IR 05000322/1989007
| ML20005G244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1990 |
| From: | Doerflein L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005G243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-89-07, 50-322-89-7, NUDOCS 9001180326 | |
| Download: ML20005G244 (15) | |
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'O. S SUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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REGION I
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.. Report No.
50-322/89-07
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= Docket'No..
50-322-1
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. License No.
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Licensee:.
~ Long Island Lighting Company
_l P. 0. Box 618
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Shoreham Nuclear Power Station:
-Wading River, New; York '11792.
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= Facility lName:.Shoreham Nuclear: Power Station'
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-Inspection At:L.Shoreham, New York'
' Dates:
-August 29, 1989 - November 9 - 1989
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- Reportin' g :
. Inspector:
F..J. Crescenzo, Senior Resident Inspector-(Approvedby:
/ (MLs
1-L. T.:Doerflein,J:hief, Reactor Projects Section 2B
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Inspection Summary:-8/29/89 - 11/09/89:(Report 50-322/89-07)-
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. Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of operations, maintenance,-surveillance,
= committee: activities-and license conditions ~. :One hundred and eighty hours of
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. direct--inspection effort were expended.
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'Results: A non-cited violation was observed in the area of containment leak
- rate: testing.~ The licensee's decision to defer leak rate testing resulted in
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- multiple instances (22)-where primary containment penetrations exceeded the 2 year 11nterval for type B and C tests prescribed by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J..The i
licensee) continued' developing plans to preserve facility systems and reduce workloads.
Planned staffing cuts at the facility have diminished although
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,l personnel continue. to leave voluntarily.
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9001180326 900105 PDR ADOCK 05000322 Q
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- TABLE'0F CONTENTS a
- PAGE-M 1.0-
. Facility Activities...........................................
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~ 2.0! Declaration'of[ Unusual Event........
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I 3.0.DieseliGenerator Fire...............................-...........
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4.0 -Diesel Fuel 011 Problem........................................
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. 5.0 P re s e rva t i on. Ac t i v i t i e s...... -...................................
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Staffing.'.......................................................
7.0 DeferralDof' Containment Leak Rate Testing.......................
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- 7.1 1 Background..............................................
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- 7'2 Containment. Leak Testing Requirements..................
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~'indings...............................................
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- 8.0 Management; Meetings...'.........................................
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.~ Attachment -IL List of Primary: Containment-Penetrations Requiring Leak Rate -
l Testing through December 1989.
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i DETAILS l
1.0 Facility Activities:
The facility remained shutdown throughout the inspection period with all fuel in the spent fuel pool.
The licensee devoted most of its technical efforts on developing the System Layup Implementation
' Packages (SLIP) ' Only two of' these have been approved; none have been i
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. fully implemented. :The licensee completed blowdown and "dryout" of r
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the core spray system.
An Unusual. Event was declared on October 16,
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- 1989 based on indications of equipment tampering. A minor fire caused j
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extensive localized-damage to an onsite diesel generator (not a safety q
related system). The licensee experienced diesel fuel oil problems
throughout the period.
The licensee ~ improperly implemented deferral
- of; primary containment leak rate testing which resulted in multiple
' examples of a violation of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J frequency requirements.
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2.0 - Declaration of Unusual' Ever.t l
On October 16,' 1989 an Unusual Event was declared based on indications
~ f unauthor'ized tampering with the fire protection system.
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A' fire. protection-water deluge system actuation was received at 8:46 a.m.
Field-investigation found no fire and attributed the actuation to un-authorized manual triggering of the local actuator. The actuator is
' located-at the 13 foot level of the reactor building. The design and location of the actuator station-are such that accidental actuation is highlyfunlikely.
In the process of securing-the system, operators noted gross leakage from'a hose station on the 75 foot level in the Reactor Building.
. Based on these indications'and in accordance with event classification instructions of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 1-0, Event Category 13, " Security Threats," the Watch Engineer classified the event as'" attempted sabotage" and declared an Unusual Event (UE). The UE was declared at 9:35 a.m.
