IR 07200001/1988001
| ML20196E161 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07200001, 07001308 |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1988 |
| From: | France G, Greger L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196E155 | List: |
| References | |
| 72-0001-88-01, 72-1-88-1, NUDOCS 8802290132 | |
| Download: ML20196E161 (11) | |
Text
.
.,
.
.
U..S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III-Report No. 72-001/88001(DRSS)
Docket No.72-001 License No. SNM-2500 Licensee:
General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA-95125 Facility Name: Morris Operation Inspection At: Morris Operation, Morris, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
Septem er 1, 1987 through January 20, 1988 Inspectors:
G. M.
r II c51-//-88 Date 2//h M. A. Kunowski Date
,
Approved By:
L.
.G r, Chief _
c#- /9-88 Facilities Radiation Date Protection Section Inspection Summary Inspection on September 1, 1987 through January 20, 1988 (Report No. 72-001/88001(0RSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced health and safety inspection, including organization (IP 88005), training (IP 88010), operations review (IP 88020),
criticality safety (IP 88015), transportation (IP 86740), preparation and receipt of spent fue'l shipments and storage operations, emergency preparedness (IP 88050), radiation protection (IP 83822), and a review of the basin leak detection system (IP 92706).
Results:
The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements in areas examined during the inspection.
,
'
8802290132 880219
PDR ADOCK 07001308 C
,DCD'
,
_ - _ ___-_
'
-
- -
-
.
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted (IP 30703)
R. L. Carlson, Specialist, NucYear Materials Safeguards
- R. G. Damm Senior Engineer, Licensing and Radiological Safety
- L. L. Denio, Supervisor, Quality Assurance and Safeguards
- J. W. Doman, Operations Engineer, Special Projects T. E. Ingels, Morris Operation Manager and Acting Manager, Plant Operations
- J. D. Kesman, Manager, Plant Engineering and Maintenance J. E. McGrath, Supervisor, Plant Safety
- S. P. Schmid, Specialist, Field Services N. P. Shaikh, Operations Engineer, Planning and Scheduling T. E. Tehan, Senior Engineer, Field Services R. Wright, Safety Technician
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on January 15, 1988.
While inspecting spent fuel shipments, the inspectors contacted personnel from the State of Illinois Office of Waste Transportation and officials of Burlington Northern Railroad Company.
2.
General The inspection of onsite activities was conducted to examine operations of spent fuel storage activities at General Electric's Morris Operation under Material License No. SNM-2500.
During the September 1987 through January 20, 1988 operating period two inspectors perfr.med independent radiological surveys on spent fuel casks received from the Nebraska Public Power District, Cooper Station (NPPD) during six shipments of spent fuel.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Item (72-001/87001-01):
Contamination of personal clothing from anti-contamination clothing.
The licensee noted that small tears in paper "anti-C" clothing with subsequent contamination to garments worn beneath the "anti-Cs", occurs frequently.
However, because laundry services will soon be available locally to supply nearby nuclear reactors with laundered cloth coveralls, the licensee is considering procurement and use of cloth coveralls for selected tasks.
The inspector will monitor
,
the licensee's use of protective clothing during future inspections.
(Closed) Open Item (72-001/87001-01):
Contamination on worker's face.
The licensee requested a urinalysis and whole body count as a followup exposure analysis.
The inspector reviewed the urinalysis and exposure data and noted that the results showed no significant intake.
l
-
.
- -
..
-
.
,e
,
'.
'
.
-
.
.
4.
' Management Organization and Controls (IP 88005)
The; inspector reviewed the licensee's management organization an'd~
controls for radiation protection and operations, including changes in
-
the. organizational structure.
A review of safety committee activities was also conducted.
.
'a.
Organization
'Mr. T. E. Ingels, Manager, Morris Operation reports to the Manager, Nuclear Training Services.
The licensee noted that one Safety Technician resigned.
The Supervisor, Plant Safety, along with the three remaining Safety
' Technicians have redistributed their work routines in order to provide plant wide coverage for radiological health and safety matters.
By the fall of 1988, the spent fuel basin should be full and basin operations will change to a standby statrs.
Hence, there are no plans to replace the Safety Technician.
b.
