IR 05000267/1981021
| ML20031H227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1981 |
| From: | Jay Collins, Sears J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031H215 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-81-21, NUDOCS 8110270272 | |
| Download: ML20031H227 (11) | |
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APPENDIX U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
IE Inspection Report:
50-267/81-21
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i Docket:
50-267 Licensee:
Public Service Company of Colorado
P. O. Box 840 l
Denver, Colorado 80201
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Facility Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generation Station
Inspection at:
Fort St. Vrain Site, Platteville, Colorado Inspection Conducted:
August 12-13, 1981
Inspector:
O&hn /h ca w h jori /3r John R Sears, Division of Emergency Preparedness Date
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Approved by:, hn T. Collins Deputy Director, Region IV ' Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection conducted on August 12-13, 1981 (Report:
50-267/81-21)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Fort St. Vrain emer-
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gency exercise involving observations by 12 NRC representatives of key i
functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection involved 200
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inspector-hours onsite by 11 NRC personnel and one consultant.
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Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8110270272 811022 DR ADOCK 05000
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DETAILS 1.
NRC Inspection Team NRC Evaluation Team and Areas Observed Robert DeFayette - Inplant Health Physics Team Art Desrosiers - Technical Suppcrt Center (TSC'
Maynard Dickerson - Control Roon Howard Holtz - Control Room George Kuznycz - Control Room Mark Padovan - Personnel Control Center (PCC)
Walter Pasciak - Forwerd Command Post (FCP)
G. L. Plumlee - (TSC)
John Sears - (Team Leader), FCP Peter Williams - TSC Clyde Wisner, - Camp George West (State EOF)
Barry Zalcman - TSC Exit Interview-Attendees Marty Block, Public Service Company of Colorado
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Ted Borst, Public Service Company of Colorado J. W. Gabre, Public Service Company of Colorado Ed' Hill, Public Service Company of Colorado H. W. Hillyard, Public Serv'ce Ccmpany of Colorado Leanord I. Johnson, Public Service Company of Colorado Milt McBride','Public Service Company of Colorado 6an McNellis, Public Service Company of Colorado Mike Murphy, Public Service Company of Colorado
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J. V. Neely, NPC, Inc. (PSC Consultant)
Lee Singleton, Public-Service Company of Colorado Ray Wadas, Public Service Company of Colorado Ocn Warembourg, Public Service Company of. Colorado John Collini, Deputy Director, NRC, Region iV Robert DeFayette, NRC Howard Holtz, NRC G. Kuzmycy, NRC Jim Montgomery, NRC Mark L.-Padovan, NRC, Dave Pasiak, NRC Sheldon Schwartz, Deputy Director, NRC, Headquarters John R. Sears, NRC F. M. Williams, NRC Clyde Wisner, NRC
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2.
Licensee Action On Previously Identified Items Related to Mirgency Preparedness None required.
3.
General An exercise of_the licensee's emergency plan was conducted at the Fort
St. Vrain Nuclear facility on August 12, 1981, testing'the integrated responses of the licensee, State, and local organizations to a simulated emergency. The exercise tested the licensee's response to a release of reactor coolant which contained some radioiodine.
Appendix A describes the scenario. The exercise was integrated with a test of the Colorado State
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-plan and the Weld County Emergency plan.
4.
General Observations.
a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the Fort St. Vrain emergency plan, b.
Observers
. Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with 12 NRC_ observers and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
g observers.
FEMA observed and will report separately on the responses
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of the State and local governments.
c.
Critique The licensee held a critique following the exercise.
The NRC and the licensee identified the deficiencies as discussed in the exit interview.
5.
Specific Deficiencies Noted Deficiencies and problems identified by the NRC observers during the exit
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interview and required follow-up actions by the licensee included:
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/a.
Providetto the NRC by September 13, 1981, a plan for up grading the interim'Fo mard Command Post until the permanent facility is completed.
b.
Review health physics practices with-temporary personnel and others, as required.
c.
Plac'e emergency kits in the PCC for use by monitoring teams
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Improve dose assessment procedures to eliminate apparent confusion among Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center.(TSC), and Forward-Command Post (FCP).
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Improve computer program for calculating radioactive release.
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Improve all communications especially in FCP and TSC and between Personn.?1 Control Center (PCC) and monitoring teams.
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g.
Upgrade procedure for:
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(1) Persennel accountability procedures (2) Use of status boards in the TSC and FCP (3) Security and access control procedures at PCC and FCP (4) Monitoring personnel and vehicles leaving the facility during and emergency.