EPIP 1-1, " Notification of Unusual Event," and other subordinate procedures were executed by the onsite emergency response
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The onsite security force responded per SP-00.021.01 " Security Alert,"
(Safeguards Information). The inspector verified that required actions of this procedure were properly implemente ys f
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'No other abnormalities were noted by the licensee.-The operations
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< LJf department promptly reset and secured the deluge system. The fire
- hose station leak was found to be caused by a failed gasket, not-tampering. The deluge sprinklers doused a vertical cable trsy in the Reactor Building.. No equipment damage was noted as a result of the actuation. No equipment or' systems required to be operable were threatened by:the water deluge. The water. released during actuation from both the sprinkler and the leaky hose station caused minor flooding.in the Reactor Building lower level.
The floor drain system adequately handled the water.
The water in the deluge system is not
radioactive nor is it considered potentially radioactive. No onsite spread of -adioactive_ contamination was anticipated and none occurred.
Based on:the above actions and conclusions, the Unusual Event was declassified at 10:25 a.m.
The licensee conduc kd a detailed inspection of equipment in the Reactor Building to identify components which had been wetted by the water.. None of the components were damaged and any wetting was minor.
'The inspector observed activities in the control room during the event.. The participants adequately followed Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
Required notifications were accomplished withinLprescribed time limitations. The State of New York and Suffolk County were contacted via commercial phone line following their failure-to answer-the Radiological Emergency' Communications System (RECS).
Effective training of the onsite control room participants was evident by the smooth flow of information and effective supervision.
.The inspector noted that the Control Room staff acted appropriately-to classify the event per the EPIP. However, the limited number of emergency
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action levels'in the procedure led the operators to classify the incident as " attempted sabotage." The inspector discussed with the licensee the need for a revised classification to evaluate events such as this as something less than " attempted sabotage." " Attempted sabotage" implies a more serious: threat to systems required to maintain fuel integrity and radiological safety. At no time during this event was there any degrad-ation in, or threat to, the fuel integrity or radiological boundaries.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments and is considering whether to change the classification.
The licensee is continuing an investigation into the cause for this m
event. The inspector had no further questions at this tim g P
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. S.0_-Diesel Generator Fire I
On September 27, 1989,.an electrical fire occurreo in a local control
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panel ~ for the 402 Electro Motive Division (EMD) diesel. The fire was confined to the panel and was extinguished shortly after discovery.
T-The-affected panel was gutted by the fire. The panel contains
apparatus common for the other three EMD diesels and as a result,
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these machines were disabled.
The EMD diesels are individually housed in railcar. skid structures-located in the protected area but not in or near an safety related structures or components. The EMDs are not safety ated or
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~important-to safety.
The EMDs were brought onsite u temporary" auxiliary power sources to support initial fuel load scensing, This was to-compensate-for the gross failures found during pre-operational testing of the Trans-American-Delaval (TDI) diesels which were to be the standby AC sources. The TDI problems were subsequently resolved and all requirements for the EMD's were omitted from the low power and-subsequent full power licenses.
The licensee elected to keep the EMD's onsite and periodically uses them for system grid voltage-peaking.
l The 401 and 402 had been running (loaded) as part of a vibration measurement's test.
The equipment. operator (EO) was experiencing
. difficulty in startup of the 404 machine when he noted white smoke billowing from the 402 generator.. The Watch Supervisor (WS) was in the area and he directed the E0 to trip the machine, (the output breaker l
l auto tripped).
The WS' discharged portable CO2 extinguishers at the fire. This was immediately effective but after a rekindling, the site fire brigade was assembled and the fire was successfully extinguished within 10 minutes.
The fire began, and was confined to, a control panel located within the EMD 402 railcar skid housing. The panel was
' destroyed. The motor and generator were unaffected and no fuel oil was involved in the fire. The affected panel contains common circuitry for certain controls of the other three machines. All four
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machines were thus disabled by the fire, p
The licensee has not conclusively determined the cause for the fire.
It is believed that a faulted fuse assembly created a phase to phase
L short and started the fire.
This cannot be confirmed due to the L
extensive damage caused by the fire.
The licensee-had been contemplating moving the four diesels to another location. Partly for this reason, repair of the 402 has been deferred. Recently, the license completed repairs to allow operation of the other three machines.
