IR 05000029/1982003

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IE Insp Rept 50-029/82-03 on 820216-25,0308-12,22-26 & 0405-12.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room,Radwaste Bldg,Radiation Protection,Physical Security, Maint,Surveillance & TMI Action Plan Items
ML20052D409
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 04/20/1982
From: Foley T, Gallo R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20052D385 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.1, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 50-029-82-03, 50-29-82-3, NUDOCS 8205060482
Download: ML20052D409 (10)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.

50-29/82-03 Docket No. 50-29 License No. DPR-3 Priority Category C

Licensee:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name:

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at:

Rowe Massachusetts Inspection conducted:

Februa y 16-25, March 8-12, 22-26, and April 5-12, 1982 y/ /fk%

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Inspectors:

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difte signed T. Foley, SenicF Yesident Inspector date signed date signed kA

/1!20 B2 Approved by:

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Gallo, Chief, RPS No. IA Division of Resident and Project Programs Inspection Summary:

Inspection on: February 16-25, March 8-12, 22-26, and April 5-12, 1982 Areas Inspected:

Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspection by the residentinspector(70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included the control room and the accessible portions of the Vapor Container, Primary Auxiliary Building and Rad Waste Buildings:

radiation protection; ohysical security; fire protection; plant operating records; maintenance; surveillance; plant operations; radioactive waste releases, and TMI Action Plan Items.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)

e205060482 820422 PDR ADOCK 05000029 G

PDR

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted H. Autio, Plant Superintendent E. Begiebing, Maintenance Supervisor W. Billings, Chemistry Manager B. Drawbridge, Technical Director E. Chatfield, Training Manager L. French, Technical Assistant K Jurentkuff, Assistant Operations Supervisor L. Laffond Technical Assistant R. Mitchell, Instrument and Control Supervisor N. St. Laurent Assistant Plant Supervisor R. Sedgwick, Security Supervisor J. Staub, Technical Services Manager The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection, including members of the Operations, Health Physics, In-strument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Security and General Office Staffs.

2.

Review of Plant Operations A.

Daily Inspection The inspector toured the facility to verify proper manning and access control.

During egress from the protected area, the inspector verified operability of radiological monitoring equipment and that radioactivity monitoring was done before release of equipment and materials to unrestricted areas. During tours of the control room the inspector observed adherence to approved procedures and Limiting Conditions for Operati6ns (LCOs).

Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed. Status of control room annunciators were reviewed.

Nuclear instrument panels and other reactor protective systems were examined.

Primary Vent Stack monitor recorder traces were reviewed for indications of releases.

Control room, Maintenance Requests, Tagout log books, and operating orders were reviewed for operating trends and activities. The requirements of the Technical Spec-ification were verified by the inspector at various times during routine tours of the control room. The following requirements were routinely checked:

l T/S Requirement l

2.1.1 Core Thermal Power l

2.1.2 Main Coolant Pressure f

3.1.1.3 Main Coolant Flow 3.1.2.6 Operable Charging Pumps 3.1.2.11 Operable Boration Paths 3.1.1.1.2 Operable Main Coolant Loops 3.1.3.1 Rod Position Indication 3.3.3.3 Operable Meteorological Instruments 3.4.4 Operable Pressurizer 3.4.5 Leakage Detection System 3.4.6 Main Coolant Chemistry 3.5 Operable Accumulator

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3.5.2 Operable ECCS System 3.6.1.1 Containment Integrity 3.7.1.3 Minimum Water Inventory 3.8.1.1 Operable AC Power Sources The inspector noted the following:

During a routine tour of the control rocm the inspector noted that the loop four Steam Generator (s/g) low Differential Pressure (d/p)

announciator was ener Investigation revealed that the Magnetic Amplifier (Mag. Amp.)gized.

failed on March 16, 1982. This failure inserts one signal into the reactor protection system scram network, which requires two signals to trip / scram the reactor.

Technical Specifications require three channels of s/g low d/p flow to be operable. Loops one, two and three s/g d/p flow instruments are currently operable. The licensee has installed a volt meter and a corresponding graph of volts verses pounds of flow directly to the s/g flow transmitter output leads in order to determine the loop four flow and verify the technical specification requirement for total core flow. Repairs to the mag amp will be instituted d ing the next shut down.