(5) Handling a contaminated, injured person h.
Resolve problems with local sheriff regarding access to facility during an emergency by essential non-PSC personnel.
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Ascertain that consultants (especially Colorado State University l
personnel) know and can follow procedures regarding their actions I
in an emergency j.
Determine feasibility of moving alternate PCC outside the protected area
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Improve physical layout of TSC to minimize congestion 1.
Provide for assistance to the health physicist at the TSC m.
Provide an emergency kit in the TSC n.
Resolve telephone' problems in the TSC (provide more space between phones or install dividers.)
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Study the possibility of adding trailer or..lobile van bookups to the FCP design and make changes as necessary.
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6.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room Control Room personnel responded in a satisfactory manner including a smooth transition of responsibility between shifts.
!;cause the scenario used cue cards, there was very little " free play" allowed for technical discussion by the staff and a minimum amount of decisions were required.
The staff correctly diagnosed the initial event and in a real situation would itave sealed the. leak of primary coolant within minutes thereby preventing any further release of radioactive material.
The licensee staff continued to exercise good judgment throughout the exercise and maintained contact and communi-cations with the TSC.
The Control Room staff notified the NRC of the simulated accident via the " hot line" but had some difficulty in describing the accident because of the apparent lack of knowledge of HTGRs by the NRC Duty Officer.
However, contact was maintained.
In general, there were no major deficiencies noted in Control Room response and the licensee staff appeared to have the event under control at all times.
A problem occurred when the emergency team first reported to the Cantrol Room and all responders gatherad in front of the Reactor Operator's duty station, thereby blocking his view of the control panels.
This was corrected within a few minutes.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was activated with essential manpower within 7 minutes of the simulated accident and communications were established with the Control Room within 3 minutes after arrival of the staff.
Communications were also established with the Personnel Control
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Center (PCC) and the Forward Command Post (FCP).
In general, there was too much congestion in the TSC even though the room is of sufficiant size to avoid crowding. The telephones were too close together without adequata noise barriers.
At one time, four telephones were in use simultaneously and it was difficult for any one party to carry on a conversation.
There was a lack of formal record-keeping and reconstruction of events and would have had to be done from scratch pads and telephone message pads.
A new data display and computerized dose assessment system was in use but was under-utilized because of the lack of familiarity of the system by the personnel in the TSC.
TSC personnel spent an excessive amount of time attempting to confirm radioactive releases
calculated by the Control Room rather than attempting to diagnose the reactor status.
However, this could have been caused by the scenario.
There was no printout or reproduction capability in the TSC and eacly data seemed to be lost and it was necessary to retrieve it from the Control Room in order to perform trend analysis.
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No protective action recommendations were developed or recommended from the TSC by 0915 (wh'a the NRC observer left and went. to another observation post) even though the emergency plan states that the cmergency coordinator has this responsibility and may not delegate that responsibility.
The health physicist in the TSC was on the telephone too much and was not able to participate enough in technical matters.
He should have had more assiatance.
The TSC should be equipped with a status board to record pertinent information.
c.
Personnel Control' Center (PCC)
Communications between the PCC and field monitoring teams was troublesome, but the licensee staff overcame the problem by relaying messages throught the TSC.
The PCC that was used is outside the protected area, while an alternate one is inside the protected area.
If.a wind shift occurred, it could necessitate the movement of the PCC and this could be time-consuming because of having to clear through security.
There was some discussion with the licensee about the possibility of moving the alternate PCC from inside the protected area to outside this area. The licensee agreed to look into this c.oncern.
The Colorado State University team did not report to the PCC as they had bean directed, but rather went immediately to the field'and collected TLDs for analysis.
This would be cause for concern in a real emergency because they had not Deen told anything about the direction of the plume or estimated dose rates.
In addition, if they had attempted to report to tho PCC, the sheriff apparently would not have let them through the roadblocks because they do not have Public Service of Colorado (PSC) identification badges (all non-PSC persons, including the NRC, would be in the sa.ne situation).
The licensee acknowledged that more dialogue is needed with the sheriff to resolve this issue.
d.
Dose Assessment The dose assessment calculations and methodology appeared to be con-fusing at times.
At 0900 the TSC dose calculations showed a projected whole body dose of 3.3 rem at the exclusion area boundary.
Plant procedures and the emergency plan state that the recommended pro-tective action for the general public in such a situation is to evacuate unless constraints make it impractical. Neither the TSC nor the Control Room provided such'a recommendation, although some I
precautionary sheltering was suggested.