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-The inspector found_the licensee's actions adequate. The fire was promptly extinguished.-
There were no challenges to safety related L
structures or components. Although the root cause investigation-and repairs have been slow, there are no license requirements or nuclear safety reasons.to justify such prompt actions. The inspector had no further questions.-
4.0 Diesel Fuel Oil Problems The licensee has ' experienced diesel fuel oil problems. The problems have been manifested in failed fuel oil sample analysis.
The problem has been complicated by numerous analysis inconsistencies.
- There are ten diesel and two gas-turbine generators at Shoreham.
These include three TDIs (standby AC source required by Technical Specifications), the four EMDs and three Colt Pielstik diesel generators.
Each of the TDI and Colt machines have an-individual 7 day supply tank.. The four EMDs are supplied from a common tank which is not sampled and analyzed to the same specifications as'the TDI and Colt machines and has thus not failed any sample analysis,
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The TDI and Colt fuel oil tanks are fed from a one million gallon
. storage tank located outside the protected area.
This tank also supplies the two gas turbine generators and the EMDs. Bulk fuel deliveries from offsite _ vendors are made to this tank. A " ferry" tanker is then used to transfer-the oil to the TDI, Colt,-and EMD i
tanks.
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A quarterly sample of tank 132A (7 day supply for EDG-101, TDI) was f
obtained=on August 10, 1989. The analysis was performed by the licensee's qualified contractor Saybolt. The analysis failed oxidation stability, one of the parameters analyzed.
EDC-101 was declared inoperable and a
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confirmatory sample -was obtained. This sample also failed analysis, but-
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results varied widely prompting the licensee to obtain a third, large batch i
E sample. This sample was split, half sent to Saybolt and the other to an l
unqualified analysis contractor, Caleb Brett for confirmation. The sample i>
sent to:-Saybolt passed the analysis and the split sent to Caleb Brett L-failed.
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W Subsequent to this, the licensee obtained, at various times, samples from the remaining five diesel tanks, the ferry tanker, and the
.million gallon tank. All tanks, except the ferry tanker, have failed
- one or more of the analyzed parameters. Confirmatory samples analyzed
. by the normal and alternate contractors have provided inconsistent D
results similar to those described above.
In addition, other parameters such as cloud point, water and sediment, and "Dupont l-Stability" (a confirmatory analysis designed to provide similar data as oxidation' stability), have variously failed the analysis in one or more of the tanks but in no apparently consistent patter pyc.
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, The licensee. initially suspected sampling or analysis errors. The licensee-
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-ha'd its Quality Control' Inspectors monitor the most recent samples and its
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chemistry _ technicians observed the analysis at the contractor's facility, S
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' discrepancies were noted, j
Also, an annual audit was conducted of.the Saybolt contractor. No
.The licensee has concluded that the oil is defective but has not
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t determined a root cause.
The three tanks were cleaned and tested last spring and it is possible that residual cleaning solvents may be j
affecting the samples. The oil vendor has stated that some of his
suppliers have. started using a new refining process which may affect
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ability of the oil'to conform with the analysis over time. Also, the-licensee recently added a. biocide.-agent to the oil which mignt affect
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,The licensee has declared the three TDI machines inoperable until the
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problem is resulved. The licensee has been frustrated in resolving-the' problem because of the sample inconsistencies. These problems
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have not been seen at Shoreham before this summer although the
. sampling procedures' and analysis contractor have been the same for several; years.
The licensee is reluctant to replace the oil until the source of the. problem has been identified and resolved. The inspector noted that although the TDI machines are. inoperable per Technical
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Specifications, they are still capable of operating and all-three are in
.the standby mode at this time.
The licensee has consulted with a contractor who claims to'be capable e
of " cleaning" the oil through use of a special filter apparatus. The
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licensee. is also considering replacing the oil altogether. The inspector
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concluded that-the licensee's actions to investigate this matter have been
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conservative and are consistent with license requirements, p
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15.0 Preservation Activities The licensee has continued with its plans to layup or preserve i
systems. A more detailed description of these plans is provided in Inspection Report 50-322/89-91. Progress has continued in development of System Layup Packages.
