IR 05000259/1997006
| ML18038B922 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18038B921 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-97-06, 50-259-97-6, 50-260-97-06, 50-260-97-6, 50-296-97-06, 50-296-97-6, NUDOCS 9707310102 | |
| Download: ML18038B922 (46) | |
Text
.U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License -Nos:..
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DPR;33, DPR-52, DPR-68 Report Nos:
Licensee:
50-259/97-06',
50-260/97-06, and 50-296/97-06 Tennessee Valley Authority Facility:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3
.Location:
10833 Shaw Rd Athens AL 35611 Dates:
.June 2-6, 1997 Inspectors:
W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader K. Clark, Public Affairs Officer G. Salyers, 'Radiation Specialist N. Stinson, Radiation Special'ist, NRR E. Testa,. Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by:
K. Barr, Chief, Pl'ant Support Branch Division of Reactor 'Safety 97073i0i02 97072i
'PDR
.ADOCK 05000259 8 'DR Enclosrue
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/97-06, 50-260/97-06, and 50-296/97-06 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise.
This plume exposure exercise consisted of full participation by the Tennessee Valley Authority, the State of Alabama, and the Risk Counties.
The exercise was conducted on June 4, 1997.
This report summarized the observations of the five-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as the utility implemented its Emergency Plan and Procedures in response to the simulated accident scenario for the plume exposure exercise.
The NRC evaluators concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Browns Ferry's Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) in response to a simulated accident.
In the process, the licensee identified issues, the resolution -of which should lead to an improved program.
Summarized observations from the key emergency response facilities follow:
Control Room Simulator CRS The Shift Manager declared the Alert and became the Site Emergency Director (SED).
While acting as the SED,he continued as the primary communicator with the incident commander at the fire team which delayed some of the procedural responsibilities of. the.SED..', The shift properly implemented their emergency operation procedures.
Technical Su ort Center TSC Excellent command and control by the SED in the TSC assisted the implementation of effective accident mitigation.
0 erational Su ort Center OSC The OSC was activated timely and provided in-plant teams as directed by the TSC.
Central Emer enc Control Center CECC The CECC Director was effective in coordinating licensee activities related to the emergency and providing information to the Federal, State, and local authorities responding to the simulated radiological emergency.
Joint Information Center JIC The JIC operated effectively in managing the coordination of information.to the news media personnel with timely and informative press releases and news conferences in most instance Re ort,Details Summar of Exercise Events This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included full participation by the State of Alabama and associated Risk Counties.
This plume exposure exercise was evaluated by an NRC inspection team and.was conducted from 8:00 a.m. to 1:10 p.m.
on June 4, 1997.
Player critiques were conducted by the licensee's emergency response participants in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) following termination of the exercise.
The NRC exit meeting was conducted on Hay 15, 1997, following the licensee'.s presentation to
.
management of exercise r'esults.
VI. Plant Su ort 4 ~
P4.
Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
P4.1 Exercise Scenario a.
Ins ection Sco e
82302 b.
C.
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's Radiological Emergency plan.
Observations and Findin s The licensee submitted its Goals and Objectives for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP),REP Exercise to the NRC with a letter dated Harch 19, 1997.
The detailed scenario package was submitted with a letter dated April 18, 1997.
A review of the package determined that the scenario was challenging as it progressed from an Alert, to a Site Area Emergency (SAE),
and then to a General Emergency (GE).
The scenario fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the State and local governmental agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency response capability.
P4.2 Onsite Emer enc Or anization.
a.
Ins ection Sco e
82301 The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to respond to the simulated emergenc ib
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response were clearly defined.
The Shift Supervisor assumed the responsibilities of the SED, and other personnel=assumed their respective pre-established responsibilities.
The inspector noted that the Shift Supervisor, after becoming the SED, continued to be the primary'communicator on the radio with the incident commander at the fire scene.
As a result of the need for frequent communication to the incident commander, the SED was delayed progressing through his procedural responsibilities which included making notification to the Operations Duty Specialist and activating the Automatic Paging System (APS).
This delay, did not result in unsatisfactory times for notifications or activating the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), but it did result in a less timely response.
Following'the activation of the APS, adequate staffing promptly responded to the ERFs and activated the facilities.
The licensee identified a Problem Evaluation Report (PER) to examine the collateral responsibilities of the SED and fire response.
c.
