IR 05000508/1979007
| ML19256F207 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Haist D, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256F203 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-79-07, 50-508-79-7, 50-509-79-06, 50-509-79-6, NUDOCS 7912110493 | |
| Download: ML19256F207 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMEhT RECIoN V 50-508/79-07 Report No.
50-509/79-06 Cocket No.
50-508, 50-509 License no, CPPR-154, CPPR-155 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 468 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: WflP-3 and WNP-5 Inspec.. ion at: WNP-3 and WNP-5 Site (Satsop)
Inspection conducted: _ August 27-30, 1979 Inspectors:
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D. F. Kirsch, React 6r Inspector
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f/f2//79 D. P. H6ist, Reactor Inspector
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Approved By: /
4)ato/ Signed R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary: Inspection during period of August 27-30,1979 (Report Hos. 50-508/79-07 and 50-509/79-06 Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional-based inspectors of allegations of deficient condit tons or practices and construction activities includ-ing:
licensee action on prev.uus inspection findings; site preparation; reinforcing steel storage; welding material control, receipt inspection, storage, observation of work and nondestructive examination as related to welding of containment steel structures and supports; work observation and quality record review related to weld-ing of steel structures and supports outside of containment; and ASME certification authorizations. The inspection involved 50 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncomcliance or deviations were identified in five areas.
One apparent item of noncompliante was identified in the area of containment structural steel welding (failure to maintain specified preheat on a joint being welded), paragraph 9.a, and one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in the area of reinforcing steel storage (failure to identify reinforcing steel as required by procedures), paragraph 2.
RV Form 719(?)
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DETAILS 3;
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Individuals Contacted
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Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
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- W. J. Talbott, Division Manager
- J. C. Lockhart, QA Manager
- R. M. Simons, Senior Project Quality Engineer
- J. M. Walker, Senior Project Quality Engineer
- R. R. Quimby, lead Project Quality Engineer
- D. C. Timins, Supervisor - Materials and Components d,
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- H. L. Barton, Senior Engineer
- e-N. Johnson, QA Secretary
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S. F. Schueman, Project Quality Engineer
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C. H. Tewksbury, Lead Project Quality Engineer
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Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
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- J. P. Sluka, Manager of Engineering
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- C. B. Tatum, Senior Resident Engineer
- A. M. Cutrona, Deputy QA Manager
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- L. F. Adams, Senior Project Quality Engineer
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- L. A. Bast, Project Quality Engineer i
G. Zerbst, Lead Project Quality Engineer
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T. E. Cottrell, Resident Engineer B. Bennett, Civil Construction Engineer W. Lear, level III NDE Examiner
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T. Bordeaux, Contract Engineer
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K. L. Kinkela, Structural Engineer J. Dekker, Instrument Technician C. M. McClaskey, QA Engineer
R. Jurbala, QA Engineer
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J. W. Cain, Project Welding and QA Superintendent
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P. Van Niel, Welding and QA Manager M. Loibl, QA Engineer D. Weinstein, QA Trainee
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G. M. Arnett, Welding Supervisor
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O. Weil, QC Inspector Three welders conducting welding on the Unit 3 containment
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Morrison-Knudsen (M&K)
D. D. Reader, QC Supervisor J. M. Sallie, Level II QC Inspector R. Wilbur, Welding / Erection Foreman R. L. Seals, Welder D. Colbert, Welding Inspector D. A. Dcw, Welding Inspector e.
Peter Kiewit Services (PKS)_
D. Paulson, Project QA Manager f.
Associated Sand and Gravel (AS&G)
P. J. Meservey, QC Technician g.
State of Washington
- G. Hansen, Engineer (EFSEC)
- Denotes those attending exit interview.
2.
General The licensee reported that Units 3 and 5 were 14.6% and 5.2%
complete, respectively.
Licensee contractors were installing reactor auxiliary building walls and structural steel.
CBI was continuing field weldinc on the Unit 3 containment and shop welding on Unit 5 containment.
3.
Site Tour
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Upon arrival, the inspectors conducted a site tour to observe the activities of construction, housekeeping and general compliance with the PSAR and applicable codes and standards.
