L-85-280, Forwards Response to 850423 & 25 Requests for Addl Info Re Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Trip.Containment Isolation Actuation Signals Do Not Affect RCP Essential Svcs
| ML17216A251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1985 |
| From: | Williams J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Butcher E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-85-280, NUDOCS 8507260575 | |
| Download: ML17216A251 (8) | |
Text
REGULATOR'l NFORMATI ON DISTRIBUTION S
'EM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8507260575 OUTDATE: 85/07/22 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-389't, Lucie Plant~
Unit 2, Florida Power 8 Light Coo AUTH ~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WILLIAMS~J~ N ~
Florida Power 8 Light Co, RECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION BUTCHERpE ~ J, Operating Reactors Branch
SUBJECT:
Forwards"response to 850423 8
25 requests for addi.info t'e reactor coolant pump (RCP) trip. Containment isolation actuation signals do not affect'CP essential svcs
~
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A001D COPIES RECEIYED:LTR ENCL SIZEs TITLE; OR Submittali General Distribution NOTES: OL:04/06/83 DOCKET 05000389 05000389 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME'RR ORB3 BC 01 INTERNAL: ACRS 09 ELD/HDS2 NRR/DL 0IR NRR/DL/TSRG NRR/DS I/RA8 RGN2 COPIES LTTR ENCL 7
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1 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ADM/LFMB NRR/DE/MTEB NRR/DL/CRAB N
I/METB REG FI 04 COPIES LTTR ENCL 0
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EXTERNAL: 24X LPDR NSIC 03 05 1
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FLORIDAPOWER IIt LIGHTCOMPANY gl2 2585 L-85-280 Office of Nuclear Reactor, Regulation Attention:
Mr. Edward J. Butcher, Acting Chi'ef Operating Reactors Branch II3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Butcher:
Re:, St. L'ucie,Unit No". 2..
Docket No. '50-389 Reactor Coolant Pum Tri I
NRC's letters of April'23, and April 25, 1985, requested additional information con'cerning reactor coolant pump trip on St. Lucie Unit No. I. Florida Power and Light Company letter L-85-209, dated June 3, 1985, forwarded the response for St. Lucie Unit No.
1 as requested.
r During a telecon on July 12, 1985, your staff questioned the applicability of our June 3,
1985 response to St."Lucie Unit No. 2.
For the most part, the Unit I
response is applicable to Unit 2.
- However, in order to avoid any confusion, attached is the Unit 2 response.
Very truly'ours, J. W. Wi~ll,Jr.
Group V resident Nuclear Energy attach.
JWW/RJS/eab 8507260575 850722'DR ADOCK 05000389
- P~DR" geol I/g PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE
J, 11
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St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Additional Information NRC Item No. I:
Does any containment isolation signal result in the termination of systems essential for continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps?
If so, identify the signals and systems effected.
N F
R Containment Isolation Actuation Signals (CIAS)do not affect any RCP essential services.
However it should be noted that the Safety Injection Actuation Signal does isolate Component Cooling Water (CCW) and CCW does provide RCP Cooling including seal cooling.
NRC Item No. 2:
If essential water services are terminated, provide a description of the operator guidelines, training, and procedures in place (or to be implemented) which assure that these services are restored in a timely manner to prevent seal damage or failure, once a non-LOCA situation has been confirmed.
FPL Res onse:
Essential water services are terminated by SIAS as described above.
Once a non-LOCA situation has been confirmed and the RCP's have not been without seal cooling for greater than ten (IO) minutes, RCP's may be restarted if the following start criteria can be satisfied:
A.
The RCS temperature is greater than 20 F subcooled.
B.
Pressurizer level and pressure control is normal.
C.
At least one steam generator is available to remove heat from the RCS.
D.
There is no indication of voiding.
E." RCP permissive light is lit.
The non-LOCA procedures involved are EOP 012004I (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) and EOP 0810040 (Main Steam Line Break).
If an inadvertant SIAS signal were to occur such that CCW was lost to the RCP's, the signal could be reset.
"Appendix A" (Safety Injection Termination and Throttling Criteria) provides for this resetting and is contained in EOP's 0030I40 (Blackout Operation),
Ol 20040 (Natural Circulation/Cooldown), 0l 2004 I (Steam Generator Tube Rupture),
0 I 20042 (LOCA), and 08 I 0040 (Main Steam Line Break).
Once the SIAS was reset, the CCW containment isolation valves could be reopened to supply cooling water to the RCP's.
These criteria are as follows.
/
.'A.
RCS T-Hot and CET temperatures indicate at least 20 F subcooled for corresponding RCS pressure.
B.
Pressurizer level is greater than 30% and not decreasing.
C.
At least one steam generator is greater than 40% wide range level and
~
capable of removing heat from the RCS.
D.
Reactor vessel inventory level is greater than 50% level as indicated on the vessel plenym region QSPDS display.
NRC Item No. 3:
Provide confirmation, including the technical
- basis, that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure.
FPL Res onse:
Seal injection is a manual system, and a containment entry would be required to initiate seal injection.
Seal injection could not be started to the RCP s to prevent seal degradation.
The RCP's would have to be stopped within IO minutes of a loss of CCW.
It should be noted that an RCP seal was tested for 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> without cooling, and the maximum leak rate was l6.I gph.
Refer to FPL letter L-8l-l07, dated March IO, l98l.
NRC Item No. 4:
Since RCP trip will be required for LOCA events, assurance must be provided that RCP trip, when
- required, will occur.
To address this concern, provide the following information.
(a)
Identify the components required to trip the RCPs.
Include relays, power supplies and breakers.
Address reliability and alternate trip methods.
(b)
If necessary, as a result of the location of any critical component, include the effects of adverse containment conditions on RCP trip reliability.
Describe the basis for the adverse containment parameters selected.
FPL Res onse:
A.
The critical components required to trip the RCP's are the'switch on the RTGB the 6.9 kv RCP Breaker and its associated
~Tri Coil.
The trip coil can be energized manually to trip the breaker from two places, the control switch on the RTGB and the push button on the 6.9 kv breaker cubicle.
I25 VDC'Control power (l25 VDC) is required to energize the trip coil.
The RCP breaker can be tripped independent of Control power by depressing the trip plunger inside the breaker cabinet or by racking out the breaker.
Power to the RCP's could also be interrupted by opening the feeder breaker to the startup or auxiliary transformers or by opening switchyard breakers.
Automatic trips for the RCP breaker include trips for loss of 6.9 kv feed, overcurrent, and phase differential.
B.
The critical components required to trip the RCP's are located outside containment.