05000482/FIN-2011002-09
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Clearance Order Disables Power Operated Relief Valve Low temperature Overpressure Function |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders. This procedure violation resulted in an inadequate tagout for the Train A solid state protection system resulting in an unplanned swap of the volume control tank charging pump suction to the reactor water storage tank and an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.4.12 due to the de-energization of power operated relief valve A low temperature overpressure protection relays. Operators took manual actions to restore the pump suction, and power was restored after approximately four hours. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 35288 and 35318. The failure to follow procedures to complete clearance orders with adequate boundaries is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of configuration control to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The significance of the finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 2, and determined to be of very low safety significance, because it did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. Additionally, the cause of the finding is related to the human performance crosscutting component of work control. Specifically, the licensee did not appropriately plan for the maintenance work scope by ensuring work groups and an offsite organization communicate the necessary electrical boundaries to assure plant and human performance. |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2011002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra C Smith L Carson G Miller B Tindell C Long C Peabody A Fairbanks D Reinert C Alldredge |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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