IR 05000358/1978016
| ML20148B958 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1978 |
| From: | Barrett P, Hayes D, Vandel T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148B922 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-78-16, NUDOCS 7811010057 | |
| Download: ML20148B958 (16) | |
Text
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,. U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT t
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/78-16 Docket No. 50-328 License No. CPPR-88 Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility Name: Wm. H. Zimmer Inspection At: Wm H. Zimmer Site, Moscow, OH Inspection Conducted-Augus 2-4, 1978 / f)O [[ Je , 't cl< u Inspectors: T.'E. Vandel ' W 3"W lS.ya P. A. Barrett _ ib ' . y 7~ .Htifhes Y0l* 9 //- 78 ' G. F. Mdxwell W h!M d /,l/ i.,p ., / Approved By: D. W. Ha , Chief //- '
Projects ection - Cv' Inspection Summary Inspection on August 2-4, 1978 (Report No. 50-358/78-16) Areas Inspected: Followup of previously identified noncompliance and unresolved matters; work activities and quality records relative to instrumentation components and cables installation.
In addition, a facility completion scheduling meeting was held with NRR (Licensing) personnel. The inspection and meeting involved 102 inspector-hours onsite by five NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, three items of noncompliance were identified in one of the areas. -(Infractions - lack of docu-mentation for qualifying safety related electric motors and instruments - Section II, paragraph 2.b and Section I, paragraph 2; and inadequate design criteria requirements regarding' separation of redundant cables - Section II, paragraph 3.
Deficiency - lack of personnel training and qualification procedures for electrical and instrumentation test personnel - Section II, paragraph 4).
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l ! . , , ! i ' i DETAILS , Persons Contacted Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (CG&E)
- B.
K. Culver, Project Manager
- R. P. Ehas, QA6S Engineer
- J. W. Haff, QA&S Engineer
- W. W. Schwiers, QA&S Principal Engineer
- J.
J. Seibert, Construction Engineer
- J. F. Weisenberg, QA&S Engineer R. L. Wood, QA&S Engineer Kaiser Engineers Incorporated j
W. J. Kacer, Assistant QA Manager M. Francuk, QA Engineer
- R.
Marshall, Project Manager
- R.
E. Turner, QA Manager J. Sabol, Lead Piping Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
Other personnel of CG&E, KEI, Sargent & Lundy, and General Electric were contacted during the course of the inspection.
i Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Matter (358/78-01-02): Cable trays CB-7, CB-8, and CB-9 were bolted directly to the terminal boxes, which are mounted directly to the diesel generator equipment.
Design Document Change E-l 2987 was issued on May 18, 1978, to prevent transmission of vibration from diesel generator to cable tray bus. The RIII inspector verified that work has been completed in accordance with DDC E-2987.
! l (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (358/78-14-01): Reactor Pressure j Vessel final test results and acceptance. The RIII inspector reviewed hydrostatic test procedure No. PRP-02 Revision 2 dated June 28, 1978 for compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, l 1971 edition through 1973 summer addenda. The test was witnessed and { ! accepted by KEI Hydrotest Supervisor, Quality Assurance Representative, i CG&E Representative /0hio Special Inspector, and the Authorized Nuclear Inspector on July 1, 1978. Under remarks on the test results data sheet ( form 2 Revision 6, it was noted that 4 welds leaked, MS-329D2, RR-134C11, l RR-114C3 and Vendor weld (Kellogg weld on the coupling) next to weld j-2-
. . . MS-114C2. Nonconformance report No. E-1126 was written on July 3,1978, for tracking, disposition and corrective action for these welds.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item (358/78-14-02): Lack of certification data sheets for the three relief valves installed for the hydrostatic test of the Reactor Pressure Vessel. The RIII inspector reviewed the certificate of conformance, which states in part, " inspected and tested in accordance with specifications, drawings and requiremente of the purchase order KEI 7070-24309, and certify that the material used to manufacture the critical parts of these valves has been inspected and complies with the required material specification," and found the certificate of conformance adequate.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (358/77-13-01; updated 358/78-03 and 358/78-08): Seismic and environmental documentation for electrical components (ECCS motors) supplied by the NSSS supplier, and certification for the reactor building recirculation fan motor. The RIII inspector reviewed licensee's Audit Report No. 78-04, Part II of General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division conducted on June 5, 6 and 7, 1978.
