IR 015000004/1993011
| ML20058D295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 015000004 |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1993 |
| From: | Troy Pruett, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D277 | List: |
| References | |
| 15000004-93-11, EA-93-201, NUDOCS 9312030123 | |
| Download: ML20058D295 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Y Report No.
93-11 Docket No.
15000004 California License No.
0373-70 EA No.93-201 Licensee: Richardson X-Ray, Inc.
12707 Rives Avenue, Suite F Downey, California 90242 Enforcement Conference Corducted: August 19, 1993
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Conference held at:
Embassy Suites Downey, California
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Report Prepared by:
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/M/U T. W. Pruet't, Radiation: Specialist Date Signed Approved by:
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M-9 hefts G.
hhs, Chief, Radioactive Date Signed
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Ma rials Safety Branch Summary:
Enforcement Conference on Auoust 19. 1993 (Recort No. 93-11)
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l An Enforcement Conference was held to discuss the apparent violations from an
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l NRC inspection conducted on July 29 and 30,1993, and described in NRC
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Inspection Report 93-10, dated August 13, 1993.
Results:
The licensee agreed with four of the apparent violations.
It contested an apparent violation involving the surveillance of the high radiation area as i
required by 10 CFR 34.41. Two additional apparent violations were identified based on discussions during the Enforcement Conference: the failure to provide supervision to a radiographer's assistant as required by 10 CFR 34.44, and the failure to provide instruction to an individual performing radiographic operations as required by 10 CFR 19.12.
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i 9312030123 931105 PDR STPRG ESGCA PDRi
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DETAILS
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Enforcement Conference Participants J
Licensee Representatives:
U Bill Deluca, Owner Gail Flagor, President d
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Clifton Johnson, Radiation Safety Officer
Terry Molloy, Radiographer Robert Kehley, Radiographer's Helper Ed Martindale, Consultant d
NRC Region Y Representatives *
Gregory P. Yuhas, Chief, Radioactive Materials Safety Branch F.R. Huey, Enforcement Officer Troy W. Pruett, Radiation Specialist
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Donald Driskill, Investigator State of California Representatives:
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Kim Wong, Department of Health and Safety, Radiation Health Branch Paul Baldenweg, Department of Health and Safety Radiation Health Branch 2.
Discussion On August 19, 1993, an enforcement conference was held at the Embassy Suites in Downey, California with the individuals listed above participating. Matters discussed during the enforcement conference related to the NRC inspection conducted on July 29 and 30,1993. The inspection reviewed licensee activities involving the use of rsaicactive materials while performing radiographic operations under reciprocity.at Vandenburg Air Force Base, California. The inspection findings were documented in NRC Inspection Report 93-10, dated August 13, 1993.
Mr. Yuhas began by explaining the purposes of the enforcement conference and stating his concerns regarding the safety significance of the apparent violations. Mr. Flagor and Mr. Kehley began by stating that they had not identified any factual errors in NRC Inspection Report 93-10. Mr. Molloy stated that there were several inaccuracies 'in NRC Inspection Report 93-10 related to: surveillance of the area, the distance of the inspector from the exposure device, surveys performed by the inspector, and the presence of radiation signs at the job site.
First, Mr. Molloy stated that contrary to the Report, the inspector did not perfom a survey of the exposure device after the first observed exposure (The following description of the survey performed by Mr. Pruett was not discussed during the Enforcement Conference). Mr. Pruett -
performed the survey by placing a Xetex-305 B survey meter on his m
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clipboard, kneeling beside the exposure device to obtain information off of the device while observing the survey meter readings, and walking along the source guide tube to the collimator. During this survey, the radiographer and his assistant were exchanging film for the next exposure. The survey technique, combined with the radiographer's preoccupation with the next exposure, may have led him to conclude that the inspector had not conducted a survey...
Second, Mr. Molloy stated that contrary to the Report, no radiation area signs were taken to the job site at Vandenburg and that the signs posted at the restricted area boundary after the second observed exposure were high radiation area signs. The inspector explained that he had mistakenly assumed that Mr. Molloy posted radiation area signs at the restricted area boundary after the second observed exposure.
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Mr. Flagor, Mr. Molloy, and Mr. Kehley disagreed with the apparent violation of 10 CFR 34.41, which requires the licensee to maintain surveillance of the operation to prevent against unauthorized entry into the high radiation area. Mr. Molloy and Mr. Kehley stated that they had maintained adequate surveillance of the high radiation area. Mr. Molloy stated that the distance from the red paint. locker to the radiographic area was 75 to 100 feet, not 15 feet as described in NRC Inspection Report 93-10(OnAugust 20, 1993, the McDonnel Douglas Operations Supervisor who established the radiographic area measured the distance from the red paint locker to the radiographic area. The measured distance was 55 feet). Mr. Molloy stated that he would have posted the high radiation area 25 feet from the red paint locker. Based on the measurement made by the McDonnel-Douglas Operations Supervisor, it appears that the inspector was 20 feet from the high radiation area and 50 feet from the exposure device during the first observed exposure.
Based on these measurements, the inspector concluded, in hindsight, that had he walked an additional 15 to 20 feet towards the exposure device, his presence may have been detected by the radiographer or radiographp,r's assistant.
Even though the inspector gained undetected access to the radiation area, the failure to maintain surveillance of the operation to prevent entry into the high radiation area is not being cited.