The inspector observed the storage and identification of reinforcing steel in the Unit 3 RAB, elevation 335 feet. At column line F-29 one bundle of #6 field fabricated reinforcing steel was without a heat number tag and one bundle of seven foot lengths of #6 owner-furnished reinforcing steel without the required identification tags.
The field
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fabricated bundle was apparently part of another identified bundle nearby which had been split and rebundled without attaching a heat tag. At column line MK-SJ the inspector observed two #11 bars of reinforcing steel laying in water on the common concrete mat without dunnage and without identi-fication tags.
The bars had apparently been moved from a nearby bundle that was tagged but not secured.
The inspector also observed a three foot length 1653 201
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-3-of #11 and a five foot length of #8 reinforcing steel without identification tags.
The above practices are contrary to Morrison-Knudsen procedures which require that (1) heat numbers be transferred to metal tags attached to rebar, (2) rebar is to be supported from the ground, (3) the last bar remaining in a bundle is a tagged bar, (4) broken bundles are to be secured and (5) QC inspectors are to monitor to assure that the last rebar from a bundle has an identification tag.
This is an apparent item of noncompliance.
(508-79-07-01)
4.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Followup Items (Closed) (508/79-06-01) Followup Item:
Allegation Concerning a Concrete Vibrating Device The licensee wrote flCR flo.10945 on July 12, 1979, documenting the possible embedment of a pneumatic vibrator 2-1/8" in diameter and 14-1/2" long, with up to 10 feet of approximately 2" diameter rubber hose, within Unit 3 ring wall placements RBF-003-351 and/or RBF-004-a51. The alleged location of the vibrator was about 4" from the interior wall, between two reinforcing steel curtains, extending from the base mat surface to about 4 feet above the base mat level.
Although the licensee was unable to verify that the vibrator was indeed inside the placement the fiCR was written assuming that the allegation was true and subsequently evaluated and resolved based on worst case orientations and locations.
The subject NCR was subsequently resolved "Use-as-is" on August 7, 1979, based upon engineering evaluation that the vibrator and hose, in the worst case orientation and location, would not affect the structural integrity of the ring wall and would not cause corrosion in reinforcing steel or a change in the chemical and physical properties of the surrounding concrete. The NCR had been dispositioned and reviewed in accordance with the QA program requirements. This item is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified by the inspector.
5.
Allegations Regarding Inadequate Welding Engineer Qualifications An anonymous letter was received by the Office of Inspection and
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Enforcement, NRC Headquarters, alleging inadequate education and experience of Welding / Materials Engineering staff personnel employed by the AE and licensee at the WNP 3/5 site.
The alleger provided a 1653 202 _4 copy of the resume of the Principal Materials Welding Engineer at the WNP 3/5 site as an example of the alleged inadequate education and experience. The allegations were received by the flRC Region V office on August 13, 1979 for investigation and disposition.
NRC Findings: The allegation was not substantiated.
The same allegation regarding WNP 3/5 was made to the licensee's Assistant Director for Technology in early May,1979 and included an additional allegation of " bad decisions" purported to have been made by the WilP 3/5 Principal Field Welding Engineer employed by Ebasco.
No specifics regarding the alleged " bad decisions" were provided. These allegations were identified in a WPPSS internal memorandun dated May 4, 1979. On May 16,1979 a neeting was held on site by Ebasco and WPPSS personnel to discuss the identified allegations and initiate the licensee's investigative effort.
On June 13, 1979, by letter EBWP-79-5344, Ebasco provided the WPPSS Project Manager with a description of the functions performed by the Ebasco site support Principal Field Welding Engineer and a statement of qualifications of the subject individual serving in the position.
The WPPSS investigative effort determined that discrepancies appeared to exist between the functions of the subject position and Ebasco procedures. The WNP 3/5 Project Engineer was assigned, on July 16, 1979, responsibility for resolution of the apparent discrepancies and monitoring the Principal Field Welding Engineer's performance over the next four months to assess the allegation of " bad decisions".
The Project Engineer's findings will be reported to uppar management.
These identified actions had been undertaken and were in progress.
The licensee's investigation concluded that, following an objectively perfomed investigation, the individual serving as the Ebasco Principal Field Welding Engineer was qualified by experience to implement the plant design welding specifications, codes and standards.
