IR 05000312/1976010
| ML19317G003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1976 |
| From: | Crews J, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317F995 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-76-10, NUDOCS 8002210704 | |
| Download: ML19317G003 (9) | |
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U. S. Mr 'IAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT dECIONV h
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IE Inspection Report No.
50-312/76-10 Licensee Sacramento Municipal Utility District Docket No.
50-312 License No. OPR-54 P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Priority Facility Rancho Seco Category C
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Clay Station, California Location PWR, B&W, 913 MWe (2772 MWt)
Type of Facility Routine, Unannounced Type of Inspection
Dates of Inspection Decomhar 11 1g. lo7c October 4-9, 1976 (Reactor Insp.)
Dates of Previous Inspection N
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Principal Inspector.-
Bate,
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R. T. Dodds, Reactor' Inspector None Accompanying Inspectors Date Date Other Accompanying Personnel: None
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. Reviewed by Date'
J.,. dreds, ' Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
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Sumary of Findings
^ Enforcement Action ilone
. Status of Previously Identified Enforcement Action It was verified that supervisory level operating personnel have been
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made aware of the requirements that a surveillance test must be com-plated prior to declaring tne system operable if the initial surveill-ance test was determined to be unsatisfactory as stated in the licen-see's response dated November 5,1976 and License Event Report No. 76-13.
(Itemclosed)
Nonroutine Events The circumstances and corrective actions described in Licensee Event Report Nos. 76-12, 14 and 15 were confirmed.
(Paragraph 2 of Details)
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Design Changes Not applicable Other Significant Findings Current Findings A.
The reactor was shutdown for a week in ilovember to replace a feedwater heater and repair a leaking core flood check valve.
Routine full power operation has been maintained since then except for an eight hour turbine shutdown to replace a rupture disc on the seal steam header and a couple of other short term power reductions due to secondary plant conditions that were promptly corrected.
B.
SMUD was not sent the Westinghouse bulletin on potential sericiencies on lower bearing locking devices on RHR pump drivers since they have horizontal rather than vertical motors.
(Re:
Potential Bearing Failures On Westinghouse Vertical Motors Used As RHR Pump Drivers.
Item closed)
C.
The licensee has checked all the serial numbers on their hydraulic snock and sway suppressors and determined that they do not have any of the Grinnell shock and sway suppressors referenced in IE Circular 76-05.
It was determined that they nad all of. this type of units on. site prior to November 1974, the date of the design change.
(Item closed)
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SMUD has completed the study of transformer tap settings and existing safety features bus undervoltage trip settings and de-termined them to be ideally set with regard to undervoltage operat-ing conditions. The installation of new overvoltage trip circuit on tne 4160 volt safety related buses to isolate the safety related buses from the system and provide the same identical diesel genera-tor starting and bus load shedding sequence as does the existing
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undervoltage trip sequence has been scheduled to be installed
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(Re: Letter, SMUD to NRR dated September 17, 1976.
Item' closed.) Equipment installation
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and testing followup will be performed during the refueling outage.
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E.
Examination of surveillance tests of the concentration of HaOH in the containment spray chemical addition tank disclosed that it has varied between 33 to 37% by weight. The technical specifications impose a lower limit of 32% but no upper limit. Licensee manage-ment has agreed to administratively impose in the surveillance etandard an upper limit of 40%. The temperature in the Auxiliary Building, which houses the addition tank, is not expected to ever g
be less than 70 F, which is well above the precipitation temperature at 40% solution.
(Re:
IE Headquarters request dated 10/22/76.
Item closed)
F.
The Control Room annunciators for the diesel generators do not have repeat capability for new alarmed conditions. As a result, infor-
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mation alarms can mask equipment availability alarms.
(Paragraph 6.b of Details)
Status of Previously Identified Unresolved Items and Other Items of Interest A.
The administrative procedures for surveillance tests now require an evaluation of previous test results when test equipment has been
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found to be out of calibration. (Item closed, IE Report No. 76-05)
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The-list of equipment components was being checked against the master preventive maintenance schedule and the schedule was being i
modified accordingly to assure that all Class I components will be periodically calibrated.
(Item closed, IE Report No. 76-08)
C.
The overall training program for all departments has been drafted
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and was under consideration by nianagement.