Conclusion The initial on-duty Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were sufficient to respond and perform defined emergency responsibilities.
P4.3 Emer enc Classification S stem a.
Ins ection Sco e
82301 The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to determine whether a standard emergency classification-and action level scheme.was in use by the licensee.
b.
Observation and Findin s Appendix A to the BFNP REP provided the accident classification scheme that was effectively used throughout the exercise to properly categorize the off-normal events.. The Alert was declared at 8:20 a.m.
based on a
simulated fire in the 2A 480V Reactor Motor Operated Valve Board, which was a fire affecting safety related equipment.
At 9:25 a.m.,
a SAE was declared due to an unisolable primary system leak and high area temperature.
At 10:40 a.m.,
a GE was declared due to the indications for the SAE and the indication of potential or significant fuel failure.
c.
Conclusion The licensee had a standard system for emergency classifications and used it effectively to classify the off-normal events promptly and correctl ~"
P4.4 Notification Hethods and Procedures a.
Ins ection Sco e
82301 The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local governmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance with".procedures.
b.
C.
Observations and Findin s-The initial emergency notification to the State of Alabama was made by the ODS in Chattanooga, who was notified on a hot ring-down phone by the SED.
The notifications for the upgrade declarations of'AE and GE were made from'he CECC.
All notifications were made promptly following the emergency classifications.
Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to make initial and follow-up notifications containing essential information for the upgraded
'lassifications to the States and counties in a timely manner.
P4.5 Emer enc Communications a.
Ins ection Sco e. 82301 The inspectors observed the flow of communications within the emergency response organization and from and among the ERFs to determine whether provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency information.
b.
Observation and Findin s The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and offsite agencies and amongst the ERFs were effective for the prompt transmission of emergency information.
Responsible personnel were kept informed of ongoing events.
Communication was effective in performing accident mitigation and initiating protective actions for both onsite and offsite personnel.
c.
Conclusion Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel.
Communcation was effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information a'nd coordinate emergency respons Ik
p4.6 a.
Public Education and Information Ins ection Sco e 82301 The inspectors observed how information pertaining the simulated emergency was made available to the public.
b. Observations and Findin s TVA established the JIC at Calhoun Community College, located outside of Decatur, Alabama.
The-JIC was operational at 9:45 a.m.
and coordinated with the State of Alabama and Risk Counties in providing information to the news media during news conferences.
The licensee provided five press releases for the news media.
The last four were coordinated from the JIC.
The press releases were timely and informative with the exception of a confusing entry Press Release No. 5.'In Press Release No. 5, there is a statement
"At 11:18 a.m. today, instruments measured 370 millirem of radiation per hour... Radiation measurements were as high as 825 millirem per hour at ll:32 and at 11:55 a.m. the radiation measurements had dropped to about 20 millirem per hour."
Without a location.for this reading, it was essentially meaningless to the public. It could create significant confusion.
The licensee established a
PER for this confusing entry in its,press release.
TVA established a rumor control function in the JIC..
Personnel adequately responded to questions and, while not operating jointly with the State of Alabama, had proper telephone numbers to coordinate information or r efer callers to the state.
C. Conclusions The JIC and its staff were activated and organized in a manner that provided for the dissemination of timely and meaningful information to the public via the news media.
P4.7 Emer enc Facilities and E ui ment a. Ins ection Sco e
82301 b.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected ERFs to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment were available and maintained to support an emergency response.
Observations and 'Findin s Control Room Simulator
- An inspector observed that the on-shift designated crew in the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the emergency response..
The facility and equipment supported the crew as they responded
.to the simulated emergenc ll
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C.
- The TSC was promptly activated with assigned
" emergency response personnel.
The facility layout provided communication between the SED and his staff.
The inspectors noted good use of procedures by the staff.
The procedural review of event classifications in the TSC was timely.
Good prioritization of OSC/exercise activities was observed.
The strong command and control exhibited by the SED was considered a strength.
'Operational Support Center
-.,The OSC was activated in accordance with procedures in a timely manner.
Congestion and noise were minimized.
Habitability of the facility was verified on a periodic basis.
The facility and equipment supported OSC mission accomplishment.
Team formation and briefings were reasonably timely.
Central Emergency Control Center
- The CECC was located in Chattanooga and was promptly staffed and activated with designated corporate
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ersonnel by 9:00 a.m.