To date only two of these have been approved by the Review of Operations Committee (ROC).
These were later sent back to the Operations Engineering Group for more work of an administrative nature and were not implemented.
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b" Preparation work continues for other system packages and it appears
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that this activity is!somewhat behind: schedule.
It is likely that a
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. number of packages will be approved and implemented close to the
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The licensee :has completed procedures to drain and _ blow down the Core
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. Spray System. This was not accomplished according to a SLIP package instruction, but rather a new procedure generated specifically to accomplish the blowdowns. The licensee is testing the blowdown and y
air dryout process to determine its. feasibility for other systems.
The inspector observed selected-portions of the drain, blowdown, and
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, d ryout.: -The system was initially drained, then an air header was attached and residual water blown out Air was allowed to continue
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purging ~the-' system _for-several. days, and humidity samples were
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obtained from.the exhaust points. -A temporary, high-volume compressor was leased and brought on-site to accomplish these. activities. The c-licensee has recently decided to purchase two of these machines for permanent use.
It is-L.nticipated that they will be available for use in-December, a
The' licensee has noted minor leakage from the suppression pool past the Core Spray isolation valves into the drained piping.
It is
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presumed that this will frustrate plans to maintain low humidity in-the drained systems.
The licensee is considering whether to drain the pool and.is evaluating whether this is allowable under current license and procedural restrictions. This appears to be a major reason for
' delay'in' implementation of the SLIP program.
The i_nspector found 'the above act-ivities were adequately performed in accordance with approved station procedures. The inspector made no judgement as to-the effectiveness of the "dryout" or blowdowns as these relate to system preservation.
6.0 ' Staffing-
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Staffing levels have remained stable although several key personnel recently resigned. These include the Plant Manager, Operations Engineering Manager and three Operations Engineers.
This group has been responsible for developing the layup program.
The licensee has assigned these functions to contractors. The Instrument and Controls Engineer and Computer Engineer have also announced their intentions to resign from LILCO.
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-The licensee has' had to cut the number of control room operating shifts from six-to five. Also, the licensee is hiring more Equipment Operators (EO) to account for recent attrition. An EO qualification class.is planned for the near future. Overtime usage for on-shift
personnel was heavy but decreased'to normal following the cutback to a
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five shift rotation.
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7.0 Deferral-of Containment Leak Rate Testing g
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7.1 ' Background
As.part of the-" minimum posture" development process, the licensee I
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considered whether to defer containment leakage testing. These l
considerations began during the summer 1989.
Various options'were
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considered.- These were: continuance of the program; deferral of the program with and without notification of the NRC; and deferral j
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,following an application for, and receipt of, an exemption to the frequency ~ requirements of Appendix J.
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'In early September, the licensee discussed the various options with i
the Senior Resident Inspector.
The inspector concluded that there
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appeared to be an adequate technical basis for deferral, but the i
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licensee should formally notify the NRC of its decision to defer either through a' letter of intent or through an exemption request.
On or about October 1, 1989, the licensee decided to defer containment i
. leakage testing. On October 3, 1989 penetration X-22A (type B)
.l exceeded its 24 month testing interval.
Subsequently, a number of other type B and C penetrations came due and also exceeded the 24 month intervals. A-licensee generated listing of penetrations and due. dates through the end of December is displayed in Attachment I to-this report. The type A test (Integrated Leak Rate Test) is still (
within the required test interval.
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As indicated on Attachment 1, a total of 22 penetrations exceeded their Appendix J required due date during this inspection period.
When reviewing Attachment l'it should be noted that penetrations X-27, X-28, and X-29 are required to be tested semiannually per H
Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.8.
This is in addition to the 24 month test requirement of Appendix J.
These are listed as overdue
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because the semiannual test was deferred. The penetrations are current for the-24 month requirements. The personnel hatch is also
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R-tested semiannually per specification 3/4.6.1.3 and is overdue
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L because of deferral of this test.
In both instances, deferral of i
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semiannual testing during periods when containment is not required is
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, allowed by the Technical Specifications.and by Appendix J.