It was expected by the licensee that the proposed program will be implemented by June 1977. -(Item closed.
Implementation to be checked during annual
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review of licensee's training / retraining program.
IE Report No.
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1-76-08)
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dana'genen t ' Interview
.The results of the inspection were discussed with Messrs. Rodriguez,
.Schweiger.and other members of SMUD management. The following itens
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were specifically addressed and commitments made by licensee repre-sentatives as indicated.
A.
The overall training / retraining program for all departments will be formulated and implemented by June 1977.
(IE Report No. 76-08)
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B.
The alarm system for the emergency diesel generators will be examined and modified.to provide repeat annunciation capability in tne reactor control room such that information alarms do not mask out equipment malfunction alarms.
(Paragraph 6.b of Details)
C.
The records to be retained for surveillance tests will be examined and revised where necessary to include a record of returning the
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system to service following the test.
(Pargraph 4 of Details)
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O.
The circumstances associated with the utilization of thermocouple wire in the turbine generator prior to the dispositioning of an outstanding nonconforming report will be investigated and the material control program re-examined to better assure tnat non-conformances will be properly dispositioned in a timely manner.
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(Paragraph 3ofOetails)
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Details 1.
. Persons Contacted
~ R. Rodriguez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
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R. Columbo, Technical Assistant J. McCulligan, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Support
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F. Eisenhutt, Nuclear Engineering Assistant D. Yount, Electrical Foreman
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D. Cass, Hechanical Maintenance Foreman J. Price, Surveillance Scheduler N. Brock, Instr 0 ment and Control Engineer D. Whitney, Nuclear Engineer J. King, Shift Supervisor 0. Comstock. Shift Supervisor D. Zompetti, Control Operator V. Fletcher, Auxiliary Operator A. Fraser, Control Operator L. Adkins, Control Operator G. Sprung Instrument Technician D. Gardner, Senior Radiation Control Technician A. Buff, Engineering Aid F. Lopez, Warehouseman.
C. Lang, Macninist J. Neyman, Nuclear Engineer
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J. Dunn, Supervising Electrical Engineer 2.
Nonroutine Event Reports Licensee Event Report Nos. 76-12 (shutdown margin less than -l%
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delta k/k), 76-14 (failure of "B" diesel generator to start) and 76-15 (failure of emergency sump valves to open) were submitted since the previous inspection. Based on the examination of selec-tive~ facility records and discussions with licensee representatives, the following were verified; a.
Each event was investigated and the details reported to facility management.
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b.
Corrective action was taken as described in the event report to preclude recurrence.
c.
The events had been reviewed by the Plant Review Connittee and were scheduled for review by the Management Safety Review Committee.
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d.
Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, ai.d, except
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for LER 76-12, limiting conditions for operation did not
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appear to have been exceeded for tne subject events.
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procurement The purchase of components, materials and supplies used for safety
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related functions was examined by a review of the following pur-
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chases and discussions with licensee personne~..
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a.
Requisition No. RS8830-Boric Acid
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Requisition No. RS51695-Steam Generator Biowdown Line c.
Requisition No.- RS54940-QA Class 1 Wire
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The examination disclosed that (1) procurement specifications were being. properly approved and included quality control inspection and record requirements (2) the me.terials were obtained from an approved vendor or were qualified by onsite testing in the case of the boric acid, (3) documentary evidence was available onsite to support equipment and material conformance to procurement requirements, (4) the material had been inspected upon delivery, and (5) with tne exception of the " Class 1" wire, were properly handled in accordance with measures established for control and separation of conforrc'ng and nonconforming materials, parts and components.
In the case of tt.e wire, four types of wire had been ordered but documentation was initially missing attesting to wire and insula-tion characteristics, including open flame resistance. i r.erefore,
a nonconfonnance report was prepared (NCR-544) but was not satis-factorily dispositioned until after three types of the wire had
been used in their entirety and the system using the wire placed in
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service. The fourth was still on the loading dock awaiting the
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required documentation.
(It had come in separately from the other reels.) According to the electrical foreman, the wire had been used only for thermocouples in the main generator. This particular usage was not, therefore, safety related.
