IR 05000423/1983006
| ML20023D972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1983 |
| From: | Elsasser T, Jeffery Grant, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023D964 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-83-06, 50-423-83-6, NUDOCS 8306060211 | |
| Download: ML20023D972 (7) | |
Text
__
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report No.
50-423/83-06 Docket No.
50-423 License No. CPPR-113 Priority
--
Category A
Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101 Facility Name:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Ur.it 3 Inspection at:
Waterford, Connecticut Inspection conducted:
March 28 - May 1, 1983 J
Med /Os /fM Inspectors:
-
+
T., Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspec' tor, --
ftesi4gned
, draitt-Haddam Neck.
g f
jgeg (. Grant,ReactorEngineer,DPRP dite signed date signed h2 4 Jym,fy,jpg3 Approved by:
T.C. Els#ak6r, Chief, Reactor Projects
@te sig~ned Section IB, Division of Project and Resident Programs.
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 28 - May 1,1983 (Report No. 50-423/83-06).
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; environmental protection commitments; welds in main control room panels; baseline inservice inspection of reactor vessel head; licensee identified reportable items; material damaged in truck accident; training course; preopera-tions system turnover program; and tour of site.
,
The inspection involved 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> by the regional reactor inspector and 61 hours7.060185e-4 days <br />0.0169 hours <br />1.008598e-4 weeks <br />2.32105e-5 months <br /> by the senior resident inspector.
Results:
No violations were identified.
.
8306060211 830523 PDR ADDCK 05000423 G
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO)
F. Comstock, Senior QA Engineering Technician P. Garver, Senior QA Engineering Technician K. Gray, Construction QA Supervisor K. Murphy, QA Specialist L. Peterson, Senior Engineer, FQC T. Sullivan, Resident Engineer - New Site Construction R. Vaccaro, Senior QA Engineering Technician D. Vail, Assistant Project Engineer Stone & Webster Corporation (S&W)
J. S. Carty, Site Engineering Group Manager A. A. Dasenbrock, Resident Manager J. G. Kappas, Superintendent of Construction P. Nelson, Engineering Assurance Engineer G. G. Turner, Superintendent, Field QC W. H. Vos, Senior Field QC Engineer Other licensee staff and operating personnel were also contacted during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings a.
(0 pen) Significant Deficiency (423/81-00-05) Damage to the Containment Liner. A regional inspector reviewed and observed work in progress on the containment liner and concrete wall damaged by a fire on September 10, 1981. Concrete was chiseled away from around the anchor studs with the remainder to be machined away to the same depth as that around the stais.
Backing bars were welded to the replacement liner and studs, and the space between the liner and concrete was grouted in four-foot lifts. The inspector observed two liner sections temporarily placed in position for determining proper fit-up. Welders were qualifying for the liner repair work which was tentatively scheduled time. gin in early April. The inspector had no further questions at that to be b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (423/83-02-02): The licensee has reviewed the extent of the cracks in the breaker housing of safety-related Gould motor control centers and does not consider it a significant deficiency under 10 CFR 50.55(e). The evaluation concludes that the cracks in question are minor in nature and were caused by over-tightening of the hold-down screw. The function of the breaker would not be impaired.
Based on the licensee's review, this item is close.
c. (0 pen) Violation (423/82-06-01); The licensee msponded to an NRC identified violation on July 8,1982, with the imediate actions that were taken and future actions planned to preclude the anomalies identified in the installation of snubbers.
1.
The' licensee has perfomed a study to determine the preferred time to install Mechanical Snubbers, and Procedure FCP-316 Rev. O, has been developed and was approved for~ use on March 2,1983. This procedure states in Paragraph 8.7 " Wrap the suppressor in plastic to protect it from contamination and place "Do Not Stand" tags on the units."
Specification M-968 ' as been amended to include (a) Inspection Criteria, 2.
h and (b) Tolerances. -After the licensee presented documentation,
.the inspector toured the containment to ascertain implementation of
the procedum. The snubber identified in NRC Report 82-06 was found partially wrapped, encrusted dirt on exposed surfaces, and no visible tags on unit.
It was requested that the licensee determine the training given to the snubber installation group, and whether the installed snubber is at an acceptable level of cleanliness and review i
the conditions of all other snubber installations that could be affected by dust or other contaminants or could be physically damaged.
'
This item remains opea, pending licensee implementation of a snubber installation program as required by Specification M-968.
.
3.