It was noted that the test reports presented to the auditor as the seismic and environmental reports for the Zimmer ECCS motors were not the same as the one's shipped to the site. The licensee requested General Electric to do an engineering evaluation to compare the Zimmer line of ECCS motors with the test results obtained from the BWR/6 line motors tested.
The resolution of this matter by the licensee as well as to verify the validity of the NSSS certificates of conformance and the effectiveness of the NSSS certification system will be evaluated during subsequent inspections.
Relative to the reactor building recirculation fan motor, the RIII inspector reviewed Sargent & Lundy letter SLC-10, 492 dated May 1, 1978 states in part, " support of documentation which proves the fan motors and bearing lubricants are able to withstand radiation doses of
1 X 10 rads."
Buffalo Forge Company letter to Sargent & Lundy dated November 1,1977 states, "This is to certify that the essential equip-ment manufactured on the above order number (S.O. 75T-6435-58) is in compliance with the environmental conditions as listed in Specification H-2290."
The inspector has no further questions relative to the certification of this component.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (358/78-13-01): Several welds on seismic Class 1 cable tray hanger components in the reactor building cable areas were of questionable quality relative to the requirements of AWS D1.1-72.
The RIII inspector reviewed a compreheneive inspection ptagram con-ducted by the licensee usinF AWS D1.1-72 which was required by the specification and purchase documents. Out of one hundred and forty-one (141) hanger assemblies inspected to this criteria, a total of one hundred and twenty-five (125) assemblies had one or more weld defects.
The defective welds were documented on drawing E-19 and nonconformance report E-1139.
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< . On July 17, 1978, the licensee informed NRC Region III office by tele-phone that the matter discussed above was a Reportable Event Per 10 CFR 50.55(e).
(Closed) Noncompliance Item (358/78-03-03): Hydrostatic test documen-tation sheets inadequately completed.
The inspector reviewed the latest revision test report, utilized to document the primary coolant system hydrostatic test results test No. RPV-1, and learned that a new Section D of form 2 added by Revision 6 makes provision for test witness and acceptance signoff by: (1) KEI hydrotest supervisor and/or engineer, (2) KEI QA representative, (3) CG&E representative and (4) Authorized nuclear inspector. This addition resolves the noncompliance item.
(Closed) Unresolved Matters (358/78-09-01 & -02): KEI QA surveillance reports numbers 831Q and 837Q regarding documentation information. A question was raised regarding the correctness and completeness of KEI forms under review.
It was learned during a discussion with the KEI QA manager that the forms had been completed correctly and that the con-cerns raised by the surveillance reports were misunderstandings re-garding the information to be included on the form. He added that this has been corrected.
The inspector had no further questions.
(0 pen) Unresolved Matter (358/78-01): Seals and o-rings radiation qualifications and snubbers environmental testing. The inspector was informed that the abnormal environmental condition testing of snubbers was in progress and that results of the testing would be available later.
However, it was learned that the radiation resistance requirement of the S&L specification could not be met.
Considerations for an operational surveillance program was being proposed in lieu of the specifications requirement.
This item remains open pending receipt and review of additional information.
(Closed) Noncompliance (358/78-09-04): Bolt sizes required to fasten Class 1E instruments to seismic 1 supports had not been specified.
Design Document Change, DDC, No. SLM-399 dated May 16, 1978, has been written to change drawing No. M-479 Sheet 2.
DDC No. SLM-399 specified the pertinent bolt sizes and the ASTM grade for the bolts, washers, and nuts. The distribution of DDC No. SLM-399 was controlled. The proper bolts will be installed upon receipt.
The installation of these bolts will be observed in accordance with the routine IE inspection program.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (358/78-09-05): Electrical cable No. VY-710 was not installed (pull tension not verified) in accordance with instruction KEI QACMI No. E-7, Revision 7.
