LER-2013-003, Regarding 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Failed to Start |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 3892013003R00 - NRC Website |
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text
FPL.
August 8, 2013 L-2013-235 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:
St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Reportable Event: 2013-003-00 Date of Event: June 10, 2013 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Failed to Start The attached Licensee Event Report 2013-003-00 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.
- e trl us I N.nsen Site ice President St. Lucie Plant JJ/rcs/mkm Attachment Florida Power & Light Company 6501 S. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957
"-) /-I-
I NRC FORM 366 U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
St. Lucie Unit 2 05000389 OF 3
- 4. TITLE 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Failed to Start
- 5.
EVENT DATE
- 6.
LER NUMBER r
- 7.
REPORT DATE
- 8.
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SQETA RE FACILITY NAME DOCKET MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR L NUMBER
' NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR NA NUMBER 06 10 2013 2013 -
003 o
1 2013 FACILITY NAME DOCKET II NUMBER
- 9.
OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1E 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
E3 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
,[I 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[3 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4) 100%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[3 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[1 73.71(a)(5)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[
50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[
50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
Safety Significance
Between the previous event on March 13,
- 2013, and the recent event on June 10, 2013, the 2A EDG had been successfully started four times.
The 2A EDG was returned to service on June 11, 2013, following replacement of the defective component.
From the probabilistic risk assessment perspective, the 2A EDG was available to perform its design function during the exposure window with the exception of the actual failure times in March and June of 2013.
The failure rate resulted in an increase of baseline risk of less than 1E-06.
This condition unknowingly existed for greater than the allowable Technical Specification action time of 14 days per Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.b and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B).
During the period of 2A EDG inoperability, the opposite train 2B EDG was unavailable during three routine surveillances on March 25, April 22 and May 28.
Had this intermittent failure occurred while the 2B EDG was unavailable during one of these three monthly surveillances, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
Therefore, this event is also reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v) (A)
& (D).
This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.
During this period the 1A EDG, lB EDG and station blackout crosstie were available to supply Unit 2 with emergency AC power if required.
Corrective Actions
- 1. To correct the problem, the diode with the uninsulated butt-splice was replaced, and the new diode has been insulated.
Similar Events
A search of the St. Lucie corrective action database for three years was performed and identified no issues that were related to the faults identified with this report.
Failed Component(s)
Fuel Priming Pump Contactor Manufacturer The contactor was manufactured by Square-D Company, now a subsidiary of Schneider Electric.
Engine Systems, Inc. is the Emergency Diesel Generator supplier.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000389/LER-2013-001, Regarding Unplanned Manual Reactor Trip Due to Algae | Regarding Unplanned Manual Reactor Trip Due to Algae | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000335/LER-2013-001, Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Failure of the Lb Main Steam Isolation Valve | Regarding Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Failure of the Lb Main Steam Isolation Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000335/LER-2013-002, Regarding Unplanned Manual Reactor Trip Due to Digital-Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) System Leak | Regarding Unplanned Manual Reactor Trip Due to Digital-Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) System Leak | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000389/LER-2013-002, Regarding Failure to Invoke Technical Specification Action Statement for Failed Containment Isolation Valve | Regarding Failure to Invoke Technical Specification Action Statement for Failed Containment Isolation Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000335/LER-2013-003, Regarding Latent MV-08-3 Contactor Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs | Regarding Latent MV-08-3 Contactor Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000389/LER-2013-003, Regarding 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Failed to Start | Regarding 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Failed to Start | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000389/LER-2013-004, Regarding Manual Trip Following Spurious Closure of Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (Mfiv) and Lowering of Steam Generator Levels | Regarding Manual Trip Following Spurious Closure of Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (Mfiv) and Lowering of Steam Generator Levels | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000389/LER-2013-005, Regarding Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Emergency Diesel Generators | Regarding Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Emergency Diesel Generators | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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