L-2019-055, Stations - Supplement to Application to Add Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.6 to the Technical Specifications

From kanterella
(Redirected from L-2019-055)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Stations - Supplement to Application to Add Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.6 to the Technical Specifications
ML19087A160
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie, Seabrook, Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/2019
From: Parks W
Florida Power & Light Co, NextEra Energy Seabrook
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-2019-055
Download: ML19087A160 (13)


Text

F;P.L..

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Florida Power & Light Company MAR 2 6*.2019 St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Seabrook Station, Docket No. 50-443 L-2019-055 10 CFR 50.90

Subject:

Supplement to Application to Add Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.6 to the Technical Specifications

Reference:

Florida Power & Light Company letter L-2018-049, "Application to Add Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.6 to the Technical Specifications," May 29, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18151A472)

In the referenced letter, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) submitted a request for an amendment to the technical specifications (TS) for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, and, on behalf ofNextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, for Seabrook Station. The proposed amendments would modify the TS to incorporate the provisions of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.6 in the improved standard TS (ISTS), which provide the actions to be taken when the inoperability of a support system results in the inoperability of related supported systems.

In addition, the proposed change adds a new Safety Function Determination Program to the administrative section of the TS to ensure that a loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken when using the provisions ofLCO 3.0.6.

A review of the license amendment request identified inconsistencies between sections of the request regarding the wording of two proposed changes for St. Lucie, Turkey Point, and Seabrook, and an omission in a proposed change that reformats a TS action in the Turkey Point TS. As discussed in the enclosure, this supplement clarifies the proposed changes as discussed in a conference call with the NRC staff on February 28, 2019. In addition, amendments to the Turkey Point TS occurred subsequent to submittal of the request to adopt LCO 3.0.6. The attachment to the enclosure provides revised markups of the proposed changes to the Turkey Point TS, which supersede the corresponding markups in the referenced letter.

This letter contains no new or revised regulatory commitments.

Florida Power & Light Company 700 Universe Boulevard, Juno Beach, FL 33408

L-2019-055 Page 2 of2 This supplement does not alter the conclusions in the referenced letter that the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, and there are no significant environmental impacts associated with the changes.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Steve Catron, Fleet Licensing Manager, at 561-304-6206.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March Z S-!!l-, 2019 Sincerely, William Parks Director, Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Compliance Florida Power & Light Company Enclosure cc: NRC Project Manager - St. Lucie NRC Project Manger - Turkey Point NRC Project Manager - Seabrook Regional Administrator - NRC Region 1 Regional Administrator - NRC Region 2 NRC Resident Inspector - St. Lucie NRC Resident Inspector - Turkey Point NRC Resident Inspector - Seabrook Ms. Cindy Becker, Florida Department of Health Director Homeland Security and Emergency Management (New Hampshire)

Mr.John Giarrusso, Jr., Nuclear Preparedness Manager (Massachusetts)

ENCLOSURE Enclosure L-2019-055 Page 1 of 2 Clarification of Proposed Changes to Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 for St. Lucie, Turkey Point, and Seabrook The license amendment request to adopt LCO 3'.0.6 (LAR) adds two new requirements to the actions in St. Lucie, Turkey Point, and Seabrook Technical Specification (TS) 3.~.1.1, "A.C. Sources

- Operating." First, as discussed in section 2.0 of the LAR, "Detailed Description," the following requirement is added to action a, which addresses an inoperable offsite A.C. circuit:

"Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from discovery of no offsite power to one train concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s), declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable."

The second new requirement is added to action d (St. Lucie) and action e (Seabrook and Turkey Point) for two inoperable offsite A.C. circuits:

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from discovery of two offsite circuits inoperable with inoperability of redundant required feature(s), declare required feature(s) inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable."

Section 3.0 of the LAR, "Technical Evaluation," also discusses these two new requirements.

However, the wording of the proposed changes in section 3.0 as shown below is different from that in section 2.0.

"Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from discovery of no offsite power to one train concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)."

"Declare required feature(s) inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from discovery of two offsite circuits inoperable concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)."

Although the wording of the actions is inconsistent between sections 2.0 and 3.0 of the LAR, the directions provided by the actions are the same. The preferred wording for the proposed changes is the wording included in section 2.0 of the LAR. The markups of TS 3.8.1.1 included in the LAR for Seabrook and St. Lucie contain the preferred wording. The attachment to this enclosure provides a revised markup of TS 3.8.1.1 for Turkey Point that incorporates the preferred wording.

Additional Revisions to the Proposed Changes for Turkey Point The LAR revises TS 3.8.1.1, actions c and e, in part, by reformatting the actions from a paragraph to a list of discrete steps. However, the list of steps associated with action c omitted the requirement to perform surveillance requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.1.a on the remaining startup transformer and associated circuits within one hour and at least once per eight hours thereafter. The revised markup of TS 3.8.1.1 in the attachment to this enclosure adds the requirement to perform SR 4.8.1.1.1.a to the list of steps in action c.

The proposed change to reformat TS 3.8.1.1 actions c and e included a requirement for a four-hour NRC notification. However, Amendments 279 and 274 lR-eference 1] eliminated the four-hour

Enclosure L-2019-055 Page 2 of2 notification requirem~nts.. As a result, the revised markup of TS 3.8.1.1 in the attachment to this enclosure incorporates this change.,

Amendments 284 and 278 [Reference 2] modified actions a and b in TS 3.8.1.1 to permit use of risk informed completion times. The revised markup of TS 3.8.1.1 in the attachment to this enclosure incorporates this change.

The LAR proposed adding new administrative TS 6.7.4.n, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." However, Amendments 281 and 275 [Reference 4], Amendments 282 and 276 [Reference 3t and Reference 2 added administrative TS 6.7.4. n, o, and p, respectively. Therefore, the designation of the proposed new administrative TS for the Safety Function Determination Program is revised to TS 6.7.4. q. The revised markup of TS 6.7.4 in the attachment to this enclosure incorporates this change.

References

1. NRC letter "Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Elimination of Certain Technical Specifications Reporting Requirements (CAC Nos. MF9601 and MF9602; EPID L-2017-LLA-0213)," March 19, 2018 (ML18019A078)
2. NRC letter "Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Adoption of Risk-Informed Completion Times in Technical Specifications (CAC Nos. MF5455 and MF5456; EPID L-2014-LLA-0002)," December 3, 2018 (ML18270A429)

J

3. NRC letter "Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Technical Specifications Pertaining to Explosive Gas Monitoring, Gas Decay Tanks, and Standby Feedwater System (CAC Nos. MG0143 and MG 0144; EPID L-2017-LLA-0272),"

September 11, 2018 (ML18214A125)

4. NRC letter "Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Technical Specifications Pertaining to Inservice Testing Program and Inservice Inspection Program Requirements and Surveillance Frequency Control Program Applicability (CAC Nos. MF9907 and MF9908; EPID L-2017-LLA-0252)," June 12, 2018 (ML18130A466)

Attachment Markup of the Turkey Point Technical Specifications

L-2019-055 Attachment Page 1 of9 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONPIIION FOR OPERATION (Continued}

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a.

INSERT ACTION b

b.

INSERT ACTION c

c.