The CECC Director communicated effectively with is staff.
Radiological field teams were satisfactorily dispatched and controlled from the CECC.
The facility and equipment supported the staff well as they performed required functions and interacted with offsite officials.
Conclusion The'ERFs were organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that satisfactively provided f'r the emergency response.
P4.8 Protective Res onses a.
Ins ection Sco e
82301 The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite personnel and the protective action recommendations (PARs) provided by the licensee to the offsite agencies.
b.
Observations and Findin s The SED implemented appropriate protective actions for onsite personnel
,as the emergency classification escalated to a SAE.
The CECC Director made the PARs to the State within 15 minutes of the GE declaration.
C.
Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures for onsite personnel and to make the required PARs for the protection of the publi P4.'9 'xercise Criti ue a. 'ns ection Sco e
82301 The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the exercise and portions of the control.ler/evaluator organization critique process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management.
b.
Observations and 'Findin s The licensee conducted effective player critiques following exercise termination.
From the player comments and the controller/evaluator observations, the controller/evaluator staff determined the performance of the emergency organization responding to the simulated accident'o be satisfactory.
A good summary of this performance and supporting observations. were provided to licensee management on June 6, 1997, prior to the NRC Exit Meeting.
c.
Conclusion The controller/evaluator organization did a good job of analyzing exercise performance.
Substantive comments were provided by the evaluators to their management:
V. Mana ement Meetin s Xl Exit Meeting Suamary The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to members of licensee management at,the conclusion of the inspection on June 6, 1997.
The summary indicated satisfactory performance.
No proprietary information is contained in.this repor I
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b'rowns Ferry.Nuclear-- 1'997 Graded Exercise Oo NOT DIVULGE The Radiological Emergency Plan Exercise willbe a fullscale exercise consisting of the'following participation by TVAand State emergency organizations:
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Central Emergency Control Center willfully participate and be evaluated.
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Technical Support Center willfully participate and be evaluated.
Operations Support Center willfullyparticipate and be evaluated.
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Joint Information Center willfullyparticipate and be evaluated.
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State Emergency Operations Center willfullyparticipate and be evaluated.
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Risk Counties Emergency Operations Centers willfully participate and be evaluated.
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State Field Coordination Center willfullyparticipate and be evaluated.
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State Radiological Monitoring Control Center willfully participate and be evaluated.
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State Field Teams willfullyparticipate and be evaluated:
EXERCISE GOALS TVA's goals for the exercise are as follows:
1.
Allowplant and'offsite personnel to demonstrate'and test the capabilities of the emergency response organization to protect the health and safety of plant personnel and the general public in accordance with the Nuclear Power-Radiological Emergency Plan (NP-REP), site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), and the Central Emergency Control'Center (CECC) EPIPs.
2.
Provide an interactive exercise to ensure proficiency of onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities.
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Provide training for emergency response personnel.
4.
Identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of improvement or revision.
5.
Provide an interactive exercise to allow the State responders to demonstrate their proficien'cy in emergency response capabilities.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES A. Control Room/Simulator 1..Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Manager to recognize conditions, classify emergencies, make required notifications in a timely.manner, and assume the initial responsibilities of the Site Emergency Director (SED).
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the'Shift Manager to maintain effective command and control of control room activities, perform classification analysis, periodically inform the control room staff ofthe status of the emergency situation, and provide a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the control room to the Technical Support Center (TSC).
3.
Demonstrate the. ability of the control room staff to make timely analysis of the incident, pe'rform mitigating actions, keep onsite personnel informed of the emergency situation prior to TSC activation.
4.,Demonstrate the ability of the control room staff to use appropriate radiological emergency procedures, maintain an accurate log of events, and defer problems that cannot be quickly resolved to the TSC for resolution.
TVAEmegency Preparedness Page 9 Revised: 4/2/97 8:15 Phl
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Brogans -Ferry Nuclear - 1997'Graded Exercise Do NOT OIVULGE Demonstrate the ability of the control room staff to continuously evaluate information, redefine/confirm conditions and event classifications, and establish an effective flowof info'rmation between the Control Room, the TSC, and the Operations Support Center (OSC).
B. Technical Support Center (TSC)
Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the control room staff to the TSC staff and assume the primary responsibilities of the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) until the CECC is activated.
