IR 05000312/1972004

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Insp Rept 50-312/72-04 on 720913-15.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Const Status,Reactor Coolant Pump Support,Containment Vessel,Reactor Coolant Piping & Noncomformance Repts 2566-2974
ML19317G645
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco
Issue date: 10/11/1972
From: Dodds R, Andrea Johnson, Spencer G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML19317G639 List:
References
50-312-72-04, 50-312-72-4, NUDOCS 8003250700
Download: ML19317G645 (8)


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n' l (O U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION DIRECTORATE OF REGUIATORY '?ERATIONS

REGION V

RO Inspection Report No.

050-0312/7204 Subject:

Sacramento M2nicipal Utility District Rancho Seco Unit No. 1 License No. (s) CPPR-56 Location: Clay Station Priority Sacramento County, California Category B

Type of Licencee:

963 Mwe (2772 Mut) PWR, B&W Type of Inspection: Routine, unannounced Dates of Inspection:

September 13-15, 1972 Dates of Previous Inspection: August 23, 1972 e

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Principal Inspector:

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A. D. Johnson, Reactor Inspector (Date )

(Test & Operations)

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R. T. Dodds, Reactor Inspector (Ddte)

(Construction)

' Accompanying Inspectors:

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i W. G. Albert, Reactor Inspector (Date)

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/C////72 L. 3. Garvin, Reactor Inspector (Date)

Other Acceapanying Personnel: None Reviewed by:

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G. S. Spencer, Chief, React.7r Construction (Date)

and Operations Branch Proprietary Information: None

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SECTION I Enforcement Action None Licensee Action ogt Previously Identified Enforcement Matters A.

An examination of the inspection records of electrical cables and terminations disclosed that deficiencies in installation are now being documented in accordance with the approved QA program procedures as stated in the licensee's response to RO:V dated August 17, 1972.

Unresolved Items None Status of Previously Reported U' resolvel Items n

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A.

Thin Wall Valves The licensee' has examined all but 20 of the valves (not yet at job site)

connected with the reactor pressure boundary piping and has not found any additional thin wall valves. The four forged valves in the primary pressure p

boundary that were previously discovered have now been repaired by weld (

buildup. There were four other large Class I valves (not in primary system)

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that had thin walls. Of these, one was repaired with weld buildup and the other three were accepted as is on the basis of an Engineering evaluation.

B.

Steam Generator Lateral Support Rings The licensee submitted a construction deficiency report to RO on July 24, 1972.

The welds have been repaired and satisfactorily passed the initial MT and PT inspection program at the Vendor's shop. One of the supports was at the site and the other was scheduled for shipment within a week. The on-site NDT had not yet been performed.

C.

Repair of[ Reactor Pressure Vessel Instrument Nozzles Repair work had not yet been started on the reactor vessel instrument nozzles to correct the def'ah_tcies identified at OCONEE. Bechtel (Construction) has a proposeG Quality Control Instruction that lists all of the witness and hold points.

D.

Control Rod Drive Pressure Tubes The tubes that were at the site and shipped to Royal Industries have been examined.

Twelve of the tubes have been found to be satisfactory, three

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-2-J do not have thin walls but have defects exceeding 0.016 inches, 23 have thin walls with no defects, and 10 have thin walls and defects exceeding 0.016 inches. Where possible, the tubes will be repaired by honing and will be returned to the field for use if they meet the new wall thickness-dimension of 0.286 inches in conformance with B&W's report to the Commission dated June 22, 1972.

E.

Tendon Strand Slippage (Containment Vessel)

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The mechanism that caused the slippage of strands in the tendon has not yet br'n identified. Lift-off readings will be made of the one tendon with s. rand slippe e following the containment building leakage rate s

test.

(Paragraph 8)

Persons Contacted The following personnel were contacted during the inspection.

^ SMUD J. Mattimoe Assistant General Manager, Chief Engineer

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V. McMahon Quality Assurance Director

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W. Friedrich

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Quality Assurance Engineer J. Hiltz Resident Engineer (Civil)

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R. Rodriques Plant Superintendent

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R. Dietric N clear Engineer u

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R. Colombo.

