IR 05000275/1980022
| ML17083A742 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1980 |
| From: | Dodds R, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083A741 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-80-22, 50-323-80-11, NUDOCS 8101210153 | |
| Download: ML17083A742 (14) | |
Text
50-275/80-22 Report No 50-323/80 ll U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COl44ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEt1ENT REGION V
License No.
pr iority CPPR-39, CPPR
Category Paci fic Gas and El ectr ic Company P.
0.
Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at Diabl o Canyon Si te, San Luis Obi spo County, Ca 1 ifornia and Corporate Office Inspection conducted:
December 2-5 and 10, 1980
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Inspectors:
D.
F. Kirsch, Reactor Inspector
> 2- ~.o -Fo Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved by:
Summary:
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R.
T.
Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section Oat Signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch.
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Inspection durinq eriod of December 2-5 and 10, 1980 Re ort Nos.
50-275/80-22 and 50-323/80-11
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inspector of construction and modification activities including; licensee action on previous inspection findings, 50.55(e)
items and potentially generic issues; gA audits and cleanup crew work control system procedures, work observation and record review.
The inspection involved 25 inspector hours by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS l.
Individuals Contacted a.
Pacific Gas and Electric Com an PG&E M.
R. Tressler, Supervisory Project Control Engineer J.
B.
Hoch, Project Engineer R." A. Young, Acting Project Design Coordinator M.
V. Williamson, Senior Licensing Engineer R.
M. Laverty, Mechanical Systems Group Leader G.
H. Moore, I&C Supervisor
- R.
D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
- D. A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical Engineer
- R. T. Twiddy, QA Supervisor
- S. J.
Foat, Coordinating QC Engineer M.
E.
Leppke, Resident Mechanical Engineer J. Bratten, QC Inspector C.
A. Hemstock, Cleanup Crew General Foreman C. Braff, Supervisory Mechanical Engineer S. !Jellmaker, Cleanup Crew Melding Foreman R. J.
Quaid, Cleanup Crew Foreman
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K. Dougherty, Cleanup Crew Foreman Yarious other crafts and QC personnel b.
Pullman Power Products Kello H. Karner, QA/QA Manager c.
Other Personnel
- T. Young, NRC Senior Resident-Inspector =
- Denotes exit interview attendee
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2.
Licensee Action on 50.55 e
. Items
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a.
Control of Aluminum Inventor Inside Containment The licensee had verbally reported on September 24, 1980 the possible construction deficiency involving failure!to comply
'ith procedures for documenting and accounting of aluminum-inside the containment.
The licensee's written report, submitted by letter dated October 27, 1980, indicated that an audit of aluminum items in the Unit 3. containment confirmed that the aluminum inventory was about 55 pounds less than that allowed by the FSAR and a review of the Unit 2 containment revealed that the amount of aluminum did not differ substantially from that in Unit l.
As"such, the licensee does not consider the item reportable under the rules of 10 CFR 50. 55(e).
The
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licensee had reviewed its aluminum control program and taken precautionary measures to issue adequate control over containment aluminum inventory.
The inspector examined the licensee's aluminum inventory control system.
Discussions with corporate engineering personnel identified that:
(1) an inventory log, used to generate the data for FSAR Table 6.2.2.7, was destroyed following NRR approval of the February, 1974, FSAR revision; (2) responsible discipline engineers had been provided with instructions for the inclusion of aluminum exclusion in procurement documents and had been providing aluminum inventory data to a
centralized point in the engineering department; and (3) Hestinghouse had provided the licensee with an inventory of aluminum that was in containment resulting from Mestinghouse procurement.
Evidence that inventory control had been accomplished, although informally, since 1974 was provided.
The licensee's system for inventory control at the site was examined and appeared to provide adequate control.
The licensee was preparing a formal inventory control system for use at the corporate offices.
This item is open pending examination of that system, and ihe implementation, during a future insoection.
Durinq the examination of licensee action on this 50.55(e)
item the inspector made inquiries regarding the inclusion of zinc (in the form of galvanizing on raceways, raceway supports and decking and zinc based primers) in the analysis for containment hydrogen generation.
It appeared that an analysis of zinc reaction formed hydrogen had not been specifically performed for Diablo Canyon on the basis that an*Oak.,Ridge National.-
Laboratory study established that hydrogen formation from a zinc/steam chemical reaction was negligible given that the containment spray solution was maintained with a basic Ph.
The licensee uses sodium hydroxide additive to the containment spray system to provide a basic Ph.
The inspector observed that an event which did not actuate the containment spray system would not provide the basic Ph necessary to preclude hydrogen formation due to the zinc/borated water reaction.
The licensee agreed to evaluate the situation.
This matter is currently under NRC review.
3.
Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Followu Items a ~
Closed (275/80-10-02 Followu Item:
Licensee walkdown of externa y ro en recombiner s stem i in The licensee had completed a walkdown and piping weld reinspection program for the external hydrogen recombiner system piping and identified weld reject rates ranging from 35% to 86%.
The
-3-walkdown was conducted by a licensee inspector during the period of May through September, 1980, and documented on Nonconformance Report No. DC1-80-SC-002 and Audit Report No.
DCO-80-023.
The NCR specified additional training for cleanup crew crafts and supervisors.
The inspector questioned the excessive reject rates on welds performed by the cleanup crew and examined the circumstances surrounding the welding activities prior to Hay 1980 and licensee actions to preclude recurrence.
It was determined that the external hydrogen recombiner piping was the only code safety related system which the cleanup crew had worked on and this was the first welding performed by the cleanup crew to ANSI B31.7.
Since May, 1980, the licensee had taken steps to increase the knowledge level of cleanup crew personnel.