Demonstrate the SED's ability to provide effective direction, command and control, to manage activities in a manner that promotes event classification, analysis, or mitigation ofan event and to perform periodic
- -
briefings forTSC/OSC staff and personnel.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to use appropriate procedures, solve problems related to incident identifiication'and mitigation, and maintain an accurate account of events through chronological logs:
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to determine the appropriate sampling and monitoring required to support accident mitigation, perform timely assessments of onsite radiological'conditions, and formulate, coordinate, implement, and track on site protective actions.
5.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to maintain effective communication between the OSC, control room, CECC, and various groups within the TSC.
Demonstrate ability of the TSC to continuously evaluate available information, redefine/confirm plant conditions and event classifications, and ifrequired assemble onsite personnel within the site area.
Demonstrate the ability ofthe TSC to effectively communicate with environmental monitoring vans from the Radcon Lab until the CECC is activated.
C. Operations Support Center (OSC)
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC Manager, through effective command and control, to coordinate and initiate activities in a timely manner, maintain effective communications between various groups within the OSC, and use appropriate procedures..
'.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to properly plan required tasks and promptly dispatch, track, and maintain communication with the response teams.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC response teams to prepare, respond, make necessary repairs or inspections, and provide an adequate debrief upon returning to the OSC.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to maintain accurate status boards, priority boards, team tracking boards, and logs. Also, demonstrate effective transfer of information between the OSC, TSC, Radcon laboratory, and Chemistry laboratory.
,5.
Demonstrate ability of the Radcon personnel to use appropriate procedures and follow Radcon and ALARA practices to ensure 'adequate worker protection and perform effective inplant surveys.
6.
Demonstrate ability of the OSC to track changing radiological conditions through survey results and/or inplant t
monitors, control internal and external exposures and personnel contamination of onsite emergency workers, and incorporate the information into personnel protective actions and exposure tracking.
TVAEmergency Preparedness Page 10 Revised: 4I287 8:15 PM
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Browns Ferry Nuclear - 1997 Graded Exercise DO NOT DIVULGE e,'entral Emergency Control 'Center (CECC)
Demonstrate. the ability of the Operations Duty Specialist to make initial notifications to State agencies in a timely.manner.
Demonstrate the ability to transfer offsite responsibilities from the TSC to the CECC.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC'Director to maintain effective command and control and promote internal communications.
4.
Demonstrate the ability, of the CECC to provide emergency classifications, protective action recommendations, plant conditions, and dose assessment information to the State.in'a timely manner.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively obtain radiological survey information from the environmental monitoring teams, keep the monitoring teams informed of emergency conditions, and provide them with exposure control.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to use appropriate procedures and equipment, maintain accurate logs, and to periodically evaluate available information and redefine/confirm plant conditions and event classifications.'emonstrate, the ability.of the CECC staff to,contact TVAcorporate, vendor, or other outside support resources as appropriate or needed.
10 Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to obtain field data needed to develop dose assessments in a timely manner.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to establish and maintain effective communication between the various emergency centers.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends, determine the potential consequences, and maintain accurate status board information.
11. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain adequate security for the CECC.
, E. Exercise Specific
'1:.Demonstrate the ability of the exercise controllers to perform their function without prompting, coaching, or otherwise interfering with the'performance of exercise players.
2..
Demonstrate that personnel participating in the exercise were not pre-positioned prior to,commencement.
3.
Demonstrate that participants did not have undue prior knowledge of scenario details or initiation time 4.
The scenario should be. technically accurate, anticipate emergency. classifications, and be sufficiently difficult
- to exercise capabilities of the emergency plan.
5.
Demonstrate the 'ability to conduct post exercise critiques.
6.. '.Demonstrate the adequacy of control room and emergency centers facilities, resources, equipment, and communication systems to support emergency operations.
TVAEmergency Preparedness Page 11 Revised: 4/2/97 8:15 PM
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6; Browns Ferry Nuclear - 1997 Gra.ded Exercise DO NOT DIVULGE
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize emergency response center personnel and activation of the emergency centers within approximately, one hour.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct habitability surveys for the TSC, OSC, Control Room/ Simulator; and all assembly areas.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain effective communication between the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Central Emergency Control Center, Control Room/ Simulator, and NRC.
F; -Environmental Monitoring 1.
2.
Demonstrate the ability ofthe environmental monitoring teams to effectively utilize procedures to perform dose rate surveys and to collect and analyze radiological samples.
