ENS 41523

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v t e ENS Event
19:00 Mar 24, 2005
Title	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Event Description	THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT. This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * EQUIPMENT PIECE FOR STORAGE RACK NOT IN PLACE FOR SAFE STORAGE OF SNM The following information was faxed by Nuclear Fuels Services: ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CONSEQUENCES TO THE WORKERS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING RELEVANT CHEMICAL AND RADIATION DATA FOR ACTUAL PERSONNEL EXPOSURES TO RADIATION OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS OR HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS REPRODUCED FROM LICENSED MATERIALS There were no actual health and safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. There were also no personnel exposures to radiation, radioactive materials, or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials. The potential Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) consequences for workers were very low given the actual material storage conditions. No additional containers of SNM above the approved limit were stored in the storage racks and additional containers were specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical. THE SEQUENCE OF OCCURRENCES LEADING TO THE EVENT, INCLUDING DEGRADATION OR FAILURE OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS, AND ACTIVITIES OF PERSONNEL RELIED ON TO PREVENT POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR MITIGATE THEIR CONSEQUENCES: On March 24, 2005, a Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer (NCSE) inspected a storage rack and observed that a piece of Configuration Controlled Equipment (CCE) was not in place. The piece of equipment is credited for preventing containers of SNM from being stored between approved storage positions. A posted Station Limit Card (SLC) instructs the operations personnel on the number and location where containers of SNM may be stored in the racks. DISCUSS WHETHER REMAINING STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS, AND ACTIVITIES RELIED ON TO PREVENT POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR MITIGATE THEIR CONSEQUENCES ARE AVAILABLE AND RELIABLE TO PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION: The remaining activities relied on to prevent potential accidents are available and reliable to perform their function. The storage requirements are posted via a Station Limit Card on the storage rack and no containers were observed to be stored in unapproved locations. ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT: The bottom two storage positions that could be involved were covered by signs instructing the operations personnel to not use them. The process engineer for the area was instructed to install the needed equipment to bring the storage rack into compliance. The event was entered into the PIRCS system (PIRCS ID 4704). SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT: The safety significance was very low for the event given that no violation of container storage was found. Containers of SNM were not stored in unapproved locations in the storage rack. More than one failure would have been necessary to be outside of the normal case configuration modeled in the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. The risk index could very easily have been written to credit additional limits and requirements that would have made this report unnecessary. BRIEF SCENARIO OF HOW A CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: For a criticality to occur, multiple containers (more than two) would have had to have been stored incorrectly. WHAT ARE THE CONTROLS OR CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES? The controls were equipment design to prevent containers of SNM from being stored between approved storage locations in a storage rack. The bottom of the storage rack had not been modified to prevent a container from being stored between approved storage locations. WHAT ARE THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN AN WHEN WAS EACH IMPLEMENTED? The storage positions involved at the bottom of the storage rack were taken out of service immediately on 3/24/2005. The process engineer for the area was immediately notified of the necessary modification to the equipment. The event was entered into the PII2CS system. There was no exposure to personnel with this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No other notifications were issued. * * UPDATE 1030 EDT ON 4/6/05 FROM RANDY SHACKELFORD TO JEFF ROTTON * * * NFS Erwin is retracting this report based on the following: On 3/24/2005, NFS made a 24-hour report to the operations center based on l OCFR70, Appendix A, Paragraph (a)(2). L OCFR70, Appendix A, Paragraph (a)(2) requires a 24hour report for loss or degradation of items relied on for safety (IROFS) that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of Sec. 70.61. The report was made because it was observed that a piece of configuration controlled equipment for a storage rack was not in place that would prevent containers from being stored between approved storage positions. The storage of containers between approved storage positions was bounded by the normal case Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) model; and, it was later determined that other IROFS listed in the ISA Summary were in place such that the performance requirements were met. This information was discussed and reviewed with an NRC Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Inspector during the week of March 28, 2005. Based on this information and discussion with the NRC Inspector, it is requested that this event report be retracted. Notified R2DO (Rodgers) and NMSS (Burgess). * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * * THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT. This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

ENS 41523 +/-
Where
Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. Erwin, Tennessee (NRC Region 2)
License number:	SNM-124
Reporting

Part 70 App A (B)(2)
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.18 h-0.0492 days <br />-0.00702 weeks <br />-0.00162 months <br />)
Opened:	Nick Brown 17:49 Mar 24, 2005
NRC Officer:	John Knoke
Last Updated:	May 11, 2008
41523 - NRC Website
v • d • e

v t e Emergency Notification System
Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. with Part 70 App A (B)(2)
WEEKMONTHYEAR2022-10-05T19:00:00 [Table view]
[ENS list for Nuclear Fuel Services Inc.]

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