05000395/FIN-2010003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Station Tagout Procedure for Controlling Safety and Non-safety Related Grounding Equipment Results in Loss of All Balance of Plant Power and Switchgear Fires |
| Description | A Green self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 6.8.1.a was identified for the failure to establish adequate procedural tagging controls of safety and nonsafety related electrical ground protection equipment which contributed to the main power transformer being energized while electrical ground protection equipment was still installed in three 7.2 kV Balance of Plant (BOP) switchgear breaker cubicles. This condition resulted in a complete loss of BOP power due to the faults to ground, significant arc flashing, and subsequent fires in each of the three switchgear cubicles requiring onsite and offsite fire brigade response and the declaration of an UE. The finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report CR-09-05093. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to develop an adequate station tagout procedure for controlling the configuration of safety and non-safety related ground protection equipment was a performance deficiency that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. While this event involved the misconfiguration of ground protection in non-safety-related BOP switchgear, the same station tagout procedural requirements apply to the control of safety-related equipment. This finding is more than minor because the failure to properly control the configuration of safety and non-safety related ground protection electrical equipment, if left uncorrected, would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. In addition, the finding is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, in that, the failure to properly control the configuration of the ground protection equipment resulted in fires in three switchgear cubicles requiring onsite and offsite fire brigade response actions and the declaration of an UE. Since this problem occurred while the station was in cold shutdown (Mode 5) with the pressurizer solid and all three reactor coolant pumps initially bumped, NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, was used to assess the significance of this finding. Using Phase 1 of Appendix G, the finding was determined to be of very low significance (Green) because it did not result in an actual loss of offsite power event nor degrade the licensees ability to cope with such an event since both emergency diesel generators, the dedicated offsite AC power, and alternate AC power sources remained available. This finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, the component of resources, and the aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures, H.2(c), because the licensee failed to establish adequate station tagout procedures for controlling the installation and removal of safety and non-safety related ground protection equipment. (Section 4OA3) |
| Site: | Summer  |
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| Report | IR 05000395/2010003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Polickoski J Zeiler G Mccoy |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Summer - IR 05000395/2010003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Summer) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Summer)
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