The inspector performed a correlation of job description functions to the subject individuals experience record.
In addition, twenty-seven welding related nonconformance reports and one field change notice were examined to assess the implementation of design specifications, codes and standards and the allegation of " bad decisions".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The licensee stated that the subject individual could not change or modify design documents without approval of the affected discipline design engineers. The NRC investigation found that the individual had perfomed the functions of the position in a manner such that the design specifications, codes and standards had been adequately implemented.
The individual appeared to be qualified to perform the functions of the position by virtue of experience and training.
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-5-6.
Allegations of Concrete Batching and Transportation Discrepancies The licensee had notified the NRC by telecon that an investigation had been initiated, by the licensee, into alleged discrepancies involving concrete batching and transportation.
Subsequent to the licensee's notification telecon, similar allegations were reported to the NRC by an alleger who apparently desired verification that the NRC had been informed, by the licensee, of the original concerns.
The inspector examined the licensee's investigation report and verified that the alleger's concerns had been adequately addressed, investigated
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and resolved.
The alleger expressed concerns to the fiRC in two additional areas, as summarized below.
a.
Allegation:
The backup concrete batch plant is rated at 6 cubic yards capacity. Mixer uniformity tests were done on a 10 cubic yard load which was nixed by using the 6 cubic yard backup batch plant.
NRC Finding: The allegation was not substantiated. The inspector verified that the backup batch plant has a 6 cubic yard maximum capacity.
Examination of Concrete Uniformity test reports, for backup batch plant unifonnity tests conducted on February 28, 1979 and August 23, 1979, indicated that the uniformity tests had been conducted on 6 cubic yard batches.
flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Allegation: Ten cubic yards of concrete are routinely loaded onto a truck with a nine cubic yard drum capacity.
NRC Findings: The allegation was not substantiated. The NRMCA rating tag attached to each truck drum. indicates that the drum volume is 402 cubic feet, the rated maximum mixing capacity (for truck mixed concrete) is 9 cubic yards and the maximum agitator capacity is 10.5 cubic yards.
ASTM-C94, Standard Specification for Ready Mixed Concrete, requires in paragraph 9 that when the concrete is central mixed, the volume of concrete in the truck nixer or agitator shall not exceed 80% of the total volume of the drum or container. The WNP 3/5 site uses a central mixing plant for the batching and mixing of concrete materials.
Following the central mixing, the concrete is loaded into the truck mounted drum with the rated capacities described above. The 402 cubic feet drum capacity translates to 14.88 cubic yards and
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80% of this equals 11.9 cubic yards.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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-6-7.
Allegations Regarding Radiooraph Validity The licensee verbally notified the inspector of certain allegations they had received regarding radiographs of the Unit 3 containment vessel weld seam T20c, increment ll-12Rl. The allegation was that the radiograph submitted by CBI as that of the repaired weld was not a radiograph of the same weld as shown on the original, before repair, radiograph. The licensee notified the inspector that subsequent to the repair radiograph, the same weld had been radiographically examined with the source positioned both on the inside and outside of the vessel and that the licensee had determined that the repair radiograph was of the original area depicted by the original radiograph.
The inspector examined the original, repair and subsequent radiographs, including the required reader sheet documentation.
It appeared that the repair radiograph and original radiograph were of the same area of weld.
Nn items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Site Preparation The inspector reviewed the actions planned by the licensee to correct gaps which were discovered between the shotcrete and the sandstone faces on the Unit 5 excavation south and east walls.
The actions planned include removal of shotcrete from areas designated by the engineer until less than 1/2-inch space exists between the shotcrete and sandstone.
Perimeter areas will then be handpacked with cement grout to prevent downward migration of flaking sandstone and to seal off the areas from further weathering. All exposed rock surfaces will be cleaned and prepared for shotcreting. Areas over and adjacent to the half-round drainage system pipes will be shotcreted. Areas not shotcreted will be protected from weathering until the RAB_ walls are placed and the vertical half-round pipes will be tested to ensure operability. The licensee stated that the actions planned are consistent with the safety margins incorporated in the seismic analysis and a new analysis would not be necessary. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the gunnite/ sandstone separations for potential reportability under the regulations of 10CFR50.55(e).
