IR 05000461/2003008

IR 05000461-03-008; 09/15/03 - 09/26/03; Clinton Power Station; Ti 2515/148; Verification of Compliance with Interim Compensatory Measures Order; Physical Protection Baseline and Performance Indicator Inspection Procedures

ML033010278
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	10/28/2003
From:	Creed J Division of Reactor Safety III
To:	Skolds J Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
IR-03-008
Download: ML033010278 (9)

Text

ber 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

CLINTON POWER STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2003008(DRS)

Dear Mr. Skolds:

On September 26, 2003, the NRC completed an inspection at your Clinton Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on September 26, 2003, with Mr. K. Polson and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with an Order issued on February 25, 2002, which required your site to implement specific measures related to the security of your facility. The inspection utilized Temporary Instruction 2515/148, Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures, to verify implementation of the Order as clarified in your responses dated March 15, 2002, May 24, 2002 and June 19, 2002. Additionally, the inspection included selected elements of the Physical Protection Baseline and Performance Indicator inspection procedures. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

The inspection results confirmed you met the Intent of the Order.

The material enclosed herewith contains Safeguards Information as defined by 10 CFR 73.21 and its disclosure to unauthorized individuals is prohibited by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Therefore, the material will not be placed in the Public Document Room.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, without enclosure, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Enclosure Contains Upon Separation This Page is Decontrolled J.Skolds -2-Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

James R. Creed Safeguards Program Manager Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62 Enclosure: Inspection Report 0500461/2003008(DRS)

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cc w/encl w/ :

Site Vice President - Clinton Power Station Clinton Power Station Plant Manager Regulatory Assurance Manager - Clinton Chief Operating Officer Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services Vice President - Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Manager Licensing - Clinton and LaSalle E. McNeil, (NSIR/DNS/RSS) (MS T4D8)

B. Westreich (NSIR/DNS)

cc w/encl w/o :

Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group Document Control Desk - Licensing Enclosure Contains Upon Separation This Page is Decontrolled

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

REPORT DETAILS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 I.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 II. WATERBORNE THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 A.

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 B.

Coordination with Maritime Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 C.

Publicly Accessible Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 D.

Surveillance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III. VEHICLE BOMB ATTACK THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A.

Explosive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 B.

Temporary Vehicle Barrier System Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 C.

Vehicle Barrier System Checkpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 D.

Limited Protected Area Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 E.

Limit Unauthorized Train Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 F.

Escort of Vehicles With Hazardous Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 IV INSIDER THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.

Vital Area Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 B.

Valid Failure to Meet Access Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 C.

Credible Insider Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 D.

Controls For Personnel With Temporary Unescorted Access . . . . . . . . 11 E.

Hostage Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 V.

EXTERNAL LAND-BASED ASSAULT THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A.

Minimum Number Of Officers Within Protected Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B.

Design, Construction and Placement of Defensive Positions . . . . . . . .

C.

Armed Responders In Excess Of Security Plan Numbers . . . . . . . . . .

D.

Spent Fuel Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E.

Owner Controlled Area Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

F.

Armed Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G.

Exterior, Ground Level Portals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

H.

Badging - Outside Protected Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

Integrated Contingency Response Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contains Upon Separation This Page is Decontrolled VI MITIGATIVE MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A.

Evaluated Actions Needed for Terrorist Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B.

Strategies to Address Loss of Large Area of Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C.

Updated Safety Analysis Report Hazard Consequences . . . . . . . . . . .

D.

Adequacy of Site Security and Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E.

Emergency Action Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

F.

Computer System and Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BASELINE INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

SAFEGUARDS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorization and Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) (IP71130.02) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3PP3 Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

4OA6 Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 LIST OF

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Contains Upon Separation This Page is Decontrolled 2