Imediate repairs are not possible without scransning the reactor. LER 82-02, concerning this event, is discussed in paragraph 5 of this report.

B.

Weekly System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of selected piping system trains.

Accessible valve positions in the flow path were verified correct.

Proper power supply and breaker alignment was verified. Visual inspections of major components were performed. Operability of instruments essential to system performance was verified. The following systems were checked in accordance with Flow Diagram 9699-FM-83A, OP-4203 Monthly Valve Check, and OP-2652 Prepar-ation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systep for Normal Operation.

Lineup of the High Pressure and Low Pressure Safety Injection

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pumps numbers 1, 2, and 3; lineup of the ECCS Nitrogen Accumulator and the Chemical Injection System.

Containment Isolation valve line-up for containment purge

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systemaand Hydrogen monitoring system.

No inadequacies were identified.

C.

Biweekly Inspection The inspector independently examined the following selected tag-t outs to verify that the valve, breaker or switch was correctly positioned, that the tag was properly attached to the correct component, and that the licensee's procedure, AP-0017, Witching and tagging of Plant Equipment, was adhered to:

Tagouts 82-27, 82-28, 82-60,82-185 and 82-243 were examine F

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The inspector reviewed selected radicactive liquid and gaseous release pemits and verified that the concentrations when eleased were within the 10 CFR 20 limits. Boric acid tank level, temp-erature and concentration were periodically verified to be with-in technical specification limits.

D.

Other Checks During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers, security i

practices at vital area barriers, completion and use of radiation work pemits and protective clothing. The use of personnel monitoring practices, and area radiation monitors were reviewed.

Equipment tagouts were sampled for confomance with T/S LCOs.

Plant house-keeping and cleanliness were evaluated. Other T/S LCOs, including Primary and Secondary Chemistry, and remote instrumentation were checked.

No inadequacies were identified.

3.

Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and/or reviewed maintenance and problem invest-igation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, and codes and standards; proper QA/QC involve-ment, safety tags use, equipment alignment, jumpers use, personnel qualification:;, radiological controls for worker protection, fire pro-tection, retest requirements, and reportability per Technical Specifi-cations. The following activities were included.

Repair of No 1 Heater Drain Pump

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No inadequacies were noted.

4.

Surveillance Testing The inspector periodically observed specific portions of surveillance tests to verify: Adherence to approved procedures, that i.COs were satisfied, test results were satisfe my, if complete, that discrep-ancies were reported and resolved, and that the system was properly returned to service. The following tests were observed.

OP-4202 Control Rod Operability Check

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OP-4204 Monthly Test of the Safety Injection Pumps

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OP-4617 Containment Isolation Actuation Channel and Sensors

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Functional Test OP-4634 Safety Injection Actuation High Containment Pressure

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Sensors Functional Test No inadequacies were identified.

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S.

Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

a.

Events which occured during the inspection period which are con-sidered to be reportable pursuant to T/S 6.9.4 (a) and (b) were reviewed to verify that the details were clearly reported, in-cluding accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further infonnation was required from the licensee, whether generic im-plications were indicated, and whether the event warranted on-site followup. The following LERs were reviewed.

LER No.

Date of Event Subject

  • 82-01/3L 01/07/82 Main Coolant Flow System, Failed Surveillance
  • 82-02/3L 03/16/82 Main Coolant Flow Channel Failure 82-03/3L 03/16/82 Number 2 Auxiliary Feed-water Flow Channel Failure 82-04/3L 03/20/82 Number 3 Auxilary Feedwater Flow Channel Failure 82-15/3L 03/25/82 Primary Vent Stack Gaseous Moniter Failure b.

For the LERs selected for onsite review, (denoted by asterisks above),

the inspector verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and did not constitute and unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and applicability to other site systems and components were also reviewed.

82-01 Main Coolant Flow System Failed Surveillance. This

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event is similiar in nature and cause as those previously reported and reviewed by the inspector in Inspection Report 81-21, Paragraph No. 10. The system will be replaced during the next refueling outage.

