IR 05000312/1973007
| ML19317G009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1974 |
| From: | Garvin L, Andrea Johnson, Spencer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317G005 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-73-07, 50-312-73-7, NUDOCS 8002210708 | |
| Download: ML19317G009 (8) | |
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IT. 3. ATCMIC ENERGY CO:2tISSluu
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DIFICTOP. ATE Of KEGUMTORY OPERATIONS
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REGION V
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RO Inspection Report No.
50-312/73'-07
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' Licensee: Sacramenco Municinal Utility District Docket No. 50-312 Sacramento, C'alifornia License No.(s) CPPR-56 Priority
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Facility: _ Rancho Seco t~ nit No. 1 Cst'egory B
location:
Clay Station, California
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Type of Facility:
Type of Itspection:
Routine. Unannounced
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Dates of Inspection:
November 26-28 and December 6, 1973
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Dates of Previous Inspection: _ october 16-18. 1973
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Principal Inspector:
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A. D. John on, Reactor Inspector
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Accompanying Inspectors:
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t. J g arv~in, neactor inspector
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Other Accompanying Personnel: None
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I G. S..Spendhr.. Chief, Reactor Construction' '
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Reviewed by,:
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(Date)
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and Operations _ Branch (
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Enforcement Action
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done Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items None Required
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Unusual Occurrences None Design Changes None Examined Other Significant Findings A.
The undervoltage coil in the control rod drive trip breakers have been replaced and satisfactorily tested.
However, the vendor's i
field change to modify the fuse circuitry had not yet been completed.
(RO Report No. 50-312/73-03, paragraph 4)
B.
The quality control instructions governing documentation of inspections to assure completion of co'nstruction of items prior to turnover to the startup group have been clarified.
(Paragraph 4 of Details)
i C.
The procedure for preoperational testing of the emergency core cooling system failed to include provisions to verify certain design aspects considered essential by Regulatory Operations.
(Paragraph 5 of Details)
D.
Cold hydrostatic testing of the reactor coolant system was satis-factorily completed on December 6 and 7, 1973.
(Paragraph 11 of Details)
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E.
Several thermocouple guide tubes were bent during. installation of tre reactor vessel closure head due to misalignment conditions.
-(Paragraph 12 of Details)
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F.
The control rod position indicating instrumentation was found to be
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drifting out of calibration.
(Paragraph 7 of Details)
_ Management Interview The inspectors met with the following personnel on November 28, 1973.
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District D. Raasch, Manager, Generation Engineering R. Rodriquez, Plant Superintendent J. Rilz, Resident Engineer R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
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L. Schwieger, QA Director J. Jewett, QA Engineer J. Sullivan, QA Engineer
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Bechtel W. Sciendfield, Project Manager W. Chapla, Project QA Engineer After a discussion of the scope and findings of the inspection, the licensee was requested to inform the indpectors within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the expected time that the primary system hydrotest would commence to enable the inspector to witness selected portions of the test.
In addition, the inspector indicated that the resolution of the setpoint drif t observed in the control rod drive position indicator circuitry will be examined during the next inspection.
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Concerning the inspector's findings related to the adequacy of testing
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planned for the emergency core cooling systems, the licensee representative stated that the areas of testing considered netassary by Regulatory Operations but not included in the present SMUD procedures will be evaluated and either included in the tests or justification for not including the items will be provided the inspector.
(Paragraph 5 of Details)
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' -3-REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Sacramento Municipal Utility District R. Oubre, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Nuclear Plant operations R. Colombo, Technical Assistant L. Kailman, Project Mechanical Engineer R. Dietrich, Nuclear Engineer D. Schoen, Assistant Plant Electrical Engineer i
S. Anderson, Assistant Nuclear Engineer 1. Dean, Instrument and Control Foreman
C. Lindquist, Instrument and Control Technician
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L. Schwieger, QA Director J..Jewatt, QA Engineer J. Sullivan, QA Engineer Bechtel
W. Chapla, Project QA Engineer A.,Stenersen, QA Engineer R. Andresen,.QA Engineer
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16. Graham, QA Clerk.
L. Blackburn, QA Clerk
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M. Jones, Instrumentation Inspector S. Tucker, Field Engineer R. Laines, Field Engineer
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Babcock & Willcox Company
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J. P. Kennedy, Site Operations Manager
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2.
Statu's of Preoperational Program From an examination of the-licensee's records and schedules the
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preoperational program was found to be essentially on schedule as updated during August 1973. The containment structural and leakage rate tests have been scheduled to be performed the first part of February 1974.
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Status of Construction The licensce's representative stated that the construction of the plant was 94% complete. He also added that the construction was
'on schedule.
4.
Action on Previous Items of Understanding The instructions controlling documentation of QC inspections of items prior to turnover from the construction to the startup group I
has been clarified. 'The instructions were found to clearly require documentation of the prescribed inspection on both the Constructica
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Inspection Data Report (CIDR) and the accompanying nonconformance report (NCR),'.ather than one or the other. See paragraph 10 of RO Report No, 50-312/73-06 for additional details.