At this time, the TSC approved a message from the. Control Room to the NRC that projected doses were less than 1 rem, while the Forward Command Post was
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informing the Colorado State University Team of dases greater than 3 rem and reconmending protective action for EPZ residents.
Shortly I
thereafter, field measurements predicted a whole body dose rate of 900 mrem /hr based upon field readings of 2 mrem /hr at well 3, and 6 mrem /hr at well 4.
It should be noted that the health physics technician and driver, who obtained these measurements, received a projected dose of 180 mrem on their personnel dosimeters during the 40 minutes they were gone from the PCC. This should have indicated that the readings at well 3 and 6 were not taken in the plume and should have triggered a search for the plume.
No such directives were given.
In general, more field data should have been obtained and more use should have been made of the survey tsams.
Air samples from the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) were reported in
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I uCi/cc of beta-gamma radioactivity. These units are not useful for assessing doses or dose-rates. The TSC did not expect data in these units and converted the concentrations into very high dose rates (15-60 rem /hr) that did not correlate with other calculations (900 mrem /hr) or measurements (2-6 mrem /hr). The result was a confused situation in the TSC.
Isotopic concentrations are preferrable for such calculations but the TSC did not receive or ask for any isotopic
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analysis of effluents during the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of the exercise. This resulted in higher calculated doses during any gilen period and these higher doses contributed to confusion over the magnitude of offsite dose impacts.
In general, the TSC may have been spending too much time on dose assessment and dose calculations. The emergency plan states that the Fomard Command Post (FCP) assumes this responsi-bility after it is activated and t.ses data provided by PSC in I
addition to field data provided by the Colorado Department of Health l
(CDH) field monitoring teams.
l The initial meteorological information made available to the "SC consisted of wind direction, wind speed, and delta temperature but with the simulated failure of the primary system (as called for in
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the scenario) all subsequent meteorological data from the backup system consisted of wind diraction, wind speed, and temperature.
The use of this backup system resulted in erroneous dose projections.
One prime example was when isolated values for wind direction were complimented by moderate wind speed (about 7 mph) and an air temper-l ature of 920F at mid-day. These conditions would normally indicate a slightly unstable ("C") or neutral ("D") condition, yet the analysis
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yielded an extremely stable condition ("G") which resulted in an over-estimation of the dose rate by an order of magnitude.
e.
Health Physics Generally, the response by health physics personnel was excellent and timely. The HP Manager moved his Command Post from his nonnal working area when conditions demanded and appeared to be in control
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at all times.
Improvement is needed, however, in general health physics practices by some radiation technicians.
Poor work habits were noted when two radiation technicians put on anti-contamination clothing and entered the reactor building to take air samples and retrieve iodine cartridges.
The licensee indicated that he recently lost several radiation technicians and currently has several tempo-
rary ones until the permanent staff can be replaced.
The poor practices were performed by at least one of the temporary individuals.
It was pointed out to the licensee that this practice may be sympto-matic of a lack of training and that he should review this and ascer-tain that all radiation technicians are knowledgeable and trained.
There were no emergency kits available in the PCC which is suppose to be maintained for ready use by monitoring teams.
Although some equipment is available in the PCC, the teams must take equipment on an ad hoc basis and this can lead to error and confusion.
In one case, a team left the PCC to monitor the environment and did not take any personnel dosimeters. A security guard at the door reminded them to return to the PCC and obtain some.
It was recommended that the licensee maintain a kit in the PCC with all necessary equipment.
f.
Forward Command Post (FCP)
All parties agreed that the FCP response was lacking but that much of this was beyond the control of the licensee.
Just prior to the exercise (on Friday, August 7), the licensee was notified that his original location in Fort Lupton was no longer available.
There-fore, the location had to be moved to a garage which the licensee intends to remodel for his permanent FCP, but which at the present me, does not have many facilities.
Three telephones had been in-
stalled over the weekend and provided inadequate communications.
There was also a need for access control and although the personnel who were at the FCP made the best of a bad situation and overcame many of the problems, this temporary FCP is inadequate.
The licensee comtr.itted to inform the NRC within 30 days of his plans for a tempo-rary FCP until the permanent facility is complete.
The licensee also agreed to investigate adding electrical hookups to the design of his permanent facility for use by the NRC mobile laboratory and those of other agencies or organizations that may be needed.
It was suggested that there was no need for press facilities at the FCP because the~ official press releases would emanate from Camp George West.
It was pointed out that the NRC Regional Director would be at the E0C, and that the press in all likelihood would need access to the NRC.
