IR 05000225/1988004

Insp Rept 50-225/88-04 on 880817-18.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Facility Organization,Action on Previous NRC Findings,Logs & Records,Procedures, Surveillances & Mgt Oversight

ML20206F823
Person / Time
Site:	Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Issue date:	11/04/1988
From:	Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206F810	List: IR 05000225/1988004 ML20206F806 ML20206F812
References
50-225-88-04, 50-225-88-4, NUDOCS 8811210355
Download: ML20206F823 (7)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.,

.

.

.

,.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.

50-225/88-04 Docket No.

50-225 License No. CX-22 Licensee:

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)

Department of Nuclear Engineering and Science Troy, New York 12181 Facility Name:

L. David Walthousen Critical Experiments Facility, and Campus Facility Inspection At:

Schenectady and Troy, New York Inspection Conducted: August 17-18, 1088 Inspectors:

H. Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector, Yankee Rowe J. Kaucher, Project Engineer Reactor Projects Technical Support Staff

.,

_ //[M6&_

Approved by:

A g@

d R.4Taverkamp, Chief date

Re tor Projects Section No. 3C Division of Reactor Projects i

Inspection Summary:

Ins lid;pection on August 17-18, 1988 (Report No.

2h758-04)

~

'

Areas inspected:

Routine, unannounced facility tour and inspection (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)

ofTaciftty organization, action on previous NRC findings, logs and records,

'

procedures, surveillances, management oversight and Nuclear Safety Review Board activities.

Results:

Several areas of concern involving apparent violations were identi-Vied.

i Ggi1210]O;{

S$;5 PDR AD PDC O

i

--

b-

.

.

.

-

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.

Persons Contacted...........................................

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (IP 40750*)..

3.

Plant Tours (IP 40750)......................................

4.

Logs, Records and Reports (IP 40750)........................

5.

Surveillance (IP 40750).....................................

6.

Nuclear Safety Revi Beard (IP 40750).......................

7.

Management Ove rsi ght (IP 40750).............................

8.

Exit Meeting (IP 30703).....................................

"The NRC Inspection Manual inspection procedure that was used as inspection guidance is listed for each applicable report section, i

.

-

.

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

1. • Dr. Robert C. Block, Department Head, Nuclear Engineering

1. • Dr. Donald R. Harris, Director, Critical Facility

• Dr. Francisco Rodriguez-Vera, Supervisor (former), Critical Facility

• Mr. Peter L. Angelo, Supervisor, Critical Facility

1. Dr. Gary Judd, Vice President for Plans and Resources

1. Dr. Dwight Sangrey, Dean, School of Engineering

"Denotes those present at the exit interview.

1. Denotes those present during phone exit of August 25, 1988, 2.

Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (Update)

Inspector Follows Item 88-03-01.

Emergency Procedores (EP)

letter of agreement for local hospital to treat accident victims from the critical facility.

In response to the recent inspection in the EP area, the inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this item and determined that the licensee was unable to document that a letter of agreement with the Ellis Hospital existed.

This item warrants further licensee correc-tive action and will be reviewed by the NRC during a subsequent inspection.

3.

Plant Tours The inspectors toured the facility on August 17, 1988. The general condi-tion of the pool area, rod drive mechanisms, reactor core, pool water dump system, fuel storage vault, radiation and air monitoring systems, the control center and housekeeping were observed.

The reactor facility appears to be generally well kept, and is clean and free of clutter.

The inspectors noted that there was a considerable amount of miscellaneous wiring within the control benchboard which appeared to serve no function, and should be removed.

There were two grounding straps which were at-tached with spring clips; these should be permanently attached if re-quired. The wall mounted electrical cabinet in the control room was found to contain flammable labels on interior wiring (tape and paper) and a transformer and power resistor connected to terminal blocks was lying unattached on the bottom of the cabinet.

There was no explanation pro-vided for the function of the resistor and transformer.

fhese items should be corrected and are considered unresolved (88-04-01).

__ ______

_ _ _ _ _

.

-

.

,

During the tour, the inspectors noted that the portable emergency ilghting was inoperative.

This concern was immediately corrected by the licensee by their procurement and installation of a new rechargeable ba tte ry-operated light source. According to the Reactor Supervisor, the licensee plans to develop a surveillance list to check the availability and func-tionality of emergency response equipment and supplies. The light source will be addea to the list.

The inspector had no further questions.

t 4.

Logs, Rec 6rds and Reports The inspector reviewed the following logs, records and reports:

Reactor Logbook, for the two year period prior to the inspection.

--

Pre-Startup Checklists, for the one year period prior to the

--

inspection, l

.

.

The Reactor Logbook contained information such as: operators and key per-

.

sonnel present at startup, designation of console operator, times asso-i ciated with reactor operations, power levels, experiments, access restric-I tions, calibration and testing, core loading and unloading, scrams, and excess reactivity determinations. The logbook contained sufficient detail to adequately describe overall operations.

