ENS 41424
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
21:04 Feb 19, 2005 | |
| Title | 24-Hour Criticality Control Report - Failure to Obtain Required Powder Samples |
| Event Description | The licensee provided the following information via email:
Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia, SC, low enriched (less than or equal to 5.0 wt% U 235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. Time and Date of Event: February 19, 2005, 1604 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.10322e-4 months <br />. Reason for Notification: Double contingency protection for non-favorable geometry (NFG) bulk containers is based on preventing moderation from entering the bulk powder blending room and then by preventing the moderator from entering the bulk containers. Prevention of moderation from entering the bulk powder container is assured through application of tiered layers of controls, such as limiting materials allowed to be utilized in the bulk powder blending room, requiring a double roof on the bulk powder room, and by rigorous controls on the handling of polypaks to be transferred into the bulk powder container. Rigorous controls are instituted on the moisture content of each polypak to ensure that the contents are less than 0.3 wt% moisture. Each filled polypak coming off of the Fitzmill is transferred to a polypak cart for handling and storage prior to transfer into a bulk powder container. Each polypak cart is capable of handling up to 56 polypaks. Prior to storage on the cart, each polypak is required to be sampled, with the sample material obtained being combined into a single composite sample for the entire cart. In addition, three additional polpaks on the cart are randomly chosen and sampled. These three additional samples are completely independent of the composite sample. Thus the composite sample and the three random samples comprise the double contingency protection for the moisture content of the polpaks to be transferred to a bulk powder container. During an audit of the operation, it was observed that the composite sample was not being taken in several instances. Thus the sample being analyzed may not have been representative of polypaks on the cart. This compromised a loss of one leg of double contingency for polpaks to be transferred into the bulk powder NFG. All of the random individual samples have been taken and analyzed properly, and thus no material has been observed that exceed the allowed moisture content. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single-parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' and 10CFR70, specifically Appendix A.b.2 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.' As Found Condition: During an audit of the Fitzmill operation it was observed that the required samples for generation of the composite sample were not being taken consistently. Summary of Activity: - All impacted operations/equipment affected has been shut down pending confirmation of the moisture content. - Revised operational methods are being developed and implemented. Conclusions: - At no time was material observed to have a moisture content above the allowed limits. - At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. - The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. - A causal analysis will be performed. The licensee is notifying NRC Region 2 and HQ NMSS. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Westinghouse Electric Corporation Columbia, South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| License number: | SNM-1107 |
| Reporting | |
| Part 70 App A (B)(2) | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+14.22 h0.593 days <br />0.0846 weeks <br />0.0195 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Ralph Winiarski 11:17 Feb 20, 2005 |
| NRC Officer: | Mike Ripley |
| Last Updated: | Feb 20, 2005 |
| 41424 - NRC Website | |
Westinghouse Electric Corporation with Part 70 App A (B)(2) | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 574722024-12-12T15:30:00012 December 2024 15:30:00
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