Demonstrate the enVironmental monitoring team's abilities to followcontamination control procedures in field conditions.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the environmental monitoring vans to support emergency operations.
(monitoring equipment, supplies, communication equipment, etc.)
4.
N 5.
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Demonstrate the ability of the site to timely and effectively activate and establish communication with environmental monitoring vans.
Demonstrate ability of the site to timely and effectively transfer control of the environmental monitoring vans to an offsite center.
Demonstrate ability to effectively dispatch and control radiological/environmental monitoring teams, coordinate with the State when applicable, and obtain, analyze, and utilize meteorological, onsite and offsite radiological conditions, and source term information to develop dose assessments in a timely manner.
Demonstrate ability of the environmental monitoring team personnel to monitor their accumulated dose, report their accumulated doses to the Environs Assessor/Field Coordinator, and receive proper authorization for emergency exposures ifrequired.
G. Public Information IJoint information Center 2.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC/Communications staff to coordinate information with non - TVAagencies prior to the JIC being staffed.
Demonstrate the ability ofthe CECC Communications staff to develop timely and accurate news releases.
Demonstrate the ability ofthe CECC Information Manager to exercise effective command and control ofthe overall communications response.
Demonstrate the ability of the JIC to coordinate public news briefings with State and Federal agencies and provide timely information to the public during periodic JIC briefings.
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Demonstrate the abiiity of media relations'ersonnel in.the JIC to answer telephone calls from the media professionally and accurately.
Demonstrate the ability ofTVA's public information staff in the JIC to provide timely and accurate information to anyone calling the public information telephone number.
TVAEnw.tgency Preparedness Page 12 Revised: 4/287 8:15 PM
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Browns Ferry Nuclear - 1997 Graded Exercise DO NOT DIVULGE
'Demonstrate the ability to provide, reasonable media access with minimal impact on emergency response activities.
Demonstrate the ability to provide information to the public that is accurate, presented at a meaningful technical level, and take corrective actions for inaccuracies.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the CECC communication staff facilities, resources, equipment, and communications system to support emergency operations Fire Emergency Response Team 1.
Demonstrate that an incident commander is promptly dispatched to the scene ofthe emergency where
', *'e/she demonstrates ability to establish a command post, establish communication with the main control room, and effectively interact with the fire brigade team leader Demonstrate the ability of the. fire brigade team to respond to the scene, establish appropriate response sectors/staging areas, and assess the physical situation in a timely manner The, fire.brigade team demonstrates adequate fire fighting skills and appropriate use of fire fighting equipment.
The fire brigade leader demonstrates ability to conduct briefings, control the fire scene,.and displays appropriate fire fighting tactics.
5.
6.
7.
Radcon personnel demonstrates their ability to monitor-fire brigade team exposures'and provided sufficient radiological information to the incident commander and / or fire brigade team leader.
The incident commander and fire brigade team leader demonstrates ability to communicate effectively.
Security personnel. demonstrate their ability to provide. sufficient and effective control at this scene of the fire.
Post Accident Sampling-
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Liquid or gaseous samples were collected containing actual or simulated elevated radionuclide levels including the use of the Post Accident Sampling'Facility.
Doses to sampling and analysis personnel do not exceed limits specified in 10CFR20.1201.
Results of sample analysis are available within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of suspected core damage (given that the reactor and core conditions are such that a representative sample can be taken within that timeframe)..i.e.: sampling is not prudent during the core damage phase or ifexercise equipment failures preclude sampling.
Termination and Recovery Ifnecessary due to the conditions existing at the time of entry into Recovery, a recovery organization adequate to maintain oversight of remaining activities was designated and a plan was developed on how to transition from TSC operations to LRC operations iflong term operations are required.
A detailed plan for activities necessary.to return the plant systems to "normal status was developed.
The Control Room, TSC, CECCNRC, and State were all included in discussions and concurred in the decision to terminate and enter recovery TVAEmenIency Piepaedness Page 13, Revised: 4/287 8:15 PM'
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Browns Ferry Nuclear-1997 Graded Exercise
'QNQTDlvULGE K. NRC Foltow-up Items NONE L. The following drills will be conducted during the exercise:
1.
CECC/State Communication Drill 2.
TSG/CECC Communication Drill 3.