Environment Protection Commitments Referencas: a) FSAR, Chapter 2.5.5
,
b) Amendment to Corps of Engineers pemit CT-NIAN-75-128,
'
April 6,1983 c) NUSCO letter of March 14, 1983, Counsil to Rees, Cofferdam removal and intake dredging
,
d) NERM-30 Environmental Protection Commitments during construction
a.
Limit of Work Area
Fig. 2.5.5.41 of the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) depicts the limit of work in the ama of the service t;ater intake structure. During a tour of the service we.ter structure, it was identified to the licensee
!
that the material removed from the area between the intake structure and protective caisson was deposited in the areas of the beach outside the limits indicated in the FSAR. The licensee's immediate action was to
,
cease dumping the material on the beach area outside the limits indicated in the FSAR where it had the potential to wash into Niantic Bay. The i
licensee does have an Amy Corps of Engineer's Pemit which pertains to
'
this material and allows an additional 55,000 cu. yards of sand to be transferred to the Cornfield Dumping Ground.
The Corps of Engineers' Final Environmental Statement and the Construction Pemit Stage Environmental Report addresses this issue. It is anticipated i
that the disturbed beach areas will be restored following completion of construction. The licensee indicated that the final disposition of this issue j
will be the subject of an environmental report on affected areas. This item J
will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection (IFI 423/83-06-01).
i b
_ _- -. _.. _ _ - _ _ -. _ _ _ _ _,., _. _ _ -. _. _ _.. ~. _ -.. -. _. _, _. _. _ _ _,. _ _. _ _ _ _ -
,, _ _ _
-
l
'
4.
Welds in Main Control Room Panels.
The ~NRC issued to all holders of Construction Permits an IE Information Notice 82-34, which addressed potential significant problems pertaining to welds in the control room panels.
The licensee's A/E found anomalies in vendor installed plates (Reliance Electric), used to seismically anchor the main control board to the control
,
room floor; the plate seam could be easily detached from the support channel.
In addition, welds on panel skin stiffeners were cracked.
The licensee's A/E has had discussions with the vendor as to corrective action to be taken, and has identified areas where discrepancies in the welding qualifications were noted. No decisions have been made as to corrective actions to be instituted to ensure ability of units to withstand a seismic event. This item is unresolved.
(423/83-06-02)
5.
Baseline Inservice Inspection of Reactor Vessel Head The licensee has scheduled a non-destructive examination (NDE) to establish base line data for the reactor vessel head. The licensee contracted its nuclear supplier to perfonn the NDE using vendor procedures that have been reviewed and approved for performance.
a.
References 1) NSD-ISI-10. Rev. 5, Qualification for Ultrasonic Manual Equipment; 2) Regulatory Guide 1.150, Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Vessel Welds During Preservice and Inservice Examinations; 3) NSD-ISI-147, Rev. O, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Welds in Vessels; 4) NSD-ISI-70, Rev. 2, Magnetic Particle-Examination.
Based on a review of referenced documents, the inspector requested the licensee to address the following concerns in ultrasonic testing:
-- When were, or when will, calibration checks be perfotsed of the test equipment?
Do photographic records of the frequency amplitude curve exist?
--
will they be used to make comparisons during future inservice testing?
Is manual scanning rate addressed?
--
The licensee review of vendor supplied procedures identified additional concerns; all concerns were resolved prior to start of testing.
b.
Observations 1) Reactor Vessel Head Indentation During a tour of ti c containment building, the inspector observed the cleaning of external surfaces of the reactor vessel head. One area of the vessel head was indented approximately three-eighths of an inch deep over a one-inch diameter at a location of 1800 based on sketch NEU-1-1300. The anomalies appeared to be over a weld seam. Pending the licensee's resolution as to a) cause of indentation and b) effects of residual stresses caused by indentation, this item remains unresolved.- (423/83-06-03)
'
2) Magnetic Particle Examination of Reactor Vessel Head The licensee's nuclear vendor performed a Magnetic Particle Examination per procedure NSD-ISI-70. The inspector witnessed:
-- Licensee preparation of vessel head external surfaces;
-- The use of dry particle Magnaflux 81M015 Green MX201. The particles did afford a discernible contrast with the background.
-- Examination was conducted with sufficient overlap to achieve 100%
coverage and two separate examinations were made with field directions perpendicular to each other.
A review of examiners' qualifications indicated proper certification in that certification levels, methods to which certified, certification dates and physical examination were documented.
c.
