ENS 40592
ENS Event | |
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15:42 Mar 16, 2004 | |
Title | Cable Separation Criteria Not Met |
Event Description | At 1042 hours0.0121 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.96481e-4 months <br /> on March 16, 2003, Operations determined that a field condition did not meet cable separation criteria. This condition represented an unanalyzed condition potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the event might represent a significant degradation of plant safety. The cable separation discrepancy, identified during a walk down, was a misplaced portion of non-safety cables from one safety channel into another safety channel. The non-safety cables are assorted low energy instrumentation cables (generally associated with fire protection and radiation monitoring or retired) and an ac power supply cable to a charcoal filter fan plenum drain line pump. The drain line pump power cable created the potential for a significant degradation of plant safety due to a potential for damage to cables of safety related components in the channels. The safety related cables in the two channels included power cables for two of three Component Cooling Water pumps, two Containment Spray pumps, and power cables to four motor control centers.
Immediate corrective action was taken at 1044 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.97242e-4 months <br /> to de-energize the power cable to the drain line pump and subsequent action was taken, at about 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, to re-establish separation by moving the cables back to a single channel. Electrical feeds to all required safeguard loads were maintained at all times. An evaluation is being performed to further identify the cables in the two channels, and to evaluate the significance of the cable separation discrepancy. The extent of condition will be evaluated as part of the corrective action process. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: Indian Point Unit 2 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on March 16, 2004, at 1702 hours0.0197 days <br />0.473 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.47611e-4 months <br /> (EN Log No. 40592). The notification on March 16, reported an unanalyzed condition that might represent a significant degradation of plant safety, as a result of discovery of a plant condition that did not meet cable separation criteria, and therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). A walk-down discovered several cables that traversed two cable channels containing cables for redundant safeguards equipment. All but one of the misplaced cables were low energy instrumentation cables. One of misplaced cables was a power cable for the charcoal filter fan plenum drain line pump. The power cable for the drain line pump created the potential for a significant degradation of plant safety due to a potential for damage to cables of safety related components in the two separate safety channels. Immediate corrective action was taken at 1044 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.97242e-4 months <br />, to de-energize the power cable to the drain line pump. At approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> re-establishment of separation was completed by moving the cables back to a single channel. Subsequently, Engineering evaluated the condition and determined the power cable for the charcoal filter fan plenum drain line pump is designed and protected such that faults originating on this cable or its associated load will be quickly interrupted prior to the onset of damage so that safety related cables in its proximity and along its route will be protected from such damage. The method of protection involving double safety related fuses has been shown to provide the necessary enhanced electrical isolation consistent with the Indian Point Unit 2 design criteria. Therefore, engineering concluded the as-found condition did not represent a significant degradation of plant safety. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray) and NRR (Reis). |
Where | |
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Indian Point ![]() New York (NRC Region 1) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.33 h0.0554 days <br />0.00792 weeks <br />0.00182 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Kieth Drown 17:02 Mar 16, 2004 |
NRC Officer: | Mike Ripley |
Last Updated: | Mar 18, 2004 |
40592 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 518292016-03-29T20:45:00029 March 2016 20:45:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Baffle Bolt Indications Identified During Inservice Inspection ENS 513292015-08-18T17:31:00018 August 2015 17:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves Unanalyzed Condition ENS 405922004-03-16T15:42:00016 March 2004 15:42:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Cable Separation Criteria Not Met 2016-03-29T20:45:00 | |