IR 05000245/1980005
| ML19318B881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1980 |
| From: | Robert Carlson, Chaudhary S, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318B878 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-80-05, 50-245-80-5, NUDOCS 8006300236 | |
| Download: ML19318B881 (3) | |
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTI0tl AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-245/80-05 Docket No.
50-245 License No.
DPR-21 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Energy Station, Unit 1 Meeting at:
U.S. NRC, Region I Office, King of Prussia, Pa.
heeting conducted:
March 13, 1980 NRC Personnel: I czu W.
Eo!SO S K.C udnary/ Reactor Inspector
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- h-If50 1. E. Trfpp, Chief, Engineering Support Date
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Section No. 1 Approved by:
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R. T. Carlson, Chief, Reactor Constructior and
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Engineering Support Branch Meeting Summary:
The meeting was convened to discuss the findings of an inves-tigation conducted by Region I of several allegations pertaining to the water-hammer event of December 19, 1979, and subsequent follow-up activities by the licensee and NRC.
Licensee actions involved in system modifications and repair were also discussed.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 71)
8006300236
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Attending Northeast Nuclear Energy Company W. G. Counsil, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations J. M. Kufel, Superintendent of Nuclear Operations R. Warner, Assistant Vice President of Generation Engineering and Construction Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. T. Carlson, Chief, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch E. J. Brunner, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch L. E. Tripp, Chief, Engineering Support Section #I., RC&ES Branch R. R. Keimig, Chief, Project Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch S. K. Chaudhary, Reactor Inspector, Region I 2.
Areas Discussed 1.
Adequacy of licensee investigation / evaluation of water hammer event of December 19, 1979.
The licensee stated that the investigation and evaluation was concen-trated in the areas where problems occurred previously.
The high stress points were reanalyzed and a visual inspection and bolt tightening operation was carried out.
However, visual inspection and bolt tightening was not well documented.
The oversight in identifying concrete expansion anchors used in the support at penetration X-10A was due to large numbers of anchor replacement in six weeks (2500 anchors), and inadequate QC documentation.
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Adequacy of corrective actions to prevent future water hammer events.
The licensee stated that the operators have been given specific instruc-tion regarding water levels in the reactor, and administrative control has been increased.
Furthermore, additional supports and restraints were installed in the system after the previous event in 1978.
3.
Accuracy and completeness of information given to NRC.
The licensee stated that Teledyne and NCSCO were working around the clock to resolve the problem.
Because of NRC's interest, and urgency placed on it, the licensee was relaying praliminary results to NRC without the final review and other QA checka.
Therefore, many pre-liminary results relayed to NRC had to be diccarded or modified later after the final engineering review and checks.
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4.
Discrepancies found in design, analysis and installation for this line.
The licensee has initiated a review of design, analysis and installation documents to determine if a similar problem exists in other areas of the plant.
5.
NRC difficulties in identifying and obtaining requested stress analyses.
The licensee stated that NUSCO believed that all the pertinent information and stress reports were provided to NRC.
The management of NUSCO was unaware that NRC encountered delay in obtaining the specific stress ana-lysis report it was interested in reviewing; probably, it was a misunder-standing.
The licensee suggested that in the future, if such problems arise, licensee higher management should be cortacted for resolution.
6.
Licensee reporting of missing rebar.
1hc licensee believed that the Resident Rea; tor Inspector was aware of the rebar problem because the RRI was in t5e same area when this problem was discovered.
Also, a member of the licensee management informed the public affairs department without realizing that NRC had not been notified.
7.
Licensee initiatives during followup investigation and repair activities.
The licensee stated that the apparent lack of initiative on the part of licensee was due to the uncertainty of the course of action that would be acceptable to NRC.
8.
Certification of as-built drawings.
The licensee has initiated a comprehensive review of the as-built drawings and other installation documents.
A task force of ten engineers and other support personnel has been setup for this purpose.
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