3F0202-04, Estimated Licensing Actions for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003
| ML020640224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/2002 |
| From: | Young D Florida Power Corp |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 3F0202-04, RIS-01-021 | |
| Download: ML020640224 (2) | |
Text
Florida Power A Progress Energy Company Crystal River Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Ref: RIS 2001-21 February 6, 2002 3F0202-04 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Crystal River Unit 3 - Estimated Licensing Actions for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003
Reference:
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-21, "Licensing Action Estimates for Operating Reactors"
Dear Sir:
Florida Power Corporation (FPC) hereby voluntarily submits information on licensing actions that are currently planned for NRC Fiscal Years (FY) 2002 and 2003. This submittal is in response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-21, dated November 16, 2001.
FPC anticipates that eight licensing actions will be submitted during the remainder of FY 2002, and that eight licensing actions will be submitted in FY 2003.
If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Sid Powell, Supervisor, Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4883.
Sincerely, Dale E. Young Vice President Crystal River Nuclear Plant DEY/ff Attachment xc:
NRR Project Manager Regional Administrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector Donna M. Skay C ystal River Nuclear Plait 15760 W. Pover Line Street C rystai Rive r FL 34428
Attachment Page lof 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0202-04 Table of Estimated Licensing Actions PLANT NAME LICENSING ACTION ESTIMATED SAFETY, OPERATIONAL, OR ECONOMIC UNIT NO.
DATE OF BENEFIT DOCKET NO.
SUBMITTAL MMIYY Crystal River Unit 3 Risk-based determination of 02/02 Potential to avoid an unjustified shutdown due to Docket No. 50-302 shutdown for missed missed surveillance (CLIIP for TSTF-258).
Surveillance (SR 3.0.3)
Revise Section 1.0 Definition -
03/02 Adopt NUREG 1430, Rev 2 change to improve clarity "Channel Functional Test" for Operations staff.
Power Uprate 24 MWt to 2568 04/02 Increase power level for economic gains.
MWt Core Flood Line Break 05/02 Resolve B&W plant preliminary safety concern, PSC Operator Response Time for 2-00.
RCP trip Emergency Diesel Generator 05/02 Perform preventative maintenance and inspections Allowed Outage Time (AOT) during operational vs. outage periods Extension Revise containment closure 06/02 Optimize outage work duration for next refueling requirements in Mode 6 to outage when replacement head will be installed to facilitate installation of new resolve Alloy 600 nozzle cracking.
reactor head Change Surveillance 10/02 Change SR to require monthly checks only for valves Requirements (SRs) for not locked sealed or otherwise secured in position Containment Isolation Valves (NUREG-1430, Rev 2. improvement). Reduces Operator dose and frees Operations resources for other tasks.
Decrease BWST Boric Acid 11/02 Reduce reliance on heat tracing to prevent boric acid Concentration precipitation.
ITS 3.0.8 Delay declaring 02/03 Allows operational flexibility when a snubber is found inoperable due to Snubbers for inoperable and facilitates testing on-line (expected to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (TSTF-372) be a CLIIP).
Risk-based ISI/IST programs 03/03 Reduce inspection scope to minimize impact on outage resources.
Extend AOT for Low Pressure 03/03 Facilitates on-line maintenance and reduces risk of Injection and Building Spray to unwarranted shutdown (expected to be a CLIIP).
7 days (TSTF-430)
Change ITS 5.6.2.10 and Other 04/03 Implement Industry initiative for control of steam Sections to Implement NEI 97-generator inspection programs. ITS 5.6.2.10 will also 06 Guidelines for Steam be changed to allow use of additional inspection Generator Inspection probes.
Increased flexibility in Mode 05/03 Allows mode changes with equipment inoperable Restraints LCO 3.0.4 (Risk based on risk evaluation (expected to be a CLIIP).
Informed Technical Specification Initiative 3 TSTF 359)
Technical Specification End 06/03 Technical Specification required shutdown Mode is States (Risk Informed not always the safest condition for the plant, e.g.,
Technical Specification Mode 3 may be safer if the decay heat removal system Initiative 1 - TSTF 431) is inoperable (expected to be a CLIIP).
ITS 3.8.4, DC Sources (TSTF-07/03 Reduces potential for plant shutdown and increases 360)
SR flexibility.
Risk informed AOTs with 08/03 Plant shutdown may involve more risk than extending backstops (Risk Informed the AOT depending on what equipment is inoperable Technical Specification and other conditions of the plant (expected to be a Initiative 4b - TSTF 424)
CLIIP).