5.
Ewergency Core Cooling System The approved procedures for testing the high pressure injection, low pressure injection and core flood systems were ocamined and discussed with the licensee representatives. The procedures included applicable provisions to verify:
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a.
Proper operation of initiating instrumentation in all com-binations of logic, initiatfug instrument channel trip on loss of instrument or channel power supply and operation of the fail-safe features provided in the design;
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Proper operatica of interlocks and protective devices utilized in pump and valves controls; c.
Proper functioning of instrumentation and alarms used to monitor the availability of the systems. A Field Change had been issued to include initiation of an alarm if the logic moduals containing the logic buffers were out of service.
Loss of this component would defeat the function of the protection system;
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d.
Proper operation of alternate electrical power supplies used for system valves, pumps and instrumentation including the operation of automatic and manual power transfer switches; Proper operation of controls including those that effect e.
transfer of water supply to pump suction;
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Proper operation of injection pumps and motors, verification
of acceptable net positive suction head (NPSH) at anticipated-maximum system flow conditions, adequacy of individual pump capacity and discharge head, speed of response to reach rated flow capacity, proper pump motor. start sequence, adequacy of pump run-out protection features, acceptable motor running
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The procedures failed to provide for:
Acceptability of system movements and adequacy of supports a.
under system startup conditions and steady-state operation; b.
Measuring the response speed of all valves to determine proper
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operation at maximum expected temperatures and differential pressures c.
Testing of the high pressure injection system under normal I
operating conditions. The ptocedures limited the test l
conditions to 700 psig at ambient temperature.
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Internals Vent Valves
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The test procedure and results that verified operation of the i -
LLaternal vent valves were examined. No deficiencies were identified.
The forces required to open the valves were consistent with the
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specified acceptance criteria. Forces required to open the several
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valves ranged from 118 to 124 pounds.
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Control Rod Drive (CRD) Control System The procedure and results of testing of the CRD control system
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were. examined. At the time of the inspection, a deficiency had been identified in-the rod position indicating instrumentation.
The indicating amplifiers for alarm and fault conditions had substantially drifted out of calibration within a time period of one week. The deficient ecndition was the subject of a noncon-formance report. The licensee had been in contact with the supplier to obtain resolution of the problem.
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Pressurizer Level Verification' Test
.This test was in progress at the time of the inspection. The test-procedure, equipment setup and data collected were examined. The i
inspector found_that the test was being performed in accordance with the approved test. procedure. The collected data was consistent with the established acceptance criteria.
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-6-9.
Reactor Internals a.
Supplier Records
The records of the manufacture of the reactor internals were examined. These records included:
- Heat numbers of material used
- Qualifications of NDE procedures
- East and lot numbers of weld electrodes used
- Wald precedure qualifications
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- List of radiographic film-
- Inspection tickets for each process
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- As-built drawings
- Classliness requirements
- Variation notices Also examined was the " Authorization To Release For Shipment" for the reactor internals. This document certified that
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certain named documents had been reviewed and approved. No anomalies were noted during the examination of the records.
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Receiving Reports
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The construction site receiving reports were examined. No deficiencies were noted during this examination.
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c.
Installation Records The Construction Inspection Data Report (CILR) used for the installation of the internals was examined.
In the same data package with the CIDR were all NCR reports that involved the internals and the reports of tests for cleanliness. No
, deficiencies were noted.
10.
Instrumentation The following aspects of installed instrumentation associated with pressurizer level control, safety injection system, reactor coolant flow and other systems within the general area were observed:
- Location of lines and instruments
- Tightness of_ wires
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- Tightness of the tube fittings
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- Labeling of wire, lines and instruments
- Routing of tubing No deficiencies were noted.
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-7-11. Reactor Coolant System Cold Hydrostatic Test c
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Test Procedure The cold hydrostatic test procedure Revision 2 dated November 8, 1973 was reviewed. No deficiencies were noted.
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Observation of Hydrostatic Test
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The hydrostatic test was conducted on December 6 and 7, 1973 and was observed by AEC inspector L. J. Garvin. The
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reactor coolant system vas tested at e pressure in excess of
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3125 psi for 10 minutes. The pressure was then decrecsed to 2550 psi to enable inspection of the welds. Three state code inspectors participated in the inspection so that all 2000 welds could be inspected for leakage in a reasonable period of time. The AEC inspector examined the major welds in the primary system, approximately 100 welds in associated sydtems and observed the inspeitions being conducted by two of the code inspectors. Cs11bration of pressure and temperature
gauges used in the test were verified. No anomalies were noted.
i 12. Thermocouple Guide Tubes
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thermocouple upper guide tubes were bent due to their misalignment with the lower mating thermocouple guide tubes. The head was removed, -the lower guides removed and repositioned, the upper guide tubes repaired and the head reinstalled.
The licensee was informed by B&W that this condition had been previously encountered at other B&W facilities.
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