IR 05000361/1983008

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Discusses Conditions Having Potentially Generic Impact Identified in Insp Rept 50-361/83-08.Vendor Calibr Data for low-range Detector Apparently in Error
ML20126A663
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 03/10/1983
From: Jordan E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To: Book H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20126A656 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-NUREG-737-C, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8506130420
Download: ML20126A663 (3)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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D}y; e RE lON V.

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March 10,1983

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EEMORANDUM FOR:

E. L. Jordan, Director

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Division of Engineering and Quality Assurance

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.TROM:

H. E. Book, Acting Director

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Division of Radiological Safety and Safeguards ? ogra=i.

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Reg' ion V

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SU3 JECT:

INSpICTION TIED 3ACK: hJEEG-0737 ITDiS II.B.3 and II.F.1 A recent inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-361/83-08) performed pursbant to T.I. 2515/44 Rev. 2 identified several conditions which have potentially generic i= pact.

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11.7.1, Attachnent 1. Noble Gas Effluent Monitor

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Southern Califor=ia Edison Co=pany (SCE) has installed several Wide Range Gas Monitors (WRCM) supplied by General Ato:ics Cc:pany at the

San Onof re Nuclear Generating Statien.

The licensee has identified

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f our specific proble=s which have potentially generic i: pact on users of this equipment.

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1.

Vender calibration data for the lov range detector was apparently in error.

D'ata from topical report, " General Ato:ic

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RD52, E.-113-647" was not consistent vith onsite calibrations.

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We understand a new calibratio= report has been prepared by the vender, but to our knowledge is not yet generally available.

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Vendor calibration data for the high range detecter " General 4

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Ateric ED-72. E-255..e61" was also incensistent with licensee

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ensite calibrations.

The licensee believed the cause vas

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f ailute of the vendor to install a spacer which preperly

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positions the CdTe detector. We vere informed that the vender has again perforned the type calibration of the RD-72.

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3.

An apparent vender 1.-iring error and sof tvare deficiency resulted in the vreng stack area being used to calculate effluent concentrations.

This de:icnstrates the potential

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vulnerability of sof tvare aspects.

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4.

During elect:cnic testing of the * KGM, the licensee discovered ~

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that an ocillatien cf activity signal can result in "cid/high ra:ge pump failure alars" atd icss cf ra:ge overlap.

General Arc =ics, issued 71 eld ChanEe Orde: 34 to ccrrect this proble.

It should be noted that' the lice:see sub=itted a 10 CTR 50.55(e)

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repert dated July 21, lee 2 regarding ite=s 1, 2, an8 3 above.

f Eevever, since any one of the p:chle=s identified could result in 8506130420 850604 PDR ADOCK 05000206 i

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erroneous results, and since many of the WRCM have been sold to,

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licensees, we wanted to highlight those conditions to you.

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3. * II.'F.1. Attachment 3. Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor

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SCE has lustalled the General Atomics Company Model RD-23 Eigh Range Radiation Monitor.

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Too separate channels feed a single panel

alarm in 'the control room.

Each instrument has a range ~ from 10E0~ to

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10E8 R/hr.

Technical Specifications require an alars set peint of

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2 R/hr.

Each detector has an internal source which produces an

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equivalent background of 1.0 R/br.

By virtue of their location and

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instrument characteristics one of the two channels is' constantly in the alarm mode.

With one channel in alarm, the panel alars remains acknowledged and essentially ignored by the operator.

A real alarm from the other channel cannot be activated with one channel schorledged.

The real problem seems to be an unnecessary Icv (2 R/br) alarm set

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point required by Technical Specifications.

We understand the

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2 R/hr alarm level is generic.

It is not clear why a high range

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pest accident monitor needs to have an alarm setting cf 2 R/hr.

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11.3.3 Post-Accident Sampling Capability

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C SCE has installed a Combustion Ingineering Cenhany Post Accident Sa=pling System (PASS).

The licensee has expanded significant resources (approximately 8-niillion dollars, 115,000 nan-hours) which

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have not yet; resulted in a reliable,syste= capable of performing the

i= tended fun,ction.

From our involvement in this case and

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discussions with some other Regional offices, licensees and certain MGt representatives, we believe there could exist a generic prob'lem n

with the acceptable development and operatien of PAS syste=s (at

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least vith Ccubustien Engineering syste=s).

In additien, in the l

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case of San Onof re 2 and 3, a license conditien ' requires the PAS

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syste= to be' operable.

Yet the Technical Specificatien associated

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h with the PAS system is an administrative requiren,ent that contains

no " limiting condition of operatien,"" action" statene'nts or specific

" surveillance" requirements.

A definitica of " operable" also does not exist in the context of the ?AS systen.

Thus the licensee is placed in a situation wherein anytime a full or partial PAS systen failure occurs, he must shutdown the reactor or continue reactor

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operation in known violation of a license conditics.

We do not know whether a similar license conditien exists in other recently

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licensed facilities or whether it vill exist for oper,ating

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f acilities c:ce they cesplete the 'iasta11stien cf their ?AS systens.

In any event, the circunstances at SCNCS 2 and 3 varrant 1:ternal reviev of NEC's intent of license requirenants and Tec Specs '

relati:s to Pl.S systetis.

In additien, we have been u:able te find any precise position en the part of ERC of the " safety 1,rignificance" of PAS 'systens.

They have been declared nen-rafety related but the safety sigdificance of the systen remains undefined.

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submitted in the spirit of II Manual Chapter

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We would be pleased to discuss -

findings with your representative.-

Greg Tuhas is."-

ved. He can be reached.at TIS 463-3748 should

,ons.

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E. I. look, Acting Director

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Division of F.adiological Safety

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and Safeguards Programs

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