Technical Assistant, Operations

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P.-Oubre

Asst. Superintendent, Operations

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Bechtel Corporation (Engineering and Construction Management)

W. Stinchfield

' Project Manager

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R. Cutler Project Field Engineer

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W. Chapla Project Quality Assurance Engineer 3-

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J. Wait Assistant QA Engineer (Electrical)

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R. Hunter

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QA Engineer

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J. Nova

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Inspector (Electrical)

R. Kmmmarer Inspector (Electrical)

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Bechtel Corporation (Construction)

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l B. Boyd Welding Department Superintendent.

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L. Lawrence Field Engineer (Welding Shop)

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J. Tosh Field Engineer (Mechanical)

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Terrell Sr. Field Engineer (Welding)

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J. Mayfield Welding Foreman

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N. Basich Welding Inspector

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Gammon Pipe Fitter

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-3-Y Management Interview The results of the inspection were discussed with Messrs. Mattimoe, McMahon, Rodriquez, Stinchfield and other members of the SMUD and Bechtel staffs. The following acknowledgements and commitments were made during the discussion.

Inspection Findings Relating tct reviously Identified Items of Concern P

A.

Electrical Cable Inspection It appears that deficiencies in the installation of electrical cables and terminations are now being documented as required by the QA program and that there was not a significant backlog of rework items as had been previously noted.

B.

Nonconformance Reports Generally, it appears that the current generation of Nonconformance Reports contain statements of the cause of the condition and the corrective action being taken to preclude repetition.

Licensee Commitments and Comments A.

Welding

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The procedures for the' control of filler metal and the usage of the portable warmers for electrodes will be examined to assure proper documentation of material issued and that adequate environmental controls are specified for the electrodes.

The documenting of the inspection of essential variables will be examined and measures taken to ensure that the records provide evidence that the welding has been performed in accordance with applicable welding procedures.

(Paragraph 6)

B.

Coated Welding Electrodes

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The Bechtel ASME approved procedures for the "rebake" of coated welding electrodes will be examined to assure that they are consistent with ASME standards.

(Paragraph 6)

C.

Paddle Vane Flow Switches No paddle vane type of flow switches will be used as part of the permanent instrumentation-for any of the systems connected with the primary coolant

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system.

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' Checks for' Thin Wall Valves Checks will be made of all valves (,e 20 out of 100 left to be checked)

to' be _ installed in primary pressure boundry systems once the valves have been received at the construction cite.

E.

Key Switches It was acknowledged that the keys for the shutdown and channel bypass interlocks could be the same as used at other sites with Bailey Meter control instrumentation.

(Paragraph 7)

F.

Short Tendons The tests and investigation of the problem of tendon strand slippage will be continued and the inspection _of the tendons, originally planned to be conducted prior to the first integrated leakage rate test, will be conducted after the test.

(Paragraph 8)

G.

Preoperational Test Procedures In several instances, the approved procedure referenced system drawings that were not the latest revisions. The licensee indicated that, prior to performing a particular test, the references will be checked to assure use of s

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the latest revision to the referenced material. The test coordinator has j

this responsibility when preparing the working copy of the final test procedure, according to the licensee.

SECTION II Additional Subjects Inspected, Not Identified 1, Section ]Lu Where

No Deficiencies or Unrosolved Items Were Identified 1.

Status of Construction The project construction status which was stated to be behind schedule, was estimated to be 77% complete as of September 15, 1972. Therefore, the expected fuel loading date has been rescheduled from April 30 to August 30, 1973. Welding of the primary coolant system piping has been started even though the lateral support rings for the steam generators have not yet been installed.

2.

Reactor Coolant Pump Support The reactor coolant pump motors will be supported by two overhead

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suspension rods with a ' combined load rating of 146,000 pounds. The weight of a motor is 92,000 pounds and a pump 113,000 pounds. Their j

. combined wet weight is 212,000 pounds.

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3.

Containment Vessel i

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Records of'tencioning.

b.

Bulges in liner plate.

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.4.

Nonconformance Reports (Nos. 2566 - 2974)

5.