KEI QACMI No. E-7 has been modified in-4-i _ _, . .. . _ -, - _ _ _,, _., ~,, .. ..m._,, ,,
.= - - - - - -. - ..-. -. -.-a r u - - w- -.. e, s.-- - I . , , f Revision 9 to include specific measures to assure nonexcessive pull tensions. The licensee stated that an evaluation to. determine the l previously installed Class 1E cables which may have.been subjected to excessive pull tensions has not been made; however, the licensee ' stated that such an evaluation would be made and that a supplemental 1etter to CG6E's response letter dated July 26, 1978, would be sent ' to RIII documenting this additional action.
'i Functional or Program Areas Inspected The functional program inspection results are provided in Sections I, II < and III of this report.
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. Section I Prepared by P. A. Barrett Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief Engineering Support Section 1 1.
Observation of Work Activities a.
The RIII inspector observed four installed Class 1E instrument lines identified by the following systems and KEI isometric drawings: Field Racks (1) Pressure indicator for a diesel generator Drawings - M479-6-DG-120 Revision 0 M482-DG-117 Revision 5 (2) Pressure indicator for the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Drawings - M479-3-WR336 Revision 6 M471-13-WR368 Revision 0 M479 Sheet 3 Revision E NSSS Racks (3) High Pressure Core Spray System Drawing - M471-9-HP-8 Revision 7 (4) Low Pressure Core Spray System Drawing - M471-10-LP-20 Revision 5 The following characteristics were in accordance with the drawings and Quality Assurance Construction Methods Instruc-tion, QACMI No.'M-14 Revision 1 dated March 21, 1978.
The welds, located per the drawings, had no visible cracks, lack of fusion, excessive porosity, or excessive undercutting.
The lines were properly routed or deviations were controlled by as-built (red lined) drawings. The line components were as speci-fled by the drawings.
The supports (hangers, etc.) were in-complete, but controlled. The lines were not identified.
However, the licensee indicated that, as constrretion progresses, the lines will be identified in accordance with Sargent & Lundy Specification No. H-2256, Supplement No. 10, dated September 7, - 6- , m e v-
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_ . 1976, Section No. 813. The installations were being properly documented on the isometric drawings which serve as the per-manent records.
The above instrument installations will be reexamined in accordance with the routine IE inspection program.
b".
The RIII inspector observed a nonseismically supported pipe No. 1RE 101A6-1180 (approximately eight inches in diameter) installed over a blue coded Class 1E cable tray which was located above 480 volt motor control center No. RXMCC 1G.
The licensee indicated that the motor control center was not Class 1E.
The licensee stated that only Nonclass 1E, associated, cables have been installed in the subject raceway to date and that an evaluation would be made to determine if Class 1E cables would be installed. This matter is unresolved.
(358/78-16-01) No items of noncompliance were identified.
2.
Review of Instrumentation Receipt Documentation
The RIII inspector reviewed the documentation available at the site for purchase specification No. H-2866, purchase order No. 2479 and material receipt No. 38839. The material received included 53 l differential pressure switches (Model No. 288A--including item No.
1PDS-WR039,1PDS-WR041, ILS-CM030, etc. ). Specification No.
H-2866, Division 3, Technical Requirements specifies the types of documentary evidence to be supplied with the switches, including the requirements of IEEE 323-1971, specific site environmental conditions, e.g., temperature, pressure, relative humidity, radio-activity dose, and the requirements of IEEE 344 (seismic).
The Documentation Checklist was signed by the CG&E QA&S Engineer on July 12, 1977, indicating that the documentation was complete and acceptable. Additionally, the licensee had documentary evidence indicating approval of seismic report No. RI-288-10 by Sargent & Lundy. However, no documentary evidence relative to the requirements of IEEE 323-1971 and specific site environmental conditions was at the site, and the material had been released for installation.
This condition is contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII; Wm H.-Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 FSAR, Chapter 17, Para-graph 17.1.7.6; and Wm H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Quality Assurance Manual Section 7, Paragraphs 7.7 and 7.7.1.
This is an item of noncompliance identified in Appendix A of the report transnittal letter.
(358-78-16-02) 3.
