05000454/FIN-2007009-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Operating Experience Procedure Not Followed for Service Water Corrosion Event |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance and a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow Procedure LS-AA-115, Operating Experience Procedure, and implement corrective actions in response to an industry service water piping corrosion event which caused a service water system failure at a foreign reactor plant. Consequently, the licensee failed to implement actions to fix existing procedural controls so that a similar service water system corrosion and failure event would be precluded at the Byron Station. The cause of this finding was related to the Decision Making Component (Item H.1(b) of IMC 305) for the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, because the licensee did not make conservative assumptions in decisions affecting the integrity of this SX piping. Specifically, the licensees decision to not implement changes to station procedures and to not perform training for personnel on this service water operating experience event was not based on sufficient information to demonstrate that the decision was safe (e.g., would preclude a similar event from occurring at the Byron Station). The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. This finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening because the finding was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the licensees failure to implement corrective actions associated with the Byron programs for maintenance of the service water system adversely affects system reliability. The team evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Column of Table 4a, the team answered No to each of the screening questions, because the failure to incorporate corrective measures for this applicable operating experience event did not directly contribute to the delay in correcting the degraded SX riser pipe condition. Specifically, each of the degraded SX riser pipes had been identified and placed in the corrective action system by June of 2007, shortly after this operating experience evaluation was performed. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance. |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2007009 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Moore D Hills J Mcghee L Kozak M Holmberg T Bilik V Meghani |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2007009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2008Q1
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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