82-02/3L Main Coolant Flow Channel Failure. This item was

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discussed in paragraph 2 of this report. Additionally the inspector noted that the cause of the failure was due to the natural end of life of the mag amp. The licensee stated that the mag amp would be replaced during the next shut down.

The inspector questioned the licensee whether it is reasonable to assume that the other three loop mag amps are also approaching their end of life. The licensee responded by memorandum, No.

PSG 82-50 from R. Berry to R. Mitchell, stating that two modifi-cations that would replace the nuclear instruments and additional primary plant instrumentation will be postponed until the 1984 refuelin r

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These modifications will encompass replacement of the other three loop flow mag amps.

The inspector had no further questions in regard to the above.

6.

Review of TMI Action Plan Items The inspector interviewed licensee personnel, reviewed NUREG 0737, NUREG 0660, licensee and NRC documents and witnessed installation of those modifications as applicable, in order to determine the status of those TMI Action Items required to be con.plete on or before January 1,1982.

The inspector reviewed a letter from Yankee Atomic Electric Company to the NRC dated, December 31, 1982, which discusses schedular problems, provides dates that the required item is expected to be complete. Sev-eral items were expected to be completed by March 1, 1982, however, the licensee enccuntered additional delays, and requested an additional two weeks extension from the Licensing Project Manager. The inspector var-ified the extension was verbally granted, via a phone call with the LPM on March 12, 1982. The following items were reviewed:

Action Item No.

Subject II. B. I Reactor Coolant System Vents This item was addressed in IR-50-29/81-16. The system is functional, except that it is tagged out of service until NRC staff approval is obtained. Currently, the NRC staff has requested the licensee to submit the operating guidelines for use of the system. The NRC Licensing Pro-ject Manager (LPM) is reviewing the design and operation of the system and is aware of the system status as a result of a telephone call between the inspector and the LPM on March 10, 1982.

II. B. 2 Plant Shielding The licensee has submitted their review of shielding design pursuant to NUREG 0737 II. B. 2.

Based-on this review the licensee proposed and is proceeding with a design alternative to substantial shielding modifications that would be required. The licensee proposed, in letter FYR-81-157 to the NRC dated November 30, 1981 a Post-Incident Cooling System (PIC),

which allows remote operation of equipment necessary to maintain cold shutdown conditions as required. The PIC system is currently scheduled for installation during the 1982 refueling outage.

II. B. 3 Post-Accident Sampling The licensee has installed a shielded post-accident sample station which.

is currently in the final stage of pr.eoperational testing. The inspector witnessed various portions of the installation construction and pre-op testing, and has verified that operation of the station has been in-corporated into OP-9450, Rev. 1, Post Accident Sampling and Analysi. - -

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The licensee and the HRC both acknowledge that studies of the worst case accidents indicate that the radiation levels from such an accident could limit access to the facility and on-site analysis may not be possible, because of structual characteristics of the facility. The NRC however, is concerned with other accident scenarios which are postulated to result in environmental releases' with lower levels of radiation, and has issued guidance to facilities with unshielded cont-ainments, to be able to sample in an anticipated ambient radiation field of 25 R/hr of.5 Mev ganna photons for the purpose of meeting the NUREG-0737 requirements.

The post accident sample station installed appears to be in agreement with the NRC requirements as modified above, however the capabilities and time limitations for sampling could not be verified by the inspector. The sample station was used during the annual emer-gency drill to draw a primary sample, and analyzed the sample with-in two hours. Additionally, the licensee has installed high range post accident containment air samplers in the Primary Vent Stack monitor house and the switchgear room, both apparently capable of sampling the containment air for iodine, cesiums noble gases and non-volatiles. Procedures for operation of the unit have been incorpor-ated into OP-9459 Post Accident Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 1.

II. F. I Accident Monitoring The licensee has discussed this topic at length with the NRC Licensing ProjectManager(LPM). The licensee has informed both the LPM and the NRC Resident Inspector of the status of these items, and has verbally requested an extension on several items originally due on January 1, 1982. The inspector discussed these items with the LPM and the re-viewed copies of memorandums dccumenting these conversations. The following is a status of the II. F. I items:

(1) Noble Gas Monitoring. This item was discussed in inspection report 50-29/80-16 and 81-16.