Plant Radcon Drill(ln-Plant Radiation Monitoring)
4.
Plant Radiological Monitoring Drill( Environs Monitoring )
5.
Radiological Dose'Assessment Drill(CECC)
6.
Post Accident Sampling Drill TVAEmergency Preparedness Page t4 Revised: 4287 8:15 Ph)
'-. Browns Ferry 1997 Annual Exercise Week of June'2, 1997 Narrative Summary The unit has been at 100% power for last 186 days (Middle of Life Core). We have been experiencing condensate chemistry problems (pH, chlorides, silicates, etc). We suspect a ( leaking Condenser Tube. We have isolated the 2A2 waterbox for repairs 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.
Conductivity has stabilized since isolation of the waterbox and is slowly improving. Reactor ( Protection System (RPS) train'"A"is on, an alternate power supply while a Preventative Maintenance activity is being performed on the Motor-Generator (MG) set.
Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) Demineralizer A is Out of Service and is expected to return.in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
( Demirleralizer B is expected to be removed in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for resin backwash and precoat.
This problem is worsened by the fact that chlorination for mussel control had'just been completed before the leak and-chlorides are unusually-high.
Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS)
train "C" is out.of service for repair of a damaged door and charcoal filterchangeout.
( At about T=O:10, circuitry shorts and burns in the breaker supplying power to the inboard Reactor Water Clean Up Isolation Valve 2-FCV-69-1. Smoke fillsthe compartment and travels to the Motor Control Center (MCC) bus. As a result of the smoke, the 480V Reactor Motor Operated Valve Board 2A shorts and trips its supply breaker.
However, the breaker did not operate quickly enough to prevent the Motor Control Center; as well as the associated cables and bus, from being damaged. by the high current. This fire is contained within the 480V Reactor Motor. Operated Valve Board 2A, Compartment 16E but does substantial damage to the compartment, the surrounding housing, the associated cables, and the bus.
At about T=O:30, an ALERTwillbe declared based on Emergency Action Level 6.4A - Fire in any area listed affecting safety equipment.
l About T=1:00, a card in the controller forthe Turbine control valves unexpectedly fails causing all the control valves and bypass valves to slam shut and the reactor to trip. This loss. causes the reactor pressure to increase to the maximum and a SCRAM results on high Reactor
'ressure.
This approaches the high pressure safety limits and severely stresses the fuel.
There is a small increase in fuel damage directly followingthe transient. Cracks develop. in the ( Reactor Water Clean Up Suction Piping from pressure transient resulting from the Turbine Control Valve closure. When the reactor scrams, two adjacent control rods near the center of the core do not insert. This willprevent the rapid depressurization of the reactor as well as cause concern over return to criticality as the reactor is cooled. (These control rods are mechanically bound in position and willnot respond to any actions). When called for, Standby Gas Treatment System Train "B".fails:to start due to a failed fan bearing.
( At about T=1:20, the Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) line fails in the, Reactor Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger room where the cracks had developed earlier. (This leak'is'isolable only'by closure of 2-FCV-69-1 or 2-FCV-69-2). The force ofthe hot liquid flashing to steam blows the door to the Reactor Water Clean Up heat exchanger roonroff the frame (next to the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Room). When operators attempt to close the Reactor Water Clean Up outboard isolation valve (2-FCV-69-2), it is found to be failed in the open position.
The ability to close the inboard isolation valve (2-FCV-69-1) was previously lost due to the fire in the breaker. to the valve operator.
The sudden rush of air pressure generated from steam leak causes one panel to blow offon the Northwest comer ofthe refuel floor and initiates an alarm for low negative pressure on the Reactor and Refueling Buildings. '(A eM foot by twelve foot refuel floorpanel is hanging from a chain outside the building)
TVAEmergency Preparedness Page 17 Revised: 6/287 11'M
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',Browns Ferry'1997 Annual Exercise
'Week of,June 2, 1997 This large leak willalso cause a sudden drop in level and pressure in the Reactor. The escaping hot water and steam push the temperature in the Reactor Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger room above 220F. Any personnel in the area willhave left the area'temporarily before the Reactor Water Clean Up line break to exclude concerns about fatalities. Leak rates exceed 2000 gpm for a few minutes and then return to about 500 gpm. As reactor pressure drops the leak rate also drops. from 500 gpm to 100 gpm.