Also it should be noted there are a number of " spare" penetrations. Typically,
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seal on)the primary containment side of the pipe and a test port on
,6 the. secondary containment side. Technically, these penetrations do.
not fallLunder_the classification of components subject to type B orL 0 testing as defined in Appendix J.. Despite' the hybrid nature of (
" spare" penetrations, the licensee has always subjected the spares to p'
24 month leak rate testing.at-test pressure Pa.
On October 17.and 19, 1989, the new Plant Manager met with regional
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and NRR managers, respectively. The meetings were held at the licensee's request to allow the new Plant Manager to introduce himself_and to provide anz update on activities at the site.
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.these discussions, LILCo informed the Region and NRR of the decision-i to defer' Appendix J testing. NRR informed the licensee that an H
exemption request would be required to allow the deferral.
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In a LILCo (W. E. Stieger, Jr.) letter SNRC-1644 to NRC (Document.
Control' Desk), dated November 3, 1989, the licensee stated its
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. intent' ion to defer '10 CFR 50, Appendix J containment leakage
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-testing.at Shoreham.
The letter justified the deferral by arguing that the rational.for Appendix J testing was not applicable when no
. fuel-was in the primary containment or when_ primary containment is
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.not required to be operable by the Technical Specifications.
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licensee.also committed to performing any deferred testing prior to
- resuming operations. requiring primary containment.
7.2 Containment Leak Rate Testing Requirements o
Requirements for primary containment leak rate testing at Shoreham are provided in 10 CFR 50 and in the plant's Technical Specifications.10 CFR 50.54, " Conditions of Licenses," states:
"Whether stated therein or not, the following shall be deemed conditions in every license issued:"
l Included in these conditions is 10 CFR 50.54 (o) which states:
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" Primary reactor containments for water cooled power reactors shall be subject to the requirements set forth in Appendix J to this part."
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- 10; CFR 50^, Appendix J, III.D 2. " Periodic Retest Schedule," " Type m
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B' tests" states:-
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" Type B tests,-except tests-for air locks, shall be-
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k performed during reactor shutdown for refueling, or other.
- i convenient intervals, but in= no case at intervals greater than 2' years."
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pI 10 CFR 50,- Appendix'J, III.D.3 " Periodic.Retert Schedule," " Type
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C Tests" states:
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" Type C. tests shall be performed during each reactor shutdown.for refueling but in no: case at intervals greater
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than 2 years".
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Shoreham Technical Specifications section 3/4.6.1.2 for
. containment leakage testing reflect _the requirements of 10 CFR 50
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LAppendix J with certain subtle but substantial differences.
. Specification 4.6.1.2 implements Appendix J testing and requires
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. testing of. Type B'and C penetrations at intervals "no greater
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than 24 months...".
The Limiting. Condition.for Operation (LCO)
for containmentLleakage 3.6.1.2 is applicable when primary
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con' tai'nment'is-required to be operable which is in operational conditions 1, 2, and 3.
Primary containment is therefore not req'uired to be. operable-in Shoreham's current defueled mode.
Also, the primary containment has been inoperable since June 20,
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1989 due.to,:among other things, the expiration of the full l
volume test on the personnel hatch.
Lastly, there are no plans
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' circumstances are allowable per the Technical Specifications.
Application of specifications 4.0.1 and/or '4.0.3 could support a conclusion that surveillance requirements of specification
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4.6.1.2.need not be conducted when the primary containment is not
- required to be operable or is in fact inoperable.
Therefore, consideration of Technical Specifications alone, (i.e.. absent consideration of 10 CFR Apperdix J), would support a reasonable l=
conclusion that containment leak rate testing could be deferred at Shoreham.
However, NUREG-0420, " Safety Evaluation Report," for i
Shoreham does not address or otherwise recognize an exemption from the 2 year interval requirements of Appendix J.
Therefore, the licensee is obligated to comply with the interval requirements of
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Appendix J notwithstanding any contrary interpretations of the Technical Specifications. Variance from interval requirements of Appendix J would require NRC approval prior to implementation.
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cN 7.3 ' Findings:
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The deferral of Appendix J testing has resulted in numerous
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instances where~pr.imary containment. type B.and C penetrations have exceeded the maximum 2 year test intervals specified in 10 CFR 50
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Appendix J.