(2)

Iodine / Particulate Sampling. This item was discussed in paragraph II. B. 3 of this report. The high range Iodine samples from the Primary Vent Stack Monitor; House, tamples from the' Primary Vent Stack and appears to be in agreement with the requirements of NUREG 0737.

(3) Containment High Range Monitor. The high range monitors are installed and operational, however the cables in the contain-ment are not enviornmentally qualified. The licensee has pro-vided training in the use of these monitors, however the use of the monitors have not been formally incorporated into the licensee'3 emergency procedures. The licensee's represen-tative stated that this should be accomplished in a few weeks.

The inspector will follow the resolution of the qualification of the monitor cables and development of procedures for use of the monitor.

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i (4)ContainmentPressureMonitor. The licensee has installed and tested two containment pressure monitors which appear to meet the NUREG 0737 criteria. The inspector examined the monitors and reviewc! the procedure OP-4664. Vapor Container Pressure Instrument Calibration for VC-P-243 and VC-P-244. No inadeq-uacies were identified.

(5) Containment Water Level. The licensee has installed two vapor container water level monitors.

Both monitors are operational

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and have been calibrated. The monitors have a level indication

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of zero to twenty feet. The inspector reviewed the design change package.and the vendor manual for the level transmitters. The

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j design criteria in the design change package is based upon a water capacity of 250,000 gallons at thirteen feet level instead

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of the 600,000 gallon capacity stated in NUREG 0737. The NUREG however, allows facilities with smaller water capacities to propose deviations from this requirement. The licensee on site representative could not provide a documented proposed deviation to the requirement. The inspector will follow the licensee's action in regard to a proposed deviation (50/29-82-03-01).

Redundant narrow range water level indicators are also provided in the control room for Vapor Container sump level. Alarm /

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annunciators functions are not operational at this time due to t

a delay in' receiving parts from the vendor. This is an out-standing item on the licensee's maintenance schedule.

(6) Containment Hydrogen Monitor. The licensee has installed a hydrogen monitor, Comsip Inc. K-11r containment Monitor. Testing the unit has identified operational problems. The licensee has generated a

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Nonconformance Report 82-13 and has requested the vendors assistance

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in troubleshooting the unit. The delays in making the unit Operatiou

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have been discussed with the Licensing Project Manager. This item will be discussed during a subsequent report.

II. F. 2 Inst'rumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooljny i

n (3) Level Instrumentation In a letter FYR-81-6 dated January 1, 1981, to the NRC, the licensee stated that until a new reactor water level system or

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any of the presently proposed systems prove to be acceptable for Yankee, they reserve any commitment on the implementation schedule for new equipment in regard to item II. F. 2.

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position is currently under review by NRR.

7.

Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to l

Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed. That review l

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included the following:

Inclusion of infomation required by the NRC; tests results and/or supporting information consistency with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action adequacy for resolution of problems; determination whether any infor-

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mation should be classified as an abnomal occurrence; and validity of

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reported information. The following periodic report was reviewed.

10 CFR 20.407 Personnel Monitoring Report

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Personnel Exposure Report

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1981 Annual Report

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No inadequacies were identified.

8.

Observations of Physical Security The inspector observed, witnassed and/or verified, during the regular

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and offshift hours, selected aspects of plant physical security to ensure

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they were in accordance with regulatory requirements, the physical security plan and approved procedures.

a.

Physical Protection Security Organization Inspection observations indicated that a full-timo. member of the

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security organization with authority to direct ph.)sical security action was present as required.

Manning of all shifts on various days was observed to be as

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required.

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b.

Physical Barriers Selected barricrs in the protected area and vital area were

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observed, and random monitoring of isolated zones was perfor:ned.

c.

Access Control Observations of the following items were made:

l Identification, authorization and badging;

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Access control searches, including the use of con.pensatory

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measures during periods when equipment was inoperable; and, Escorting

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No inadequacies were note r

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9.

Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and preliminary findings of the resident inspector.

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