Independent Inspection The RIII inspector discussed the classification and requirements governing the installation of the Reactor Protection System,-RPS, cables. The licensee stated that RPS is not classified as Class 1E-7- - . -. . .. . . . .. . . . ..~ , -
. for the Wm H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
However, the system is designed to meet the seismic criteria for the site and the requirements of IEEE 279-1971.
Separation criteria for the RPS cables were not available at the site.
The inspector could not determine how channel independence, as addressed in IEEE 279-1971, Section 4.6, will be controlled and verified for cables enclosed in field routed conduit. The licensee has requested the separation criteria from the Architect Engineer. This matter is unresolved.
(358/78-16-03) No items of noncompliance were identified.
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' Section II i Prepared by G. F. Maxwell Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief Engineering Support Section 1 1.
Protection of Installed Class 1E Electrical Equipment On August 3, 1978, the inspector observed that temporary scaffolding supports were placed inside two safety-related cable trays. The cable trays, which had been installacion inspected and contained safety-related cables identified with numbers 2118B and 3052A, were located in the Reactor Building at approximately elevation 475'. The inspector informed the CC6E QA personnel that IEEE-336 Section 5.1.2 does not allow this practice.
On August 4, 1978, prior to the exit interview, the inspector noted that the scaf folding had been removed f rom the two cable trays (Nos. 23".8B and 3052A) and that craft personnel had been cautioned no-to place scaffolding on or inside Class 1E cable trays. At th!s time, there are no further questions about this matter.
2.
ESF and Supporting Auxiliary System Pump Motors On August 3, 1978, the inspector requested that the site CG6E Quality Assurance Electrical and/or the CC6E Electrical Engineer provide the purchase specifications and any manuf acturers docu-mentation to assure that any "2" applicable Sargent 6 Lundy pur-chased pump motors complies with answer number 1 and 2 for the Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 FSAR Question 221.94(8.3.1.1).
As a result, the inspector was provided with the specifications and manufacturers drawings for the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Pump Motors (100 hp) IWROP, A, B, C and D and the Service Water Pump Motors (1250 hp) A, B, C and D.
The S&L specifications H-2185, H-2233 and Form 1800-Y, the manufacturers outline drawings supplied by Westinghouse for the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Pump Motors and the manufacturers outline drawings supplied by Electrical Machinery Manufacturing Company for the Service Water Pump Motors were reviewed by the inspector and both of the aforementioned CC6E representatives.
The results of the review indicate: . -9- -.. - . . - - - . -.
i ' ' a.
The S&L specifications'did require that the manufacturers
supply motors which are capable of starting an accelerating
' load at 80% applied voltage and are capable of developing a breakdown torque of not less than 200% of their normal full' load running torque (for motors 7from 10 to 200 hp) and to > conform to NEMA MG-1 for motors greater than 200 hp.
However, the specifications did not require that the certified design drawings from the manufacturer state that the motors are capable of starting an accelerating load at 80% voltage applied nor did they require that conformance with the torque values be confirmed on the approved outline drawings from the motor
manufacturers, b.
The manufacturers outline. drawings were.found not to contain ( the_ aforementioned statements for the applied voltage and/or , the breakdown torque values.
The inspector asked if there were any additional documents, which were supplied by the' motor manufacturers, to indicate that these motors comply with the 80% voltage and/or the breakdown torque values. The in- , spector could not be provided with any information that assured / l ' indicated that the above motors were capable of starting an accelerated load at 80% voltage applied or capable of developing l the breakdown torque values which were.specified in the S&L specifications.
i This. condition is contrary to 10 CFR,50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Wm.Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 FSAR Chapter 17, ' ' Paragraph 17.1.7.6; Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 FSAR Question 221.94(8.3.1.1), answers 1 and 2 and Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Quality Assurance Manual Section 7, Paragraph 7.7.
This is an item of noncompliance identified in Appendix A of the report transmittal letter.
(358/78-16-04) 3.
Independence of Redundant Systems On August 3, 1978, the inspector observed that two valves . identified as CV035 and CV036, located in the Reactor' Building South West near the RCIC pump at approximately elevation 475', J had two cables leading to indicator devices on the valves which appeared to have redundant functions. The two cables that supplied the apparent redundant devices were identified j ' as RI214 (with a blue marker denoting electrical division 1B) and RI218 (with a yellow marker denoting electrical division 1A).
