IR 05000361/1983008

Discusses Conditions Having Potentially Generic Impact Identified in Insp Rept 50-361/83-08.Vendor Calibr Data for low-range Detector Apparently in Error

ML20126A663
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	03/10/1983
From:	Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:	Book H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20126A656	List: IR 05000361/1983008 ML20126A652 ML20126A666 ML20126A669
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-NUREG-737-C, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8506130420
Download: ML20126A663 (3)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t ?,.

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. March 10,1983 .

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EEMORANDUM FOR: E. L. Jordan, Director ' '

Division of Engineering and Quality Assurance

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.TROM: H. E. Book, Acting Director .

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'. Division of Radiological Safety and Safeguards ? ogra= Reg' ion V

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SU3 JECT:

INSpICTION TIED 3ACK: hJEEG-0737 ITDiS II.B.3 and II. A recent inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-361/83-08) performed pursbant to T.I. 2515/44 Rev. 2 identified several conditions which have

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potentially generic i= pac ~

'A . 11.7.1, Attachnent 1. Noble Gas Effluent Monitor

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Southern Califor=ia Edison Co=pany (SCE) has installed several Wide

• Range Gas Monitors (WRCM) supplied by General Ato:ics Cc:pany at the

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San Onof re Nuclear Generating Statien. The licensee has identified f our specific proble=s which have potentially generic i: pact on users of this equipmen . Vender calibration data for the lov range detector was

. apparently in error. D'ata from topical report, " General Ato:ic

, RD52, E.-113-647" was not consistent vith onsite calibration We understand a new calibratio= report has been prepared by the vender, but to our knowledge is not yet generally availabl . Vendor calibration data for the high range detecter " General 4

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Ateric ED-72. E-255..e61" was also incensistent with licensee ensite calibration The licensee believed the cause vas

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.- f ailute of the vendor to install a spacer which preperly 4 positions the CdTe detector. We vere informed that the vender

,, has again perforned the type calibration of the RD-7 . An apparent vender 1.-iring error and sof tvare deficiency resulted in the vreng stack area being used to calculate effluent concentrations. This de:icnstrates

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the potential vulnerability of sof tvare aspect " During elect:cnic testing of the * KGM, the licensee discovered ~

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that an ocillatien cf activity signal can result in "cid/high ra:ge pump failure alars" atd icss cf ra:ge overla General Arc =ics , issued 71 eld ChanEe Orde: 34 to ccrrect this proble .

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It should be noted that' the lice:see sub=itted a 10 CTR 50.55(e) i repert dated July 21, lee 2 regarding ite=s 1, 2, an8 3 abov Eevever, since any one of the p:chle=s identified could result in f 8506130420 850604 PDR ADOCK 05000206 i .

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erroneous results, and since many of the WRCM have been sold to ,

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licensees, we wanted to highlight those conditions to yo ~

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- 3. * II.'F.1. Attachment 3. Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor '

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SCE has lustalled the General Atomics Company Model RD-23 Eigh

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Range Radiation Monito *

Too separate channels feed a single panel

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alarm in 'the control room. Each instrument has a range ~ from 10E0~ to

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10E8 R/hr. Technical Specifications require an alars set peint of

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2 R/hr. Each detector has an internal source which produces an equivalent background of 1.0 R/br. By virtue of their location and

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instrument characteristics one of the two channels is' constantly in the alarm mod With one channel in alarm, the panel alars remains acknowledged and essentially ignored by the operator. A real alarm from the other channel cannot be activated with one channel schorledge .

The real problem seems to be an unnecessary Icv (2 R/br) alarm set

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point required by Technical Specifications. We understand the . .-

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2 R/hr alarm level is generic. It is not clear why a high range

. pest accident monitor needs to have an alarm setting cf 2 R/h .3.3 Post-Accident Sampling Capability -

C SCE has installed a Combustion Ingineering Cenhany Post Accident Sa=pling System (PASS). The licensee has expanded significant

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- resources (approximately 8- niillion dollars, 115,000 nan-hours) which

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• have not fun,ctio i= tended yet; resulted in a reliable,syste= capable of performing the

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From our involvement in this case and discussions with some other Regional offices, licensees and certain MGt representatives, we believe there could exist a generic prob'lem n with the acceptable development and operatien of PAS syste=s (at

'; least vith Ccubustien Engineering syste=s). In additien, in the l '

case of San Onof re 2 and 3, a license conditien ' requires the PAS *

ji? . syste= to be' operable. Yet the Technical Specificatien associated h with the PAS system is an administrative requiren,ent that contains

no " limiting condition of operatien,"" action" statene'nts or specific

" surveillance" requirements. A definitica of " operable" also does not exist in the context of the ?AS systen. Thus the licensee is placed in a situation wherein anytime a full or partial PAS systen failure occurs, he must shutdown the reactor or continue reactor

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operation in known violation of a license conditics. We do not know whether a similar license conditien exists in other recently ~

licensed facilities or whether it vill exist for oper,ating -

f acilities c:ce they cesplete the 'iasta11stien cf their ?AS systen In any event, the circunstances at SCNCS 2 and 3 varrant 1:ternal reviev of NEC's intent of license requirenants and Tec Specs '

relati:s to Pl.S systetis. In additien, we have been u:able te find any precise position en the part of ERC of the " safety 1,rignificance" of PAS 'systens. They have been declared nen-rafety related but the

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safety sigdificance of the systen remains undefine .

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l submitted in the spirit of II Manual Chapter

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cdb ck." We would be pleased to discuss -

findings with your representative.- Greg Tuhas is ."-

ved. He can be reached.at TIS 463-3748 should * *

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E. I. look, Acting Director .

Division of F.adiological Safety

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and Safeguards Programs

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