Safety Committee Meetings / Activities The inspector examined minutes of the monthly safety meetings and confirmed that the Committee conducted monthly meetings during the July-December 1987 operating period in accordance with Appendix A, Section 6.4.1, Material License No. SNM-2500.
During the onsite inspection, the Safety Committee convened to determine the cause of an alarm enunciator that registered in the control room due to a decrease in air pressure. -Over a period of about ten minutes, the instrument air pressure decreased from 88 psig to below the 50 psig alarm point.
A trace of the air compressor system disclosed that an air flow control valve which normally remains open was in the closed position.
After interviewing several workers the Committee determined that the valve must have been accidentally or inadvertently closed.
A possible cause was provided by a worker who stated that he was using air to sparge a 500-1000 gallon tank of sodium hydroxide solution shortly before
.
the alarm indicated a loss of air.
While returning the air compressor system to the normal operating mode before departing for his morning break, the worker may have inadvertently closed the instrument air flow valve.
The alarm enunciated shortly after the worker departed for his morning break.
The inspector interview 3d several members of the Safety Committee and accompanied the Operations Engineer during a walkdown of the air J
compressor system.
The air flow valve was the handle-type mounted about four feet above the floor surface.
The inspector noted that condensate relief and/or check valves associated with the. air compressor sy' tem are checked daily on the operators' maintenance schedule.
After observing an operator performing daily maintenance checks and reviewing the Committee findings, the inspector concluded that the Committee's explanation of the closed valve seemed plausible.
- - -
- -
- - - -
-.
- - - - -.
- - -
-
i
.
.
In reporting the incident, the licensee complied with the following surveillance requirement of Appendix A, Material License No. SNM-2500.
Notification of NRC Regional Office shall be made at the time of the next inspection, advising them of events that resulted in a surveillance requirement being violated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Training (IP 88010)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's provisions for training and periodic retraining of employees, as related to employee work assignments with radioactive and fissionable materials.
The Operations Engineer disclosed that training was conducted in the following areas of interest:
Safety classes for "B" certification were given to two outside
contractors.
Training in the preparation and shipment of hazardous materials was
conducted for 37 Morris Operation employees.
The inspector attended the annual safety orientation class for site
familiarization and emergency alarm systems.
Completion of this annual safety instraction allows limited onsite privileges without the need of an escort.
Forty employees received training in the use and care of respiratory
equipment.
Each employee passed a fit and leakage test performed in an atmosphere containing isoamyl acetate.
The workers were tested while wearing either a MSA or a Welsh full-face mask equipped with the proper canister to adsorb or filter airborne irritants.
The inspector concluded that the licensee is complying with regulations and license requirements related to the training of licensee employees.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Transportation Activities (IP 86740)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for receipt and/or shipment of radioactive materials.
a.
Spent Fuel Cask Shipments During the September 1987 through January 1988 operating period, two inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for receipt and shipment of radioactive materials.
The review included inspection of six incoming rail shipments of spent reactor fuel from Nebraska Public Power District's Cooper Station and one outgoing rail shipment
..
.
,
.
.
of an empty spent fuel cask shipped to Southern California Edison's San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
The schedule of one shipment was altered to discourage media (television) coverage.
Minor cask contamination problems are still being noted in the spent fuel shipment program.
Contamination surveys showed that one wipe from an empty cask exceeded 22,000 dpm/100cm2 upon arrival at GEM 0 from NPPD in November 1987.
However, the licensee determined a smear efficiency of 51.7% which demanstrated that the DOT contamination limit was not exceeded.
In January 1988, the licensee shipped an empty IF-300 cask to Southern California Edison's San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.. While pre-shipment survey data'
(examined by the inspector) average'd less than 500 dpm/100cm2, upon arrival at San Onofre the incoming cask survey indicated that four individual wipes exceeded 22,000 dpm/100cm2 San Onofre determined smear efficiencies of.28-38%, which demonstrated that the DOT contamination limit was not exceeded.
b.
Other Shipping Activities On January 27, 1988, GEM 0 was notified by San Onofre officials that a discrete particle may have been discovered on the surface of the
,
l enclosure that protects the IF-300 shipping cask.
