05000424/FIN-2013004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On October 11, 2012, the NRCs Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation to review whether a contract employee willfully failed to implement a maintenance procedure involving the independent verification of landing electrical leads during maintenance of a safety-related Motor Operated Valve. Based in part on the investigation, completed on July 2, 2013, the NRC concluded that the actions of the contract employee were willful, and his actions caused VNP to be in violation of regulatory requirements. This issue was identified by the licensee. Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, requires that written procedures, specified in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, shall be established, implemented, and maintained. Section 9.a of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, requires that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Licensee procedure NMP-ES-017-004, MOV Diagnostic Procedure for Gate and Globe Valves, provides instructions for maintenance of safety-related motor operated valve 1HV8105. Step 6.10.3 of the procedure provides instructions to re-connect control wiring per the Data Sheet. Per the Data Sheet the lead (LS-16) from point 39 needed to be re-landed and independently verified. Contrary to the above, on September 26, 2012, a contract laborer from Crane Nuclear willfully failed to independently verify that lead LS-16 was correctly landed per procedure NMP-ES-017-004. Specifically, the contract laborer failed to conduct an independent verification but signed-off the data sheet stating that he had verified the landing of leads for MOV 1HV8105. The inspectors determined that the underlying technical significance of the failure to perform an independent verification on landing a wire from a control switch of a safety-related MOV was a minor violation. However, based on an assessment of the factors described in Section 2.2.1.d of the Enforcement Policy, this violation is disposition as a non-cited violation. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR 524641. |
| Site: | Vogtle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000424/2013004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen F Ehrhardt M Cain R Baldwin M Coursey T Chandler C Dykes M Donithan |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Vogtle - IR 05000424/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Vogtle) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Vogtle)
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