05000528/LER-2005-002, Regarding Technical Specification Violation: Mode Change with Safety Injection Valve Not in Its Required Position

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Regarding Technical Specification Violation: Mode Change with Safety Injection Valve Not in Its Required Position
ML051220111
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 04/18/2005
From: Danni Smith
Arizona Public Service Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-05249-DMS/SAB/REB LER 05-002-00
Download: ML051220111 (7)
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LER-2005-002, Regarding Technical Specification Violation: Mode Change with Safety Injection Valve Not in Its Required Position
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
5282005002R00 - NRC Website
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text

10CFR50.73 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station A subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation David M. Smith Plant Manager Nuclear Production Tel: 623-393-6116 Fax: 623-393-6077 e-mail: DSMITH10@apsc.com Mail Station 7602 PO Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-05249-DMS/SAB/REB April 18, 2005 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit I Docket No. STN 50-528 License No. NPF 41 Licensee Event Report 2005-002-00 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-528/2005-002-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER reports an event resulting in a technical specification violation when a mode change occurred with a safety injection valve not in its required position.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, a copy of this LER is being forwarded to the NRC Region IV Office and the Senior Resident Inspector. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Daniel G. Marks, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-6492.

Arizona Public Service Company makes no commitments in this letter.

Sincerely, DMS/SAB/REB/ra//

Attachment cc:

B. S. Mallet, Region IV Administrator G. G. Wamick, Sr. Resident Inspector M. B. Fields, PVNGS Project Manager (all w/attachments)

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway

  • Comanche Peak
  • Diablo Canyon
  • Palo Verde
  • Wolf Creek,

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/3012007 6-200)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are Incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52). U.S.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to lnfocollects~nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. NE0B-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget. Washington. DC 20503. If a means used to Impose an information (See reverse for required number of collection does not display a currentiy valid OMB control number, the NRC may sfor each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the digits/characters frec bl k)Information collection.

3. PAGE Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 05000528 1 OF 6 4.TITLE Technical Specification violation: mode change with safety injection valve not in its required position.
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE S. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEUMENTA REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACINRTY NAME OCKET NUMBER 02 17 2005 2005 - 002 -

00 04 18 2005

9. OPERATING MODE 11 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF10 CFR§: (Check al that apply) o 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xi)

E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v0i) 3 0 20.2201(d) 03 20.2203(a)(3Xii)

E 50.73(aX2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(aX2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(aX2)(vlii)(B) 0I 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)iXA) 0 50.73(aX2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1Xii)(A) 0 50.73(aX2)(ivXA) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4)

O 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(aX3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 0 C 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(aX2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(aX2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify In Abstract below or In (if more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 366A) approximately 20% open during SDC standby line-up initiation operations. The operator assumed the test would be performed when the system was restored to a normal operating lineup.

Secondly, the recovery from SDC to normal operating lineup procedure (400P-9SI02) has a step to open SIB-HV-307 and a separate step to initiate performance of the valve position verification test (73ST-1XI12). The operator verified the valve was open (based on light indication). He was not aware that the valve had been stroked to 20% open per the SDC initiation procedure (400P-9SI01). He therefore incorrectly concluded the valve had not been operated/stroked and that no testing would be required to verify valve position.

7.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

On February 21, 2005 at 00:30 hours, the burned out bulb was replaced and valve 1JSIBHV0307 was placed in its full throttled open position. At 02:44 hours the surveillance test was completed verifying the valve was in its correct position.

The SDC initiation procedure, 400P-9SI01, will be revised to require a TSCCR be initiated, when a SDC heat exchanger bypass valve is operated, to alert the operators to the requirement to perform the position verification test.

r. -~

8. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 50-530/2003-003-00 reported a condition in which a technical specification violation occurred when required reactor power instrumentation was not calibrated as required by surveillance requirements. The cause of the event was human performance error by control room licensed operators who did not recognize the change in acceptance criteria when power was reduced below 80 percent.

LER 50-528/2004-002-00 reported a condition in which power was raised above 20 percent rated thermal power without meeting the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Axial Shape Index (ASI). The cause was determined to be that control room operators had incorrectly interpreted a provisional note in procedures.

(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

LER 50-530/2001-002-00 reported a condition in which control room personnel incorrectly interpreted a provisional note in LCO 3.7.5 that allows Mode 3 operation with the steam driven AFW pump inoperable and proceeded with a mode change to Mode 3 on two separate occasions in violation of LCO 3.0.4.

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