In conjunction with the smear survey, the San Onofre workers used disposable cloths to wipe the surface of the enclosure.
This action minimizes the accidental transfer of contamination from the enclosure surface to the worker.
A radiological measurement equivalent to 130,000 dpm was detected on a small portion of one of the cloths, apparently a
"hot" particle.
San Onofre officials are reviewing the discrete particle incident. GEMO indicated that there had been no recent history of discrete particle problems at Morris Operation.
This incident will be reviewed further during a future inspection.
(0 pen Item 72-001/88001-01)
The licensee noted that contact beta measurements are made on each empty cask prior to shipment. Over a six-month period these measurements ranged from 11 to 17 mR/hr with an average reading of 13 mR/hr.
There doesn't appear to be any correlation between these data and the smear data at the shipment destinations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Radiation Protection (IP 83822)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's internal and external exposure control programs including the required records, reports, and notifications.
I
'I
-
- -
-
-
-
-
-.
-- - ---
-- -
'.
-
.
'
.
.
a.
Internal Exposure Control Urinalysis results for workers performing spent fuel operations and cask maintenance duties disclosed trace quantities of cesium-134 and 137. Whole body count results for the same group of workers
~
were significantly below the maximum permissible body burden for cesium, cobalt, plutonium, and uranium.
Records were available to document.the medical approval of workers selected to wear respiratory equipment in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.15.'
Based on. licensee records and interviews with licensee workers,.the inspector concluded that there had been no significant internal exposure to workers engaged in spent fuel activities since the previous inspection.
(See Inspection Report No. 72-001/87002)
b.
External Exposure Control As reported in previous inspections a significant amount of exposure to workers occurs around the cask basin decontamination pad, cask receiving area, and during the performance of cask turnaround maintenance. A review of exposure records indicated that the highest annual exposures recorded were about 2 rem for three individuals.
I c.
ALARA Review i
Because of the amount of time required in making technical adjustments and repairs during cask maintenance and turnaround, the licensee is concerned with keeping radiation exposures ALARA.
The licensee provided the following examples to demonstrate ALARA concepts.
High intensity lights are used during cask turnaround
inspections to "speed up" visual inspections.
,
Lead shields are designed and fabricated to reduce radiation
exposure-from waste disposal containers and hot spots in the basin pumping equipment.
During a tour of the spent fuel basin, the inspector noted that
hot spots were labeled on the basin pumping system.
Exposure to QA inspectors was lowered by a factor of two by
using improved inspection techniques and using two-man teams to shorten inspection time.
The licensee noted that radiation. level (contact reading up to
150 mR/hr) in the pump room had also been reduced by-a factor of two.
A solution containing nonradioactive cesium nitrate was recirculated through the basin filter and connecting pumping equipment, thereby allowing the collection of Cs-137 via an ion exchange mechanism and the subsequent discharge of the Cs-137 to the low activity waste vault (LAW).
Sample
,
,
.
'.
.
.
.
.
results indicated that 1.5 curies of Cs-137 was removed from the basin filter system and jetted to the LAW vault.
No problems were noted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operations Review (IP 88020)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's spent fuel storage activities including current and proposed fuei receipts and shipmerts.
A discussion on observations made during the receipt of spent fuel shipments can be found in Section 6, Transportation Activities.
The insraector also observed operator performance in the basin control room.
The control room operator conducted a walkthrough response to an alarm indicating instrument air shortage.
See Section 4.b., Safety Committee Meetings, for more discussion on the licensee's response to the instrument air alarm which occurred during this inspection.
The inspector reviewed recent changes to the following Standard Operating Procedures to determine if they are consistent with the Technical Specifications for safety required in Appendix A, Material License No. SNM-2500.
No problems were noted.
50P-16-10, Revision 5, Basin Water Compliance Test 50P-1-20, Revision 11, Basin Filter Operation 50P-16-13, Revision 8, Basin Leak Rate and Operability Test 50P-1-12, Current, Basket Handling and Installation of BWR Square Tube Baskets 50P-1-3, (IF-300 Cask) Cask Handling Operating Procedure The licensee noted that Nebraska Public Power District's Cooper Station will interrupt the spent fuel shipping program after the January 20, 1988 shipment.