The-inspector observed that, while this was the case in this instance, the wire was ordered and handled as " Quality Class 1"
material and the potential existed for its use in Class 1 systems, Quality Assurance Procedure Nc. 8 requires in part that, "...the r
NCR must be cleared prior to putting the item in service." The licensee agreed to re-examine the mar.arial control program to better assure that nonconfonnances wi'l be properly dispositioned
.in a timely manner.
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Surveillance
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The surveillance test program implemented by the licensee in response to surveillance requirements of the technical specifi-cations was examined during the inspection. A review of selected
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that the program was consistent with the requirements of the
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i technical specifications.
It was noted that a record was made, but not being maintained as part of the permanent record, of returning'
a system to service following a surveillance test in one case.
Specific surveillance tests that were examined in detail included the following.
a.
207.02A Testing Following Opening of RCS b.
208.02 CRD Hechanism Exercising c.
210.03 Turbine Steam Stop Valves
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d.
205.06 Reactor Building Isolation
_ uarterly DHR System e.
203.05 Q
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201.08 Surveillance of Hydrogen Purge Systems g.
206.02 Diesel Generator SFAS Start Test
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206.04 125 Volt DC Systems Testing Portions of the following surveillance tests were witnessed to verify that the test procedures were being followed, calibrated O
equipment was being utilized and test prerequisites and acceptance criteria were met:
a.
200.10A (I.022) Boric Acid and Heat Tracing Thermocouples b.
208.02
- CRD Mechanism Exercising c.
203.05C'
DHR Pump Venting 5.
Surveillance of Core Power Distribution Limits
.The surveillance of core power distribution limits was inspected by a selective examination of surveillance data and discussions with the engineering staff. No anomalies were identified. Specific areas examined were as follows:
a.
Data analysis code-PDQ7 (modified for Rancho Seco computer per B&W instructions)
b.
Code calculation includes control rod position. core power level and burnup.
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c.
In-core detector intercalibration was being functionally checked monthly.
d.
Axial power imbalance was being maintained within technical specification and the licensee's administrative limits.
e.
Hot channel factors were being-calculated per the technical specifications and included uncertainty /per.alty factors.
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Apparent anomalies were being evaluated and dispositioned.
f.
No substantial quadrant powe tilts were observed in the data reviewed.
g.
Primary responsibility has been assigned for data analysis.
The analysis was being independently evaluated by knowledge-able engineers.
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Procedural changes to calculations had been reviewed and approved in accordance with Administrative Procedure Ho. 2.
6.
Plant Operations a.
Shift Loos and Operating Records perating logs and records were selectively examined for the s
period October 8, through December 15, 1976. Observations-from this examination were as follows:
(1) The log sheets were complete and contained appropriate
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signatures and initials of personnel responsible for log entries and log review.
(2). Abnormal conditions described in the logs contained sufficient information to communicate equipment or system status and results of corrective action taken.
(3) Spt:cial orders examined that were issued by the Assistant Superintendent, Plant Operations, did not conflict with the intent of the technical. specifications.
(4) The jumpers and bypass permits examined and issued in accordance with AP-26, " Abnormal Tag Procedure" did not contain bypassing discrepancies with technical speci-fication requirements.
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Site Tour (s)
Tours of the facility included the auxiliary building, turbine building, and control room. No signs of abnormal piping
. vibrations or fluid leaks were observed. Hangers, supports and shock and sway suppressors observed appeared operational.
Proper position of several decay heat removal system valves
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and their tagging was verified by direct observation.
Radiation controls had been established for the controlled areas included ir. the tours.
Tne instrumentation for monitoring reactor power level and coolant system conditions were verified to be operational.
Discussions were held with the control room operators regarding safety related annunciators which indicated an alarm condition.
Tney were knowledgeable as to the cause and significance of the apparent alarm conditions.
Control room manning was in conformance with the facility technical specifications.
It was observed that the control room annunciators for the diesel generators were both alarmed because of high levels in the diesel fuel day tanks.
Since these were not designed as repeat alarms, the inspector observed that other local alarms would not warn the operator in the control room of potential s'
equipment malfunctions. This subject was discussed in the Management Interview at the conclusion of the inspection.
7.
Independent Inspection Independent inspection activities included (1) examination of the administrative program for reportable occurrences and workers and supervisors-understanding of the program, (2) observing several shift changes (3) licensee's program, including instrumentation, for monitoring reactor temperature and pressure and (4) general discussions with plant personnel, i
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