~-------~

INSERT ACTION a OPERABILITY ef the ether startup traAsferR9er aAd its asseciated circuits ey peFforR9iAg SuF¥eillaAce ReeiuireR9eAt 4.8.1.1.1.a 'NithiA 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> a Ad at least oAce per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

If the iAoperaele startup traAsferR9er is the associated startup traAsfermer aAd eecaR9e iAeperaele while the uAit is iA MODE 1, reeluce THERMAL POVVER te <30% RATED THER~.AL POWER withiA 24 heurs, er restere the iAeperaele startup traAsferR9er aAel asseeiateel circuits to OPERABLE status withiA the Ae>El 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or iA accerelaAce with the Risk IAferR9ed GeR9pletioA )'

Time Program, er be iA at least HOT STANDBY withiA the Aext 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> aAd iA GOLD

  • 1 SHUTDOWN withiA the fellewiAg 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. If THERMAL POWER is redueea le <30% RATED THERMAL POIJVER withiA 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> er if the iAeperaele startup traAsfermer is asseciated with the eppesite uAit restere the startup traAsfermer aAd its asseciated eircuits to OPERABLE status withiA 30 days ef the loss ef OPERABILITY, er be iA at least HOT STMIDBY withiA the Ae>El 12 heurs aAd iA GOLD SHUTDOWN withiA the fellowiAg 30 l:ieurs. If the iAoperaele startup traAsferR9er is the asseeiated startup traAsformer, aAd eecaR9e iAoperaele while the uAit was iA MODE 2, 3, or 4, restore the startup traAsfemier aAel its associated eireuits to OPERABLE status withiA 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> er iA aecoFelaAeo with the Risk IAfermed Gom19letioA Time Program, er ee iA at

,1' least HOT STANDBY withiA 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> aAd iA GOLD Sl=IUTDO\\".'N withiA the fellowiAg 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

This ACTION applies to eoth uAits simultaAeously.

WiH1 oAe of the reeiuired diesel geAerators iAoperaele, demoAstrate the OPERABILITY of the above reeiuired startup traAsformers aAd U1eir asseciated circuits ey peFferR9iAg SuFVeillaAee ReeiuiremeAt 4.8.1.1.1.a withiA 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> aAd at least oAee per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. If the diesel ger1eretor beeemo ir1e,:,ereble duo to ar1y cause ether thaA eA iA019oreblo sup,:,ert system, eA iAdepeAdeAtly testable compoAeAt, er prepleAAed preveAtative maiAter1ar1ce er testiAg, demoAstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaiAiAg reeiuired diesel geAeraters by peFformiAg Surveillar1ee ReeiuireffieAI 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 withiA 24 heurs, liAless the ebseAce of aAy poter1tial commeA mode failure fer the remaiAiAg diesel ger1eraters is deterrfliAed. If testiAg ef remaiAiAg reeiuired diesel ger1eraters is reeiuired, this testir1g must be performed regardless et wheA the iAeperable diesel geAerator is restored to OPERABILITY. Restore the iAeperable diesel ger1erator te OPERABLE status withiA 14 days** or iA aeeordaA~e witl'l tl'le Risi< IAfermod

}

Gemplet,eR TtR9e Pregram, or be IA at least HOT STANDBY withtA tl'le Re>Et G hours aAd iA GOLD 'I SHUTDOWN withiA the fellowiAg 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Wi01 oAe startuf') traAsfermer aAd ene of the reeiuired diesel geAerators iAoperaele, demoAstrate tt'le OPERABILITY of the remaiAiAg A.G. sources ey peFformiAg S1:lF¥eillaAse ReeiuiremeAt 4.8.1.1.1.a OR the remaiAiAg 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if inoperability is associated with Action Statement 3.8.1.1.c.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4 3/4 8-2 AMENDMENT NOS. 2-84 AND ~

L-2019-055 Attachment Page 2 of9 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued}

ACTION (Continued) startup transformer and assooiated oirouits within one hour and at least onoe per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; and if the diesel generator beoame inoperable due to any oause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable oomponent, or preplanned preventive maintenanoe or testing, demonstrate the OPeRABILITY of the remaining required diesel generators by performing Surveillanoe Requirement 4. 8.1.1.2a. 4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless it oan be oonfirmed that the oause of the inoperable diesel generator does not exist on the remaining required diesel generators, unless the diesel generators are already operating; restore one of the inoperable souroes to OPERABLE status in aooordanoe with /\\otion Statements a and b, as appropriate. If testing of remaining required diesel generators is required, this testing must be performed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPeRABILITY.