Reactor Coolant Piping

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Welding (1) Records of inspection of joint preparation, environmental control, root gap, alignment, root pass and completed weld.

j (2) Identification of weld, welder and inspector.

(3) Records of welder qualifications, b.

Coolant Piping

(1) Records of chemical, physical and manufacturing NDT material certifications.

(2) Receiving inspection. Examined all Receiving Inspection Data Reports.- No deficiencies were identified.

Details of Subjects Discussed in Section I 6.

Welding of, Primary Coolant Piping i

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Filler Metal During tours of the facility, it was observed that lids were open

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on most of the portable warmer cans containing low hydrogen coated

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electrode filler metal., In one instance, about eight inches of the coated electrodes was extending from the can. These electrodes were

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felt and found to be at ambient temperatures.

In other instances

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where the electrodes were not so exposed, they were warm to the touch'and were extimated to be.at a temperature of about 120*F.

These practices were ' discussed with the ~ Welding Superintendent who stated that the code and welding procedures perr'.t electrodes to be

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exposed for four hours before rebake would be required. Their

' practice is to use the warmer cans which are capable of maintaining an oven temperature of 200 - 350*, to preclude the necessity of-rebaking electrodes.- He further stated that they never rebake electrodes but destroy and discard them since rebaking usually cracks the coating.

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When questioned about the rebaking temperature for E7018 electrodes,

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the Welding Superintendent stated that it should be perfcrmed at about 700*F for at least an hour. However, an examination of Bechtel's ASME approved procedures manual showed a rebake temperature of 200 - 350'.

This was noted to be contrary to the AWS and ASME

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specifications which require rebake at 700*F for E7018 electrodes.

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The Superintendent stated that Bechtel San Francisco would be notified

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of the apparent error in their approved manual.

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The welder uses an authorization form to draw filler metal from the issue room that lists the type (s) of electrods(s) to be used in the weld.. The issue room only documents the date(s) and welder (s)

receiving material on the form and does not record type or quantity of material issued. In many instances, several types of electrodes have been authorized on the form such as bare electrodes for the

root pass (TIG) and coated electrodes for subsequent welding. Therefore, the records were antiguous since they did not actually show the i

material issued.

.7.

' Key Switches The licensee contacted Mr. Charles McGringle of the Bailey Meter Company, Cleveland, Ohio to discuss the keys used for the shutdown and

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. channel bypass interlocks.

Mr. Gringle stated that the single key used at Rancho Seco could be used at other stations. However, stations with

multiple reactors such as OCONEE 1, 2 and 3 have different keys for each

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unit.

Investigation on the keys used for electrical switch gear disclosed that they were unique for each cabinet and were not interchangeable. The switch gear cabinets were manufactured by the ITE Imperial Corporation, Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania.

8.

Tendon Strand Slippage (Containment Building)

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SMUD is continuing to look into the deviation on slipped strands in

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tendon H-50.

Hardness tests and photomicrographs have confirmed the adequacy of the wedges that the strands slipped through. All but four of the ten ~ strands that slipped have been tensioned and appear to be holding

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satisfactorily. VSL is testing a 12 strand dead-ended tendon with a

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loose locking plate in an attempt to duplicate slippage. To date, no i

mechanism that could cause this slippage has been positively identified.

i The disposition of the N nconformance Report has been changed from that o

. indicated in RO Inquiry Report No'. 050-0312/72-03 CDR. No special inspection is now planned prior to the containment leak rate test. However, Mr. Hiltz stated during the exit interview that. lift-off. readings will be E

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made on both ends of tendon H-50 (the tendon with strand slippage) to confirm tendon loading following the containment building leak rate test.

The tendon still maintains capability for 98% of the loading of the other tendons.

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SECTION III

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Additional Subjects Inspected. Not Identified in Section I_ Where No, Deficiencies og Unresolved Items Were Identified

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General With the exception of tests performed on the two startup transformers, no

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preoperational tests have yet been performed. Tentatively, system testing will coemence after December 1971.

2.

Approved Test Procedures a.

Boric acid mixing and storage system functional test.

b.

Reactor coolant system hot leakage test.

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Core flooding system functional test.

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Details of Items Discussed in Section I

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