9.
Containment - Steel Structures and Supports (CBI)
a.
Observation of Welding Activities The inspectors examined the conduct of welding operations on the Unit 3 containment during the site tour.
Helding Procedure Specification No. WPS-E7018/74-3431 states that
" Plate thicknesses over 1" require a continuous preheat of 200 F minimum." Contrary to this requirement, on August 27, 1979, the 1653 205
-7-inspector observed that, while welding was in progress, the preheat temperature of seam C-1, material thickness of 2-5/16", on the bottom gead of the Unit 3 cgntainment vessel between about g70 and 360, was less than 200 F, as indicated by use of a 200 F Tempilstick. This is an apparent item of noncompliance (508/79-07-02).
The inspector, subsequent to the site tours, observed manual and automatic welding activities associated with Unit 3 seams C-1, 5-6G, W-42 and W-46.
The activities included joint preparation, fitup alignment, filler passes, grinding, cleaning of passes and maintenance of preheat. The welding processes observed included shielded metal arc and submerged arc welding. All welders observed were using the proper filler material and were qualified for the process and posi-tions being used.
In-process work records kept by the Q.C. inspectors were reviewed and appeared to accurately reflect work status.
The inspector also examined fabrication shop welding activities associated with Unit 5 seams B19C-5 and B18C-5.
The activities included joining preparation, fitup alignment, filler passes, and maintenance of preheat for submerged arc welding.
lio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Welding Material Control The control of welding filler metal inside the Unit 3 containment and in the fabrication shop was examined by the inspector. The daily Weld liaterial Distribution Logs for August 29,1979, were reviewed and the filler material storage conditions were examined for compliance with the quality assurance program and specification requirements.
Storage temperatures were checked for filler metal ovens A, D, E, F, and G.
flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Receipt Inspection and Storage The inspector reviewed receiving inspection records for the following items for compliance with the quality assurance program and procedural requirements:
(1) 1/16-inch Alloy dual shield welding wire, Heat tio. H7016 (2)
3/16-inch Linde welding wire, Heat tio. 402015 (3) Plate flo. 34-3703, Piece fio. 6-1 S/f11 (Unit 5)
(4) Plate flo. 34-3703, Piece flo. 6-1 S/ft 6 (Unit 5)
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-8-(5) Plate No. 74-3703, Piece No. 6-4 S/N 41 (Unit 5)
The inspector reviewed records of monthly storage area inspections and verified that storage conditions meet quality assurance procedure and specification requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Nondestructive Examination The inspector reviewed magnetic particle examfnation records for seam No. K-lG, interval 90 - 180, and reviewed the certifications of the Level 11 examiners for compliance with applicable procedure and SNT-TC-1 A requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Steel Structures and Supports (f1&K)
a.
Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector examined the conduct of welding activities on structural steel beam-to-embed plate attachment clips for compliance with procedural and regulatory requirements.
In addition, the completed welding of attachment clips to nine structural steel beams in the installation staging area were examined for compliance with regulatory and procedural requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, b.
Review of Ouality Records The welder qualification documentation and QC weld inspection documentation, for the observations conducted in 1C.a. above, were examined for compliance with regulatory and procedural requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, 11. ASME Certificate of Authorization The inspector reviewed the status of each contractor's ASME Certificate of Authorization for those contractors currently on site or working under the ASME Code. The following certificates were examined for compliance with ASME Certificate system requirements.
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-9-Contractor Certificate No.
Expires Ebasco (overall responsibility)
N-1406 June 14,1982 N-1407 June 14,1982 N-1408 June 14,1982 N-2339 June 14,1982 CBI N-2134 May 6,1981 P-K Interim Letter September 8, 1979 Site surfeys had been requested for those contractors engaged in site ASME code work.
An extension to the P-K interim letter had been requested.
The licensee has requested a certificate of authorization for the WNP 3/5 site and is expecting this authorization within a few months. The inspec-tors will monitor the progress of ASME site surveys during subsequent inspections.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee and AE representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 30, 1979 and summarized the inspection scope and findings.
The licensee acknowledged the apparent items of noncompliance identified in paragraphs 2 and 9.a.
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