Restore the other AG. power souroe (startup transformer or diesel generator) to OPeRABLe v

status in aooordanoe with the provisions of Seotion 3.8.1.1 /\\otion Statement a orb, as

/1 appropriate, with the time requirement of that /\\otion Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.G. power souroe.

d.

With one diesel generator inoperable, in addition to ACTION b. or c. above, verify that:

INSERT ACTION e

e.
1.

All required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices (except safety injection pumps) that depend on the remaining required OPERABLE diesel generators as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE.

2.

If this condition is not satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

At least two Safety Injection pumps are OPERABLE and capable of being powered from their associated OPERABLE diesel generators.

If this condition is not satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. This ACTION applies to both units simultaneously.

1*11.Gth two of the above required startup transformers or their assooiated oirouits inoperable; J

restore at least one of the inoperable startup transformers to OPeRI\\BLe status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least FlOT STANDBY within the next 6 ~

and in GOLD

  • If the opposite unit is shutdown first, this time can be extended to 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4 3/4 8-3 AMENDMENT NOS. 2-+.Q AND ~

IN SERT ACTION a

a.

With one of two startup transformers or an associated circuit inoperable:

L-2019-055 Attachment Page 3 of9

1. Demonstrate the OPERABILI1Y of the other startup transformer and its associated circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
2.

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from discovery of no offsite power to one train concurrent with in operability of redundant required feature(s), declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.

3. If the inoperable startup transformer is the associated startup transformer and became inoperable while the unit is in MODE 1:

a)

Reduce THERMAL POWER to _:S30% RA TED THERMAL POWER within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or b) Restore the inoperable startup transformer and associated circuits to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDO\\v'N within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

4. If THERMAL POWER is reduced to _s30% RA TED THERMAL PO\\v'ER within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or if the inoperable startup transformer is associated with the opposite unit, restore the startup transformer and its associated circuits to OPERABLE status within 30 days of the loss of OPERABILI1Y, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDO\\v'N within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
5. If the inoperable startup transformer is the associated startup transformer and became inoperable while the unit was in MODE 2, 3, or 4 restore the startup transformer and its associated circuits to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDO\\v'N within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. This ACTION applies to both units simultaneously.

INSERT ACTION b

b. With one of the required diesel generators inoperable:

L-2019-055

.Attachment Page4of9

1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above required startup transformers and their associated circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
2. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining required diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unless the absence of any potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generators is determined. If testing of remaining required diesel generators is required, this testing must be performed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.
3. Restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 14 days** or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

INSERT ACTION c L-2019-055 Attachment Page 5 of9


JIJOTE--------- ---------------------------------------- -----

Enter applicable ACTIOJIJS ofLCO 3.8.3. 1, "Onsite Power Distribution - Operating,"

when ACTIOJIJ c is entered with no AC power source to any train.

c.

With one startup transformer and one of the required diesel generators inoperable:

1. Demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a on the remaining startup transformer and associated circuits within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
2. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining required diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2a.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless it can be confirmed that tl1e cause of the inoperable diesel generator does not exist on the remaining required diesel generators, unless the diesel generators are already operating. If testing of remaining required diesel generators is required, this testing must be performed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.
3.

Restore one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status in accordance with Action Statements a and b, as appropriate.

4.

Restore tl1e other A.C. power source (startup transformer or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.8.1.1 Action Statement a orb, as appropriate, with the time requirement of that Action Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. power source.

INSERT ACTION e L-2019-055 Attachment Page 6 of9

e.

With two of the above required startup transformers or their associated circuits inoperable:

1.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from discovery of two offsite circuits inoperable concurrent with in operability of redundant required feature(s), declare required feature(s) inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.