'A complete listing of the penetrations and their due
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dates.is displayed in Attachment 1.
This istan apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J frequency requirements with multiple examples
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s ta tus.' Also, the licensee initiated corrective action to perform the Appendix J. testing.
Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 2-Appendix-C,-Section V.A. a notice of violation will not be issued.
The. inspector;found'the the licensee's submittal in SNRC-1644 to-
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'be inadequate.
SNRC-1644 provides a basis to support an NRC
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m exemption:from the requirements of. Appendix J;. however, it does not request an exemption. The licensee acted improperly in. choosing to implement; deferral prior to obtaining an NRC granted exemption from theLapplicable regulations.
s The. inspector found no elements of willful or intentional actions to' violate NRC requirements on the part of the site management.
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The licensee was forthcoming with the NRC and acted in apparent good faith to comply with NRC requirements.
This was evidenced by the licensee's discussions with the resident inspector and with q
the Regional and NRR management. Deferral of testing was supported
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by reasonable arguments although these resulted in premature
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Limplementation. The Technical Specifications are ambiguous in this area-and may conflict with Appendix J.
- There is no apparent impact of any safety significance resulting from the penetrations exceeding the test intervals. There is no requirement or basis for operability of primary containment in
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the current defueled mode. The licensee has opted to leave the primary containment open to the secondary containment for ease of atmosphere sampling requirements. There is no fuel or significant
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levels of: contamination in the primary containment.
Also, there is no apparent impact on plant preservation resulting from deferral of the testing. There is no basis to conclude or suspect that deferral would contribute to increased degradation of. leakage boundaries.
-urther, Appendix J does not require immediate repair of failed penetrations and thus would allow the licensee to defer repairs until power operations were resumed.
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In' summary, the inspector found the licensee acted improperly in
choosing to defer Appendix J testing prior-to getting an exemption
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from the'NRC. However,-for the reasons stated above, the safety l
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l significance of this violation is minimal.
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8.0 Management Meetings
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- Periodic meetings were held with station management to discuss
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. inspection findings during the inspection period. A summary of findings was also discussed at the conclusion of the. inspection. No
proprietary information was covered within the scope of the inspection. No written material was given to the licensee during the
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inspection period.
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ATTACH E
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sovembek7,1989.
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' Following is' a liet of LLRT related primary containment penetrations that have exceeded their extension datos or will exceed thair extension dates by December 31. 1989:
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PENETRATION VALVE NUMBERS LEAX RATE (ecfd) DATE LAST TESTED EXTENSION DATE l
~ Personnel liatch
.(Full Volume).
156.24 02/23/89 06/20/89
!
X-27 IT46*A0V-039A'
19.68 12/09/88
'07/27/89 X-27-1746*A0V-039B 19.68 12/09/88 07/27/89
X-28 IT46*A0V-038C 19.92 01/19/89 09/06/89 X-28.
IT46*A0V-038D 19.92 01/19/89 09/06/89
,
X-22A IP42*MOV-035-0.0 09/21/87 10/03/89 Elect. Penet.
'lT23*Z-WD2 0.0 09/29/87 10/11/89
.X-14..
SPARE 0.0 10/05/87 10/17/89 XS-26 SPARE.
0.0 10/05/87 10/17/89
- XS-28 SPARE.
0.0 10/05/87 10/17/89
,
X-34 SPARE 0.0 10/08/87 10/20/89 XS-2.
SPARE-0.0 10/08/87 10/20/89-XS-3-SPARE 0.0 10/09/87 10/21/89
.XS-11; SPARE 0.0 10/09/87 10/21/89-XS-12 SPARE 0.0 10/09/87 10/21/89 XS-13
- SPARE 0.0 10/09/87 10/21/89-XS-14-SPARE.
.
0.0 10/09/87 10/21/89 X-29 IT46*A0V-039C 0.0 03/10/89 10/26/89
.X.29-IT46*A0V-039D 0.0 03/10/89 10/26/89
"XS-1 :
SPARE-'
O.0 10/15/87 10/27/89 LXS-15 SPARE-0.0 10/15/87_
10/27/89 XS-17 SPARE 0.0 10/15/87 10/27/89
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X-35 V
SPARE 0.0 10/15/87 10/27/89 X-40
%.