The reactor pre-startup checklist contains a preformated action list.that mirrors the reactor startup and operating procedures.

The list is detailed and provides a good basis for tracking startup preparations and prerequisites.

All logs, records and reports reviewed contained required information signeffs and reviews.

The inspectors noted no deficiencies.

,

5.

Surveillance The inspectors reviewed the facility records associated with the conduct

}

l of certain surveillance activities required by the Technical Specifici-i tions (TS).

The following surveillance requirements were reviewed to determine proper performance and procedural control:

i j

TS Reference Subject t

j 4.1.1 Rod Drop Time and Magnet Release Time

'

4.1.2 Pool Water Dump Time 4.1.3 Instrument Channel Calibration

4.1.4 Safety System Channel Test 4.1.5 Pool Water level

,

'

l i

,

_ _ _ _ _.

.

.

.

-

The inspector noted that surveillance test data are kept on combined de.ta sheets for semi-annual and annual surveillance.

However, the inspector identified that no semi-annual or annual data sheets exist for the last year.

The TS section 4.1 contains several requirements for the perform-ance of semi-annual / annual surveillance, and TS 6.6.1.c requires that records of tests, checks, and measurements documenting compliance with surveillance requirements be maintained at the facility for at least five years.

Discussions with operations personnel regarding the missing TS surveillance reco/ds provided neither assurance nor any method for check-

!

ing whether the subject surveillances had, in fact, been performed. The above items constitute a violation of TS 4.1 and 6.6.1.c requirements

,

(50-225/68-04-02).

Additionally, there was no evidence that TS 4.1.2,

!

moderator-reflector water dump time, has been performed as required.

The inspector also determined that preplanned survelliance procedures do not exist in mary cases. In the past, informal instructions were used. These concerns were conveyed to the licensee.

6.

Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB)

The NSRB meeting minutes for the past four years were reviewed in detail to verify proper meeting frequency and quorum and to ascertain the per-formance of the review responsibilities mandated by Technical Specifica-tions. The following concerns were identified with regard to the manage-ment oversight provided by the subcommittee, the conduct of the meetings and the performance of responsibilities.

During the past three years, the NSRB has not met at the semi-annual

frequency required by Technical Specification 6.1.5.2.

The NSRB did not meet for as long as fif teen months between May, 1937 and August

,

1988.

'

Section 6.2 of the TS requires that procedures used to conduct

periodic surveillance requirements, startup, operation and shutdown

'

of the reactor be reviewed and approved by the NORB.

The inspector found that there was no evidence that the procedures used tu conduct TS surveillance tests htve been reviewed an ipproved by the NSRB as required.

I Subsequent to the core reload to low enriched fuel, the startup pro-

cedures had been revised to reflect new operating parameters. These substintive change; have not been reviewed and approved by the NSRB i

as required by section 6.2 of the TS.

l i

I

.

!

I i

.

.

.

A

The fact that the NSRB has rot met at the required semi-annual fre-

+

quency, and that there are missing TS surveillance records and unre-viewed procedures and substantive changes thereto indicate that the audit functions of the NSRB required by TS 6.1.5.4a have not been adequately performed.

The above items constitute a c clation of TS requirements (50-225/

88-04-03).

Crilectively, the above four icesis indicate a degradation in the perform-

....e of the NSRB in the cot.doct of its Technical Specification required functions. The adequacy t.f the conduct of activities by the NSRB will be further reviewed during a future inspection by the NRC.

7.

Management OversigM As an indirect result of the other areas which were observed during the conduct of the inspection there are strong indications o' lack of manage-ment oversight at ibis facility as evidenced by the concerns discussed below.

The poor condition of the TS-required surveillance program including

unreviewed procedures, incomplete records and non performance of required TS st veillance activities indicate a lack of involvement of management level personnel.

The NSRB, which is established as an executive level oversight com-

mittee, has not adequately performed its responsibilities.

The licensee has.1os designated any dedicated management oversight

to the facility.

Instead, this responsibility was assigned as a collateral duty.

The delegation of operation of the facili+y as collateral duties is indicative of a weak commitment by RPI adminis-tration to a strong, dedicated operational staff.

The adequacy of management oversight remains a concern pending further inspection by the NRC (88-04-05).

8.

Exit Meeting The ins,nectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection, and presented the scope and findings of this inspection.

The licensee acknowledged the findings and indicated that correcti"a actions would be takei, where appropriat,

_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

.

,t

=

Subsequent to the inspection, during a

telephone coriversation

.

August 25, l'J88, between the NRC..c. ting Projects Branch Chief and the l

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Vice President and Dean of the Graduate School, the Dean of the Engineering School, and others, the violations and concerns were summarized as discussed in this report.

I

.

t

,

,

i l

!

i