At about T=1:30 a SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared, based on Emergency Action Level 3.1S (An Unisolable Primary System Leak discharging into Secondary Containment AND Any area temperature exceeds the Maximum Safe Operating Area Temperature Limitlisted in table 3.1).
At about T=2:15, the combination of initial chemistry problems, pressure transients, temperature transients at the pipe rupture, approaching safety'limits, and the cooldown and depressurization post-scram cause an increase offuel cladding damage.
This is noted by the increase in the Rad monitor readings over the next 30 minutes exceeding 270 R/Hr in the drywell around T=2:40.. Offsite.iodine committed dose equivalent levels reach 4.4E-8 pCi/cc at 2 miles downwind.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared around T=2:30 based on:
Emergency Action Level 3.2G (An Unisolable Pnmary System Leak discharginginto Secondary Containment ANDAny area'radiation level at or above the Maximum Safe Operating Area Radiation Limitlisted in Table 3.2 ANDAnyindication ofpotential or significant fuel failure exits)
OR Emergency Action Level 8.4G (Loss ofany tv'amers and potential loss ofthird bamer)
Between T=3:30 and T=4:00, some combination of ongoing actions willhave been successful in isolating the leak and minimizing the release.
At this point, the focus of the actions willturn to termination and recovery activities. The current configuration of the plant, the actions necessary to ensure long term stability of the core and necessary systems, availability of personnel, and control of future releases willbe addressed.
We expect 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to conduct the necessary reviews and to develop the Recovery Plan.
I The Exercise willbe terminated when:
(1)
The fuel is stable (Water above top of fuel and criticality addressed)
(2) The leak is isolated (3)
Quantifying the fuel damage has begun (Post Accident Sampling Initiated)
(4)
Sufficient offsite monitoring and sampling has been accomplished to meet objectives (5) A Recovery plan addressing the items from the site EPIP has been developed.
~ ~
TVAEmergency Preparedness Page 18 Revised: 6/2671$ :)8 AM
0
-:Browns Ferry.'1997,Annual, Exercise
.
'=.,'Week. ofJune'2, 1997 IMPORTANCE OF'SCENARIO ASPECTS:
Chemistry Problems Helps justify cladding failure by stressing the cladding 3 leakers
'RPS on.Alternate Wams of.poor fuel condition. Helps justify later fu'el damage.
Prevents operators from noticing the failure of 2-FCV-69-2 at the SCRAM.
Mechanical Binding of 2-FCV-69-2
.Prevents isolation of RWCU suction line when coupled with fire in the 480V RxMOVBoard compartment for the inboard isolation valve
- Fire 480V RxMovBd 2A Compartment 16E Prevents closure of 2-FCV-69-1 (RWCU inboard isolation valve).
This.
coupled with the mechanical binding of 2-FCV-69-2 prevents isolation of the RWCU leak.
Pressure.instrument Creates an:over-pressure event exceeding. safety limits and-justifies a large amount of cladding failure due to pressure and temperature stresses on the cladding.
2. Rods Stuck.out, Prevents rapid depressurization of the Reactor.
Holding higher pressure in:the Reactor helps justify increased offsite releases.
Creates a technical analysis opportunity.
SBGTS 'O'oor/Filters Provides.release path to the secondary containment as well as a method of reducing coolant inventory.
Reduces the maximum treatment system flowrate and thereby
.increases. the fraction of the steam release from the leak that is allowed-to escape the building untreated.
SBGTS"B':Fan Bearing.
Reduces:the maximum treatment system flowrate and thereby increases:the fraction of the steam release from the leak that is allowed to:escape the building untreated.'
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I TVAEmergency Preparedness Page 19 Revised: 6I287 11QS AM
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SUMMARY REPORT WEEKLY STATUS OF INSPECTION REPORTS LICENSEE RESPONSES AND REGIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AS OF 07/21/97 DIVISION INSPECTION REPORTS LICENSEE RESPONSES REGIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FACILITY/REPORT DAYS LATE FACILITY/REPORT DAYS LATE FACILITY/REPORT DAYS LATE DRP RP1B TOTAL LATE (DRP)
RP2B RP3B RP4B RPSB RP6B
SEQUOYAH/97004
OLH2 i
PSB2
- '.."...