The cables were. routed through flexible' conduit at their , - 10 - l , . -. ... .... _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _. -..... _ _ _. ~. _. _ _. _. _. _.,. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ . . J
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' . - respective terminating points and were located within "3" inches of each other The inspector informed the CG&E Quality Assurance Electrical representative that this conditon was contrary to Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 FSAR Chapter 8, Paragraph 8.3.1.11.2.4, which states, in part: " Conduit, both rigid and flexible, has the following separation requirements for the three ESF divisions: where conduits of different divisions run in prox-imity to each other, but contain cables whose function is not redundant, the minimum separation is 1 inch. Otherwise, the 3-foot by 5-foot rule is used."
The inspector was informed that S&L specification H-2173 supplement 5, May 25, 1978, Paragraph d.1 is.the governing document and that it only requires a 1 inch clearance between conduits which contain cables whose functions are redundant.
On August 4, 1978, the inspector was informed by the CG&E Quality Assurance Electrical representative and the S&L Project Electrical Engineer for Zimmer, with no reservations, that S&L has recently conducted fire tests involving conduits containing cables. Further, results of these tests have proven that redundant circuits contained within conduits are adequately protected from internal fire with only 1 inch clearance between the conduits. The S&L Project Electrical Engineer stated that a proposed revision to the Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Unit 1 FSAR Chapter 8, Paragraph 8.3.1.11.2.4, to account for this deviation from the current requirements has not been submitted to NRR.
This condition is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III; Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Quality Assurance Manual Section 3,' Paragraph 3.3.1;-and Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station
Unit 1 FSAR Chapter 8 Paragraph 8.3.1.11.2.4.
This is an item of noncompliance identified in Appendix A of the report transmittal letter.
(358/78-16-05) 4.
Qualification and Training of Inspection and Test Personnel , The inspector reviewed the procedures and/or records for four site organizations and observed that two of the organizations had failed to prescribe, in written instructions or procedures, how they' intend to comply with ANSI N45.2.6-1973.
a.
The CG&E Electrical Operating and Test Department (E0TD) has not specified, on test personnels' certifications, the effec-tive period of the certification. Also, there were no pro-cedures or instructions requiring that test personnel have - 11 - , , e -- r,, ,-- - -,w , r- . a -- e.-n,---,- ,e,--n- .,.,--,,--.-,-.-,.-s-,.wn,-,-. , - -,,.. - - - _....,-,-n .-e.. - - - - -, --.-,,,,.._.,-..,,..n, ,,
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. e ! . physical exam'inations, to include visual acuity or color vision, (ref. ANSI N45.2.6-1973 Sections 2.2.4(5) and'3.2.1).
I The inspector observed that EOTD test personnel have been testing Class 1E electrical equipment and circuits.
, b.
The contractor (Waldinger/ Young and Bertke) responsible for' installation and inspection of safety-related HVAC supports and systems, has failed to prescribe in written instructions or procedures how they will comply with ANSI N45.2.6-1973 . Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5.
These sec'tions address: general requirements, qualifications, performance and records, The inspector observed that documentation for the inspection / c.
test personnel for the above two organizations indicates f ' that training / qualification requirements have been established.
The inspector discussed this matter with CC&E Quality' Assurance personnel who assured him that all site organizations will be evaluated to assure full compliance with ANSI N45.2.6-1973.
l This condition is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V; ! Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 FSAR Appendix C (dated February 1976) which commits to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.58 Revision 0, and therefore, ANSI N45.2.6-1973, Section 1.3; and Wm Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 FSAR Chapter 17, Paragraph 17.1.5.1.
This is an item of noncompliance identified in Appendix A of the report transmittal letter.
(358/78-16-06) l ! l l
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. . i . Section III Prepared by J. Hughes Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief ' Engineering Support Section 1 1.
Instrumentation - Observation of Work Activities The RIII inspector observed several work areas and activities.