Shipments will resume in the spring of 1988, with the last of the fuel scheduled to arrive at GEM 0 in the fall of 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Criticality Safety (IP 88015)
The inspector noted that the licensee's nuclear safety records, audits and/or monthly operating reports continue to indicate a description of the spent fuel received from Nebraska Public Power District, Cooper Station (NPPD).
These records demonstrate the licensee's ability to assure that fuel parameters such as uranium-235 enrichment, rod lattice limits, and/or pellet diameter, fall within the range defined in Appendix A, Material License SNM-2500.
Inspection Report No. 72-001/87002(DRSS) discusses the nuclear safety of the square tube fuel basket, designed to consolidate the spent fuel stored at GEMO.
The licensee noted that 20 of the new baskets have
- -
. -
-
.
'
'
,.
.
o arrived and are now in use.
There are, however, no further plans to expand the basin capacity by using the new square tube baskets due to the lack-of current need for additional capacity.
No violations or deviations were noted.
10.
Technical Surveillance / Maintenance (IP 92706)
Technical Specification 4.0, Appendix A, SNM-2500, prescribes the water levels, physical quantities, and surveillance requirements to provide assurance of specification compliance.
a.
Effluent Air Effluent air is continuously sampled for particulates.
The weekly average of 4E-08 uCi/ml was not exceeded for the, period examined.
Recent sample analyses have shown about 3-5E-14 uC 11, which is significantly less than the action level of 4E-10 uus/ml. The ten-minute interruption to the air flow as. discussed in Section 4.b.,
Safety Committee Meetings, did not have any deleterious effects on effluent air monitoring.
However, during the week of September 28 -
October 4,1987, the weekly sample of particulates in effluent air (collected on filter paper) was not pulled in a timely manner.
The sample omission was documented as not meeting 50P-16-84, Exhaust Gas Analysis Compliance Test. Apparently, the sample was not pulled because of the personnel workload in combination with scheduled time-off.
Upon discovery the sample was pulled.
The Safety Committee reviewed the incident and although satisfied with the written procedures, reminded all parties of the requirements for taking surveillance samples.
This matter meets the criteria s.9ecified in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C for self-identification; therefore, no notice of violation is being issued.
b.
Basin Water Sample analysis of basin water disclosed results that fall well within specified limits.
The parameters of interest are:
1987 Parameter Month pH nan 02 C1.
Accepted Limits July 6.2 0.8 0.1 pH = 4.5 - 9.0 August 6.1 0.8 0.1 nan 03 = 5 200 ppm September 6.1 0.8 0.1 C1
= 1 10 ppm October 6.2 0.8
< 0.1 November 6.1 0.8
< 0.1
<
December 6.2 0.8 0.1
No problems were noted.
o T
..
.,
.,
,
-
.
.
c.
Sealed Sources Checks and/or leak tests performed on sealed sources were completed on October 5, 1987.
No leaks were identified in any:of the sources.
d.
.Emeroency Generator During a weekly load test of the diesel generator a fitting on the lube oil line failed, causing an oil spill of nearly 10 gallons of oil.
The line was replaced and the generator'was retested for operability.
The licensee noted that there was no radioactive contamination associated with the oil spill. 'Hence, the spill was removed with a dry absorbing compound and discarded as nonradioactive waste.
In other instances of compliance operability tests involving the emergency generator, the licensee replaced a defective bank of electrical load elements and a leaking radiator.
The inspector concluded that the licensee is performing tests in accordance with technical specifications that govern the safety of the receipt, possession, and storage of spent reactor fuel.
e.
Basin Leak Detection System The inspector reviewed the operation of the basin leak detection system with the Operations Engineer and examined the Control Room Technician's log for test results and observations.
A perforated pipe located between the basin liner and the concrete wall slopes to I
a low point causing seepage to accumulate in the sump.
Seepage (empty-out) may be discharged to the LAW vault by air lift and/or s
steam ejector systems.
Seepage collected in the system is analyzed
'
for radioactivity and/or other selected parameters.
