05000440/FIN-2014002-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Procedure for Extreme Cold Weather |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the licensees failure to maintain adequate procedures to respond to acts of nature as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements. Specifically, the cold weather procedure did not adequately direct equipment walkdowns and subsequent actions to protect equipment important to safety from severe weather risks, directly resulting in freezing and breaking of fire protection piping in Unit 2 turbine power complex, elevation 593 level. The piping provides fire protection for Unit 2 startup transformers deluge system and the three Unit 2 inter-bus transformer deluge systems. The Unit 2 startup transformer is an integral part of one of the two qualified circuits specified in Technical Specification 3.8.1 between the offsite electrical transmission network and the onsite 4160-volt safety-related electrical system. Corrective actions included immediate posting of compensatory actions and warming of the space to prevent further damage to the system until repairs were completed. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the procedure did not direct the licensee to take proactive steps to limit the likelihood of extreme cold weather freezing and breaking the fire protection piping located on the Unit 2 turbine power complex elevation 593 level. In Step 1.2 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Category of Fire Inspection Finding, the inspectors assigned Category 1.4.2, Fixed Fire Protection Systems, to the finding and by answering yes in Step 1.3 A, Is the reactor able to reach and maintain safe shutdown (either hot or cold) condition? the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, avoid complacency, where individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee did not identify that the fire protection deluge valves and piping in the Unit 2 turbine power complex were subject to freezing, even though extreme cold conditions had existed in prior weeks, allowing the licensee ample time for additional walkdowns to ensure that the plant was ready for the extreme cold weather event the first week of January 2014. |
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2014002 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Nance M Kunowski M Marshfield T Bilik |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2014002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Perry) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Perry)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||