Mr. Flagor, Mr. Molloy, and Mr. Kehley agreed with the apparent violation of 10 CFR 34.43(b), which requires the radiographer to perform a survey of the exposure device and source guide tube after each radiographic exposure. Mr. Flager stated that there was no reason for the failure to perform the survey, but Mr. Holloy stated that Mr. Flagor knowingly sent him to the job site sick, that Mr. Kehley was tired from working the previous shift, and that they both were in a hurry to complete the radiographic work and return home. Mr. Molloy stated that to expedite the work, he and Mr. Kehley had decided that.Mr. Molloy would operate the crank assembly and that Mr. Kehley would perform the surveys of the exposure device. Mr. Molloy stated that he assumed that Mr. Kehley knew the requirements for sealed source radiography, and that neither Mr.-
Flagor or Mr. Johnson had informed him otherwise. Mr. Kehley stated that m
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the Vandenburg job was the first time he had worked with sealed sources and that he had not received instruction in how to perform a survey of a radiographic exposure device and source guide tube (Subsequent to the Enforcement Conference, the NRC determined that Mr. Kehley had been assigned to assist a radiographer using a cobalt-60 sealed source at Pacific Pumps on July 19, 1993. The radiographer Mr. Kehley was assigned to stated that Mr. Kehley only posted the. radiation area signs and that he did not allow Mr. Kehley to handle the sealed source or perform surveys. When Mr. Kehley was questioned about the work at Pacific Pumps he stated that all he did was set up the boundaries and wait for the radiographer to complete the work). Mr. Flagor stated that prior to July 29, 1993, all radiographers working for Richardson X-Ray had been informed of Mr. Kehley's status as a helper, and that Mr. Kehley was not to operate the exposure device and was only to perform surveys under the direct supervision of the radiographer.
Mr. Flagor, Mr. Holloy, and Mr. Kehley agreed with the apparent violation of 10 CFR 34.42, which requires the licensee to post the radiation and high radiation areas. Mr. Molloy indicated that the radiation area was not completely posted since there was insufficient barrier tape and there were no radiation signs on the truck. Mr. Molloy stated he was aware of the requirement to post the enti:e radiation area; however, he continued with radiographic operations after the Air Force's Bioenvironmental Section approved the posting of the radiation area. Mr. Molloy stated that the high radiation area was not posted since there were no objects to place the high radiation area signs on.
Mr. Flagor stated that stakes are available at the facility's garage, but that trucks are not outfitted with devices to hang signs required to adequately post the area.
Mr. Flagor, Mr. Molloy, and Mr. Kehley agreed with the apparent violation of 10 CFR 34.33(a), which requires the radiographer and radiographer's assistant to wear at arm ratemeter. Mr. Flagor stated that alara ratemeters had been pre ided to the workers, but that specific
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instruction to wear the devices had not been provided. Mr. Molloy stated that he wore his alarm ratemeter, but failed to determine if Mr. Kehley was wearing an alarm ratemeter. Mr. Kehley stated that he had never been instructed to wear an alarm ratemeter or in the operation of an alarm ratemeter. Mr. Deluca indicated that the alarm ratemeters were only provided to radiographers while working under NRC jurisdiction and that the use of alarm ratemeters results in radiographers not performing the required surveys of the exposure device.
Mr. Flagor and Mr. Molloy agreed with the apparent violation of 49 CFR 177.842, which requires the blocking and bracing of radioactive material during transport. Mr. Flagor stated that the truck used by Mr. Molloy had not been outfitted with the proper equipment to block and brace exposure devices.
Mr. Yuhas questioned Mr. Flagor about Mr. Molloy's assignment as a Radiation Safety Monitor. Mr. Flagor stated that Mr. Molloy was not the
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Radiation Safety Monitor, but that a July 1,1993, amendment request had been submitted to the State of California to name Mr. Molloy as the Radiation Safety Monitor. Mr. Flagor also stated that after the NRC.
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inspection, the licensee had sent a letter to the State of California to remove Mr. Molloy as Radiation Safety Monitor.
Mr. Yuhas stated that based on the discussions during the enforcement conference, two additional violations were apparent and would be cited:
(1) the failure to provide supervision to a radiographer's assistant during the performance of surveys to determine if the sealed source had returned to the shielded position, as required by 10 CFR 34.44, and (2)
the failure to provide instruction to individuals in the radiation safety requirements associated with the license and in NRC requirements, as required by 10 CFR 19.12. The failure to provide supervision to a radiographer's assistant is based on Mr. Holloy's failure to watch and direct Mr. Kehley during surveys of the exposure device to determine if the sealed source had been returned to the shielded position. The failure to provide instruction to individuals is based on management's failure to provide Mr. Kehley with instruction on the radiation safety requirements associated with sealed source radiography.
Mr. Flagor, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Deluca stited that the licensee's corrective actions for the apparent violations consisted of a 30 day suspension without pay for Mr. Molloy, training of all radiographic-personnel on the findings identified during the inspection, and hiring a consultant to perform audits of radiographers.
i Mr. Wong stated that management's commitment to improve the radiation safety program was inadequate and that management should provide
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instruction to radiographers prior to their performance of work within NRC jurisdiction.
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Mr. Huey restated the purposes of the Enforcement Conference and
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explained the NRC enforcement process, including base civil penalties, adjustment procedures, and aggregation of violations.
Mr. Yuhas concluded the meeting by stating the licensee's radiation safety program was degraded and by describing the safety significance of the apparent violations. Mr. Yuhas also expressed his concerns over the failure to provide training to individuals prior to perfomance of work with sealed sources. Mr. Yuhas stated that licensee management needed to take prompt, effective, and long lasting corrective actions to ensure that these violations are not repeated.