L-81-480, Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure (IE Bulletin 81-02), Originally Reported on 810622.Adjustments & Mods Indicated in Encl Table 1 Will Be Completed by Dec 1981

Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure (IE Bulletin 81-02), Originally Reported on 810622.Adjustments & Mods Indicated in Encl Table 1 Will Be Completed by Dec 1981

ML20033A614
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	11/16/1981
From:	Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-SSINS-6820 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 50-389-81-002, 50-389-81-2, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, L-81-480, NUDOCS 8111250627
Download: ML20033A614 (7)

Text

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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMP ANY November 16, 1981 L-81-480 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II (0

Office of Inspection and Enforcement 9

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Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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NOV2 4 Igggw Re: St. Lucie Unit 2 T 5 S"'r e,m u m.,

Docket No. 50-389

\\4 IE Bulletin 81-02, Failure of Gate Type 4

Valves to Close Against Differential

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.4 Pressure, 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report 50-389/81-002 "Q' i ' ~

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

On June 22, 1981 Region II was notified that gate valves of the type referred to in the IE bulletin 81-02 were utilized at St. Lucie Unit 2.

An interim report was submitted to you on July 14, 1981 (L-81-289).

We have determined that use of those valves is reportable under-10 CFR 50.55(e). A final report is attached for your review.

Yours truly, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems & Technology REU:TCG:cf Attachments cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, D. C.

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STATE OF FLORIDA

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Robert E. Uhrig

, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is Vice President of Florida Power &

Light Company, the herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said s

s Robert E. Uhrig"~

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s Subscribed and sworn to before me this

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NOTARY PUBLIC, 1)1 and for the County of Dade, State of Florida ts.y r.w som of rmm ei ty My commission expires:

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Final Report BULLETIN 81-02:

FAILURE OF. GATE TYPE VALVES TO CLOSE AGAINST DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE Name of Station:

St. Lucie Unit 2 Owner:

Florida Power & Light Co.

NSSS Supplier:

Combustion Engineering, Inc.

Architect / Engineer:

Ebasco Services, Inc.

Date of NRC Notification:

June 22, 1981 Date of Final Report:

November 16, 1981

I.

Summary Bulletin 81-02 identified the potential for failure of certain gat'e vr.ives. to completely close even though the flow rate was within design limits. A review of S,t. Lucie Unit 2 revealed that six safety-related valves (supplied by Westinghouse via C Tmbustion Engineering) could potentially experience closing difficulties.. Westinghouse has reviewed the' design of each valve and expects to complete. valve modifications in December 1981.

II. Description The valves which could experience closing difficulties are listed in Table 1; along with the identification of the system in which each valve is used, the maximum AP for which closing is required, and the valve modification being implemented..Six of these valves have safety related functions, as described -

in Section.IV below.

III. Corrective Action-The Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical Division has evaluated the capability of each l

of these valves to operate under their specified conditions. The evaluations of each valve assembly was based on engineering records of the calibration and out-4 put of each individual motor operator unit and on production test records of each valve assembly.. The adjustments and modifications in Table 1 are being made to-ensure valve operability in each application. The modifications are expected to be complete by December 1981. The corrective modifications indicated in Table 1 are described below.

Torque Switch Adjustments The torque switch settings (both OPEN and CLOSE) on each of these valves are being adjusted.

Model Number Valve 03000GM82FBB07D00S74 V2508 V2509 V2514 04000GM82FBB07D00S74 V2501 V2525 04000GM84FEB07000S74 V3662 V3663 10000Gf184NDB07D05S74 V3664 V3665 L

10000GM88NDH17E00S74 V3651 (SMG-1-40 (1800) Operator)

V3652 V3480 V3481 V3545

--_-.---.-------.-_--.,,-------.----------.---s-a.-,_

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.Model Number _'

Valve 12000GM84NCH27D00S74 V3658

.1200.0GM88NCH17E00S74 V3614

-(SMB-2-40 (1800) Operator V3624 V3634 V3644 Gear' Ratio Change with Torque Switch Adjustment i

The motor operator gear ratio and the torque switch seetings (both OPEN and CLOSE)'

on the following valve are being adjusted.

Model Number Valve 12000GM84NCH27D00S74 V3517 (SB-0-15 Operator)

Gear Ratio Change with Closure Control Change The following valve requires a change from torque-controlled closure to limit closure and a gear ratio change.

flodel Number Valve 04000GM87FHB07DC0574 V3653 (SB-00-15 Operator)

V3655 Closure Control Change These valves require only a change from torque-controlled closure to limit closure.

Model Number Valve 03000GM87FBJ17D00S74 V3659 (SB-00-15 Operator)

V3C60 l

06000GM875GH07D00S74 V3654 (58-0-15 Operator) 06000GM88SGH07D00S74 V3656 (SB-0-15 Operator) i 10000GM84NDB27005S74 V3456 (SB-0-15 Operator)

V3457 i

IV. Safety Implication If V2501 and V2525 would fail to close' completely as the result of a safety injection actuation signal. the safety injection water delivered to the RCS could have a lower i

Boron concentration than that assumed in the safety analysis. However, actual safety of the plant would not be affected since there are sufficient conserva-tisms in the safety analyses to assure that the reae. tor core is maintained in a subcritical state.

IF V3654 and V3656 would fail to close completely the percentage of safety injection (SI) water delivered to the RCS hot and cold legs would be slightly different that assumed in the safety analyses. However, the total quantity of SI water delivered to the RCS would remain enchanged.

If V3664 and V3665 would fail to close completely, some RCS coolant could be released if there were a leak in the shutdown cooling system outside of con-tainment.

V.

Conclusion The action indicated in Section III will correct the deficiency referred to in IE Bulletin 81-02. This report closes out this issue with respect to the re-porting requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

TABLE 1 ST. IUCIE UNIT 2 VALVES REPAIRED AS A RESULT OF BULLETIN 81-02 Maximum Closing Valve Application AP (psid) Corrective Modification V2508, 09, 14 Boric Acid Makeup 200 Torque Switch Adjustment V2501, 25 Normal Makeup Isolation 200 V3662, 63 Spare Valves 700 V3664, 65 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) 500 Isolation V3545 Shutdown Cooling Suction 500 Isolation V3651, 52 Shutdown Cooling Suction 500 Isolation V3480, 81 Shutdown Cooling Suction 500 Isolation V3658 SDC Heat Exchanger Isolation 300 V3614, 24, 34, 44 SI Tank Isolation 300 V3517 SDC Heat Exchanger Isolation 300 Gear Ratio Change and Torque Switch Adjustment V3653, 55 Spare Valves 1500 Gear Ratio Change and Closure Control Change V3654, 56 Hot Leg Safety Injection 1250 Closure Control Change V3456, 57 SDC Heat Exchanger Isolation 500 V3659, 60 SI Pump Mini-Flow Isolation 1750 l

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