Including small bore pipe hangers (instrumentation sensing lines) and terminations of cables. Results are as follows: Seismic Class 1 hanger supports were found to be installed in a.
accordance with S&L specification H-2256 and drawings; l (1) Low Pressure. Core Spray System, hanger No. 1NX2428 HG, ISK drawing M471-3-LP-45 Revision 7 and hanger detail drawing INX2428 HG.
(2) Low Pressure Core Spray System, hanger Nos. 1NX2430 HG and.1NX 2552 HG, ISK drawing M471-3-46 Revision 4 and hanger detail drawings 1NX2430 H and 1NX2552 HG.
(3) Residual Heat Removal System, hanger No. INX2522 HG ISK drawing M471-3-RH-56 Revision 5 and hanger detail drawing 1NX 2522 HG.
b.
Terminations at 1PM075 control panel (MSIV Leakage Division 1)' were being properly terminated, i.e., proper lugs used, calibrated crimping tools used, minimum bending radius was not exceeded, cable identification tags were installed, and separ-ation criteria inside control panels, e.g., 6" to 12" were being maintained. Cables included: VY057, VC062 and LC060.
Drawings in use were E-1870 Revision H, E-1858 Revision M
! and E-2650 Revision B which were current revisions.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
l 2.
Instrumentation - Review of Quality Records l The RIII inspector reviewed cable termination records. The l a.
following was determined: i
(1) Termination drawings were the current revisions; l - 13 - . _. _. . . . - .. .. . -. ... . ,.. _.. - _ -... _...._. _... _.-. - _. - - _ -
' . . (2) Calibration records for crimping tools were up to date; (3) Correct materials were being used, b.
Termination inspection records (CIP) included provisions as evidenced by KEI QA stamp, to verify that: (1) Current drawing revisions are used; (2) Component name and location; (3) Cable number and number of conductors; (4) Crimping tool calibrated and number of tool used; (5) Stripping of cable and proper lug being used; (6) Separation and bundles secured properly; (7) Cable color codes correct; (8) Inspector stamp and date of inspection.
c.
Records and other documents reviewed include: (1) Cables Terminated (Cable Number) VYO57 VX073 VX077 LC060 VX075 VX078 VC062 VX113 VX085 (2) Construction Inspection Plans CIP/IPLB8J CIP/1PLB7J CIP/ LPM 07J CIP/IPL92J No items of noncompliance were identified.
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3.
Other Areas Inspected The inspector reviewed seismic analysis and environmental test results pertaining to the Electrical Penetration Assemblies per S&L specification H-2167.
The following were determined: Conax seismic analysis test report IPS-lll Revision A dated a.
March 2, 1977 states in part, " analysis for the penetration assemblies (canister) and feed through sub assemblies. .. - 14 - .. . . . ... . -. . .. -
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, . . . within the allowable stress criteria for the operating basis and design basis earthquakes.
Therefore it may be concluded that the Conax penetration assemblies analyzed are capable of withstanding the seismic loadings imposed for the operating basis and design basis earthquakes in accordance with S&L Engineers specification H-2167 (January 1, 1977) for reactor containment structure, electrical penetration assemblies."
b.
Conax environmental test report IPS-112 Revision A dated March 2, 1977, qualification report for electrical penetration assemblies included the following: (1) Continuous Current Test; (2) Shorttime Overload Test; (3) Fault Current Test; ' (4) Impulse Dielectric Test; (5) Accident Environment Test, Conax Report IPS-234, special 340 F. environmental penetration test (for BWR environ-ment); (6) Temperature profile and chemical spray chart; (7) Radiation Test 1 x 10 rads.
c.
During inspection inside the primary containment, a service air line located at elevation 523' was observed running per-pendicular to and approximately 4' above the safety-related instrument lines. The inspector expressed concern relative to the installation of the service air line in such close proximity to the safety-related instrument lines, in that failure of the line may adversly affect the performance of the instruments.
The licensee stated that this type of installation will be evaluated by their A-E on a generic basis. This matter is unresolved.
(358/78-16-07) No items of noncompliance were identified.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section I, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Section III, Paragraph 3.
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Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in the , ' Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 4, 1978. The inspectors summarized the scope and find-ings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the information.
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