Radiochemical analyses have shown that seepage is due to intrusion from a ground water system developed either from perched rainfall,.latual seepage from confining zones, or lateral flow from fractured rocks.
Radiochemical analyses do not support a conclusion that seepage is coming from the basin liner.
Additional parameters in the accumulated seepage are checked in accordance with instructions found in 50P-1-27.
The licensee noted that the rate of leakage is
,
routinely plotted by the Control Room Technician. The largest leak
'
rate plotted during 1987 was just over one liter per day.
The licensee performed similar tests for detecting leaks in the LAW inner container and the cladding vault liner.
Seepage collected in the LAW vault detection system is caused by ground water intrusion and/or condensate build up from the liner-to-tank annulus.
No leaks have been detected.
Intrusion water is accumulated at the rate of 50-80 liters per day. The cladding vault is equipped with a similar leak detection system.
Seepage accumulates very slowly and is based on the amount of condensate that forms in the air tunnel stack release system.
There were no indications that the liner leaks.
'
- -
- -
-
-
-
-
-
- - -
-
-
-
-
.
_
-*
,,.
,
.
.
It is apparent that the potential for leakage from the spent fuel pool liner was accounted for in the initial design of the plant.
However, based on the licensee's radiochemical analyses, the seepage that accumulates in the sump is due to ground water intrusion.
The inspector concluded'that the spent fuel pool liner and/or.the cladding vault and LAW vault liners have shown no indication via compliance tests that either of them leak.
Operability tests _are performed on the basin pool, LAW vault, and cladding vault leak systems in accordance with the SAR and the technical specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Emergency Preparedness (IP 88050)
The licensee conducted an in-house audit of emergency _ instructions covering alarm systems and noted the following:
Criticality Alarm:
Apparently, some workers although shielded from
significant radiation exposure due to criticality may be located in areas where the alarm is not audible.
The auditors recommended that-these areas be equipped with a paging system.
In case of an emergency involving a criticality, the control room operator would activate both the paging system and the criticality horns in order to alert all workt.rs.
During the course of this inspection, the licensee was investigating this matter.
- Air Monitor Alarm:
The audit reinforced the licensee's policy to instruct workers to wear respiratory protection prior to reentry into ar. area of radioactive airborne contamination. The licensee noted that this requirement is usually covered during safety'
meetings.
There was no indication that this practice was being violated.
The licensee's corrective action to the above concerns'will be reviewed during a future inspection (0 pen Item No. 72-001/88001-02(DRSS)).
In response to concerns about offsite surveys in the ambulance or hospital, the licensee indicated that St. Josephs Hospital of Joliet has dedicated an emergency room to receive' patients who are potentially contaminated with radioactivity.
Survey instruments supplied by the licensee are located at the hospital emergency room.
The inspector noted that several emergency procedures should be reviewed for current application.
The following list of emergency procedures had not been reviewed since 1985:
MOI 203 Morris Operations Safety Alarms
MOI 222 Onsite Contamination Release i
'
M0I 223 Offsite Contamination M0I 225 Recovery Plan MOI 227 Chemical Spill M0I 241 First Aid
-
- - -.
..
.
.
_
-
_
_
. - *
'*4
..
.
,
a The.importance of updating all procedures ~ covering emergency practices
'
was discussed during the exit meeting.
A follow-up examination of-i emergency procedures will'be~ conducted during a-futureLinspection (0 pen Item No. 72-001/88001-03(DRSS)).
~
1k) violations.or deviations were identifieJ.
12.
Exit Meeting (IP 30703)
The inspector met with licensee representatives _(denoted in Section 1)
- at.the conclusion of the Jonsite inspection on ' January 15,1988. : The inspector summarized _.the scope and findings of.the inspection. The inspector pointed out the importance of updating and/or reviewing procedures covering all' emergency practices.
-
The inspector acknowledged that theilicensee's_actionLin correcting the air outage and advising the inspector of the events follows the surveillance requirements of Appendix A, Haterial License No. SNM-2500.
During the course of the inspection and the exit meeting, the' licensee did not identify any documents or inspector statements and references to specific processes as proprietary.
'
'
.
d
-
,
I
~f f
i
-.
-
-
,
_
-
..
- - -. -, - -
-