SPARE 0.0 10/15/87 10/27/89
.i
^
=XS-25:
SPARE 0.0 10/16/87 10/28/89 X-42.
1E51*HOV-049 29.76 10/26/87 11/07/89 XS-30 IT48*0lV-0016B 8.16 10/27/87 11/08/89
'XS-30-IT48*SOV-131 5.28 10/27/87 11/08/89 XS-22 IT46*A0V-078A 19.68 10/27/87 11/09/89 XS-22 IT46*A0V-078B 2.472 11/10/87 11/22/89 XS-18 SPARE 0.0 10/30/87 11/11/89 XS-19 SPARE 0.0 10/30/87
!!/11/89 X-2A IB21*A0V-036A 2.472 11/05/87 11/17/89 Equip. Hatch (Full Volume)
147.6 05/19/89 11/18/89 i
X-2B IB21*18V-1103B 34.56 11/06/87 11/18/89 X-2B:
IB21*A0V-036B 9.84 12/02/87 12/14/89 XS-6 1G41*MOV-034A 0.0 11/16/87 11/28/89-XS-6 IC41*HOV-034B 6.48.
11/16/87 11/28/89 X-98 IEll*MOV-031B 0.0 11/17/87 11/29/89 X-9D IEll*MOV-031D 5.04 11/17/87 11/29/89 X-4 IG33*MOV-033 0.0 11/19/87 12/01/89 X-4 IG33*MOV-034 0.0 11/19/87 12/01/89 XS-16A IP50*02V-0603 0.0 11/21/87 12/03/89
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Page 2 of 2
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PENETRATION VALVE NUMBERS 1,EAX RATE (eefd) DATE 1.AST TESTED EXTENSION DATE
,
"[s XS-16A1
- IP50*02V-0601-0.0 11/21/87 12/03/89
.XF-ll 1831*01V-0002B-12.24:
11/21/87 12/03/89 1, _, _
- XF-11 1C11*0lv-10288 0.0 11/21/87 12/03/89 L
- JO X-21B'
- lE21*MOV-0318 0.0 11/24/67 12/06/89 j
~X-9C
. !E11*MOV-031C~
0.0
- 11/27/87-12/09/89
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' '-
~1 Ell *MOV-037A 32.16
. 11/28/87 12/10/89
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X-26 IT46*A0V-038A 0.0-04/25/89 12/11/89 j;
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X-26 IT46*A0V-0388 0.0
.X-20A lE21*MOV-033A 0.0
' 04/25/89 12/11/89
!
~
12/03/87 12/15/89 X-20A 1E21*A0V/MOV-081A-0.0~
12/03/87 12/15/89-X-19-1E51*MOV-032 0.0 12/04/87 12/16/89
.:
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X-18 IE51*02V-0025 0.0 12/08/87 12/20/89 X-18'
IE51*MOV-046 0.0 12/08/87 12/20/89
'I XS-7~
IT48*MOV-034B 0.0-12/09/87~
12/21/89 XS-7-IT48*MOV-040B 12.48 12/09/87 12/21/89
'XF-10
!cI1*01V-1028A 0.0 12/11/87-12/23/89
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- - LXF-10-IB31*0lv-0002A
.5.04 12/18/87 12/30/89 cb
=X-36
=lC41*02V-0008 6.24 12/14/87 12/26/89
^X-36 1041*02V-0010:
1.25 12/14/87
.B-3 1748*SOV-128A-0.0 12/16/87 _
12/26/89
12/28/89 l.,
B-3
- IT48*s0V-1288 0.0 12/16/87 12/28/89 X-10AL3
' 1 Ell *01V-0047 0.0 12/17/87 12/29/89
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X-10A-3 a-
- X-10B-4
. lE11*SOV-168-
.0.0.
12/17/87 12/29/89
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IEll*0!V-0048 0.0 12/17/87-12/29/89
'X-105-4 1E11*SOV-169 0.0
~ 12/17/87 12/29/89 u
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