Among the actions taken were:
conducting prework sessions on quality class
work packages to familiarize personnel with the procedures to
,be used, hold points necessary and work sequences; conduct of classroom training by gC in the areas of concrete anchor bolts, precision tool-use, equipment alignment, grouting, drypacking, and ASME Section IN code requirements; conduct of training sessions for welders in the areas of weld quality standards, code requirements, and welding procedure requirements.
The inspector discussed training rec'eived, qua1ity assurance awareness, and work procedure familiarity with cleanup crew supervisors and crafts.
The inspector observed a general lack of familiarity with quality control procedures and gA awareness-=
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on the part of-clea*nup crew foremen." "11hile significant action had been. taken,to upgrade the training level of welders..and certain other crafts personnel, the inspector discussed with licensee management personnel the apparent need for additional training of field foremen.
The licensee agreed to-'evaluate the situation.
The insoector discussed, and observed evidence of, welder traininq activities with the cleanup crew welding foreman and observed that welding procedures being worked were posted in a prominent place.
Examination=of welding filler material control activities, storage conditions, thermometer calibration and segregation of class 1 material were conducted; Numerous tools and test equipment were examined in the tool issue area.
All material had the required calibration stickers, affixed and the tool issue log appeared to be properly completed.
Di'scussions with the cleanup crew tool room attendant indicated that, while the man expressed unfamiliarity with calibrated equipment procedure, the attendant had received sufficient verbal
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F-4-directions and appeared knowledgeable regarding duties, responsibilities, and practices employed to such an extent that procedural compliance was eviden't.
The licensee agreed to make the necessary procedures available to the attendant.
Class 1 work installed by the cleanup crew is 100Ã inspected by licensee General Construction gC personnel.
The individual responsible for welding and support inspection was fully knowledgeable regarding quality assurance, work procedure and quality control procedure requirements.
The licensee's system for specifying repairs and NDE, aoproving and initiating the required rework, inspecting the inprocess and completed work, and specification of appropriate acceptance criteria was examined.
Ttvo minor situations were observed in one procedure (SMEI-7) where adequate reference to criteria were not clearly delineated.
The licensee immediately initiated and approved the necessary revision to provide clear direction.
The inspector had no further questions on this item and indicated that clean up crew activities would be reexamined during a future inspection.
(275/80-22-01)
Closed 275/80-16-01 Followu Item:
Tor ue on concrete anchor bolts was not released rior to weldin stiffener lates on haseplates The licensee had viritten Minor.Variation, Report No. H-4210 identifying those supports where concrete anchors on baseplates may have not been untorqued-prior to welding baseplate attachments.
Pullman Power Products ( Kellogg) had identified aoproximately 55 such support installations pursuant to a review of their records.
The licensee had approved instructions for determining if anchor bolt integrity had been compromised and, if so, repair instructions.
Discussions with Pullman personnel indicated that about 70% of the support baseplates had been checked and no instances were found where the support integrity had been affected.
The inspector had no further question '\\
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4.
Licensee Action on Potentiall Generic Issues a 0 b.
Discrepancies in ri id swa brace assemblies and beam attachment brackets SIE Ins ection Re ort 50-275/80-18 The inspector had discussed welding problems, identified by a different licensee, on welded beam attachment brackets with licensee personnel.
The licensee reported by telecon that their evaluation determined that welded beam attachment brackets of the types determined to be discrepant were not used at Diablo Canyon.
Excessivel hard stainless steel bolts on Anchor-Darlin Valves See IE Inspection Re ort 50-275/80-18 The licensee was informed by the inspector that valves supplied under a particular purchase order possibly contained excessively hard bolts.
The licensee had evaluated the locations of the eight valves supplied by that purchase order and determined that none were located in class 1 systems and supplied the inspector with the valve identities.
,The inspector's examination of the applicable p'iping diagrams verified the licensee's conclusions.
This item is closed.
C.
Pressurizer Relief Line Block Valves d.
A recent construction deficiency report, issued by a utility in IE:RII identified that certain 3" -, 15008 valves manufactured by Hestinghouse Electromechanical
.Division failed to seat=-...,.',--
completely after cycling during preoperational testing:
The "-
licensee examined"-their=equipment=-list.-and"notified
>>the inspector.
none of these valves were installed in nuclear safety related.
quality class 1 applications at Diablo Canyon.
Failure of certain valves to close at, rated ressure or
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flow conditions Certain utilities located in IE:RII and RIII recently notified the NRC of closure problems, at rated pressure and/or flow conditions, experienced by three inch motor operated qate valves used in the CVCS and safety injection systems.."Westinghouse had notified those utilities of the condition but licensee'ersonnel at the site were not aware of such notification.
Discussions with licensee personnel at the site indicated they had experienced problems with limitorque motor operated valves supplied by llestinghouse.
The problems experienced had been valve disk/stem damage and failure of some valves to fully
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close.
The licensee had determined that improper setting of torque limit switches was the problem and obtained the Westinghouse specification for torque limit switch settings.
PG8E had reviewed the torque limit switch settings on all tJestinghouse suoplied motor operated valves and assured the switch settings on valves installed were consistent with manufacturer's recommendations.
In addition, the licensee stated that a verification program was conducted to assure that the limit switch components on the valves were of a type necessary to achieve the manufacturer's recommended torque settings.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
5.
gA Audits The licensee's internal audit system was examined by reviewing
gA audits performed on General Construction activities during the time period of August 19 through November 14, 1980.
In those cases where findings required corrective action, the actions had been completed in accordance with the -licensee's nonconformance reporting system or open item resolution system.
No items of noncompliance or deviations from the licensee's gA audit and reporting system were identified.
.6.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on December 5,
1980 and summarized the inspection purpose, scope.and finding l
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