use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions for Fire Zones 98J and 99M, was not reviewed and approved by the NRC.
3 Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," states, "Cases where an
inspector provides tacit approval are relatively rare. Simply not challenging a licensees practice
would not be considered tacit approval."
-6-
IV.
NRCs Alleged Tacit Approval of the Licensees Methodology for Complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that in 1982, they submitted to the
NRC a description of their methodology for complying with Appendix R, which included a
statement that under certain conditions credit for manual operation of equipment was
taken. Entergy also stated that because this statement was not challenged in
subsequent NRC correspondence (such as inspection reports) or safety evaluation
reports, this silence constituted tacit approval of the use of manual actions, thus, making
it part of the ANO licensing basis.
As discussed in NUREG 14093, simply not challenging a licensees practice in inspection
reports would not be considered tacit approval. Furthermore, contrary to Entergys
claim, the NRC was not silent regarding the use of manual actions. In an
August 31, 1982, meeting between NRC and Arkansas Power and Light Company, as
documented by the NRC in a letter dated September 3, 1982, the NRC requested
additional information for fire zones that required some sort of manual action or non-
routine operation. Fire Zones 98J and 99M were not identified by the licensee as
requiring manual actions. By this licensee omission, the NRC staff would have
concluded that no manual actions would be credited for mitigating fires in Fire
Zones 98J and 99M.
In submitting the results of their Appendix R compliance review in a letter dated
July 1, 1982, the licensee stated, that in certain cases, credit for manual operation of
equipment was taken if controls (and power for valves) could be damaged by a fire.
"Such credit was taken only if:
a.
the component to be operated is not located in the affected fire zone,
although the cable may be damaged by fire;
b.
sufficient time is available to perform the required manual actions; and
c.
personnel are available, beyond the fire brigade and minimum operations
shift crew limitations, to perform the manual actions."
Contrary to the above conditions, the licensee did not perform an analysis that
demonstrated sufficient time was available and sufficient trained personnel were
available to take all the actions required to mitigate all the failures, which could occur as
a result of fires in Fire Zones 98J and 99M. As discussed in Section III of this enclosure,
manual actions were reviewed and approved for use in alternative shutdown areas
(10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3). Even if the NRCs approval of manual
actions could be construed as acceptable for meeting the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 (which, as discussed in Section III, there
-7-
was no such approval), it appears that the licensee did not comply with their own criteria
for the use of manual actions.
Conclusion: Even if, as Entergy claims, the NRC approved (tacitly or otherwise) the use
of manual actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R (which it did not), this
approval would have been dependent on the licensee doing so under the conditions
described in their Appendix R compliance methodology. However, for Fire Zones 98J
and 99M, the licensee did not meet their own conditions set forth for the use of manual
actions.