ENS 53815
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
15:40 Jan 5, 2019 | |
| Title | En Revision Imported Date 2/12/2019 |
| Event Description | EN Revision Text: POTENTIAL LOSS OF MSIV SCRAM FUNCTION DURING MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE TESTING
At approximately 1040 EST on January 5, 2019, during evaluation of test results for the 'C' Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), it was determined that closure of three of four Main Steam Lines would not necessarily have resulted in a full scram during testing due to failure of a limit switch (LS-6) associated with MSIV-1C while in the test configuration. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The system was restored from the testing configuration at 1057 EST and the failed trip channel was placed in the tripped condition at 1326 EST thus restoring the design function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of the notification is to retract ENS Notification 53815 made on 01/05/19 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The previous notification reported that there was a potential loss of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) scram function during main steam line isolation valve testing, at the time of discovery, due to failure of a limit switch (LS-6) associated with MSIV-1C while in the test configuration. Subsequent evaluation has demonstrated that the scram function credited in the design basis was not lost. Specifically, after an Engineering Evaluation, it has been determined that the MSIV position RPS logic was not lost for those functions within the design basis and, as such, was capable of performing its intended safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Cahill). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Pilgrim Massachusetts (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.83 h0.0763 days <br />0.0109 weeks <br />0.00251 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Paul Gallant 17:30 Jan 5, 2019 |
| NRC Officer: | Donald Norwood |
| Last Updated: | Feb 11, 2019 |
| 53815 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (31 %) |
| After | Power Operation (31 %) |
Pilgrim with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 538152019-01-05T15:40:0005 January 2019 15:40:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor En Revision Imported Date 2/12/2019 ENS 417992005-06-26T14:55:00026 June 2005 14:55:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable Due to High Ambient Temperature ENS 405472004-02-26T06:05:00026 February 2004 06:05:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor Control Power Fuse Failure in Hpci System 2019-01-05T15:40:00 | |