SIB2 WATTS BAR/97003
0
DNMS l
TOTAL LATE (DHHS)
FFB MI21 MI22 0,
PORTSMOUTH CAR/97001 RIVERSIDE REGI/97001
6
REGION TOTAL G: KWEEKSTAT
~
~
SUMMARY REPORT WEEKLY STATUS OF INSPECTION REPORTS LZCENSEE RESPONSES AND REGIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AS OF 07/21/97 DIVISION BRANCH INSPECTION REPORTS FACILITY/REPORT DAYS LATE LICENSEE RESPONSES FACILITY/REPORT DAYS LATE REGZONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FACZLZTY/REPORT DAYS LATE DRP RP1B RP2B TOTAL LATE (DRP)
RP3B RP4B RP5B RP6B
SEQUOYAH/97004
t
'F %
OLH2 PSB2 SIB2 Ik WATTS BAR/97003
0
DNMS MI21 MI22 gP,
'!
TOTAL LATE (DNHS)
PORTSMOUTH CAR/97001 RIVERSIDE REGI/97001
6
REGION TOTAL G: hWEEKSTAT
O~
WEEKLY STATUS PECTION REPORTS LICENSEE PONSES AND REGIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AS OF 07/21/97 DIVISION OF REACTOR SAFETY PLANT SUPPORT BRANCH LICENSEE FACILITY INSPECTION REPORT LICENSEE RESPONSE REG ACKNOWLEDGEMENT LEAD INSP SENT DAYS DAYS
.
SENT DAYS DOCKET/RPT ¹ INSPECTOR END DATE DUE OUT LATE DUE RECVD LATE DUE OUT LATE NOTE SUMMER 05000395 97010 SARTOR MCGUIRE 1 MCGUIRE 2 HATCH 1 HATCH 2 SURRY 1 SURRY 2 05000369 97012 SARTOR 05000370 97012 05000321 97008 SARTOR 05000366 97008 05000280 97008 SARTOR 05000281 97008 BROWNS FERRY ~ 1 05000259 97006 SARTOR BROWNS FERRY 2 05000260 97006 BROWNS FERRY 3 05000296 97006 06/06 07/21 7j+/
07/18 09/01 08/08 09/22 08/22 10/06 08/29 10/13 TEAM PENDING CLEAR TEAM TEAM PENDING TEAM PENDING TEAM PENDING
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SITE:
REPORT NO.:
BRONIS FERRY 97006
REGION II
RITS AUDIT REPORT DATA'HROUGH 07/05/97 INSPECTION EHD. DATE:
06/06/1997 LEAD 'INSPECTOR:
'NS EMPLOYEE WEEK END ING DOCKET NO.
aa PROCEDURE IPE NO.
CODE a
a a
PROCEDURE STATUS INI REGULAR NONREGULAR CODE HOURS HOURS aaa aaa aaaaaaaa a
aaa a
EDTESTA GWSALYERS J
WNSARTOR 06/07/1997 05000260 05000260 ENPLOYEE TOTAL>>
05/31/1997 05000260'5000296 06/07/1997 05000260 05000260 EHPLOYEE TOTAL>>
05/3'I/'1997
. 05000259 05000260 05000296 06/07/1997 05000259'5000259 05000259 05000260 05000260 05000260 05000296 05000296 05000296 EHPLOYEE TOTAL>>
REPORT TOTAL>>
82301 82301 82301 82302 82301
'82302 82301 82302 AT CO APP APP
~
AT CO ARP ARP
.
ARP AT CO CO AT
.CO CO AT CO CO IRAD IRAD IEPI IEPI IEPI IEPI IRAD IRAD IRAD IEPI
,IEPI IEPI IEPI IEPI IEPI IEPI IEPI IEPI
'.0 36.0 44.0 4.0 4.0 18.0
,26.0 52.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 9.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 2.0 3.'0 9.0 2.'0 53.0 149.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- 0.0
~ 0.0
'0.0 0.0'.0 2.0 C
C C
C C
C I
HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE'DATA AND TO THE BEST OF IIY KNOWLEDGE THE TINE ALLOCATIONS FOR REPORT
,(BROWHS FERRY.=.. /.97006)
ARE ACCURATE.AND RE CT,.WHAT IS DOCUHENTED IN.THE INSPECTION REPORT..
INSPECTOR SIGNATURE 8 DATE:
BRAHCH CHIEF SIGNATURE &.DATE:
7'RETURN TO IRB after rePort is issUed.
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