Transfer of low
uranium concentration discard solution from Tank WF03 to Waste Water Treatment Facility (WWTF) Tank 29 without final sample and analysis due to inadvertently opening incorrect valve.
There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment.
Solution from discard Tank WF04 had been sampled and analyzed and was approved for transfer to WWTF Tank 29. An incorrect valve was opened and low uranium concentration solution was transferred from discard Tank WF03 to WWTF Tank 29 without final sample and analysis. All sources into the discard tanks (WF03 and WF04) are routed through an in-line uranium concentration monitor.
Remaining SSC's were available and reliable. Solution in discard Tank WF03 had passed through an in-line uranium concentration monitor which would have stopped the transfer if a high uranium concentration was present.
Solution in discard Tank WF03 and WWTF Tank 29 were sampled. Both uranium concentration results are low. The solution in discard Tank WF03 would have met sample analysis requirements.
The safety significance is low due to the low mass and concentration of U-235. In-line monitor was also present which would have prevented transfer of high concentration solution into discard Tank WF03.
The control is to sample and analyze solution prior to transfer to WWTF. The deficiency in this case is the failure to perform those actions prior to discard.
Event was identified and entered into Problem Identification, Resolution and Correction System (PIRCS) - PIRCS #15829. Investigation is underway. Both the discard Tank WF03 and the WWTF Tank 29 were sampled.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.