2. Restore at least one of the inoperable startup transformers to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s* and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. This ACTION applies to both units simultaneously.
3. With only one startup transformer and associated circuits restored, perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1. l a on the OPERABLE Startup transformer at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and restore the other startup transformer and its associated circuits to OPERABLE status or shutdown in accordance with the provisions of Action Statement 3.8.1. l a with time requirements of that Action Statement based on the time of initial loss of a startup transformer. This ACTION applies to both units simultaneously.

L-201 9-055 Attachment Page 7 of 9 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION <Continued}

ACTION (Continued)

SHUTDOWN within the following ao hours. This ACTION applies to eotl'l units simultaneously.

Witl:l only one startt1p transformer ans associates eiret:1its restores, 19erfol'ffl Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 a on tl:le OPERABLE Startu19 transferRwr at least once 19er 8 l:lours, and restore tl=te other startup traRsformer ans its associates cireuits to OPERABLE status or sl:lutsown in accordance witA 11:le provisions of Action Statement 3. 8.1.1 a witA time reQuirements oftl:lat Action Statement eases on tl:le time of initial loss of a startup transfermer. Tl:lis ACTION a19plies to eotl:l units simultaneously.

f.

With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two startup transformers and their associated circuits by performing the requirements of Specification 4.8.1.1.1a. within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Restore all required diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 14 days from time of initial loss or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or be in at least HOT

,,;(

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

g.

Following the addition of the new fuel oil* to the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks, with one or more diesel generators with new fuel oil properties outside the required Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program limits, restore the stored fuel oil properties to within the required limits within 30 days.

h.

With one or more diesel generators with stored fuel oil total particulates outside the required Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program limits, restore the fuel oil total particulates to within the required limits within 7 days.

The properties of API Gravity, specific gravity or an absolute specific gravity; kinematic viscosity; clear and bright appearance; and flash point shall be confirmed to be within the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program limits, prior to the addition of the new fuel oil to the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4 3/4 8-4 AMENDMENT NOS. 284 AND 2-78

L-2019-055

.Attachment Page8of9 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

p.

!INSERT SFDP Risk Informed Completion Time Program This program provides controls to calculate a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) and must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b: Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines," Revision 0-A, November 2006. The program shall include the following:

a.

The RICT may not exceed 30 days;

b.

A RICT may only be utilized in MODES 1 and 2;

c.

When a RICT is being used, any plant configuration change within the scope of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program must be considered for the effect on the RICT.

1.

For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration.

2.

For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

3.

Revising the RICT is not required if the plant configuration change would lower plant risk and would result in a longer RICT.

d.

Use of a RICT is not permitted for entry into a configuration which represents a loss of a specified safety function or inoperability of all required trains of a system required to be OPERABLE.

e.

If the extent of condition evaluation for inoperable structures, systems, or components (SSCs) is not complete prior to exceeding the Completion Time, the RICT shall account for the increased possibility of common cause failure (CCF) by either:

1.

Numerically accounting for the increased possibility of CCF in the RICT calculation, or

2.

Risk Management Actions (RMAs) not already credited in the RICT calculation shall be implemented that support redundant or diverse SSCs that perform the function(s) of the inoperable SSCs, and, if practicable, reduce the frequency of initiating events that challenge the function(s) performed by the inoperable SSCs.

6.8.5 DELETED TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4 6-148 AMENDMENT NOS. ~

AND ~

INSERT SFD P

g. Safety Function Detennination Program (SFDP)

L-2019-055 Attachment Page 9 of9 11-us program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate action taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.7, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists.

Additionally, other appropriate actions may be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system ACTIO s. This program implements the reguirements of LCO 3.0.7. The SFDP shall contain the following:

a.

Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected,

b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists,
c.

Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's completion time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities, and

d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, no concurrent loss of offsite power, or no concurrent loss of onsite diesel generator(s), a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A reguired system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable, or
b. A reguired system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable, or
c. A reguired system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate ACTIO s of the LCO in wluch the loss of safety function exists are reguired to be entered. When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate ACTIONs to enter are those of the support system.