IR 05000315/1992005
| ML17329A402 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1992 |
| From: | Harold J, Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17329A401 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-92-05, 50-315-92-5, 50-316-92-05, 50-316-92-5, NUDOCS 9203030248 | |
| Download: ML17329A402 (7) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No.
50-315/92005; No. 50-316/92005 Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Licenses No. DRP-58; No.
DRP-74 Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
D.
C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
February 4-7, 1992 Inspector:5pp.
F.
Date Approved By:
B. L.
g n, Chief Project Section 2A Date Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Februar 4-7 1992 Re orts No. 50-315 92005 No. 50-316 92005 Areas Ins ected:
An unannounced safety inspection of the licensee's program for reliable decay heat removal during outages (2515/113).
Results:
Based on a review of documentation and interviews with plant staff, it was determined that the procedures were adequate and well written, and a corporate assessment was thorough in identifying areas of potential vulnerability.
However, areas for improvement were identified.
Examples include the need for administrative controls for the unit operators to communicate and coordinate operation from separate control rooms of the spent fuel pool pumps or the power sources for the pumps. Also, a
procedure is needed to detail an alternate method for fillingthe spent fuel pool if the spent fuel pumps are unavailable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
920303024S 920221 PDP, ADOCK 05000315 PDR
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Indiana Michi an Power Com an IM
- A. Blind, Plant Manager
- K. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager L. Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager
- J. Sampson, Superintendent, Plant Operations
- B. Svensson, Executive Staff Assistant R. Rickman, Outage Manager
- R. Gillespie, Plant Scheduling
- M. Horvath, Quality Assurance
- L. Matthias, Administrative Superintendent G. Arent, Operations Procedure Supervisor American Electric Power Service Cor oration AEPSC
'J.
Sharp, Nuclear Safety and Licensing U. S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission NRC
- J. Isom, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Passehl, Resident Inspector
- E. Schweibinz,'enior Project Engineer
- Indicates those attending the exit meeting on February 7,
1992.
Other licensee personnel were contacted as a matter of routine during the inspection.
2.0 Reliable Deca Heat Removal Durin Outa es Ins ection The. purpose of this inspection was to assess the licensee's capability for ensuring reliable decay heat. removal during the upcoming refueling outage.
In order to evaluate the licensee's heat removal capability, the inspector reviewed nine OHPs (operations procedures),
two PMI's (plant manager instructions),
and enclosures to the January 15 letter from J.
B. Kingseed to S. J.
Brewer which provided details of an independent assessment by corporate engineering.
f
2.1 Review of 0 erations and Plant Mana er Procedures The inspector examined the operations, and plant managers procedures to determine if special test procedures and operations that have the potential for contributing significantly to a loss of capability to remove decay heat have been reviewed and approved.
Criteria included ensuring one offsite power source and one onsite power source are available to each required shutdown load when less than the full complement of power sources or switchgear are available.
The review also examined periods of increased vulnerability, to ensure they do not coincide with the minimal availability of electric power.
The following procedures were reviewed:
a.
PMI 4090 Revision
"Criteria for Conductin b.
Infre uentl Performed Tests or Evolutions" PMI 4070 Revision
"Criteria For 0 eratin at a Reduced Coolant S stem Inventor c ~
d.
1-OHP 4030 STP.037 Revision
"Refuelin Surveillance" 1-OHP 4023.016.001 Revision
"Loss of Com onent Coolin Water" e.
1-OHP 4023.020.001 Revision
"Loss of Non-Essential Service Water" 12-OHP 4024.134 Revision
"Annunciator 134 Res onse Fuel Pit" g.
12-OHP 4021.018.002 Revision
"Placin in Service and 0 eratin the S ent Fuel Pit Coolin and Cleanin
~sstem" h.
12-OHP 4030.STP.130N Revision-0
"North S ent Fuel Pit Pum Surveillance Test" i.
2-OHP 4022.017.001 Revision
"Loss of RHR While Partiall Drained or at Mid-Loo 1-OHP 4023.019.001 Revision
"Loss of Essential Service Water" k.
1-OHP 4030.STP.041 Revision
"Refuelin Inte rit
The procedures that were reviewed are adequate, well written, and thorough in identifying areas of potential vulnerability when components may by unavailable.
Protection when the fuel is in the reactor appeared to be ensured.
However, D.
C.
Cook normally defuels the entire core each refueling outage.
The net effect is moving the heat source from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool.
This configuration allows for potential vulnerabilities which have not been addressed in the assessments or procedures that were reviewed.
The procedures reviewed detailed residual heat removal (RHR) system requirements during reduced inventory operations.
However, the RHR system is not needed for reliable decay heat removal when the core is completely defueled.
Instead, the spent fuel pool cooling system is relied upon to provide a reliable source of decay heat removal.
The spent fuel pool and its associated pumps are therefore systems for which it is important to assure a
reliable power source and a method to maintain pool level or restore it if it is lost.
The two spent fuel pool pumps are powered from separate units.
Therefore, it is important to have proceduralized coordination between the two units to ensure the power'ource to the spent fuel pumps is not disturbed without the opposite unit operator's knowledge.
There is currently a
non-proceduralized agreement between the units to communicate, but during refueling operations, operators are in a non-standard mode of operation and may not communicate.
It was also noted that in the event level is lost in the spent fuel pool the only method, by procedure, to add water to the pool is via the spent fuel pool pump.. Shen plant personnel were interviewed as to alternate methods for refilling the pool, there were several different methods identified but none proceduralized.
If an event of this type were to occur, there is no guidance as to which approach is more feasible than another.
Therefore, a
procedure would enhance the ability to respond to this event in a manner that has been reviewed and approved.
3.0 Conclusion Based on the inspector's review of the procedures, it was determined that they adequately addressed areas of vulnerability that had been previously identified.
Areas of vulnerability that were not identified, such as the spent fuel pool and its associated pumps, were not addressed by procedures.
No operability concerns were noted during the inspectio ~
~
~
r 4.0 Exit Meetin The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 7,
1992.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the statements made with respect to the weaknesses identified and stated appropriate actions would be taken to resolve them.
The inspector asked the licensee whether any material that was reviewed or presented was proprietary.
The licensee indicated that none were proprietary.
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