05000395/FIN-2016004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Accomplish Procedure for Foreign Material Exclusion Control Involving Failure of a Safety-Related Breaker |
Description | Green. The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, involving the failure to accomplish safety-related (SR) station administrative procedure, SAP-0363, Foreign Material and Debris Control, Revision 8H, for foreign material exclusion (FME) control during a SR breaker refurbishment. A subsequent breaker failure occurred due to foreign material. The licensee immediately initiated corrective actions to repair the breaker, and the licensee entered condition report, CR-16-03099, in their CAP. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, and determined that the PD was more than minor and therefore a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone by adversely affecting the cornerstone objective to ensure in part the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the equipment reliability attribute was impacted because foreign material rendered the SR breaker nonfunctional causing inoperability of the pressurizer backup group 2 heaters for greater than the Technical Specification limiting condition for operation. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Significant Determination Process, Attachment 4, dated October 7, 2016, and Appendix A Exhibit 2, dated July 1, 2012, and determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation. A regional senior risk analyst performed a bounding risk evaluation in accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix A using the VC Summer SPAR model. The finding was modelled as a transient initiator with a loss of the B EDG as a surrogate for the group 2 pressurizer heaters for a 94 hour0.00109 days <br />0.0261 hours <br />1.554233e-4 weeks <br />3.5767e-5 months <br /> exposure interval. The dominant sequence was a transient initiator with a consequential loss of offsite power without recovery, failure of the A EDG without recovery leading to a station blackout and loss of core heat removal after battery depletion. The risk was mitigated by the available normal and group 1 pressurizer heaters. The bounding assessment determined that the performance deficiency represented an increase in core damage frequency of < 1.0 E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014, and determined the cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution and the aspect of work management, H.5, because the licensee failed to ensure the planning and execution of the respective work order for breaker refurbishment followed SAP-0363 for FME control to support nuclear safety-related work. |
Site: | Summer |
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Report | IR 05000395/2016004 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Masters C Smith D Lanyi E Coffman G Ottenberg J Reece |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Summer - IR 05000395/2016004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Summer) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Summer)
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