Findings The inspector observed the magnetic particle examination of portions of the closure nead to flange area.
No violations were identified.
6.
Licensee Identified Reportable Items (10 CFR 50.55(e))
a.
Motor Control Center (MCC) Terminal Block On March 29, 1983, the licensee reported a construction deficiency under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e). The licensee identified the problem as MCC " pull-apart" terminal blocks popping out of position as a result of electrical wire vibrations. Movement of the terminal block from its intended position could result in the malfunction of the MCC during plant operations. The " pull apart" terminal block, manufactured by Underwriter Safety Device Company, and installed in the MCCs by Gould, are kept in place by no restraint other than friction. The licensee has not been able to find documentation of the blocks' seismic qualifications, and is investigating the possibility that the MCCs without the terminal blocks were qualified. Approximately, 3000 b'ocks exist at Millstone 3, with an estimated 25% being safety related. The licensee feels that this problem is not generic because the " pull apart" design was specifically requested by the licensee. A regional inspector verified that the blocks easily popped when wiggled cr shaken by connecting wires.
The licensee is in contact with both vendors and is continuing its investigation.
(IFI83-06-04)
b.
Reactor Trip Breckers - SD-37 DS416 Upon investigation of the reactor trip breakers due to the Salem incident, Westinghouse has advised Millstone 3-that the undervoltage assembly could probably be misaligned.
In one instance, the pivot shaft at another licensee v?s found detached from its retaining ring, thus making the undervoltage assembly inoperable. At another licensee, it was determined
.
.
that a change in the design of the retaining clip (a thicker material)
caused shaft misalignment.
Replacement of assemblies are recomended by Westinghouse and will be done prior to operations. The changeover of parts in breakers will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection.
(IFI 83-06-05)
7.
Material Damaged in Truck Accident On February 22, 1983, a truck carrying a shipment of Category I, Enclosure Building siding material (Smith Shipment Load #07-619) overturned near the entrance to the site. The spilled material was transferred to an intermediate area and inspected by QC. Only material in the same condition as when manu-factured was considered by QC to be acceptable; that is, material with any surface imperfections, damaged paint, scratches, dents, etc., was rejected.
Rejected material was marked with red spray paint and segregated from any acceptable material. A regional inspector reviewed the E.G. Smith Deviation and QC Inspection Report (DDR No. 2) and the Smith QA Procedure Manuals.
The inspector also verified that the rejecteo material was marked and segregated as stated.
It was observed that the accepted material had been transferred from its temporary storage area to the Enclosure Building for erection. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
8.
Familiarization Course The licensee has initiated a training course on nuclear plant systems specific to the Millstone 3 facility. The course is 10 weeks in duration, is held two nights a week (one night each for licensee and A/E personnel), and is taught by the various systems supervisors. A regional inspector observed one class in progress and noted that training facilities and equipment were more than adequate, instructors were knowledgeable, and class attendance was high.
9.
preoperational System Turnover program The licensee has entered the system preoperational program with the interim acceptance of six water treatment and condensate systems from its architect /
engineers.
The scheduled August powering of the RSST/ Reserve Station Service Transformer is a key event in that its power will be available for the system motor control
'
centers.
Discussion with licensee indicated that turnover of approximately thirty-eight systems will be completed or started by October 1,1983.
The inspector requested a copy of the start-up manual and all generic type procedures that will be used for the verification of the test program. Upon receipt of the referenced material, a review of the preoperational program will be performed.
(IFI 83-06-06)
.
,m
, - - -... -.
r r_~
4.
,-,,,_ _ - - ----- - - r
- - -. -. - - - - - - - -
-
J
.
-
10. Plant Inspections a.
During the course of the inspection, the inspector conducted multiple tours of the following plant areas:
-- Control Room Intake Building
--
Primary Auxiliary Building Containment Building
--
--
Diesel Generator Rooms
-- Yard Areas
--
Turbine Building
-- Pipe Fabrication Shops
--
b.
The following observations / determinations were made:
Plant housekeeping controls.
Plant housekeeping controls were observed,
--
including control and storage of flammable material and control of potential safety hazards.
Fire protection / prevention. The inspector examined the condition of
--
selected pieces of fire fighting equipment. No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas.
'
No items of concern were identified.
11. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more ir. formation is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in
,,
Paragraphs 4 and 5.
12. Management Meetings
At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.
'
- - -
.. -.
--
-
_
.
.. - _ _.
.
_ __
__._ -
.
._