IR 05000316/1990003
| ML20005F534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1990 |
| From: | Cooper R, Huber M, James Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005F524 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-316-90-03-EC, NUDOCS 9001160366 | |
| Download: ML20005F534 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0FNISSION l
REGION III
Report No. 50-316/90003(DRS)
i Docket No. 50-316-License No. DPR-74
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216
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Facility Name:
D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2
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Meeting At: Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois
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Meeting Conducted: January 4, 1990
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Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference Inspectors:
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@ mes N Smith Date d A,44
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Date
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//t/f0 Approved By:
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Richard T. Cooperi II, Chief Date /
Engineering Branch
Meeting Summary
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Meeting on January 4, 1990 (Report No. 50-316/90003(DRS))
Areas Discussed: Apparent violation of Technical Specifications for the failure.to ensure operability of the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and information pertinent to the catse, treatment, and corrective actions to prevent recurrence were discussed. The analysis of the significance was also discussed. Disposition of the apparent violation will be presented in subsequent communications.
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l DETAILS i
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Persons Contacted
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American Electric Power Service Company (AEPSC)
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M. P. Alexich, Vice President Nuclear Operations S. J. Brewer, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing J. E. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical, D. C. Cook
P. A. Barrett, Director, Quality Assurance J. R. Sampson, Operation Superintendent i
G. Costello, Administrative Compliance Coordinator, Operations R. G. Vasey, Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
S. K. Farlow. Instrumentation and Controls M. R. Michaelson, Engineer R. B. Bennett, Engineer, Nuclear Fuels / Analysis M. S. Ackerman, Engineer
J. R. Ripak, Senior Engineer
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
C. J. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator
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l-T. O. Martin, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety J. A. Grobe, Director of Enforcement
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R. W. Cooper, II, Chief. Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety l
J. G. Giitter, Project Manager, NRR l
D. H. Danielson,' Chief, Materials and Processes Section, Division of l
Reactor Safety B. L. Burgess, Chief Projects Section 2A, Division of Reactor Projects l
W. H. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator B. L. Jorgensen, Senior Resident Inspector, D. C. Cook
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2.
Enforcement Conference As a result of an apparent violation of NRC requirements, an Enfcreement Conference was held in the NRC Region III office on January 4, 1990. The preliminary findings which were the basis for this apparent violation of NRC requirements were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-316/89028(DRS) and were transmitted to the licensee by letter dated December 21, 1989. The attendees of this conference are noted in Paragraph 1 of this report.
The purposes of the conference were:
(1) to discuss the apparent violation, the significance, cause, and the licensee's corrective actions; (2) to determine whether there were any mitigating circumstances; and (3) to obtain other information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement action.
The NRC representatives identified the apparent violation and those deficiencies contributing to the apparent Technical Specification Violation.
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The identified apparent violation was a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, which states, in part:
"At least three Independent Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and associated flow paths shell be operable...". The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was considered inoperable from August 31, 1978 until November 10, 1989.
The deficiencies contributing to the apparent violation discussed by the
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NRC representatives included:
inadequate receipt inspection of process flow orifice plate (1978)
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inadequate corrective action for an identified discrepancy (1978)
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failure to identify cause of flow anomaly
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failure to prevent use of an inaccurate instrument in a
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safety-related application failure to identify inaccurate flow in process flow meter during I
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monthly pump operability testing The licensee reviewed the system description including the system function and actuation and the operation of the flow retention system.
Additionally, the licensee discussed the problem, the 1989 event, root cause analysis and the corrective and preventive actions, as well as the safety impact.
The licensee concluded that the TDAFP was inoperable for the period
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described in the apparent violation. Discussion of the process orifice
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(the orifice which resulted in the inability of flow retention to prevent run out of the TDAFP) included the finding of this condition in 1978 by the licensee and the failure to complete the investigation by measuring the questionable inside diameter of the orifice.
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Corrective actions reviewed by the licensee included:
I verification of test line flew indication for monthly operability
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testing.
reset of the process flow indication switches to properly initiate
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review of the other auxiliary feedwater pumps (on both Units) to l
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ensure acceptability.
future removal of the process flow orifice for examination.
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review of a sample of pre-1986 condition reports to verify
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I corrective actions identified were completed.
calculated that the flow from one pump would be enough to meet ECCS
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criteria.
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The licensee also indicated that the inoperability of the TDAFP did not
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represent a significant threat to public health and safety by presenting)
an analysis that:
(1) two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFP
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were available. (2) cross-tie with the other unit was possible, and (3) emergency operating procedures ensure operator attention.
It was also noted that the present corrective action system would ensure that identified discrepancies would be resolved due to a tracking system that
now exists.
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The evaluation and disposition of the apparent violation will be presented in subsequent communications.
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