05000390/FIN-2012003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Maintain Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves in the Environmental Qualification Program |
| Description | The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control , for the licensees failure to maintain steam generator blowdown (SGBD) isolation valves 1-FCV-1-181, 182, 183, and 184 in the environmental qualification (EQ) program. Removing the valves from the EQ database resulted in internal components (lower bottom gasket and reed switch) in the SGBD valves exceeding their qualified life and replacement intervals as stated in the licensees existing EQ and revised EQ calculations. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as problem evaluation report (PER) 495239 and service request (SR) 562298, and performed additional analyses and evaluations to provide reasonable assurance of operability of components. The team determined that the failure to maintain SGBD isolation valves 1-FCV-1- 181, 182, 183, and 184 in the EQ program, which resulted in two subcomponents in these valves exceeding their qualified life and replacement interval, is a performance deficiency. In addition, the licensee failed to perform an adequate functional evaluation to confirm operability of these valves after the NRC identified that the reed switch was not included in the original functional evaluation. The revised EQ calculation performed by the licensee to address the lower bottom gasket indicated the reed switch had exceeded its qualified life of 13.5 years; however, this was not addressed in the licensees functional evaluation until identified by the NRC. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of design control to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of safety systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition, this performance deficiency also closely parallels Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 3.j because the error resulted in a condition where there was a reasonable doubt of the operability of safety related components as a result of the revised EQ calculation. The team screened this finding in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Attachment 4, Phase 1, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The team determined that no crosscutting aspect was applicable because this finding was not indicative of current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000390/2012003 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Monk S Shaeffer P Higgins A Vargas T Lighty K Miller T Su |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Watts Bar - IR 05000390/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Watts Bar) @ 2012Q2
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