05000528/FIN-2016002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement High Radiation Area Controls in an Area with a Dose Rates Greater Than 1 rem per Hour |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a Green, self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2, which was caused by the licensees failure to control a high radiation area with radiation levels greater than 1 rem per hour in the Unit 1 containment. A radiation protection technician received an unexpected dose rate alarm while conducting surveys on piping in the 87-foot elevation of the 2B reactor coolant pump bay area near a high efficiency particulate air unit in containment. Licensee personnel corrected the error by guarding the area, posting the area, and changing the pre-filters in the adjacent portable a high efficiency particulate air units to reduce the dose rates. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 16-06515 and 16-07479. The inspectors determined that the failure to identify a locked high radiation area through timely surveys and adequate a high efficiency particulate air maintenance procedures that could have revealed changing radiological conditions was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation because licensee personnel did not implement barriers intended to prevent workers from receiving unexpected dose. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, dated August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined the violation had very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with the resources component, because the licensee leaders failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, and procedures were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that procedures were adequate to ensure radiation levels around portable high efficiency particulate air units were monitored to evaluate changing radiological conditions in a timely manner such that hazards were appropriately controlled [H.1]. |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2016002 Section 2RS1 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Peabody D Reinert D You G Guerra G Miller G Pick I Anchondo J Drake L Carson N Greene D Tailleart |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2016002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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