05000424/LER-2014-003
| Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 1 | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4242014003R00 - NRC Website | |
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not dIsplay a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT
This report is required per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT
Mode 1, 100 percent rated thermal power.
C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On May 30, 2014 at 11:16, the Technical Specification 5.5.11 VFTP criterion of 0.2 percent penetration (99.8 percent retention) at a 70 percent relative humidity for methyl iodide was exceeded on the 1A CREFS charcoal adsorber sample. The control room was notified that the result for the sample taken on April 15, 2014 was 99.66 percent and the 1A CREFS was declared inoperable. The 1B CREFS was placed in service as required by Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.10, Control Room Emergency Filtration System — Both Units Operating. The charcoal bed was replaced and on June 6, 2014 Unit 1A CREFS was returned to service.
This event was identified as a failure to meet the acceptance criteria of Technical Specification 5.5.11 since the resultant filter sample did not meet the acceptance criteria for penetration and the total sampling time exceeded the 7-day required action completion time of LCO 3.7.10 for one unit of CREFS inoperable.
D. CAUSE OF EVENT
The direct cause of the event was a failed charcoal adsorber sample with a total sampling time exceeding one unit of CREFS required action completion time. The apparent cause included inadequate work planning, coordination, and tracking.
E. SAFETY ASSESSMENT
Unit 1 remained in Mode 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power in steady-state conditions with no loss of the CREFS safety function. There were no adverse effects on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public. The charcoal adsorber sample result did not affect Unit 2. Therefore, this incident is of very low safety significance.
F. CORRECTIVE ACTION
Immediate corrective action for the failed surveillance included replacing the charcoal bed and returning the CREFS unit to service on June 6, 2014. Additional actions will ensure work orders associated with the charcoal bed sampling are prioritized and classified correctly.
G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
1) Failed Components:
Component: Filter — FLT 2) Previous Similar Events:
ML13338A586. "Unit 1 Failed Surveillance Test A Train Control Room Emergency Filtration System". November 18, 2013. — Byron "A" Train CREFS inoperable due to a failed charcoal sample and total sampling time exceeding the required action completion time for the LCO.
3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:
Control Building/Control Complex Environmental Control System — VI RC FORM 366A (02-2014)