GO2-17-210, Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status

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Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status
ML17355A671
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/2017
From: Javorik A
Energy Northwest
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-17-210
Download: ML17355A671 (3)


Text

EII ERGY Alex L Javorik Columbia Generating Station N0 R1* H IJiI EST Richland, WA 99352-0968 Ph. 509-377-8555 I F. 509-377-4150 aljavorik@ energy-northwest.com December 21, 2017 10 CFR 50.4 G02-17-210 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBGIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 ANCHOR DARLING DOUBLE DISC GATE VALVE INFORMATION AND STATUS

References:

1 ) Letter from Greg Krueger (NEI) to John Lubinski (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Industry Resolution Plan Update (Project 689), dated August 4, 2017

2) Letter from Joe Pollock (NEI) to Brian Holian (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), NSIAC Concurrence on Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Industry Response Actions (Project 689), dated October 26, 2017
3) BWROG Topical Report TP-1 6-1 -1 1 2, Revision 4, Recommendations to Resolve Flowserve 1 0 CFR Part 21 Notification Affecting Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Wedge Pin Failure

Dear Sir or Madam:

In Reference 1 the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided the NRC a resolution plan for the U.S. Nuclear Industry to address the known Anchor Darling Double Disk Gate Valve (ADDDGV) issues. Reference 2 indicated each utility will provide a listing of their Anchor Darling valve population with active safety functions along with relevant valve information, including the results of susceptibility evaluations, repair status, and a repair schedule for each susceptible valve not yet repaired. This letter serves to provide this information for Columbia Generating Station.

The Attachment to this letter contains the following information for each ADDDGV.

. Plant Name, Unit, and Valve ID.

. System.

. Valve Functional Description.

. Valve Size.

. Active Safety Function (open, close, both).

. Are multiple design basis post-accident strokes are required (yes/no).

G02-17-210 Page 2 of 2

  • Expert Panel Risk Ranking (high, medium, low).
  • Result of susceptibility evaluation (susceptible or not susceptible).
  • Is the susceptibility evaluation in general conformance with TP 16-1-112R4 (Reference 3)?
  • Does the susceptibility evaluation rely on thread friction? If yes, was the COF greater than 0.1 O? For cases where thread-friction was relied upon, information is provided whether the coefficient of friction was above or below 0.1 .
  • Was an initial stem-rotation check performed? If yes, include rotation criteria (i.e. s1 O degrees or S5 degrees).
  • Was the diagnostic test data reviewed for failure precursors described in TP16-1-112R4 (Reference 3)?
  • The valve's repair status (i.e. repaired or not repaired).

There are no commitments being made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms.

D.M. Wolfgramm, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4792.

Executed on this 2/ ~ day of ~ , 2017.

Respectfully,

~/d./L for-MJ,..,;~

A. L. Javorik Vice President, Engineering

Attachment:

Energy Northwest I Columbia Unit 2 ADDDGV Valve Listing cc: NRC Region IV Regional Admin NRC Region IV Project Manager NRC Senior Resident Inspector C.D. Sonoda - BPA W .A. Horin - Winston & Strawn

Energy Northwest I Columbia Unit 2 AD DDGV Listing Is the susceptibility Does the susceptibility Was an initial stem-Result of Valve Active Are multiple design Expert evaluation in evaluation rely on thread rotation check Was the diagnostic test data Plant Valve Functional susceptibility Valve repair Unit Valve ID System Size Safety basis post-accident Panel Risk general friction? performed? reviewed for failure precursors Name Description evaluation status

{inches) Function strokes required? Ranking conformance with If yes, was the COF greater If yes, include rotation described in TP16-1-112R4?

TP16-1-112R4?(A) than 0.10? criteria (Open, (High, (No), {No),

(susceptible or (repaired or Close, Medium, (Yes/No) (Yes, >0.10), (Yes, SlO deg.), (Yes/ No)

(Yes/No) not susceptible) not repaired)

Both) Low) (Yes, S0.10) (Yes, SS deg.)

High Pressure HPCS-P-1 Suction Colu Core Spray from Condensate mbia 2 HPCS-V-1 (HPCS) Storage Tank 14 Close No High Not Susceptible Yes No Yes, :'5 5 deg Yes N/A< 2J HPCS-P-1 Discharge High Pressure to Reactor Pressure Colu Core Spray Vessel (Injection mbia 2 HPCS-V-4 (HPCS) Valve) 12 Both No High Susceptible Yes No Yes, :'5 5 deg Yes Repaired< 1J High Pressure Colu Core Spray HPCS-P-1 Minimum mbia 2 HPCS-V-12 (HPCS) Flow Valve 4 Both No High Susceptible Yes No Yes, :'5 5 deg Yes Repaired< 1J High Pressure HPCS-P-1 Suction Colu Core Spray From The Suppression mbia 2 HPCS-V-15 (HPCS) Pool 18 Both No High Susceptible Yes No Yes, :'5 5 deg Yes Repaired< 1J

\AJ Applied Wedge Pin Torque must bound anticipated design basis operating torque requirements and current maximum total torque (1) The repair was performed during R23 refueling outage (Spring 2017) for these MOV's. The repair consisted of a new stem with an integral backseat, upgrading the wedge pin material (lnconel), and torqued the stem/wedge connection to above actuator torque rating & capability:

(2) HPCS-V-1 valve's wedge pin shear is bounding the anticipated design basis operating torque requirements and current maximum total torque.