Therefore, provisions should be made in your emergency pian to transport official company spokesman and the NRC l
Regional Director to Camp George West on a timely basis.
g.
Personnel Accountability Accountability of persons evacuated from the reactor building and i
from the site was a problem.
For the case of the site, everyone was told to report to the Personnel Control Center where they were i
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checked for contamination before being released and their names checked against a list of those present that day.
It.took over an hour for this process to be completed so anyone who was missing would not have been noticed until the chc:k had been completed.
Accountability of persons from the reactor building was performed by asking area managers in each of the emergency areas to report the status of personnel to the Control Room.
This was also a slow process and the licensee stated this procedure would be revised so that accountability of persons in the reactor building would be done by.
having Security check the computer listing of key card entries to make certain that those who have entered the building had also exited it.
h.
Weather The methodology for predicting stability conditions after the meteor-ology tower was lost, was critized because of its unrealism. ' A stability class G was predicted when conditions were given which
could not possibly result in such a class (wind speed of 7 mph and 92 degrees in the afternoon).
The licensee agreed with this criti-cism and stated that improvements would be made in this area.
7.
Exit Interview i
The NRC evaluation team held an exit interview with the licensee on August 13.
In addition to the personnel listed in Item 1, John Collins,
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Deputy Director of Region IV, was also present.
Although no violations or deviations were observed, the NRC evaluation team informed the licensee that improvements were needed in his emergency response capabilities.
The NRC evaluation team believes that in the event of an emergency at the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Facility, the health and safety of the public could be protected. Assurance comes from the excellent performance of the Control Room personnel who appear technically competent to respond to an emergency and take immediate steps to mitigate its consequences.
The licensee agreed to correct the deficiencies which were discussed in the exit inter-
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view and listed in Item 5, and acknowledged that NRC would review these corrective actions during the emergency preparedness appraisal scheduled for December 1981.
The licensee also agreed to inform the NRC in writing by September 13, 1981, on his plans for upgrading the interim FCP.
r Attachments:
1. FSV Radiological Emergency Response Plan Exercise - 1981 2. TSC Radiological Emergency Response Plan Exercise - 1981
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Attachment 1 FSV RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE - 1981 l
l Basic Objectives
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' Test and evaluate the FSV emergency response organization and decision-makin;,
processes.
Test communication interface between FSV and outside agencies responsible for i
providing emergency response support.
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Test revised offsite dose calculation methodology.
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Utilize and evaluate the Technical Support Center as an onsite emergency response post.
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Attachment 2 TSC RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE - 1981 NARRATIVE SulWARY The initicting event, which will occur at time (zero), will consist of a complete double-end break of the 1" buffer helium supply header line (L21121-A3) to "A" circulator.
The break will occur downstream of the "A" circulator penetration.
Check valve V-21117 will also fall open.
The plant conditions at time (zero) will be as follows.
(a) 100% reactor power.
(b) All systems operating normally.
Due to the termination of buffer helium supply and subsequent buffer-mid-buffer disturbances, primary coolant flows down "A" circulator shaft and is released into the Reactor Building.
At time (zero + 2 minutes),
"A" circulator trips, and the brake and static seal are automatically set.
Reactor power is auto-matically reduced to 50%.
The unplanned release to the Reactor Building results in a " Notification of Unusual Event." The Reactor Building is evacuated, and Health Physics personnel begin air sampling.
CAMS in the Reactor Building read upscale.
At time (zero " 41 minutes), RT 7312 alarms on point 1 (PCRV bottom head).
A-Health Physics Technician in the Reactor Building taking air samples notes that CAMS are continuing to read upscale, indicating the continued leakage of primary coolant to the Reactor Building.
The technician exits the Reacter Building and reports this information to the Control Room At time (zero + 47 minutes), it is determined that the "A" circulator static seal is leaking.
The reactor is manually scrammed, and an " Alert" is declared.
Onsite and offsite posts and centers are manned.
Operations personnel attempt to determine the exact leakage path to the Reactor Building and stop the release.
At time (zero + 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 45 minutes), a total failure of "A" circulator static seal occurs.
Primary coolant is released into the Reactor Building and subsequently to the environs via the reactor plant exhaust filters and stack, and results in stack monitor alarms.
Preliminary dose assessments indicate the necessity of declaring a " Site Emergency." Depressurization of the PCRV is begun immediately.
Dapressurization is continued for the next four hours.
During this time, offsite dose assessments continue.
The exercise is terminated when depressurization is completed and cloud passage has occurred.
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